The Linguistic Postulate and Derivational Thinking

MJ Hardman

The four articles included here deal with the theoretical constructs linguistic postulate and derivational thinking. The first article, “Andean Ethnography: The role of language structure in observer bias” deals with the concept of the linguistic postulate in detail and show its functioning within ethnography. The other three articles, all written ten years after the first, deal with the application of the concept of the linguistic postulate to English in a contrastive manner, leading to the development of the concept of derivational thinking, which is the mutually reinforcing interplay of three of the linguistic postulates of English. “Gender Through the Levels” is the defining article; “And if We Lose Our Name, then What About Our Land?” or, What Price Development?” was written before that article and “Derivational Thinking, or, Why is Equality So Difficult?” was written after.


1993 "Gender Through the Levels" in Women and Language Vol XVI no. 2 pp 42-49.


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COVER: Photograph of Susan Smith © 1995 by Wide World Photos.
In the 1960s, we said to ourselves that we would be nonracist and nonsexist. Now 30 years later, we find that simply saying so was easier than being so. We have, to our chagrin, discovered the truth of Russ' statement and the difficulty of implementing a society where concern and responsibility for the group coexists with respect for individual integrity, where both community and personal autonomy mutually support and reinforce each other.

One of the factors that makes it so difficult for us to perceive sexism, let alone to free ourselves of it, is that sexism is deeply embedded in our grammar in such a way that we are mostly unaware of its daily impact. (For linguists, the term grammar includes the formation of words, sentences, texts, and discourse.) This same structure leads us to think of autonomy and community as opposites.

The structure of English persuades us, both gently and not so gently, to think in sexist ways. Because our grammar leads us to see human relationships in sexist terms, we use that model to structure our relationships with other human beings, much as the laws governing slaves were based on the laws that governed women. Language and culture are on a feedback loop; changing one changes the other in complex interactional ways.

One can better understand the effects of our own language by looking at another; one is aware of the air only when one sees what it is not. Therefore, as a contrast, the structure of the Jaqi (pronounced “hah-kay”) languages of South America can give us a glimpse into what a grammatical structure based on other principles might be like. The Jaqi are three groups of people in the Andes: 3.5 million Aymara (“eye-mah-dah”) speakers in Bolivia, southern Peru, and northern Chile; a few thousand Jaqaru (“hah-kah-doh”) speakers in Tupe and scattered in cities in Peru, mostly in the department of Lima; and a handful of Kawki (“cow-key”) speakers, the modern remnants of what was, 1,500 years ago, a vast mercantile empire extending from northern Peru to Argentina. Kawki is now a dying language.

The material presented here follows from a conceptual framework I first developed working with the Jaqi people—a language and culture without sexism in the basic structure. In order to account in a holistic way for the linguistic structures I discovered while writing the grammars for these languages, I developed the concept of the linguistic postulate, which is a theme or motif that can be found in almost all the sentences of a language, a feature that is used repeatedly by the language to organize the universe. For example, you might try to think of a sentence in English with no number—that is, with no singular or plural. It is possible only if the sentence consists of expletives (“Ouch!”) or exclusively of an imperative (“Help!”) or other second-person verb (“You sing”), no other verb forms or nouns allowed. Clearly, grammatical number (singular/plural) is a linguistic postulate in English, and just as clearly, English speakers regularly view this number classification as “natural,” a part of nature rather than a learned part of an arbitrary system.

By contrast, the Jaqi languages do not mark singular versus plural—number is marked only if important or relevant to the context. Just as we can say those without indicating how many we mean, so Jaqi speakers can say uka (“that, those”) with a similar lack of specificity—but for them this may also include one.

Since I discovered the linguistic postulates of the Jaqi languages of South America to be quite different from those of English, I have found it worthwhile to compare the major Jaqi and English postulates—ones that require realization in virtually every sentence of each. This is a particularly useful exercise because human relations in the Jaqi languages are grammatically constructed on the basis of sexual and human
The grammatical marking of data-source gives ideas both historical and human ties, encourages observation, and builds community through the recognized dependence on others.

Ranking comparative/absolute. In English, before she leaves the hospital, the child will be ranked using comparatives and absolutes as well as a lot of other narrative structures we have developed. By family and visitors, the child will be declared to be the most beautiful baby ever born: the best, the biggest, the smartest, the mostest you ever saw. The hospital personnel will weigh and measure and rank the baby with all the other children born that day—at that hospital, in that city, in that state or country. Parents go home talking about their “eightieth percentile” newborn. She has been placed in a hierarchy where there are no equals and where there is community only in competition.

The girl child in the Andes has come into a world where humans cannot be compared. If, in European style, she should try it, she will be told that comparing people is rude. To speak well of someone, one says suma jakauna (“That one is a beautiful human”). Within this structure, there is autonomy in uniqueness.

Number. In English, the first sentences the child hears will be full of numbers; as we have already seen, virtually every sentence will be loaded with singulars and plurals. As soon as she starts to speak, she will be corrected on any number of errors made, such as “one feet/two foot”—errors that will be met with great hilarity. She will also be picking up, gradually and continually, the value of the singular, especially as tied in with ranking; as she hears that only one person can be best, one needs to be on top, the buck stops here, there always has to be a boss, and so on and on. The child learns that singular is “best,” that singular is the “norm,” that singular is “most desirable.” This applies finally to only one way of life, accompanied in many cases by an insistence that others adopt this one way, too, and herein lies one of the reasons that diversity is so very difficult for us to understand or appreciate. Even our national motto, E pluribus unum, says “Out of many, one,” exalting the singular and implying that we need to eliminate our diversity.

The Andean girl child is surrounded with sentences marking data source; all day she must say, as part of each sentence, whether she heard what is known from someone else or whether it was gained from her own experience. What the child experiences directly is different from what people relay or what the storytellers weave. “Did you see?” or “What did they say?” they may ask. All of these categories—personal knowledge, knowledge through language, or nonpersonal knowledge—are marked grammatically, as constantly and as insistently as our number. Jaq speakers view such marking as utterly natural and essential to any language. The child learns to pay attention to “how do I know?” This grammatical marking of data-source gives ideas both historical and human ties, encourages observation, and builds community through the recognized dependence on others for information.

Sex-based gender for people and animal classification. The child also learns that the major classification for people and all animals is sex-based and hierarchical. As with number, the male as the “best,” the “norm,” and the “most desirable” is learned early and well. Almost all animals and people are male in the story books, except those with young. It doesn’t take very long for children to learn that all other judgments are subordinated to this classification, with the result that boys like to be called by male names from animals, such as studs or bulls (feeling more in common with a male animal than with a girl), and girls learn quickly to be “feminine”—that is, to display, in a polite and courteous manner, a tractable, passive, and docile lower status. This allows the boys to show “masculinity,” even “chivalry,” which is the polite and courteous manner to display dominance and the threat of violence.

Part of the narrative pattern of this classification is that “everyone” is male. The following show this principle in action:

My freshman year, I took a creative writing class. I wrote a story about a woman coming to terms with her grief at her grandfather’s death. Although my story was the only one that got a unanimous “I like it” from the rest of my class, my teacher said that I hadn’t written something “important” enough, and if I ever wanted to write a good story, I would have to learn how to recognize these “unimportant” topics. I asked what an important story would be, and she said it should be something more relevant to all people. When I asked what could be more relevant to everyone than grief, she said that men couldn’t relate to my main character, and my story would alienate half the people who would read my story. (Apparently it was okay if women felt they were being left out.) However, after the class period in which we had workshopped my story, two of the men in the class came up to me and told me that, after they had read the story, they called up their own grandparents just to tell them that they loved them.

Karen Mya Rieler

[According to the National Institutes of Health] virtually all medical research has been on males only, including white mice. Now . . . medical researchers must include some women and nonwhite males—but only—to be measured against white male response! However, some researchers have objected, saying that the rules will reinforce racial and ethnic stereotypes. To quote one of them: “Basically these rules say that every racial and ethnic group is fundamentally different biologically. And this is just not true. In the U.S. we don’t single out different
By the time we are six years old, the grammatical structure of our native language appears to us to be the nature of the universe. Such is the nature of the human experience.

equality. The major linguistic postulates in Jaqi are humanness (human/nonhuman) and data source (how do I know what I am saying—my own experience, from someone telling me, or otherwise?). These postulates are realized at all levels of the grammar: verb endings, noun endings, sentence formation, and storytelling. These linguistic postulates lead to a particular construction of the world and to thinking patterns that contrast with those to which our own language structure leads us.

To account for a particular constellation of linguistic postulates in English, I have developed the concept of derivation thinking. Three linguistic postulates in English interact in mutual reinforcement. These three are: number (singular/plural), sex-based gender with masculine as the root, and our ranking comparative/absolute (wise, wiser, wisest). These are further reinforced by a number of other sentence-forming and narrative patterns. This derivational thinking forms the grammatical base for our general model of human relationships.

The totality of a culture and a language are present at all times, with some portion being foregrounded. While grammatical items can be analyzed singly, they do not occur singly, which is why they also act as mutual reinforce—ers—they are all part of a pattern, one that is learned as a necessary requirement for participation in the human community. From the work of the Japanese neurosurgeon Tsunoda, we also now know that the very physiology of our brain structure is determined by our native language. By the time we are six years old, the grammatical structure of our native language appears to be the nature of the universe. Such is the nature of the human experience.

**Grammatical and Narrative Patterns**

In the following, we will examine the life pattern of a girl child in acquiring English and in acquiring Jaqi as we course through the sexist circuits of English.

**Naming Patterns.** In English, as soon as a baby is born, we label it as being the child of a man. Our naming patterns make the mother disappear precisely as she gives birth: the baby usually carries the father’s name. Furthermore, when the formal announcement comes, the mother is reduced to a mere prefix: “Mr. and Mrs. John Jones announce . . .” Furthermore, the name a girl child is given at birth isn’t even a permanent one: it will change over her lifetime as the man responsible for her changes. Even the part of the name she feels is her own—the “given” name—will, for the most part, be a derivative of some man’s name, formed by adding something. For example: Stephanie from Steven or Paula from Paul or diminutives like Betty or Patty. She is denied the identity that can be the foundation of autonomy from the very start. The social concealment of the birth process is a part of this denial, as illustrated in the following incident, described by Tara Schreier, one of my students:

I recently attended with my friend John a gallery opening featuring two nature photographers who had both never shown their work to the general public before. Each artist was billed separately and equally and the only difference on the invitations was that one artist was a female and the other was a male. The photographs were arranged in one room in an alternating fashion so there was no division between the artists’ works. The general theme of the entire show was “survival.” The female artist concentrated on reproduction and birth. Most of the pictures showed all types of animals in the midst of the birthing process. I remember thinking how graphic but beautiful they were. The male artist chose to show the predatory nature of animals. Most of the scenes were violent hunt-and-kill shots. He too caught the beauty of it, I thought. As we came to the final photographs, John said, “This guy has such a unique and raw perspective, he really made this show!” I asked him what he thought of the other artist and tried to point out that she really showed promise and her interpretation of survival showed pain and joy, which takes talent. “Give me a break!” John said. “That is exactly the point: look at the subject matter. It’s a bunch of animals having babies! They belong in a nursery, not a famous gallery. Yeah, she took her chances with some wild animals; too bad it was not for something that meant something.” The work was wasted effort because the subject was something he obviously could not comprehend.

Among the Jaqi, the legal naming patterns follow Spanish custom, where the girl child takes the names of both mother and father. The given name is taken from some prestigious source, such as the Saints’ calendar (for Macedonia, Sofia, Eustolia, and so forth), from newspapers (Gorda), or from a prestige language such as English (for Mery, Beti, and so on). The names may be derived from men’s names in the original languages, but they are not so perceived by the Jaqi and would not be so within the Jaqi languages. Furthermore, the name given is a permanent one, Spanish custom notwithstanding. By Spanish law, grandchildren do lose grandmothers’ names, but that is not of immediate perception nor identity/autonomy significance to the child. Furthermore, since most people can recite a family tree through five generations, and do so regularly when making introductions, the name may be legally lost but is not forgotten. These practices tie the newborn girl to her community while simultaneously giving her the first tool for developing identity and autonomy.
The structure of ranked classification by sex denies autonomy to half of us and gives rank-dependent autonomy to the other half.

ethnic groups. We assume that basically everyone is similar—that is, all are white male. If this latter assumption were real, then women and minorities would have been included on a regular basis from the beginning in establishing basic doses.

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This structure of ranked classification by sex denies autonomy to half of us and gives rank-dependent autonomy to the other half.

One notation in the preface of the first edition of Oh! Pascal! by Doug Cooper and Michael Clancy (W. W. Norton and Co.) stands out for its unusualness as a corrective: "Incidentally, all personal pronouns in Oh! Pascal! are feminine. After hundreds of years of 'he' and 'his,' a few decades of 'she' and 'her' shouldn't bother anyone."

On the other hand, the Andean child learns that the major classification is between people and animals. A girl learns that her links are with other humans, not with the female of animals; she is not called by those names, nor are the boys around her. This structure also builds a sense of community, this time with all humans.

Pronoun sets. In English, the pronouns echo the structure of the noun sets. The child learns that the "generic" is he and thus begins a life of translations. A girl child must learn how to "translate" each and every he to know whether or not she might be included: "Will everyone please come in with his ticket?" Can she go in? This is not an easy matter and grammatically leaves girls and women always on the edges, always uncertain as to belonging. Her position is always uncertain, always subject to exclusion, even when legal barriers to inclusion have been removed. Because the male is the "norm," the "best," and the "most desirable," she is always being measured against him. This means that there is nothing she can do that is not marked. Deborah Tannen in a recent article has pointed this out in regard to women's apparel. Anything we wear is marked and open to judgment; there is no way for a woman to dress neutrally. The child is also learning that the first person, in all senses, is I—but, of course, that said person should be male.

The Andean girl must also learn pronouns, but her sets are people as contrasted with all else. The child is also learning to mark the presence or absence of you as a focus in the conversation: interaction with other people must always, grammatically, take into account how the person she is speaking with figures into what is being said. This grammatical structure causes a focus on community.

Things organized by sex. In English, the child learns that things are organized according to the sex principle as well: ships are "shes"; women have "appliances" while men have "machines"; there are "girl" toys and "boy" toys; and so on. These are examples of covert gender in English.

The Andean girl learns that in her world things are organized by shape and that these shapes in motion are expressed in verbs. So if she carries pencils, it's aya; if grains, it's adi; if potatoes, it's iri; and if she is carrying water in a bucket (which a child will do from the age of two on), it's aya.

Word order in phrases. In English, as a girl acquires the rudiments of sentence formation, she learns all about ordering: boys, men, or males are always first and, together with the ranking comparative/absolute, this ordering is a very powerful statement. If she complains, she is reminded of "ladies and gentlemen" and "bride and groom" and is expected to be satisfied. No one remarks on what the bride and groom become by the end of the ceremony—namely, "husband and wife." Presumably the ordering is optional, but those who have tried to switch the order on a regular basis find it surprisingly difficult. This structure is a syntactic statement of the actual precedence in life: that it is difficult to change both reflects and reinforces the societal order. Every time we say "men and women" instead of "women and men," we reaffirm men's position as first precisely because order is important in English. This overwhelming assumption is illustrated in the following from Brooke Kelly:

While doing my research for this paper, I was surprised to find that not one subject (female or male) made a phrase with the female in the first position. I asked each subject to circle their [sic] gender at the top of the page, and I listed female before male. In fact, the male as primary seems to be so accepted that males circled female as their gender. I guess they were so accustomed to being first they neglected to even read the options.

After reading this to one audience, a young man came up to show me an application where the order of sex had also been switched. He told me that he had nearly marked the wrong sex.

Phrase order for the Quechua child is far more flexible and also occurs much less as a syntactic device because people are included in the verb. Furthermore, when phrases do occur, the linker is more like our with—that is, more inclusive, not so itemizing. In addition, inclusion can be done with sentence suffixes. There is no pattern comparable to ours to make a girl child or a woman feel "always second."

Subject male/object female. Within English, the subject of the sentence is ranked above the object. Within linguistics, we even speak of "raising the object to subject position." The subjects in the child's world—the agents—are overwhelmingly
The ranking of subject above object ties in closely with the ranking of both number and sex-based gender: thus we find the singular male subject the most "comfortable."

I was sitting in the waiting room, playing with my baby daughter Jamie. One of her favorite games is to grab my fingers for stability, and muscle her way up into a stand. A woman saw us playing this game and came over and said: "What a strong little boy you are, able to stand up on your own like that!" I answered: "She is very strong, isn't she?" The woman looked surprised and commented: "She's so big for a little girl. And you're so cute letting daddy pull you up like that."

[Art Bautista-Hardman]

My sister was taking an English class in high school that I had taken the year before. The class requires a fifteen-page term paper. My sister is an excellent writer and had always done well in English but had never written a formal term paper before. My parents suggested that I help her out with the logistics and I was happy to do so. I told her how I felt was the best way to do research, organize note cards, and so on, but left the actual work to her. As I expected, Susan did very well on the paper and when she showed the "A" paper to my parents, my father remarked, "Good work, Mike. You should help your sister out with her schoolwork more often!" At the time I was very used to comments like these and didn't think anything of it. Now, however, I recognize it as a denial of agency.

[Mike Wasson]

The ranking of subject above object ties in closely with the ranking of both number and sex-based gender: thus we find the singular male subject the most "comfortable" and where we should place our "trust." The ranking of object/subject is anti-community and is part of what makes cooperative endeavors so difficult. The person in the object slot is likely to be uncomfortable; certainly an equality is not easily felt.

The subject/object grammatical structure is one of the areas in which the Jali languages and English most diverge. It could be said that the Jali languages grammatically express the Heisenberg principle: object and subject are conjuncted into single-person suffixes such that object and subject are not separable. With these suffixes, the verbs are conjugated in ten interactive persons: for example, yankshumta ("help me"), where the person suffix is -uma ("you to me imperative"). Also, there is no tendency toward foregrounding any particular person except you. The grammar, rather, keeps a strong running commentary as to the mutual involvement of all concerned with the matter at hand. This type of structure keeps community mentally present without distracting from autonomy.

Good for women equals bad for men. English vocabulary is heavy in deprecatives for women (see the next section). This is also true of sentences. Even compliments to women are insults when applied to men. This structure makes for a lot of trouble, as demonstrated in the following from Laura A. Boyce:

My roommate Amy’s group of male friends have been "proving their manhood" by jumping off a cliff—at least 80 feet I've been told—at the quarries. I'd been hearing about a lot of groups of guys going to the quarries and hearing the stories. The stories about who wouldn't jump were the big thing. They were the butt of jokes and ridiculed by their "friends." So my roommate Amy, who is fearless beyond all measure, went with her male friends to the quarries. She jumped. The stories and jokes changed about the guys that didn't jump—a girl [sic] jumped and they didn't. They were less than a girl [sic], beneath a girl [sic]. Soon after, the trend among that group of guys of bringing new guys to the quarries to jump to prove their manhood ended. A girl [sic] had jumped, showing up the guys; she had tainted the ritual. It meant nothing now. The ritual died.

In other words, "Woman is 80-foot cliff jumper" makes the sentence "Man is 80-foot cliff jumper" no longer respectable or admirable; the first makes the second an insult. This structure is also directly behind the problem of women in combat and gays in the military: men frequently go into a volunteer military in order to prove themselves “men”—that is, agents/subjects. Given the structure here illustrated, if women should prove as good at killing as men, then why should men do it? What value would that be? Or if "unreal" men could do it, then how could it prove masculinity? The argument, however
The words in Jaqi that cluster around women are those having to do with creativity or productivity or usefulness in work, in art, in people.

couched in overlying philosophical structures, is right back here at the grammatical level: if a woman does it, it is an insult to men, and “we” must keep women (and their analogs) out of the agent position. Or, if they insist on being in that position, we will coopt them; they couldn’t be “real” women. As Ruth Troccoli tells it:

My housemate, a single female, is in the process of trying to refinance her mortgage. She has done lots of maintenance and improvements prior to the visit of the appraiser, including using a chainsaw to remove some overgrown bushes/trees in front of the house. A neighbor (retired male professor) complimented her on the improvements, telling her, “You’re a good man.”

Among the Jaqi, good character is an aesthetic goal that is the same for both women and men, focused on productivity, hard work, and community responsibility while not trying to tell anyone else how to live. What is good for women is also good for men. The aesthetic falls under heavy attack in the cities, of course. I have seen the status of women there deteriorate over my lifetime, as they got more “education,” which includes teaching them how little they are worth. The boys get the same teaching, of course, which means that some men among the Jaqi try to act “white,” which means beating women and ordering people around. This trend is exemplified by Florence Babb in “Women and Men in Vicos, Peru: A Case of Unequal Development”:

In the fifties and sixties, the anthropology department of Cornell University took on a plantation in Peru as a demonstration site for a development program. Before Cornell, all serfs had the right to cultivate specific portions of the land. Under Cornell, land titles were granted to the men serfs but denied to the women serfs. At one town meeting where such matters were being discussed, one woman showed up to defend her right to her land. She was vehement in her demands. The anthropologist conducting the meeting said that land was the concern of her husband only and told her to leave. She did not. He asked her husband to eject her, but her husband did not move; Andean husbands do not have such authority. Thereupon the two anthropologists present removed her bodily from the room, in an example of how modern husbands should treat their wives.

Deprecative words. A great many studies have been done of English vocabulary, pointing out the great number of deprecative terms used for women and the dearth thereof for men, except for being compared to women. A young woman is seen as a vegetable or a piece of meat; as she grows older, she may be “feisty” but never strong or forthright. The vocabulary of words that deprecate women is furthermore always increasing as words get introduced for a given purpose, pass into general use, then become deprecative. The word tart was once a nice pastry. Think of what has happened to the word feminist. The mirror image of this is that deprecative words for men that are not based on women (nissy, bastard) do not remain unambiguously deprecative; think of what has happened to the word macho.

For the Jaqi, women are productive and there are no deprecative terms specific to them. There is one very bad insult, however: q’ara, which means “naked” and is used of men—especially white men—who are unmarried, have no land, and like to tell people how to live. Priests and boys coming home from school are prime examples of q’ara. One priest believes this to be the generic term for “white people.” It is, in general and because of their behavior, the generic term for white men; but interestingly, it cannot be used for women. That women could be so unproductive is just not conceivable. I have not found a single anti-woman joke in any Jaqi language, nor any general anti-woman sayings; if they wish to denigrate women, the Jaqi switch to Spanish. There are a few jokes about men, not much used, generally relating to laziness. The words that cluster around women are those having to do with creativity or productivity or usefulness in work, in art, in people.

Referencing women as derivations. To underscore the derivational status of women in English—as though all of the preceding were not enough—we have a long list of derivational suffixes whereby one can derive a woman from a man—such as smurfette, heroine, and many others. These derived forms can never be as good as the “real thing”; think of how leatherette holds up against leather. A goddess is never as powerful as a god; after all, she needs him to define her. This structure even keeps us from seeing structures from elsewhere that might inspire us to think otherwise, as the following by Lisa R. Perry illustrates:

The Cherokee have a person of power in the tribe who fits the white definition of a medicine man, but this person is a woman. White men had trouble dealing with this, so they decided that she was really the assistant of the real medicine man and called her a “corn woman.”

And Elizabeth Ream reports:

In one science class where the majority of the people were males, the instructor would often end a statement with “for you guys,” pause [and add] “and guyettes!” He never forgot to add “guyettes,” but he always paused
In the Jaqi languages, words referencing women or men specifically are all different roots. There is no linguistic way to link women and men derivationally.

before saying it, and said it in the plural, even when I was the only female in the class.

This structure also denies autonomy to half the population.

In the Jaqi languages, words referencing women or men specifically are all different roots. There is no linguistic way to link women and men derivationally.

Conversational styles: community or hierarchy. A great deal of work has been done by many linguistic scholars on conversational styles in English. They have discovered that conversational styles for women most frequently have as their goal the building of community. Men, on the other hand, almost always use conversation for the purpose of building or maintaining hierarchies. The most common complaint in marriage is: “He won’t talk to me.” Taking into account the structures we have seen so far, and adding that of conversational style, this response to marriage is an understandable one. If he has you completely outranked, even to the point where you have given up your name for his, and the purpose of conversation is to build or maintain hierarchy, then, of course, there is nothing to talk about, unless you threaten to leave, and then the hierarchy must be maintained, so there is conversation for a while. These are learned patterns, and there are many individuals, of course, who know both styles and can switch. But many women face daily in the workplace men who are using language as a weapon, not as a tool for building a cooperative workplace, while their own styles carry other presumptions.

A student of mine, Christopher Thomas, recently did a term paper looking at the responses to requests for directions. He and a woman friend each asked 25 women and 25 men for campus directions to (a) a fake hall, (b) an obscure hall, and (c) a well-known hall. In total, they asked 500 people for directions.

The women generally replied the same whether the asker was a woman or a man. For example, 19 of the 25 women asked about the fake building sent both the woman and the man askers to an information booth. This is a community-building response, showing concern for the asker and including the asker in the community of the asker. It was the same pattern for the obscure building; those who could not give directions sent the asker to an information booth. In both cases, where directions were given to the obscure building, almost all were correct. Every woman gave both the woman and the man correct directions to the well-known building.

For the men, the pattern was very different, heavily dependent on whether the asker was the woman or the man. For the man as asker, they mostly refused to give directions or gave very vague directions. For the fake building, they mostly brushed him off. For the obscure building, only one-third of those who gave directions were correct, and even for the well-

known building only 15 men gave him directions. Not once did a man direct the asker to an information booth.

For the woman asker, on the other hand, she was given directions every single time, including directions to the fake building from the 25 men she asked. Not once, in all three questions, when the woman asked a man, did any of the men just say they didn’t know. All of the men replied with some directions to the building. For the obscure building, only 10 out of the 25 were correct!

At no time did any man say “I don’t know” to the woman. No man ever sent anyone to an information booth. Clearly, in this example, the men were using the conversational encounter as an opportunity to build hierarchy, making sure they were one-up on the woman—no matter the inconvenience to her should she believe them—and that they were not one-down to the man.

The woman uses conversation to establish a link, a friendship, while the man uses conversation as a tool with which to dominate.

In the Jaqi languages, conversation-language—is what one gives in recognition of proper human behavior; withdrawal of language is a specific sanction for those who behave like animals. Thus, both women and men talk a lot, although popular European belief has them as quite taciturn, which is a powerful statement as to their perception of European behavior.

Mismatched metaphors. One of the misfires in attempting to communicate across the sex barrier in English is the use of differing metaphors and also the use of metaphors that place men in the driver’s seat, that emphasize the sea of privilege in which they live. Another is the commonness of the metaphors of violence and war: these do violence to the narrative style of women and leave us uncertain, again, of our place, emphasizing the sea of violence in which we live. We also have that whole terrible set of seminal metaphors which in academia equate intellectual ability and male sexual performance: for example, hard ideas that have great thrust and can stand up by themselves and be penetrating and not peter out and disseminate all over, entering and conquering all that virgin territory. The sexual metaphors underlying science are part of the chilly climate for women within science.

Work on the metaphors of the Jaqi languages is far from complete. A major domain is that of the metaphorical link between woman and seed. Also, the metaphor for love is arahi, “to speak mutually.”

Conclusion

Derivational thinking is the name I have given to the type of
thinking and of perception in English that results from the union of all the structures listed previously, and that has as its foundation the three linguistic postulates of number, sex-based gender, and ranking comparative/absolute. These are the thinking patterns that rank human beings such that man is the norm and all else must be measured accordingly and seen as derivative therefrom.

Derivational thinking is the structure our language gives us for human relations. It is not surprising that we apply this structure to all other human relations, with the result that nonwhites, colonials, and others we wish to denigrate are equated negatively to the "sublevel" of woman. In the center court of our first national reserve, now a national park in Hot Springs, Arkansas, there is a statue, lovely in its execution and considered emblematic, of a mostly unclothed native woman kneeling facing the fully clothed white male conqueror, offering up to him a bowl over which flows the water of the springs—America giving her gifts to Europe. This statue is simultaneously deeply racist and sexist, and the artistic embodiment of derivational thinking. Unfortunately, this depiction is "customary, ordinary, usual, even polite."

The most common "womanly" characteristic assigned to colonials, nonwhites, and others is lack of reason, which fully justifies denying agency, which keeps the grammatical structure of not only male but white male in the subject slot. This makes for difficult and uncertain autonomy even for men—any moment someone might outrank you and reduce you to some "woman" status (the only insults for men that remain insults). It makes us think that autonomy is antithetical to community. It makes us rank community below individual dominance, and it makes it difficult for us to appreciate diversity. So strong is the pattern that, when someone in a category that is not white male does something admirable, we find the way to make them, at least temporarily, honorary white men rather than recognizing the accomplishments as coming from a "derivative" source. Elizabeth Williams offers this case in point: "A close friend of mine in high school was black. When speaking of him to newcomers or just in casual conversation, people would often say, 'Jae is not really black—he is a white guy trapped in a black man's body.'"

And the following anecdote is almost a definer. It occurred during a social for new graduate students and was given to me by Lisa R. Perry, a minority woman. Notice that academics is a pseudogenic term; from the rest of the conversation, the subject was clearly limiting it to white males:

In a conversation with a professor here, he made the comment that it made more sense for "academics" to write books concerning minority and "Third World" problems because they would reach a broader audience (and more importantly the "right" audience) than if those same books were written by minorities and residents of Third World countries. When I asked him why he thought that, he said that the latter books would only appeal to such specialized groups as black studies, women's studies, etc. He did say, however, that minorities and women make good assistants.

The grammatical structures we have seen for Jaqi come together for the Jaqi world view—a view now under heavy assault from European world views, all detrimental to the status of Jaqi women. Rather than learn and share, our actions are to dominate and destroy.

Life among the Jaqi, however, is not a utopia. The Jaqi are subject—as are all human beings—to the vagaries of human existence: children that come too soon, too late, or not at all; people who fall in love with the wrong person; rains that come too much, too soon, too little, too late; this year, the corn blights; next year, the potatoes. And all this without counting the troubles the dominant group brings in or the worries about educating the children so they won’t suffer so. And there are the worries about the children who go to the city to get educated and turn out bad. Life is like that.

Suggestions

The English derivational thinking structure leaves all of us with a diminished capacity for autonomy, at best with a precarious sense of autonomy, with serious identity problems, and with rudimentary community-building ability. Most of us have, to one degree or another, at some point in our lives, challenged the assumptions underlying derivational thinking and, equally often, have felt frustrated at the difficulty of implementing what we perceived to be a more humanistic way of organizing human relations. We cannot simply adopt another set of linguistic postulates, nor can we wholesale and instantaneously change the linguistic patterns of our native language.

What I am suggesting is that it is possible to learn from other people, that it is possible to envision other ways of organizing human relationships. I am also suggesting that we can become more aware of the daily, sentence-by-sentence patterns that form our current relationships. Because language is essentially open, we can change some of the sentence-forming and narrative patterns for other patterns. We can opt for sentences without ranking. We can opt to place women before the and. We can opt for women in the subject position—without denigration. And we can seek new metaphors such that one will no longer be synonymous with best. We can be consciously aware of those we cannot (at least at this point) change—like grammatical number. This very awareness reduces its power. And as we change our language, thus also do we change our thinking and, sentence by sentence, the social environment in which we live.

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by Moore
They say that "and" is a conjunction where both sides are equal. They say that "men and women" sound better. When we say that maybe we could say "women and men," they say that we are indulging in "reverse discrimination." They also used to say that generic "he" really included us all. I want to suggest that we should say "women and men" until the whole social/cultural world changes such that it doesn't matter anymore. I say that only by saying "women and men" do we today have any chance of equality on both sides of that little conjunction "and." Let me tell you why.

In English, three grammeratical patterns interact (see Hardman 1978, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1996) to reinforce each other:

1) number—singular and plural so that singular is the base form and plural is derived from singular.
2) ranking comparative—virtually all we say or do is ranked (e.g., the questions we mostly ask have to do with ranking: What did you like most at? What did you like best out of?)
3) sex-based gender—the masculine is the base and the feminine is derived therefrom.

This means that:

1) In English order matters. Therefore, what comes first is seen as first in the metaphorical sense — better, higher ranked. So in the phrase "men and women" women do indeed come second.
2) Women are perceived as being derived from men, feminine words are perceived as being derived from masculine, even when not true etymologically (e.g., "woman" from "man" and "female" from "male" — both false derivations etymologically).

Therefore, in the usual order, "men and women," women not only come second but are perceived as the additional appendage of the first item, as part of the derivation that the root carries with it.

In the phrase "women and men," on the other hand, because "women" comes first, women are perceived. Since within the structure of English "men" are not perceived as ever being derived from men1 but as always being the root, men are also perceived. Therefore, the phrase "women and men" comes as close as is possible in English to an equal listing of two items.

Because of derivational thinking, the phrase "women and men" does not put women in the spot previously occupied by men: we are not perceived as the root even if named first. Rather, the ordering of feminine first balances two perceptions, "first" and "derived." It permits women to occupy a spot where we are not perceived as the derivation of men, while men are perceived as being there fully nevertheless, because they are the root. Therefore, both women and men are perceived as present in a syntactic structure that comes as close to equality as is possible in English.

The ordering consequences apply not only to all other phrases as well as the one illustrated here, but to sentences, paragraphs, and discourse structures. Thus, for genuinely inclusive language, it must be "she or he." The other way around only allows us to be tacked on, as we always have been. In sentences, if we discuss first what Mary did, and then what John did, Mary's activities won't sound like an addendum to John's, but rather both people will be perceived as having done something. In presenting, for example, research results, if we present women-related results first, then both sets of data will be heard.3

Derivational thinking pervades our perception and our thinking within English; constant energy is required if we wish to think otherwise.

Notes

1 The regular failures of fictional attempts to switch sex roles is an example of the difficulty of altering this pattern. I know of only two successful efforts in this direction: Elizabeth Vonarburg's In the Motherland / Marauders Chronicles, Bantam, 1992; translated from French by Jane Brierty; successfully makes feminine linguistically the root, with masculine derived therefrom in a gripping epic-type novel. Gerd Brantenberg's Egalia's Daughters: The Seal Press, 1977, translated from Norwegian by Louis Mackey, is the only successful sex reversal I know of, a funny satire with women in control, men with restrictive clothing, etc.

That both these books are translations from other languages into English says something about English. In the case of French, in terms of straight linguistic analysis, the masculine is derived from the feminine, by a subtractive morpheme—drop the final consonant; if nasal then nasalize the vowel, the feminine form is not predictable from the masculine. Because this is too radical, students, even today, still learn two lists for all adjectives — the masculine first and then the feminine! Forty years ago, I was involved in a project aimed at improving the teaching of foreign languages. We tried to introduce the feature of masculine derived from feminine to the teaching of French, to simplify learning. We failed. Derivational thinking was more powerful.

2 At a recent conference of an organization comprised almost entirely of women, the three male members asked that the language of the bylaws be changed from "she" to "he or she" to include them. After I explained what I have stated here, the group accomplished, with unanimous vote the use of "he or she." Lately, a surprising number of women came to thank me and to say that they felt that the proposed change to "he or she" was in fact changing their organization from one of women to one dominated by men (all three of them!), but they hadn't known how to voice their concerns.

3 This has been a big problem in medical research, e.g., heart research. One example is that the artificial hearts were so constructed that they would not fit in a woman's body so that only men were candidates. When they finally did use one for a woman, it had to be "modified" (=derived) from the ones built for men.

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Andean ethnography:
The role of language structure in observer bias

M. J. HARDMAN-DE-BAUTISTA

The book under review examines one portion of the Aymara culture. The Aymara language is a Jaqi language, one of three that remain today from a much larger group once spoken throughout the length and breadth of the Andes mountains (Hardman 1981, 1986). Today speakers of the Aymara language number approximately three million: in Bolivia (the native language of approximately one third of the population), Peru (the dominant language of Southern Peru), and northern Chile. The other two extant Jaqi languages, Jaqaru and Kawki, are spoken in Peru, in the Department of Lima: Jaqaru by several thousand, including children; Kawki by only some twenty, and clearly a dying language. My own work among the Jaqi peoples now spans more than a quarter of a century, and includes, among other works, the grammar of Jaqaru (Hardman 1966, 1983) and the grammar of Aymara (Hardman, Yapita, and Vasquez 1975, 1988). This has meant hours upon hours of conversation, uncounted tapes, teaching and lectures in the communities, and numerous fictive kinship ties. My travels have also taken me to Qumpi, the community used as the base for the study under review.

The Masked Media purports to be an examination of the fiesta complex among the Aymara in terms of its role in defining, continuing, and/or disrupting ongoing alliances. In other words, beyond the importance of the ritual itself is the importance of whom those sponsoring the fiesta choose as participants and what purpose the participants serve, in terms of communication and expression. Thus far there is no difficulty with the hypothesis; rather, it is a bit like pushing on an open door.

Buechler then elaborates for nearly four hundred pages about men’s roles in the fiestas, in the end giving us a great deal of data but no feel at all for the meaning of the fiestas to the Aymara individuals involved — the stated objective of the book. In fact, in spite of my years in Jaqi-speaking communities, my familiarity with the community in which


Meaning is a result of structure. It also involves structure. If the structure is not productive, then the meaning is difficult to discern. In this book, we focus on structure and the elements of structure. When the structure is clear, the meaning is easier to discern. However, if the structure is complex, then the meaning is more difficult to discern.

The structure of a sentence is important for understanding the meaning of the sentence. In this book, we focus on the structural aspects of language and how they influence meaning. We also discuss how the structure of a sentence can be used to create more effective communication.

In addition to structure, meaning also involves the use of context. Context can help to clarify the meaning of a sentence. In this book, we discuss the role of context in language and how it can be used to improve communication.

Overall, this book provides a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between structure and meaning in language. We hope that you will find the information presented in this book useful and informative.
at the appropriate moments, 'models for the analysis of language structure at all levels, synchronic and diachronic; a knowledge of anthropological linguistics, sociolinguistics, ethnosemantics, language, and culture; and understanding of glottochronology, dialectology, culture context, linguistic acculturation, language processes such as pidginization and creolization; and the ability to integrate all of this to focus on a single problem' (Hardman 1978: 117). The problem Buechler posed for himself was of precisely this type.

A given grammar will typically demand that high-level linguistic postulates be specified in virtually every sentence of the language. (There will be exceptions — every linguistic system I have ever examined has a 'leak' somewhere part of the dynamics of change?) Thus, by the time a child has acquired her language and culture, her cognitive system automatically encodes the relevant linguistic postulate features from any experience, whether or not these are subvocally or linguistically encoded. (Whether all thought is linguistic or not is a different argument, and not relevant here.) Thus, linguistic postulates are accepted without argument or discussion as natural parts of the universe, an example of nurture becoming nature for the participants. In fact it is so difficult to imagine 'real' human beings operating without one's own linguistic postulates that it verges on the impossible. They are the major structuring and selecting grids for the perception/cognition of any given culture.

Linguistic postulates must, however, be taught to children. As underlying assumptions they are particularly powerful, but they are also typically reflected in proverbs, sayings, and/or typical admonitions to children. They are also built into the vocabulary structure and the grammatical structure. Frequently they serve as major classifying devices for other types of behavior, most frequently without intellectual and/or conscious justification. When challenged, the most common native reaction is 'But it's natural!' When one at last discovers a linguistic postulate, and shares such a marvel with one's consultants, the usual reaction is 'Well, of course, everybody knows that', or 'Well, only gringos could be so dumb as to not know' (cf. Carpenter 1981). It has even been argued that surely we make such a distinction, even if it is not visible in the grammar.

I will here describe and illustrate two postulates from Indo-European, with some specific reflexes in English and Spanish; the way in which they impinge on Aymara studies; and two contrasting Aymara postulates which increase the negative impingement of the postulates the anthropologists take in with them. The Indo-European postulates are number and sex. The Aymara postulates are data source and humanness.

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**Number**

Number, specifically singular versus plural, is a major postulate throughout Indo-European. Some languages mark it more overtly than others; some limit it to nouns and verbs, some include adjectives, marking in both morphological and syntactic (by agreement and/or governance) constructions. Spanish and English mark number rather differently — but both are unambiguous on the matter of singular and plural, with singular being unmarked. Looking briefly at English, cultural correlates are immediately obvious: in proverbs (one thing at a time); in our adulation of linear work; in our obsession with monotheological stances in academia (and its concomitant throwing out of all else in favor of the new one [cf. the Transformational Grammar period in linguistics]), with monotheism in religion, and with singular causes in history; in the sponsoring of monocropping in agriculture, even to single species of a single crop; and in our search for singular causes of diseases, with singular cures. Consider the epithet some have tried to make of 'eclectic'. The list is endless. Furthermore, each time we use language we regenerate the feedback necessary to reinforce the postulate — virtually every sentence in English (or Spanish) carries some number mark.

The notion of singularity given above may seem so obvious that it is unnecessary to state. But to an Aymara person, the above list is almost unthinkable, and certainly not very logical. The impingement of this singular/plural postulate on the Aymara has been devastating, from the earliest years of the conquest. An enormous amount of cultural energy has gone into efforts to thwart or at least diminish the repercussions.

In spite of the fact that Aymara has no grammatical number marking, under the pressures of the translation tradition two suffixes — one for verbs and one for nouns — have been pressed into service to translate Spanish plural markings. However, absence of such does not mean singular, and the more monolingual the speaker the less they occur (cf. Hardman 1982). In fact, one of my students has argued (Martin and Briggs 1981) that it is virtually impossible to be unambiguously singular in Aymara. (For example, the number one [mayu] also glosses as 'few'.)

Singular holds no fascination for the Aymara; nobody gives a thought to the concept. Rather, in coping with the environment, multiplicity has been the model. In land-holding the ideal is the *archipielago* (Murra 1972) system, i.e., access to as many ecological niches as possible, which in the Andes means altitudes. Thus, a person may typically hold small plots of land from the high puna (14,000 feet) down to the sea coast, if possible. If not, she will seek access routes to such lands, or trade and cultivate fictive kin relations which allow her to be the fruits of the various productive
Open your eyes to the reality of the world today. For one, it's clear that our society is facing significant challenges. Ethical dilemmas, economic disparities, and environmental crises are just a few of the issues we must address.

Ethical dilemmas arise from the complex nature of human interactions. How should we treat one another? What is the right thing to do in a given situation? These questions are not only philosophical but also practical.

Economic disparities are evident in the global marketplace. The gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen, often resulting in social unrest and political instability.

Environmental crises, such as climate change, are another major concern. The impact of human activity on the planet is undeniable, and we must take immediate action to mitigate the damage.

It's crucial that we as individuals and as a society take responsibility for these issues. Only through collective action can we hope to make a positive impact.

The future is in our hands. Let's work together to create a better world for all.
the Spanish speakers making data source mistakes were simply acting
their usual non-human (or dog) best.

The data source postulate on the part of the Aymara acts to exacerbate
the number postulate in clouding the vision of the anthropologist. If a
man talks to a man about his relatives, he will get primarily male relatives,
and from a male point of view. If he is asked to comment on the female
view with marks that the Aymara man perceives as being PK, his answers
will not be of the same caliber, and may even sound uncertain to the
researcher, who, primed for singular focus, quickly dismisses such
apparently useless material. If the question were framed in TLK terms,
the answer would be quite different. A reflex of this is the ridiculously
convoluted way in which some investigators have attempted to handle
what data they didn't throw away but did not understand (cf. Hickman
and Stuart 1972). Because the Aymara man values his human status (see
below), he is unlikely to put words in the mouth of anyone he considers
human, including his female relatives.

The same difficulties appear as he discusses land and animals; these are
exacerbated further by the interplay of the postulates discussed below.

Gender

Sex and/or gender marking (seen as synonymous in Indo-European
grammar [Miller 1977]) whether they are or not) is, in Indo-European, of
the sexist variety in that the male is seen as the prototype and the female
as a secondary derivative, such that if the male is known, the female can
be described with reference to him, but not vice versa. (Even the word
female, from the French femme in diminutive, was reformed in English to
look like it was derived from 'male' even though it wasn't.) A great deal
has been written recently documenting the distorting effect of such
grammatical practices as the 'generic' masculine; I will not recapitulate
it to say that we have been plagued with ethnographies of men, by men,
for men that with unconscious dishonesty claimed to be ethnographies of
entire cultures. If women were included at all it was only as servers of
males in roles that for the most part look like they came out of Victorian
England. Unfortunately, ethnographies of the Aymara have not been
immune — this includes The Masked Media (but see Collins 1981, Painter
1981). Even the Aymara have protested this blindness (Mamani 1975,
Llanque 1979, Copana 1981), to no avail. (It will be noted that Hardman,
Yapita, and Vasquez 1975 and 1988 have two Aymara authors — one a
woman, one a man, at the specific request of the Aymara themselves, who
felt that one could not learn the language well with the voice of only one
man.)

Some of the very obvious distorting effects have been noted already;
ignoring half the population is likely to distort any ethnography. Among
the Aymara it is particularly bad, because this gender-marking interplays
with the lack of number, as well as with the important postulates of data
source and humanness.

Humanness

The second linguistic postulate of the Aymara language/culture that I
wish to describe here is that of human/non-human. There are two sets
of pronouns, one for humans, one for everything else — and the use of the
non-human set to refer to humans is a good way to pick a fight
(analogous perhaps to the use of female terms for males in English).

Human pronouns:

| Naya | 'I, with or without others, but not you' |
| Juma | 'you' |
| Jupa | 'they, she, he' |
| Jwasa | 'you and I, with or without others' |

Non-human pronouns:

| aka / uka / k'aya |

The latter are usually translated as 'this' and 'that', and may be used as
adjectives in Aymara. However, as pronouns for humans, they do not
work at all. The unwise, working in translation tradition only, quickly
fall into assigning animal status to Aymara people (e.g., 'this' is my
informant).

Furthermore, vocabulary words for people are clearly distinguished
from those of animals. Correlating with this, in the lack of any sex
postulate, words which specifically refer to women are not derived from
the paired item referring to men.

| Jagi | 'people, person' |
| Warmi | 'woman, wife' |
| Chaacha | 'man, husband' |
| Wawa | 'child' |
| Imilla | 'girlchild' |
| Yuqalla | 'boychild' |

On the other hand one has:
humans, including the woman with whom the speaker shares a household.

wants to intervene in the world to make the woman feel powerful. The woman's awareness increases the necessary interaction between the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge. The intervention of the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge is a significant part of the process. The intervention of the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge is a significant part of the process. The woman does not feel threatened by the woman's knowledge as she is aware of the importance of her interaction with the woman's knowledge.

Thus, our main theme is the woman's and the man's awareness of their interaction with the woman's knowledge. The woman's awareness increases the necessary interaction between the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge. The intervention of the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge is a significant part of the process. The intervention of the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge is a significant part of the process.

We would like to emphasize the importance of our interaction with the woman's knowledge. The woman's awareness increases the necessary interaction between the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge. The intervention of the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge is a significant part of the process.

Applying our knowledge and experience, we can conclude that our interaction with the woman's knowledge is a significant part of the process. The intervention of the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge is a significant part of the process.

Thus, our main theme is the woman's and the man's awareness of their interaction with the woman's knowledge. The woman's awareness increases the necessary interaction between the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge. The intervention of the two Indigenous European political practitioners acting in the background of the woman's knowledge is a significant part of the process.
but she never travels. It took me a long time to discover, but the definition of 'travel' is 'international' and/or 'airplane'; anything less does not count (which ought to say something about how much traveling is done). One Jaqi woman who went to England as a consultant said to me when she returned to the U.S.A. 'Now I've traveled!'. Thus, focus on rural women does not mean focus on women with no knowledge of the variety the Andes have to offer.

The thing that weighs heaviest on Jaqi women is control of their own reproductive lives. Of course there are herbs for inducing abortion and there is abstinence (not very satisfying), and, maybe, from the city there may come some contraceptives (about which every woman researcher will be immediately and thoroughly questioned). But cheap, effective, safe, and humane control does not exist (as we all know only too well). Therefore, it is not unusual for pregnancy and birth to be greeted with ambivalence. On the one hand, children are clearly welcome — who else will take care of you in your old age, accompany you, help with the farm work, take care of the animals while you irrigate, run to carry the water, the firewood, etc.? On the other hand, too many too soon can be a terrible burden, and there is the fear of injury or death in the birth process itself. But, given a good delivery and a lack of overbearing concerns, a birth is good. If the child is a girl, especially if it is the first, there is a quiet kind of deep satisfaction; she is a sign that the marriage is a good one, or if the mother is unmarried, maybe just that the relationship with the father is a good one. Also, she will be much company and wealth. If the child is a boy, that is also good, because he won't have to work as hard, and maybe he will have some luck in the school and thus in the city. Even if things are difficult at the beginning, these feelings do grow very shortly.

Jaqi children are spoiled mercilessly. The only corrective balance is the tremendous responsibility all children must bear. By five or six a child will be responsible for the family's sheep and goats, and no one refrains from scolding a child who allows the animals to damage crops. In the city, particularly if the parents are successful, such corrective influence disappears as the children are relieved of work, and the spoiling comes to the fore. A good deal of this has to do with the humanness linguistic postulate, and the correlative notion that one's will cannot be forced on any other human being; and the data source postulate, whereby one cannot have personal knowledge of another's internal state. Even with children, consensus is the goal.

Babyhood is spent snugly against mother; only seldom is bodily contact broken, and then only for work. I have slides of women dancing with babies on their backs. The children learn the rhythms of work and play in harmony through contact with their mothers' bodies. As soon as they are toddlers, children will accompany their fathers as well in daily tasks, so that all little children receive much attention from adults. Boys may go more with fathers and girls with mothers, but the reverse also occurs, depending a lot on age and the tasks to be undertaken. At meals, around the fire at night, little girls are snuggled up sitting beside their mothers, in constant learning and reassuring contact.

By the time the child has learned to walk she will begin to bring water in containers suited to her size, gradually substituting larger ones as she is able to carry heavier and heavier weights. She will bring little twigs to the fire, gradually developing the capacity to bring great loads of heavy firelogs. Also, she will begin to accompany older siblings with the animals, until at five or six she is fully competent with a few sheep or goats. Gradually she will develop her skills to include larger numbers of animals, as well as pigs and cows — both harder to herd. Her skills in agriculture also develop along the same lines; she sits by her mother learning first to husk and shell the corn, then to sort the seed kernels into seeds, food, and market goods. It will be the same for potatoes. First she will participate in the stomping of the freeze-dried potatoes, in collecting and storing, gradually learning the complicated economy of deciding which potatoes, which varieties and qualities (of the several hundred varieties that any one woman will usually have access to, although the number is decreasing under foreign simplistic male ideas of farming) will be used respectively for planting, consuming, and marketing. If the woman will sponsor a festival in the coming year, specific portions of the harvest will be set aside for that purpose. If she is active in one of the saint-cults (hermandades), she may set aside some supplies for that purpose. She will also calculate any quantities she might need for upcoming ceremonies of a personal nature, such as the branding of her cows.

The work is ordinarily carried out, as much as possible, together with comadres, sisters, sisters-in-law, mothers, and daughters, so that in some tasks, like corn husking and shelling, there is also opportunity for exchange of information. Marketing is sometimes done cooperatively; for example, if it is the season for irrigation, but certain crops must be taken to market, one woman will take another's in exchange for irrigation, or two sisters will split up the tasks. Also, frequently, the men may be entrusted with handling the farming duties while the women take produce to market. There is some uneasiness in leaving men alone with work to be done, especially if animals are involved or if some crops need special attention, but it simply is not possible to handle all tasks in the ideal way — there is simply too much to be done, too many places to be at the same time.

What a little girl learns, then, is that she will have a career as a farmer;
The measure of success is not limited to one's position in life, but also includes the internal satisfaction and fulfillment of one's work. The attainment of the desired outcome is the result of consistent effort and dedication to one's goals. The ability to adapt and overcome challenges is a testament to one's resilience and determination. The pursuit of knowledge and the continuous learning process is essential for personal and professional growth. The recognition of one's achievements, whether public or private, is a crucial aspect of self-esteem and confidence. The importance of relationships and the support of loved ones cannot be overstated in the journey of success.
irrigation, plowing, and minding the kids and the house while one is off to market. Fortunately, the Jaqar marriage system (roundly denounced by all Christian sects) does allow some time for the couple to get to know each other (Carter 1977). Furthermore, since folks cannot act as full citizens until marriage — the culmination of the marriage ceremony is community commitment, not permission for sexual indulgence — there are a lot of reasons to marry. Children are not necessarily one of them — many women choose children without marriage, or choose a child and then reject the father, maybe later to marry better (and then grandma frequently has one more to raise).

Although stoutly denied (I suspect first under priestly pressure, and later internalized for form's sake), early friendship is developed from the age of five or six in the fields, followed by courtship, also in the fields. The herding is, in spite of appearances to the contrary (as reported by male white eyes), a highly social task, as kids endeavor to get the animals to cooperate in getting them to where they can interact with favorite friends. The children and teenagers carry with them (for animal control, they say) slingshots — in some places beautifully woven, highly decorative ones. Early contact is by slingshot. If a woman sees a shepherd she might like to talk to (to fall in love, or to love; in Jaqar is arishi, 'to mutually speak'), she might toss a rock in his direction, or vice versa. If the shot is answered, then talk may begin. Even in apparently arranged marriages, the truth, late and intimately told, is that a lot went on before the event, out in the fields, and the young'uns got the parents to formalize it. In earlier times, this ritual of formalizing 'arranged' marriages was a very public yearly event in some places — but the fiction of never 'talking' before marriage fooled only the anthropologists (and, more importantly, the priests and missionaries).

Affectionate satisfaction is a woman's due. If her husband is an inadequate lover, she is fully within her rights to seek satisfaction elsewhere, although the logistics, given the farming business she runs, may make it very difficult, thus more easily said than done. However, she does have, and exercises, the right to complain, sometimes bitterly, to her fellow women. I have never, in more than 25 years, heard anyone blame the woman for such inadequacy. (She may, however, be criticized for short-sightedness if he is a good worker.) Furthermore, sex does get better as one gets older. There is a saying, in all three languages, in many versions, that has been told to me over and over, by more old women than I can count (and the number goes up rapidly as I now join their ranks) to the effect that 'well, we lose our teeth, our eyes don't see so well, our ears don't hear so well, but ...' accompanied by hearty chuckles, giggles, and good camaraderie. One must only look out that one steer clear of compadres — a stronger incest taboo than even blood relatives.

Girls are initiated early into politics, precisely because when Spanish-speaking authorities show up women are not encouraged to attend the meetings (some communities imitate such tactics even when the officials are not present). However, a man may only speak for himself; if he speaks for his family he must first have his wife's consent and opinion, such that he acts as a reporter (cf. Núñez del Prado Béjar, 1975a, b). Children are always tolerated on the outskirts of any function, as long as they make no noise. Little girls act as court reporters for their mothers on political matters from the time they can accurately repeat what is said. This happens very early, and is closely related to the data source linguistic postulate. In fact, all Aymara verbs are divided into the groups of kamsaña ('what to say') and all others (Hardman, Yapita, and Vasquez 1975, 1988 Chapter V). Thus women do not rely only on men's reports of a meeting. If necessary, women will take charge of a given situation, for example arming themselves to fight a land takeover, but they really have more important things to do than sit in meetings. Since they hold the purse strings, nothing really crucial can take place without them — except, nowadays, for the funds which come directly from the government or international charities; these are typically placed in the hands of the incompetent men (everyone knows they can't handle money well).

Women are also active politically in the hermandades (cult groups or clubs), which care for a given saint's image and festival — precisely the topic of the book under review. Membership in these societies is inherited, usually along sex-specific lines (although if there is no same-sex heir, cross-sex inheritance is occasionally permitted). However, one way membership declines is by lack of inheritors — people don't jump at the chance to inherit cross-sex memberships. The proportion of a crop or of the market proceeds which will go into the sponsorship, who will do the dancing and singing, what kinds of mink'a and ayni ties will be formed and/or drawn on, which comadres one wants there, which will be honored — all are serious matters in political as well as personal terms for the women, and many an alliance thus formed between women will have repercussions down through the years on the entire community.

In some places women do indeed do (only) what the white males see them as doing — like cooking (but see Painter 1981). No task, however, is so sex-specific that the other sex cannot take it on. For example, women sort the seeds, but in the American Universities Field Staff film 'Potato planters' (1976) the Aymara, being shorthanded of women, send an old man to get the seeds for one planting (although a woman does give them the once-over in the field before proceeding).

However, it must be noted that nobody is a housekeeper — housekeep-
The study and dignity she has as a human and productive person are
central activities of the community.

Cultural activities and made manifest in them — with active participation in
the community and made manifest in them — with active participation in
the cultural and social activities of the community. Clearly, most interactions
are not simple, non interpersonal acts, but they are more complex, dynamic,
and interactive processes that shape the identities and positions of
participants. These interactions are characterized by a process of
coconstruction, where participants negotiate and build on each other's
definitions and interpretations of the social world. The process is
constantly evolving, as participants bring their own perspectives and
experiences to bear on the interactions, and as they are influenced by
the broader cultural and historical contexts in which they find themselves.

The media, through its powerful influence on society, plays a crucial role
in shaping public opinion and attitudes. The media has the power to
shape the way people think about issues, and it can have a significant
effect on public policy. However, the media is not a neutral force; it
is influenced by the interests of those who control it.

The reality of the situation for women in the Andes is complex, and
can be seen in the way that women are often excluded from political
processes and are not given the same opportunities to participate in
cultural activities as men. This is reflected in the way that women are
often not given the same opportunities to participate in cultural
activities, and are often not given the same opportunities to participate
in political processes. This is a result of the way that society is structured,
and it is a result of the way that women are not given the same
opportunities to participate in cultural activities as men.

The mass media, in turn, reinforces these patterns by promoting
stereotypes that depict women as passive and subservient to men. This
has a significant impact on women's ability to participate in
cultural activities, and on their ability to participate in political
processes.

The Andes are home to a diverse range of cultures and communities,
many of which have unique traditions and practices. It is important
to recognize the cultural diversity of the Andes, and to celebrate
the unique contributions that these communities make to the
Andean region. Through the study of these cultures, we can gain
a deeper understanding of the Andean region, and can better
appreciate the richness and complexity of Andean life.

The study of the Andes is not only important for understanding the
Andean region, but it is also important for understanding the
world as a whole. The Andes are a region of great cultural
diversity, and they have a unique way of life that is rich and
vibrant. It is important to study the Andes, and to learn from
the experiences of those who live there.

The Andes are an important part of the world's cultural heritage,
and they are a testament to the resilience and ingenuity of the
people who live there. It is important to protect the Andes,
and to ensure that their unique culture and way of life are
preserved for future generations.
marking, disregard of human/non-human marking, and expectation of the male as the primary and dominant figure.

Expectation of singular/plural

One pervasive flaw based on the singular/plural distinction, which I cannot cite without seeing the specific language, is the source of some of his mistakes regarding ‘men only’: since number is not routinely marked in Andean Spanish, the I/we (yo/nosotros) distinction serves no useful purpose and thus seems ‘empty’. On the other hand, Spanish has no inclusive/exclusive. So, yo/nosotros was pulled into the task. If a man says ‘mi casa’ (‘my house’) or ‘mi fiesta’, he does not mean singular, only that the addressee is not involved. Just where this expectation of singular/plural cross-cuts with the gender postulate would be impossible to know without the original language — but I have seen it happen a lot.

Buechler describes the circular migration to the Yungas (p. 22) as a result of the hacienda system. (This is clearly not the case, as I have shown in both sections above; it is simply further implementation of a very old pattern. It is true, however, that current misti political stands will have an effect on just where one may go [cf. Collins 1981].) It is also to him a pattern of an individual ‘leaving’. This is simply a misperception of the pattern. The issue is the cultivation of as many varying resources as possible, including cities (Painter 1978, 1981). Buechler here demonstrates his dependence on the singular/plural postulate of Indo-European, as described above, as though only one focus exists for home/work.

Buechler sees duality everywhere, except in marriage (for example p. 56), where there is a duality — two lineages coming together (cf. Carter 1977). His misunderstanding of dowry [dote] (p. 125) brings together not only number and gender, but data source and humanness as well — plus a belief (unexpressed) in the absoluteness of Spanish lexemes. This is absurd, bringing to the fore, as it does, the author’s limitations in Andean Spanish; Buechler lacks sensitivity not only for the Aymara but also for Andean Spanish.

While preparing this review, I read some sections to Andean folk. They found this bit about dowry particularly hilarious. I took the word used in Spanish [dote] and told them what European dowry was like (as Buechler understood it). They told me that I didn’t know the meaning of the word. I told them that was indeed the way it was done in some places. They didn’t believe me. They said no woman could possibly be so foolish as to give her husband title over any of her land. No woman anywhere in the world would ever behave in that way. (Note that they said no woman would so behave — nothing about the power of a father to so instruct, because he so clearly could not do so that no one even considered it mentionable). Furthermore, some of the men were indignant because they were really very proud of their dowries, and felt slighted that only women would be considered capable of owning land at marriage. (They did not consider that it was impossible for the woman only in a union to have land; however, they stressed that most of them also had land, and that they had not gone into their own marriages empty-handed.)

The meaning of dote in Andean Spanish is that portion of the child’s inheritance that is ceded to her (not to her spouse) by her parents at marriage. It is important that parents be willing to part with some property when their child marries — and some parents are more generous, or more capable of giving up lands early, than others. Some allow only cultivation, rather than ownership — i.e., not full dowry.

Ownership always remains individual and personal. Lands are cultivated in common in the partnership of marriage, but are not held in common (Collins 1981, Painter 1981). Both members of the new couple are expected to recompense their spouse’s kindred for the removal of a productive member (Collins 1983), and this is fully reciprocal. Concentration of same-sex informants, lack of understanding of data-source, expectation of singular inheritance, and expectation of male dominance kept Buechler from seeing that daughters-in-law are expected to help as much as sons-in-law — i.e., there is no ‘dowry’ repayment; instead there is producer payment.

When no men are around, Buechler can see the women. Someone must hire the brass band or panpipe assembly (p. 151), so women are seen if they constitute the singular source. This is then justified by saying they are ‘market women — maestras mayores’ (rather than ‘normal’ women).

The ritual ties across communities are important throughout the Andes, as far back as can be traced — and the road routes with toponyms give a good idea as to their complexity, in contrast to what Buechler says (p. 157). The cross-community ties increase with land reform, which often demands that members of one family split up in order to maintain control of lands. Also, marriages across boundaries are frequent, and serve to increase access to different lands (cf. Harris 1985). Interest in the festivals of other communities is great, including comparative statements. In fact, cross-community festival interest and attendance even transcend such differences as language.

Contrary to Buechler (pp. 46, 133, 158, 223, etc.), individuals do not sponsor festivals — married couples do. He says it correctly several times (although mostly restricting himself to ‘a man must be married’), but then he goes back to thinking of a married couple as one — i.e., the man, the
Buchanan discusses: the role of 'godmother' in marriage (p. 127): It is, of

both cases, a role of staffing to fulfill human stimuli (see above).

In the former, there is little, if any, of the human/non-human distinction and the

interactor: if it is taken to the human/non-human distinction and the

maternal of Godmother — an accentual dynamic — but the door not necessarily

Buchanan does the child's position (p. 95), especially in the

other does hear a voice of the more critical, but a voice is, perhaps, better

dissection: Buchanan could not have been so close to hold the population

discrimination. Buchanan's position is so much more critical, most of the examples are

Buchanan's sections with that of Gerson. But since


This problem presents the entire book, although not of a particular nature.

Directed to data, source.


deed partial understanding of the grammar.

By those who do not understand the grammar (sort of if you can do it, but not really)

(resources) only to be seen. Essentially with a pre, a pre-down of women, and not the

example with a non-binary woman. Only of context! will

witness such a sentence. Where an 'arrow' woman, one of context! will

their is the other where the subordinated. Buchanan: I have, then, this

irrelevant what it means. The 'arrow' woman, the one, is not to be taken lightly,

to. The only notion of pre-down was in the case of the subordinated

rightly. The pre-flash women is, not the subordinated what is

Buchanan: some women, some directional, but these are

slide. Your prior is not a particular nature.

Think, do not come through

This, did not come through

'95.' [Again, starting hernburg. C. 95. This didn't come through]

The child's money.

A godmother's role is, therefore, to create some specific, some directional, some directional of the

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'95.' [Again, starting hernburg. C. 95. This didn't come through]
mare — girls also receive land. Both receive inheritance from both parents, though a mother may show preference, all other things being equal, to a daughter. This is widely reported elsewhere (Carter 1977, Collins 1981, Miracle 1976, Painter 1981).

Buechler claims that the wife’s kin have more importance in the city, which is nonsense, once again a product of what is in the eye of the beholder — in this case a frequently encountered belief that white men’s women have it ‘best of all women’ and that the higher the social class or more powerful the men, the better they treat ‘their’ women. This correlates to the ‘whites will bring salvation’ syndrome. (In this case the reverse might be closer to the truth. For a similar error serving as the framework of a book, cf. Bourque and Warren 1979.) Actually, there is no way a woman can disown her kin. And as to residence patterns, my experience across the Andes is that uxorilocality accounts for approximately 50%, exclusive of completely neolocal. In fact, I was severely taken to task by one older woman for allowing my husband to reside where he wished (i.e., in his house) rather than simply informing him that he was to live in mine with me — I was shirking my responsibility as a woman.

Buechler does recognize that women dominate the market — in a footnote (p. 31) he generally reduces whatever it is women do to footnotes, cf. footnote 19, p. 102. The implication ought to be clear that no festival of any kind can be carried out without women supplying the goods (cf. Núñez del Prado Béjar 1975a, b). Even the footnote is not entirely accurate — the entry of men into the coca market is not yet complete, and in some areas men do not sell coca. That the whole economic underpinning of the fiesta system can be relegated to a footnote simply because that power is held by women clearly indicates the bias of the book — and its severe limitations as a network description of anything. In the same vein Buechler implies total male control of the child’s hair-cutting ceremony (p. 109) (cf. Miracle 1976). This cannot possibly be the case. If women have marketing control (as he admits elsewhere), it ought to be obvious that supply control is critical to any ceremony. Even if men do on occasion make some purchases, I don’t know any Andean man who would buy a sheep or a bicycle or any similar object without consulting his wife (although the reverse is not so true).

Buechler claims there is increasing female participation in dance — a truly amazing view implying change parallel to European-based groups. Elsewhere in the Andes, women’s (and men’s) participation is obligatory — the two have complementary roles. Most of the traditional dances cannot be performed by one sex alone. However, the dances mocking the Spaniards are indeed mostly male — as were the Spanish who deserved the mockery (judges, priests, soldiers, etc.). If female participation is


Other comments

It is unfortunate that the lessons in the book are limited to the text. However, the text is well-written and the ideas are clearly presented. For those who are interested in learning more about this subject, I recommend reading the book in its entirety. The author's passion for the topic is evident throughout the text, and the arguments are well-supported by evidence from various sources. Overall, I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the field of economics, gender, and the labor market.
such view — indeed, no one from Qumpi saw it that way, although the patrones believed themselves benefactors, and in their presence the Aymara did not contradict them. This one statement betrays the framework of the book. Yes, the patrones do have roles in the fiesta system, as do the priests. Neither is liked. The fiesta system has adapted to integrate the misti power structure and Catholic liturgy. Many dances, and such rituals as the funeral games, mock precisely those roles also seen as essential even by the Aymara today. If there is communication, part of it is what a good job of being courteous the Aymara can pull off. Fatherly image indeed! Priests and patrones together! Interestingly, Buechler once asked me about the ‘boy’ from Qumpi with whom I had worked — referring to a man who is Buechler’s senior and a college professor.

Buechler comments on the influence of the hacienda system on fiestas, including leadership patterns and prestige ranking. He is, of course, correct in that there was great influence, except that he misses the most important change — denigration of women (cf. Babb 1976). (Women have lost most in colonial situations; cf. Inos 1983.)

Buechler thinks that women are new to drinking (p. 321) and to economic power (as of 1970) — presumably because European women were. When I first went among the Jaqi in the late fifties, women older than I drank and held economic power. I have accounts of women dancing, drinking, sponsoring fiestas, even singing old songs from fiestas they had sponsored years before — women now in their seventies, eighties, and nineties. This is most certainly a new thing! On the contrary, they have in recent years lost economic power, and there are now pressures to drink less (for example from the Protestants).

If women carry money and pay for the beer their men drink, that is Andean, not mestizo as Buechler claims. Even Bourque and Warren (1979), with a conceptual framework similar to that of Buechler and thus with many of the same problems, found women giving drinking allowances to men. Drinking in Spanish taverns is different, of course, but women do make decisions about expenditures. For women to pay is an Andean carry-over — it has not come with increasing Hispanification.

If in any sense young women are becoming more important (p. 332), it is simply the restoration of what their foremothers had. In many cases women clearly state this in Aymara. However, in Spanish, courtesy will lead Aymara folk to say what the misti wants to hear.

In a further justification of his framework, Buechler invokes the work of Bernstein (p. 184 and 353ff.). It is extremely unfortunate that any anthropologist (or anyone else) would choose Bernstein as an example of anything but faulty research techniques (cf. Vollweiler 1975). Bernstein’s work has been used extensively to give to one’s class prejudices a ‘scientific basis’. The notion that any upper-class English speaker would automatically know Cockney, while the ‘deprived’ Cockney could not reciprocate (or that any white English speaker in the U.S. would automatically know Black English, but not vice versa) is absurd on the face of it. A critique of Bernstein cannot be undertaken here, but Buechler is badly misreading the richness and complexity of traditional Aymara society, even the ‘elaborateness’ of some portions of their ‘code’.

There has always been much travel — I am collecting toponyms on some of these mule roads, an extremely complex and still-in-place system wherever motor roads have not yet arrived — so ‘restricted’ talk ‘only’ in small intimate groups was never the case. Furthermore, in the Aymara language itself (but not in the Andean Spanish of serfs) there are numerous levels and styles. The simplicity of the Qumpi festivals is in the eye of the beholder — Buechler is simply more attuned to complexity in La Paz. I myself find the city rituals more easily understandable — it is the country rituals, some portions of which are performed out of range of misti observers, that I find more difficult to comprehend in their entirety. Also, much of the historical relevance is not immediately evident, coming out only when I ask for texts, in which the recounting of earlier enactments of given ritual/fiesta clearly interplays with the present one, adding a dimension that is sometimes absent in more citified versions. Also, under pressure from priests, missionaries, and misti, there may be only tokens of what used to be large parts of a ceremony — invisible unless the history is known. If these pieces are not clearly articulated by the young, who then go to the city, they are lost; thus the citified rituals really are often simplified versions, in the symbolic semiotic sense (though more complex in terms of cash expenditure). Buechler’s use of Bernstein’s model in this case is severely distorting and prejudicial; to put Bernstein in the company of Whorf is a grave insult to the latter, and a distortion of what Whorf’s work was about.

Some additional problems arise because of lack of language knowledge. Throughout the book the lack of understanding of ceremony names shows through. Nor does Buechler recognize Spanish borrowings (for example alwa [p. 319], which should have signaled to him a recently introduced piece of the ceremony).

In discussing age-linked roles, Buechler could have easily found that there are named ages corresponding to roles. He was apparently unaware of the connection. As mentioned above, his lack of knowledge of ‘to marry’ [jaqichasaqta], based on the root jaqi (‘person, people’), led him to misunderstand not only the marriage ceremonies themselves, but also the entire process of sponsorship selection. The five named age roles are all either sex-neutral or parallel. The sex-neutral terms are the beginning
Differences That Make a Difference

Examining the Assumptions in Gender Research

Edited by LYNN H. TURNER and HELEN M. STERK

BERGIN & GARVEY
Wesport, Connecticut • London
M. J. Harman

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<th>Or What Price Development?</th>
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<td>Then What About Our Land?</td>
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"—W. S. Evans"
derivation of the masculine, number with plural derived from the singular, and the
vase ranking comparative/absolute. I call the interplay of these three structures
derivational thinking."

Sex-based gender marking in the world's languages is not necessarily rare, although
way in which grammars have been written by members of the conquering European
ieties gives us a biased idea of frequency and typology. The language structures
ought by these conquests involved not only the obligatory marking of sex-based
eder, but a derivation of the feminine from the masculine, the result of a tradition at
5,000 years old, in a constant feedback loop between women's place in these
uropean societies and in their languages.

Part of the realization of this derivation is in the naming practices imposed on all
quired populations, patronymics that labeled all people, and by implication all
ds, as belonging to men. The power to name implies much of the power of creation.
 patronymics give the power to name exclusively to men; without a father the
d "has no name"; ancestry and family are identified through father's name; mother
es her name and identity at marriage. Our old property rights exactly echoed these
tices: old Anglo law allowed no property to a woman; what was her father's became
ous or son on his death. Recent times have modified these
tices, but the underlying attitudes remain, particularly as "development" is practiced
"third world" countries. The devastation of the conquest was compounded for women
ese practices were imposed by law, denying them the name, property, and identity
ts that they had never had any reason to think were not theirs by birthright.

Current efforts at "development" threaten to destroy what little language and culture
survived the original European conquerors. The affected women lose status, status
ion and, often, their very means of livelihood. Women's resistance to schooling, for
ple, is frequently a recognition of the loss such implies for them (Stein, ms.). At
me, the rest of us may be losing models for what nonsexist societies might
, a chance to imagine ourselves as living and growing in such societies. I argue
 is a loss to the women and men of the affected societies and also to ourselves as
pants in the European-derived societies. In the languages of the conquerors, other
men are invisible to us.

The Jaqaru family of languages has been the focus of my research. As an anthro-
pological linguist, my primary training enables discovery of the grammar of a language
viously undescribed. This involves, in so far as possible, seeing a language within
context in order to discover the meaning and function of grammatical particles.
ecessarily, one must understand the sentences, discourses, and cultural contexts in
ich these are used if one is to account for the distribution. Part of the methodology
re collection of "texts" for analysis. These texts include narratives which include,
ong other things, stories, autobiographies, biographies, histories, myths, descriptions,
so also the recording of such ongoing events as conversations, speeches, celebrations,
ceremonies. For accurate language analysis, these texts must be collected without
stitution interface, that is, in the context of the language being studied, not of a
inant prestige group. A language needs to be studied where it is spoken.

Jaqaru is a member of the Jaqi family of languages, which also includes Aymara,
a major language of Bolivia, of southern Peru and of northern Chile. There are today
some three and a half million speakers of Jaqi languages, the remnant of an empire that,
before the time of the Incas, stretched from Ecuador to Argentina. The homeland of the
Jaqaru speakers is a steep valley heavily terraced on both sides. The plaza is a little over
9,000 feet above sea level. Although under Spanish rule for 500 years, they have been
able to maintain many of their own cultural constructs. This they have done by internal
community cohesion, by the use of the language, and by reconstructing much of what
they have been given to better fit their own worldview.

I, personally, have gained much from observing the women in Tupé. I first went
there in the 1950s, when women's choices in the United States were far more
scribed than they are today. I watched women working, not in the home and with
no notion of the role of "housewife." I listened to and worked with a language that
amed no deprecations of women and with texts from strong, self-possessed women
ho could not understand subservience. I remember one incident: my husband and I
ere living a long-distance marriage for professional reasons, which meant that he
ot with the children. I was complaining of this to a Jaqaru friend. Utterly baffled as to
y I had a problem, her solution was, "Well, you just tell him where he should live." For
myself, as a young woman in the 1950s, this possibility had not occurred to me.

About fifteen years ago I invited my children's godparents to visit with us in Túpe,
where Jaqaru is spoken. The godparents are very tall, fair gringos (the usual word in
y, often said with affection, for European-looking foreigners). Because Túpe is a
two-day trip from Lima, the second day on foot for some twenty-five kilometers and
ith a climb of some 5,000 feet, foreign visitors were, and are, exceedingly rare. One
evening, after my compadres had recovered from their climb, I introduced them to a
roup assembled for tea and conversation in the home of one of my Túpe friends. The
godparents' English name was very difficult for the people of Túpe to pronounce. For
the godfather they finally got it right: Erdmann. Then they all braced for the god-
mother's name. I will never forget the look on the Tupinos' faces when her name turned
out to be the same!

The only possible explanation for the two sharing a name that would have occurred
to any of the Jaqaru people was that they were blood kin, therefore incest. The
godmother asked me to explain as, for this situation, her Spanish was failing her. I
explained how in the United States a woman took her husband's name at marriage,
losing hers, resulting in their having the same name. So that was why the names of my
madre and my compadre were the same. A young woman farmer, married to the man
schoolteacher, looked quite perplexed and said to me: "But what, then, of inheritance,
what of our land?" Yes, a good question indeed. The name attached to the land is also
the name of the owner of the land. If a woman would have no name of her own, then
how could she have land of her own? European practices had certainly long reflected
that. At the time this conversation took place, it had only been legal for about a year for
a woman to buy property in Florida without a male relative's signature.
The problem of gender violence affects women and girls worldwide. Violence against women is a violation of human rights and a barrier to gender equality. It is estimated that 1 in 3 women worldwide have experienced physical or sexual violence at the hands of an intimate partner or other person. This violence can take many forms, including physical, sexual, emotional, and economic abuse. The consequences of violence against women are far-reaching, affecting not only individual victims but also entire societies and economies.

In order to combat violence against women, it is essential to raise awareness about the issue and to implement effective policies and programs. International organizations, governments, and civil society organizations are working together to promote gender equality and end violence against women. This requires a multi-sectoral approach that involves education, legal frameworks, access to justice, and support services for survivors. It is crucial to involve men and boys in these efforts, as they have a role to play in addressing the root causes of violence.

One effective strategy is to promote positive masculinity and challenge traditional gender norms that perpetuate violence. This includes providing boys and men with opportunities to develop healthy relationships, emotional intelligence, and problem-solving skills. It also involves creating safe spaces where boys and men can discuss their experiences and challenges.

In conclusion, ending violence against women requires a commitment from all sectors of society. By working together, we can create a world where violence is no longer tolerated, and all women and girls can live free from fear and violence.
have been successful. For example, the impact of the importation of sexism from the conquerors can be seen in the tax structure. Within the community, where the tax is based on labor, a woman’s day is exactly equal to a man’s day, that is, it is a human labor day. These activities are primarily dealt with in Jaqaru. When cash money, an introduction from Europe, is used, as in cash wages, a woman’s day is worth exactly half a man’s day. These latter activities are mostly dealt with in Spanish.

Women who remain farmers and who sell, for example, cheese, on the open market or who, for example, run restaurants during fair/market days, can do very well indeed. Women, in fact, are major business entrepreneurs within the Andes, though ignored by international development concerns. For example, when I needed a truck to move my household goods from Bolivia to Peru it was done by an Aymara woman who owned a fleet of trucks for international commerce; she hired a man to drive the truck to Peru for me. Given the European belief in the name/property tie and the man/name tie, economic development is aimed at men only, including in the Andes commerce; but in the Andes, women are the merchants and the money handlers. No international small business loans or development materials ever go in their direction.

Another example of how the sexism is imposed and what is done to women’s status is how the school system, held universally to be a “good” and to be a way to improve oneself, acts differentially on the girls and the boys, not because of the native culture but because of the imposition of the behaviors associated with derivational thinking from the dominant society. If a woman goes to school, then her possibilities become circumscribed by the Hispanic norms, which in the Andes are less severe than Anglo norms, but are nevertheless far more restrictive than the comparable status in the native cultures or for men in the European-derived sectors.

With the conquest, the imposed loss of name, and the loss of land came also the threat, and the reality, of violence, specifically in the form of rape. Rape was apparently unknown in the Jaqi societies; there is no easy linguistic way even of speaking of it, no name for it. Even today, in this aspect, there has not been a great deal of impact within village life. However, in language terms, a whole new genre of oral literature has developed to warn young women of this danger from Spanish speakers. Even in these stories the danger is depicted as seduction and betrayal, not as the violence with which we are so familiar. This new genre is one of the creative ways in which the Jaqi people have tried to cope with the new dangers specific to women. Translating or understanding structured violence toward women is difficult for people coming from a different sexual reality.

In texts I have recorded from Jaqi women, it is often what they do not say that is very telling. Their stories focus on themselves, not on their husbands, on their own land, not on the land of their husbands. Land is held personally; I have not yet met any Andean woman willing to pass the title of her land to her husband. This is a major issue in land reform, at least to the women involved, whether coming from revolution or internal politics or imposed by foreign institutions (BID, USAID, etc.) in the name of development. Florence Babb (1976; 1980) cites a particularly appalling example of development depriving women of land rights. In Vicos, men were given formal title,
and that we are not aware of the profound impact of the media. The media, through their influence on our perceptions and attitudes, shape our understanding of the world and our place within it. 

The media’s role in shaping our understanding of women is significant and often overlooked. Through their portrayal of women, the media can either empower or devalue women. This is evident in the way women are often depicted as subservient, passive, or objectified in popular culture, which can contribute to a broader cultural mindset that reinforces gender inequalities. On the other hand, positive representations of women can challenge these stereotypes and promote a more equitable view of gender roles.

In conclusion, the media has a profound impact on our understanding of women and their roles in society. It is essential that we remain conscious of these influences and work towards creating a media landscape that promotes positive and empowering portrayals of women. This can be achieved through increased diversity and representation, critical engagement with media messages, and support for media outlets that prioritize accurate and empowering representations.
furthermore, is verbalized with a suffix meaning "mutually." Thus to say that someone "helps" another, in Jaqaru, means the people work together mutually in companionship. Thus if a woman says she "helps" her husband in the fields it does not mean that the work is primarily his, it means the two of them jointly cultivate both her fields and his. That time the developer did not succeed. There are still no rabbits in Tupu.

Stories are numerous, where "development" is fed through the men with no consultation with those who handle the money and with those who would be most affected; see, for example, the work of the Cuzqueña Daisy Irene Núñez del Prado Béjar for examples involving Quechua speakers (1975a; 1975b). In fact, in the Andes, money management is the almost exclusive province of women.

About the same time as the rabbit story, I was called upon to evaluate a similar project for another community. These projects were being pushed as major development from the central Eurocentric government. The whole notion of women having a lot of free time comes, of course, from our western definitions of housework as "not work" and from seeing all other work as done by men, thus obliterating from view the work the women actually do. If women are viewed as derivative of men, a woman and a man working together in the fields is easily and commonly perceived as one man only. This example of derivational thinking involving language and perception is amazing perhaps, when analyzed as I have done here, but is nevertheless common and normal.

CONCLUSION

As the conquerors’ languages both reflected and caused the sexism they sought to impose, so also the non sexist culture of the Jaqiu is both reflected in and imposed by the language. Today there is a real possibility that, as a result of past governmental programs and present terrorism, what little has been able to survive these five centuries will be destroyed by violence. The loss of the language may close forever the possibility of thinking and speaking in this one non sexist way both for the descendants of these self possessed women and for us.

The differences make a difference. Language patterns that are used on a daily basis give rise to and reinforce different perceptual patterns. I have been the beneficiary of the opportunity to talk with and live with women who have never thought of themselves as derivations of men nor as "belonging to" men, but who have thought of themselves as autonomous productive human beings. In the crush of "world culture" these differences may well be lost. Respect for difference on our part, a profound belief in different and equal, may be the only hope for survival for these differences. As a minimum, we can listen to the voices, few thought they be, that are now asking for that respect and for the return of the status held by their foremothers. As part of that ability to listen, we must also understand the blinders our own language places on us. A woman’s name is her own; we must not assume we know hers simply because we have met her husband. Her land is her livelihood and her dignity.

NOTES

1. At the time of the conquest, the Andes supported some 20-30 millions in population, without hunger for anyone. Twenty-five years after the conquest, the population was one million and is only now rising again to preconquest numbers, but with extensive hunger and poverty.

2. Methodology is described in the field methods textbook (Hardman & Hamano, 1993).

3. All examples in this paragraph are from the Aymara language.

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"Derivational Thinking, or, Why is equality so difficult?"

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"Derivational Thinking,
or, Why is Equality so Difficult?"

In the introduction to a book regarding some aspect of feminism—which book I now forget—the author lamented that, within early feminist groups, structured to avoid hierarchy and authority, there nevertheless always emerged a hierarchy. She expressed bafflement as to why.

Many of us have been involved in activities which we believed would end some particular, agreed upon, injustice, only to find that as we eliminated one form or another, that very injustice simply mutated to express itself in other, sometimes more subtle or more sophisticated ways. This has certainly been the experience of many of the civil rights activists from the sixties. And it most certainly has been my experience in the matter of sexism within language. Some twenty or thirty years ago when I first began taking seriously the matter of reference to women in language, in spite of being a linguist, I honestly believed that it would be a relatively simple matter—for example, that using 'they' instead of 'he' would include women.

Some have argued that the beliefs are 'so deep in the culture' that they could not be eliminated by language. But as an anthropological linguist I am fully aware that all culture is mediated through language; if the belief is 'deep', then it must be 'deep' within the structure of the language.

I developed the concept of the 'linguistic postulate' in order to account for the manifestations of grammatical themes that I found realized within the grammar of the Jaqi languages of South America.¹ These categories, or postulates were realized over the whole of the grammar, not just in one place, and were also realized through the whole of the culture. These same themes also gave the people strength to resist at least part of the encroachment of the European cultures. Part of that resistance involved the continuing recognition of women as equal contributors to the well-being of the entire group. That was very impressive to a young woman from the intense sexism of post-war USA. Knowing, living with and studying the language of these women over the past 35 years has been valuable to me, both in coming to know my own and in imagining what might be.

Confronted now with the questions of our own resistance to the creation of structures of equality, I have recently turned my lens of linguistic postulates on my own language and culture. The result has been most useful.

¹ The Jaqi languages include Aymara, the native language of a third of the population of Bolivia and the major language of southern Peru and northern Chile, and two languages in Peru with very few speakers, Jaqaru and Kawki. These languages are the remnant of what was, before the Incas, the largest of the economic 'empires' of ancient Peru [Hardman 1985]. My own work among the Jaqi peoples now spans more than a quarter of a century [Hardman 1966], [Hardman 1983; Hardman et al 1975; Hardman et al 1988].
Three linguistic postulates realized in the grammatical structures of English make the construction of human equality difficult in English. These three are: number (singular/plural), sex-based gender with masculine as root, and our ranking comparative (wise, wiser, wisest). These three linguistic postulates interact together in a mutually reinforcing way to lead to the construct that I call Derivational Thinking. Derivational thinking relates not only to our construction of sex relations but, because it gives us the template for all human relations, is also the underlying mechanism which keeps us racist, that makes diversity so difficult to understand, and which leads to our imperialist behavior abroad.

Number is overtly obligatory and pervasive. Try thinking, for example, of a sentence in English with no mark or either singular or plural. Singular is unmarked and primary, plural derived.

Sex-based gender is partly overt, partly covert. The principle of English sex-based gender, which is the same as the sex-based gender of all Indo-European, is that the feminine is derived from the masculine. Therefore the feminine is dependent, grammatically, on the masculine, the masculine unmarked and the root.

The third structure is the comparative/absolute which means constant hierarchy. This structure may not appear to be obligatory but in interplay with the other two does indeed so function and thus forms the third partner in the construction of derivational thinking. If you doubt the pervasiveness of hierarchy, try going even an hour with no comparative or absolute.

Derivational thinking, then, results in thinking patterns that have all people (& things) ranked at all times, with only one can as primary, and that one as the unmarked. Since feminine is marked, than clearly that is not primary. Masculine singular as the top of the hierarchy 'feels' fully grammatical, fully coordinated—in incorporates the realization of all three postulates simultaneously. This manner of thinking carries the notion that there is not room 'at the top' for more than one, so that if women are elevated, then men must be demoted; if other races are given opportunity, then whites 'lose' opportunity—opportunity can only be singular, and all must be ranked.

As part of my teaching practice I require that my students observe language behavior according the the categories described in this paper. One student, a minority woman, brought an observation that is a summary of what I have been saying, all non-whites non-males structured together as dependent on and derived from the 'real' people on the top. She first reported it of one professor and then told us that a second professor had said the same thing to her only a few days later.

The professor told me that I had two strikes against me "as far as becoming a real scientist. You are a woman and a minority and that will keep you from being objective, you are too close to those people to get the right data. You just can't do it. You people need guidance to handle the data correctly and you need someone who can reach a real audience. But don't you worry. There is a place for you as an assistant. In fact women and minorities make very good assistants in the field." When I asked what he
meant by the "real" audience, he went on to say that works not done by "academics" only appeal to such specialized groups as "Black studies, Women's studies, etc." so they can't reach the "people who can recognize the real issues and can come up with real solutions to the problems: Experts who know best." [1]

Our grammar does not make it easy for us to hold diversity as different only, that is, equal and different. Indeed, the usual expression is "equal but different" as though the two expressions were mutually contradictory.

That the two expressions be understood as contradictory is not so everywhere. For example, among the Jaqi, where the simile is grammaticalized but where there is no easy way to rank, people are considered non-comparable. With the interaction of their linguistic postulates of 'data source', which specifies that one cannot have personal experience of another's internal states, and of the primacy of human over non-human, each person is considered autonomous and unique and equal. Among co-equal adults even the use of the imperative is avoided out of respect for the humanity of the other. If one does presume to compare (as I did early on in ignorance) one is chided for rudeness. Singularity is not a good nor a goal. At one point, for example, I was treated for a minor illness by invocation of a Protestant god, a few catholic saints and the divinity of the guinea pig and the river— with no sense of any contradiction on the part of anyone involved.

In one recorded speech, the mayor of a town explains that the higher authorities, all Hispanic with postulates similar to our own, have told him to order the people to do certain things. He then says that he knows he can't order anybody, but he will try to persuade. In other words, having a position of responsibility among the Jaqi gives one the right of first persuasion, but does not carry status. Prestige yes, but not status. Different and equal.

As I have shown elsewhere, these postulates are realized in the vocabulary, morphology, syntax, discourse and metaphorical structure of English [Hardman Forthcoming A; Hardman Forthcoming B]. Figure 1 is a summary of the structures identified in the overall view of English, with the basic ones and the one currently under discussion highlighted. [See Figure 1 ] In this paper I look specifically at the the subject/object construction of English. The discourse strategies that I discuss are identified in the work of Joanna Russ in How to Suppress Women's Writing [Russ, Joanna, 1983]. She does not there identify the problem with the grammar of English, but that is precisely what is being discussed.

It is a design feature of language—openness—that all things can be said in any language if enough context and length is allowed; one can always go through long circumlocutions or descriptions, or whatever. Languages differ in what can be said conveniently and in what must be said in order to be grammatical.

Donna Haraway in her book Primate Visions [Haraway, 1989] also uses the work of Joanna Russ, cf. p 46ff, as a frame for looking at primate studies.
Deborah Tannen recently published an article in the New York Times [Tannen, 1993] in which she discussed the perpetual markedness of women's dress. She is absolutely right. She, also, does not quite identify this cultural manifestation with the feminine in English grammar, but, again, that is exactly what is happening.

At the syntactic level in English the subject is the primary focus of the sentence. We are a noun oriented language to start with. Furthermore, we are agent oriented, focusing on 'who did it', this frequently being the first question asked of any situation. These three things come together in the focus on the subject of the sentence. Note also that the subject is again primary, which ties in with both singularity and with ranking. The kind of ranking that is involved is even reflected in linguistic theory which discusses raising the subject to object position—not unlike talk of raising women or non-whites to the white male position. Therefore, one of the results of derivational thinking is that a singular white male subject/agent would 'feel' most grammatical. Think of the way we write history and award patents, etc.

All of this is in sharp contrast with our attitude toward the object—who should get out of the way and become an agent or accept being blamed. Objects, furthermore, are considered easily interchangeable—not unlike derivations. 'Mrs John Jones', clearly a derivation as in 'man & wife', is interchangeable as to which human being it can apply to. 'John Jones' is not. The derivational suffixes such as '-ette' clearly flit from root to root.

In a term paper one student analyzed the examples in a text book on syntax [Maranzana, 1992]. I quote

"The role of the male is consistently that of agent or actor, while female figures are represented as some kind of object, recipient, instrument, or container. These roles, once assigned linguistic titles, represent grammatical relationships which are used in formal descriptions of language."

And every example reiterates, in both concrete and theoretical fashion, derivational thinking. Another textbook, the title not given me, was reported to have only one sentence in which Mary was the subject: 'Mary wrote a book about John'. As this sentence illustrates, there is more than one way, as in all grammars, for realizing the postulates so that if one way is blocked another way can be found.

Joanna Russ discusses the ways in which women's agency is denied within the literary canon. Though she does not specifically state so, what she has illustrated so richly are discourse devices for coping with the situations in which women, in spite of the grammar, are subjects/agents anyway. I have used her categories as guides to teach my students to observe in language behavior specifically what is meant by the application of derivational thinking to this agentive/subject category of grammatical/cultural behavior.
Part of derivational thinking is that anything that can go into the sentence ‘Woman is ______’ is necessarily bad. If applied to men it is likely to be an insult. From the sentence ‘Man is ______’ the implication is neutral to good. Terms from the second sentence can be applied to women and will normally be complementary, though simultaneously denying her womanhood, making her in some fashion an ‘honorary’ man. Thus, if a woman can be the subject/agent, then the activity does not belong in the second sentence.

My roommate Amy’s group of male friends had been “proving their manhood” by jumping off a cliff—at least 80 feet I’ve been told—at the quarries. I’d been hearing stories about a lot of groups of guys going to the quarries. The stories about who wouldn’t jump was the big thing. They were the butts of jokes and ridiculed by their “friends”. So my roommate Amy, who is fearless beyond all measures went with her male friends to the quarries. She jumped. The stories and jokes changed about the guys that didn’t jump—a girl jumped and they didn’t. They were less than a girl, beneath a girl. Soon after, the trend among that group of guys of bringing new guys to the Quarries to jump to prove their manhood ended. The ritual died.[2]

If woman is an 80-foot cliff jumper, then it doesn’t count for man to be an 80-foot cliff jumper. I argue that this is the grammatical pattern behind the problem with women in combat and gays in the military. i.e. “Woman flies a combat jet.”, therefore ‘Man flies a combat jet’ is no longer a satisfying sentence. Many men go into the volunteer army in order to prove themselves ‘men’. If women and gays (a derivational type of ‘man’) can do it, then what is it worth?

Let us look now at some of the discourse strategies used by those thinking derivationally to keep women out of the subject/agent slot, with examples from the life experiences of my students. To quote Keller [Keller, 1985:17], ‘Naming nature is the special business of science.’ To cope with any situation, we must first name it.

One of the most common, and one the students find easiest to illustrate, is simply to say that she didn’t do it some man did it, her father, her brother, her boyfriend, her teacher, but not her. This we call Denial of Agency. The following story is from a married student with his first daughter.

I was sitting in the waiting room, playing with Jamie. One of her favorite games is to grab my fingers for stability, and muscle her way up into a stand. A woman saw us playing this game, and came over and said: “What a strong little boy you are, able to stand up on your own like that!” I answered: “She is very strong, isn’t she?” The woman looked surprised, and commented: “She’s so big for a little girl. And you’re so cute, and letting daddy pull you up like that.”[3]

Note the grammar. In the first case the little boy, subject/agent, was standing up. In the second case the only agency the little girl had was to put herself into the object position, with her father as the ‘real’ subject/agent. Jamie didn’t do it, her father did.
On the other hand, in the Jaqi languages the subject/object not only are not ranked, they cannot even be separated. Thus, in Jaqaru, arkt*wa is ‘I speak to somebody’, arktawa is ‘you speak to someone’, but ‘I speak to you’ is arkimawa, where the person suffix on the verb, -ima carries the object and the subject in a unit that cannot be separated into parts. In Jaqaru the verb ‘to help’ is yanhishii, composed of yanha ‘companion’ and -ishi ‘reflexive’, so that the sentence Yanhshutma ‘Help me.’ means literally ‘You to me be a mutual companion.’ The language is interaction focused, not agent focused.

If she did it, and it can't be attributed easily to some man, then one can pollute her agency. Given our hierarchy plus the connotation of derivation as 'not original' and therefore, in some sense or other 'bad', which realizes itself in 'blame the derivation', this can result in such a denigration that what she did can be utterly dismissed. The pollution also ties into another cultural construct of good and bad being opposites and absolutes. Most of the pollution is sex-related, and for my students, comes in apparently a constant barrage of insulting epithets. Crazy is the other most common pollution. We all know only too many of these instances. Just this semester a student reported that a professor had dismissed the whole body of Margaret Mead's anthropological work because she had married thrice. But here's a story brought by a young man.

When a friend of mine had finished reading one of the several Star Trek novels written by Vonda N. McIntyre, he appeared truly satisfied with the contents of the book. "I'm impressed," my friend said "this book wasn't as bad as some of the others. It's probably because that Vonda chic is some strange lesbian who stays locked up in her house all the time except when she dresses up as Mr. Spock to pick up other women." Although he had read many other lacking novels in the same genre (written mostly by men) he never made a comment more than "That was terrible" or "that sucked." However, when it was actually a good book, written by a woman, he had to make a derogatory comment to justify the occurrence. Until now, I never would have picked up the pattern.[4]

When I was first among the Jaqi I found it most disconcerting to listen to someone denigrate someone else and then be easily working with them. It took me a long time to understand that the denigration was of behaviors, and that in the round of things, other behaviors would not be so judged. I thought that is was an amazing practice of forgiveness, but 'forgiveness' was not part of the structure. They are highly critical of each other, and there is a verb tense that I call the 'remonstrator' used almost exclusively to scold. Real understanding came when I finally realized that judgment was on an aesthetic base, that the terms used in the judgment were not, in fact, good and bad, but beautiful and human or stony, naked or ugly. Furthermore, the judgments were not antonyms—Jaqi doesn't do antonyms—nor were they ranked as absolutes and mutually exclusives. One behavior did not cancel out the other, either way.
The third Russ discourse strategy for keeping women out of the subject slot is that of 'double standard of content' which invokes the hierarchy, that the experience of the derivation is of no consequence. What is the meaning of 'goddess'? She can only be defined through the existence and characteristics of a male god? That is the point—that the examination of a woman's life has no meaning except as examined through the masculine.

I recently attended a gallery opening featuring two nature photographers who had both never shown their work to the general public before. Each artist was billed separately and equally. My friend John and I toured the gallery together. The photographs were arranged in one room in an alternating fashion so there was no division between the artist's works. The general theme of the entire show was "survival". The female artist concentrated on reproduction and birth. Most of the pictures showed all types of animals in the midst of the birthing process. I remember thinking how graphic but beautiful they were. The male artist chose to show the predatory nature of animals. Most of the scenes were violent hunt and kill shots. He too caught the beauty of it, I thought. As we came to the final photographs John said, "This guy has such a unique and raw perspective, he REALLY made this show." I asked him what he thought of the other artist and tried to point out that she really showed promise and her interpretation of survival showed pain and joy, which takes talent. "GIVE ME A BREAK!", John said, "That is exactly the point, look at the subject matter. It's a bunch of animals having babies. They belong in a nursery, not a famous gallery. Yeah, she took her chances with some wild animals, too bad it was not for something that meant SOMETHING."[5]

This double standard of content utterly baffles my Jaqi friends. One Andean man, as he watches men engaging in this behavior has often remarked 'But don't they know where they came from?', i.e. 'Don't they know they were created by woman?' The equal privileging of women's and men's life experiences is, however, heavily impacted from the central government as boys' activities are funded but girls' are not, and silly things are invented for women to do because 'developers' can't see what women actually are doing.

The fourth Russ discourse strategy for keeping women out of the subject slot is that of 'false categorizing'. Categorizing is pan-human and even essentially human. So, if you can't get rid of these subjects by other strategies, invoke hierarchy and put the work in a category further down the hierarchy scale. This example is from a Cherokee woman.

The Cherokee have a person of power in the tribe who fits the white definition of a Medicine Man, but this person is a woman. White Men had trouble dealing with this so they decided that she was really the assistant of the real Medicine Man and called her a "corn woman".[6]
This type of false categorizing keeps us from seeing what woman elsewhere in the world have created and accomplished.

The fifth Russ discourse strategy for keeping women out of the subject slot is that of 'isolation'. She only did one of whatever it was, so it doesn't count. It can be attributed to 'luck' or a 'fluke'. In a way this might look like a contradiction of the singular, but the operative word here is not 'one' or 'first', but 'only'.

My piano teacher had to choose her three top students to play for a charity recital. Four of us were equally qualified for her top students (3 males and myself). She chose the three males to play. When I inquired politely as to the selection process, she informed me that she felt they had more experience playing for an audience after their participation in a Sonatina competition recently. Since I only competed once in an "official" competition (in which I won first place over the other three), she felt I would have difficulty coping with an audience. This was exceptionally ironic considering that she was aware of my accompanying my choral department and church in front of an audience regularly. I only competed once (even though the charity recital was not a competition).[7]

In the Jaqi languages data source marking enforces a sense of history so that the notion of things appearing or people doing things with no history is not easily expressed grammatically. One specifies what one has experienced or witnessed personally, what one has learned through language, and what comes from non-personal knowledge, like myths, old history, and so on. This makes for a connected sense of behavior and personality expectations.

The sixth Russ discourse strategy for keeping women out of the subject slot is that of 'anomalousness'. For example, virtually every young woman in my classes is involved in athletics of one kind or another, yet everyone of them feels herself to be, and is regularly told by everyone else that she is, absolutely weird among women to be able to do what she does. This neatly destroys community among women and also relieves the speakers of looking about for any other subjects that might belong to this category. Categorization into anomalousness renders the agent invisible.

Driving around this afternoon, I saw a sign that read "Men at Work," on the side of the road and I commented to my girlfriend that this sign might be the last sign to ever have to be changed to "People at Work," because I had never seen a woman working on road repairs and therefore the sign still holds true. In all seriousness, I was kidding her but she quickly called my attention to a woman we had both seen and commented on the day before, who was working on drainage pipes by the roadside. Oddly enough, she quickly dismissed her own example as invalid because the woman was "weird". Indeed we had both perceived this woman to be weird the day before, this being why we had commented on and remembered her. My girlfriend had cited her as an example in our little joke and then quickly disregarded her. Immediately I explained to her that she had just used one of Joanna Russ' categories and thanked her for an example to use for this observation.[8]
One young woman, active in sports from a young age, felt that anomalously had been the most scaring of the strategies used against her, recounting how she was told that she was too rough an influence on girls, yet if she played with the boys she might turn them into sissys—anomalous either way.[9]

When women move into new fields, that is become subjects/agents where they have not before, two things happen with the effect of maintaining the existing derivational thinking structure. First, discourse strategies are used to keep the existence of women in the subject/agent slot invisible. When that is no longer possible, then hierarchy is invoked, the sentence frame behind the ‘women is 80-ft cliff jumper’ comes into play and the profession itself gets downgraded. This happened to secretaries and to teachers, and in my lifetime appears to be happening to physicians, professors, and maybe even to lawyers.

Clearly what we think of as the nature of the universe is not so. Clearly there other ways of organizing human relationships, and of constructing these relationships in language. Because English is a creole language, primarily dependent on syntax, we can at least on an individual basis name some of the manifestations of derivational thinking and alter our language, which will have the effect, slowly, of altering our perceptions and those of people around us.

Two caveats:

1) All of these discourse strategies are of course available for use in any situation a speaker may desire. The nature of language is indeed its flexibility. What we have been looking at here are the patterns of use, especially those patterns of use that are not fully in the conscious awareness of the speakers but that are pervasive, those patterns that reveal underlying conceptual structures.

2) The Japi people include women and men as equal human beings. They are also just ordinary human beings with all the ordinary flaws that come with being human and trying to muddle through. I found their way of life refreshing and enlightening, a most valuable and empowering experience for myself. It is not utopia. I am not recommending that we abandon our own for theirs, but rather that we share together in appreciation and mutual learning the creations that we have separately managed to bring about. Different and equal—not ranked.

3) I have found the work of other scholars valuable, in particularly two linguists, Suzette Haden Elgin [Elgin, 1980; Elgin 1 993] and Deborah Tannen [Tannen 1986; Tannen 1993]. Their grammatical insights, especially at the discourse level, have helped me. I see my work as additional analysis to theirs and to that of so many others, not as opposition. As humans we are most adept at creating elaborate superstructures as justification of underlying perceptions. That my analysis work at the grammatical base does not in any way impugn those that work with other levels.
The value of naming the grammatical patterns being used is illustrated by the following observation.

I was sitting in the corridor with another student waiting for my exercise class to begin. Another student sat across from us, with his shorts pulled up around his leg so that most of his penis showed. He appeared to be reading the paper, but he had a smile on his face. I told the instructor that we had been flashed. He said, "You get what you look for." (Pollution of Agency.) I rebutted this, so he replied that it was just the same thing as a girl wearing a short skirt. (False Categorizing) I said that it certainly was not and indicated that the flasher might have mental problems. Then he told me, "Well, you were the only one who saw it." (Isolation, anomalousness) I said that I was not, that at least one other person saw it. Then he said, "Well, I didn't see anything." (Denial of Agency) This was an awful experience. However, I was thinking as it happened, "This is just like Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7 from Russ." I'm glad that I was able to recognize what was happening.[10]

Naming is empowering. To return to my first example, the feminist groups referred to had clearly organized themselves in a rational, thoughtful, egalitarian superstructure, only to be sabotaged from within our native language as derivational thinking reasserted itself in spite of the explicitly stated intentions of the speakers. Meanwhile, the Jaqi speakers easily believe the tales that the United States is a place where all people are completely equal, that being the normal, civilized way to live.
Endnotes

[1] Courtesy of Lisa R. Perry
[2] Courtesy of Laura A. Boyce
[3] Courtesy of Art Bautista-Hardman
[4] Courtesy of ScoK LaPorta
[5] Courtesy of Tara Schreier
[7] Courtesy of Anna Davis
[8] Courtesy of Carlos Martinez
[9] Courtesy of Karen Motz
[10] Courtesy of Joan von Dauch

Bibliographies


Hardman forthcoming A Hardman, M.J. "Gender through the Levels" Women & Language

Hardman forthcoming B Hardman, M.J. "And if We Lose Our Name, then What About Our Land?" or, What Price Development?" Differences that Make a Difference.


Book Reviews

*Essays About the English Language, Western Science, Patterns of Thought*

Sometimes an editor feels a serendipitous symbiosis among essays received and/or books sent for review. That has happened with papers received and considered for this issue of *Women and Language*. And for that reason, the following group of papers is presented together. We have first an essay by M. J. Hardman, in which she provides fundamental insights into the connections among gendered thought patterns reflected in the English speaker’s talk. Then we present two reactions to the collected essays of Evelyn Fox Keller, *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science*. For that reason, we devote more space than usual to book reviews. We combine two original reviews of Keller’s book with excerpts from a review by Anne Fausto-Sterling in the May 1993 *Women's Review of Books*. At the same time, we invite your attention to the summary of Julia’s Penelope’s *Speaking Freely* and to the review of that book we previously published (Fall 1991). We hope to stimulate ideas and commentary on the usually unseen patterns of thought that perpetuate gender bias even when the words themselves may appear to have been “cleansed” of such biases.

*Aita Taylor*

*Gender through the Levels*  
By M. J. Hardman

“To act in a way that is both sexist and racist, to maintain one’s class privilege, it is only necessary to act in the customary, ordinary, usual, even polite manner.”  
Joanna Russ

Language permeates all we are as human beings, both within ourselves and in all our interactions without. As humans, our language provides for us the necessary structure for perception and for action. Different languages provide different structural principles for their respective speakers. By the time we are six years old we quite naturally assume the structural principles provided by our own language to be those of the universe; such an assumption is necessary to the acquisition of one’s first language and culture. Some of the structural principles of English, the linguistic postulates of English, lead us to what I call ‘derivational thinking’ which makes it difficult for us to perceive women or the work women do as autonomous.

In working with the Jaqi languages of the Andes of South America, I gradually became aware of how the structural principles of these languages contrasted sharply with those of my own language in precisely the areas which make our perceptions of women so difficult.

I have developed the concept of the *linguistic postulate* to account for the way in which themes/concepts are manifested structurally across all the levels of a grammar within a given language and culture.

The grammar of any given language will typically demand that high-level linguistic postulates be specified in virtually every sentence of the language. In this way, by the time that a child has acquired her language, and her culture as well, her cognitive system automatically encodes the relevant linguistic postulate features from any experience. Thus, we accept the linguistic postulates of our mother tongue without argument or discussion, as natural parts of the universe, an example of nurture becoming nature for the participants. In fact it is so difficult to imagine ‘real’ human beings operating without one’s own linguistic postulates that it verges on the impossible. Linguistic postulates form the major structuring and selecting grids for the perception/cognition within any given language/culture.

Linguistic postulates must, however, be taught to children. As underlying assumptions they are particularly powerful, and they are also typically reflected in proverbs, sayings, and/or typical admonitions to children. For example, English speaking children are admonished with a sex reference, typically ‘Be a good girl’ or ‘Be a good boy’. In the Jaqi languages, with the linguistic postulate of human/non-human, children are admonished to ‘Act like a human’ or they are accused of not treating someone else as a human.

Linguistic postulates are also built into the vocabulary structure as well as the grammatical structure. For example, verbs and nouns in the Jaqi languages carry a covert mark of human or non-human, like many of our English terms carry such a covert gender mark, e.g., Mary, ship. Frequently the postulates also serve as major classifying devices for other types of behavior, most frequently without intellectual and/or conscious justification. When challenged, the most common native reaction is ‘But it’s natural!’ When one discovers, at last, a linguistic postulate while doing field work, and shares such a marvel with one’s consultants, the usual reaction is—well, of course, everybody knows that, or well, only ‘gringos’ could be so dumb as to not know. It
has even been argued that surely we make such a distinction, even if it is not visible in our grammar. (Cf Carpenter, 1981.)

One such postulate in English is number. It is difficult to produce a sentence in English in which there is no singular or plural mark, and correspondingly, we think of the unmarked number, singular, as being primary. If you doubt this, try thinking of a such a sentence. It is possible, but such sentences can't say much.

Marked versus unmarked is a linguistic concept referring to the fact that for some grammatical categories one form is the base on which the other form is constructed, i.e. one form is unmarked, the other marked. In English number, the unmarked (singular) is the primary.

Number, specifically singular versus plural, is a major postulate for all Indo-European languages. Some languages mark it more overtly than others; some limit it to nouns and verbs, some include adjectives, marking number in both morphological and syntactic constructions by agreement and/or governance. English marks number overtly in nouns, pronouns, and verbs and requires syntactic agreement. For English, cultural correlates of the number postulate are immediately obvious: in proverbs (one thing at a time); in our adulation of linear work; in our obsession with monotheoretical stances in academia and its concomitant throwing out of all else in favor of the new one, with monotheism in religion, with singular causes in history; in the sponsoring of monocropping in agriculture, even to single species of a single crop; in seeing singular causes of diseases with singular cures. Consider the epithet some have tried to make of 'eclectic.'

These Indo-European postulates contrast with those of the Jaqi languages of South America, for example. The Jaqi languages include Aymara, the native language of a third of the population of Bolivia and the major language of southern Peru and northern Chile, and two languages in Peru with very few speakers, Jaqaruru and Kawki. These languages are the remnant of what was, before the Incas, the largest of the economic 'empires' of ancient Peru (Hardman, 1985). My own work among the Jaqi peoples now spans more than a quarter of a century (Hardman, 1966, 1983; Hardman et al, 1975, 1988). The two major postulates of these languages are Data Source and Humanness.

The linguistic postulate of Data Source means that the speakers indicate, in virtually every sentence, the source of the knowledge the sentence imparts. The three basic categories of data source in the Jaqi languages organize experience for the Jaqi speakers as singular and plural do for us. The first is Personal knowledge which is the unmarked category for verb tenses but does require a sentence suffix, -wa; this category is that of personal witness. The second is Thor-language-knowledge, which is all knowledge acquired because you heard someone say it or because you read it. The third is Non-personal-knowledge which typically requires special verb conjugations and which includes all knowledge from myth, legend and history for which there are no living witnesses. On the basis of these three categories the Jaqi languages each build an elaborate structure with endless nuances of data source. In the Jaqi languages it is virtually impossible to utter any sentence without indicating the source of one's data.

Also, like us with our postulate of number when learning other languages, Jaqi people learning English will protest that it can't possibly be true that one can speak a language without marking data source. It is only human to do so. Data source in the grammar of the Jaqi languages was not discovered in the nearly 500 years since the arrival of the Spanish because the Aymara presumed that the Spanish and speakers of other European languages making data source mistakes were simply acting their usual non-human manner.

At one time the Jaqi were the dominant people in the Andes, and they, like us, also imposed their postulates on the people they came in contact with. Today the other languages of the Andes, Quechua and Aymara Spanish, also reflect these same three basic categories of data source (Hardman, 1982; Martin, 1981a & b; LaPrade, 1976, 1981).

The second linguistic postulate of the Jaqi languages that I wish to describe here is that of human/ non-human. This correlates in function to our sex-based gender system. The grammatical base consists of two sets of pronouns, one for humans, one for all else. Referring to humans with the non-human set is, in Aymara, a good way to pick a fight, analogous to using a woman term for a man in English. Since the non-human pronouns are translated with the English terms 'this' and 'that' (and the Spanish equivalents), non-Aymara speakers may unwittingly find themselves in the position of having seriously insulted Aymara people. Also many verbs, nouns, and adjectives carry in their meaning covert reference to human or otherwise, a meaning that is not obvious in the translations, and again leads to serious misunderstandings. Vocabulary words for people are clearly distinguished from those for animals. Correlating with this, since there is no sex postulate, words which specifically refer to women are not derived from the paired item referring to men.

As a correlate of the humanness postulate, it is never a compliment to refer to a human being in animal terms. Children are admonished to behave like people.
(not animals) or to treat others as people (not animals). In a quarrel, to accuse the other of not behaving like a human is a particularly nasty insult. In Aymara, the verb 'to marry', the same for both sexes, /jichasí/, means literally 'to cause oneself to become a human being,' that is, to assume full human responsibility and relationships within the community; this human status is the goal for the children.

Postulates are learned, they are not part of the common human heritage. The linguistic postulate that is of concern in this paper is that of sex-based gender in English, which, like humanness in Jaqi, is partly covert and partly overt. Its distinguishing feature is that the feminine is derived from the masculine. This postulate permeates every level of grammar, and has reflexes in the culture.

Because linguistic postulates are learned so early and because they interplay in the physiology of the brain (Tsunoda, 1985) our perceptions are guided by these structural principles. In any ordinary circumstance we project onto any new event or person the structures we already know. In this way, for example, women of non-European societies lost status with the imposition of colonialism, precisely because the European men could not/would not interact with a woman in power nor would/could they even recognize the full personhood of women.

Sex-based derivative gender is realized in all levels of English structure. Some of these levels have been quite thoroughly explored by other scholars; some have not. Under the concept of the linguistic postulate I tie these structures together, showing a common motivation in the varying manifestations.

Sex and/or gender marking (seen as synonymous in Indo-European grammar [Miller, 1976] whether they are or not) is, in Indo-European, of the sexist variety in that the male is seen as the prototype and the female as a secondary derivative, such that if the male is known, the female can be described with reference to him, or constructed from him, but not vice versa. Even the word female, from the French femme in diminutive, was reformed in English to look like it was derived from 'male' even though it wasn't (cf McConnell-Ginet, 1980; Kramarae, 1981; Martyna, 1980).

Refer to Figure 1 to follow the map as we trace gender through the levels of English.

The level of syntax and discourse, that of the sentence and the paragraph and the dialogue, have been dealt with at length by Elgin (1989), Tannen (1986), Penelope (1990), and others. This includes the differing ways in which women and men converse, the different meanings attributed to what appear to be common sentences and conversational strategies, and the differing semantics for what would appear to be the same words, including the differing metaphors by which we structure our perceptions.

The material that these scholars have dealt with gives us some of the reasons for breakdowns in our daily communications. One metaphor misce that Elgin discusses, for example, is the use by women of a schoolroom metaphor in cross with a sports metaphor preferred by men. In terms of semantics this root metaphor means that for women 'failure' carries a semantic burden of 'final'; for the other metaphor it does not. This is not biological in any way; for Japanese men, working out of a vastly different structure, 'failure' carries an even stronger semantic weight of 'final' than it does for those of us operating on the schoolroom metaphor. Elgin also deals with the verbal abuse that comes from 'intelligent, educated, good' men. Tannen deals with purpose in conversation, specifically that women talk to form community, men to form hierarchies. You will note that the classroom is, ideally, a community, but that the purpose of sports is to outrank someone else. In this way the work of the two scholars can be seen as complementary, and we begin to understand why intimate conversation is so difficult.

Another aspect, beyond the scope of this paper, are what I call the "seminal" metaphors—the way in which scientific theory is couched in language reflecting men's sexual beliefs, a further manifestation of this linguistic postulate. Keller's 1985 work speaks to this.

Also in discourse and syntax we find the studies that have addressed the myth of the quantity of women's speech, as study after study shows great constancy in the larger portion of any mixed sex conversation going to the men. If we think of this in derivational terms, then we can see that the root must, of course, have more time and more space than its derivation.

Two other aspects of syntax are of interest here.

In English the subject is prime. In linguistics we even speak of 'raising the object to subject position' to form the passive. Subjects are obligatory; objects are not. The title of a recent movie, purporting to treat the subject of friendships between women and men was titled 'When Harry Met Sally', Harry in the subject position, and Sally guess where! One of the marks of 'derivative thinking' is keeping women out of subject positions. Textbooks in linguistics, for example, are notorious for examples of the type 'John hits Mary', never the reverse. Recently on our campus the students challenged one professor; he tried but had great difficulty imagining Mary in subject positions! (Maranzana, 1992)
Also, in English normal syntactic ordering is not women and men, but men and women, not female and male, but male and female, thus reinforcing the derivational order and also in this ordering reinforcing the nexus of male and one, leaving men singularly first even when plural.

The level of vocabulary is the level we are most clearly conscious of and is the level that has been most popularly explored. Penelope (1990), among others, has done a great deal of work with vocabulary. Because of the nature of the postulate it is difficult for words referring to women to remain positive or words referring to men to remain negative. For any sentence of the type, woman is ______, the item in the blank has a strong tendency to become deprecative; it is very difficult to make it otherwise. On the other hand, with the male as unmarked and prototype, it is difficult to keep anything unambiguously bad; even such things as assassin turn out to be admirable ‘anti-heroes’! The word ‘macho’, which feminists had hoped to make into an insult, is an example. Equally, words referring to women are always insults when applied to men. I.e., if it is good for a woman, it is bad for a man. This includes not only specifically woman words, but adjectives referring to peaceful and nurturing qualities. In terms of derivational thinking, whatever belongs to the derivation must be stripped away from the unmarked root, otherwise the root might become the derivation.

The postulate has, perhaps, its most powerful realization at the grammatical level of the English language, not only because of its own characteristics, but because it is reinforced by two complementary postulates. The three basic obligatory constructions, all linguistic postulates, interplay together to reinforce each other. These are: number, hierarchy, gender.

Number is overtly obligatory and pervasive, as I illustrated above. Singular is the unmarked category, and the category that carries the semantic freight of ‘best’ oh to be Number One!

The second structure is the comparative/absolute (wise, wiser, wisest) which means constant hierarchy in our speech and our perceptions. Unranked comparison, which we label as a ‘figure of speech,’ the simile, is, interestingly, grammaticalized in the Jaqi languages, but Jaqi does not have our type of ranking comparative. The ranking comparative/absolute structure does not appear, at first glance, to be obligatory, but in interplay with the other two, does indeed function in this way, in mutually reinforcing fashion. We talk about equality as a topic but in our daily speech enunciate constant hierarchy. If you doubt me, try doing without a comparative or an absolute for even an hour. I require my students to try it for 24 hours; so far no one has made it.

In contrast many languages have no ranking comparative at all, including the Jaqi languages. It may be that we must talk equality if we wish any at all, because we so easily and consistently lapse into hierarchy. In contrast, the Japanese talk hierarchy constantly because, according to Mizutani (1981), the moment they stop they lapse immediately into equality. (A culturally correlative example of this is that now well-known statistic that the Japanese CEO’s are paid 16 times the salary of the lowest paid member of the firm; ours are paid 160 times that salary). We might think also of our constant ranking of students, the power of standardized tests, the importance given to even a hundredth of a second, the judgments of experiences by ‘What did you like best?’, etc. It is a constant experience of my students to discover that they must suddenly pay actual attention to the attributes of people and objects when they can no longer simply rank. Notice that this postulate is mutually reinforcing with one, in that only one can be at the pinnacle of our type of hierarchy.

The third structure is, of course, sex-based gender, which in English is partly overt and partly covert. The principle of English sex-based gender is that feminine is derived from masculine. Therefore the feminine is dependent, grammatically, on the masculine. The masculine is the unmarked; the feminine the marked. The structures which directly reflect sex-based gender include pronouns, names, and person referencing. There are results both in terms of perception and culture most of which are well-known to all of us; conferences like this one are held to discuss the cultural results.

A common myth is that languages like the Romance languages with overt gender everywhere are by that very fact more clearly sexist. This is not true. Covert categories actually may carry more weight precisely because they are not visible. Also, in a language like Spanish, a man cannot entirely divorce himself from the feminine; after all he personally has a feminine head, a feminine mind, a feminine hand, a feminine mouth, a feminine leg. These structures merit separate studies; ranking of languages is inappropriate.

First and foremost is the matter of pronouns, which are far more important than vocabulary precisely because they work as an integral part of the grammar. In many languages the functions that we assign to pronouns are carried in suffixes or other grammatical markers. The ‘generic’ he and the difficulties we have had finding substitutes for it are problems we are all familiar with. The relative difficulties between vocabulary
and pronouns was neatly illustrated on our campus by a
document for graduate exams which had a line labeled
'Signature of chairperson or his representative.' Martyn-
a (1980), among others, has done some excellent stu-
dies of the psychology of the generic masculine whereby
she found that the only people who could actually not
imagine a male figure upon hearing the generic 'he'
were a few women, not many but a few. Apparently
there were no men who ever imagined anyone but a
male. Part of the semantic freight of this use is that to be
human is to be male.

However, the sex-based gender system of English is
not confined to persons. Vehicles are frequently re-
ferred to as she—ships, boats, cars, etc. Mathiot (1979)
does a most interesting study in which she pulled
apart some of the semantic elements of the pronouns in
English. Another item that has been making the
rounds, is that it is astonishingly easy for English speak-
ers to assign a contrasting sex (gender) to any two items,
and correlation from speaker to speaker is very high.
Given a fork and a spoon, for instance, which is which?

In the same vein, the use of 's/he' makes an implica-
tion of derivation based on an accident of spelling where
there is, in fact, no derivation historically. Linguistically
the two forms are unrelated, but the power of the postu-
late is such that we can see it even in chance spelling
conventions.

Part of the manifestation of the male as unmarked,
with the feminine derivative, is the way in which women
are identified. Identity is closely related to name refer-
ence, which is part of the power of naming, so that, as
women, we may come to accept a derivative status along
with our derivative name.

First, in terms of referencing, are the derivations
-ess and -ette which are today the most productive of
the feminine/diminutive suffixes (in the history of En-
GLISH there are many more). These can be added to any-
thing, and are always, to one degree or another,
pejorative. Consider, for example, how 'leather' holds
up against 'leatherette.' A colleague of mine, con-
cerned about the education his children were getting on
TV started a collection of such terms as 'smurfette.' I
was heartened by a report from a student of mine re-
cently. A child, a niece of hers, was discussing some
women actors. An adult corrected her to 'actress'. No,
she said, women can be actors, too. She knew the mean-
ing of the 'feminine' suffix very well' i.e, no validity ex-
cept as specified by a governing/defining male presence.

Also, our basic terms, woman and female, appear
and are believed to be, derived from the man and male.
The history of woman and man is convoluted and in-
volves meaning shifts, woman coming from a com-
pound, not directly a derivation. Female and male have
no historical connection at all; female, from a French
diminutive of femme, was respelled to look like it was
derived from male! Thus is the power of the postulate of
derivation, that is, the assumption of derivation is made
even when inappropriate because it is assumed to be
'natural'.

There is great power in naming. Women's names,
the very labels by which we claim our identity, are in En-
GLISH derivational. Our surnames are all patronymic,
a custom our men are now imposing on the rest of the
world. Thailand, for example, adopted this custom
about 100 years ago, to the loss of women's names. The
title Mrs. plus his name is fully derivational. Many wom-
en's personal names are also derived from men's
names—Carla from Carl, Francie from Frank, etc. Only
one name that I know of goes the other way"—Marion
from Mary, which Eisler (1980) would probably argue is
a remnant of the goddess (? not god?).

Elgin was commenting on a difficulty that had aris-
en in the use of the name syntomics for some of the work
she does. From a reader response she answered as fol-
low:

"Steve Marsh writes to tell me that he likes the idea
of naming the work I do 'the Haden-Elgin' method or
system or whatever, and he lists its various good points. I
understand. But there's a problem. Neither my first
husband (Peter Haden) nor my second husband
(George Elgin) took part in my work in any way, that is,
supposing what I do is important enough to be labeled in
this fashion, the label credits my two husbands, not me,
with what I have done. Nor would my 'maiden' name be
any help, since my father (Gaylord Wilkins) had nothing
to do with my work either. Dale Carnegie doesn't have
this problem; no American male has this problem; mal-
es tend not to realize this problem exists [Elgin, 1990]."

Derivational thinking results from the sex-based
gender system of English which derives the feminine
from the masculine and is reinforced by the linguistic
postulates of number, with singular as unmarked (like
masculine), and the ranking comparative. So masculine
and singular go together in an interplay which allows
only one on top. Male is unmarked. If female is to have
equal rights, then by the number postulate and the hier-
archy postulate, male would have to go down, and the
singular/masculine unmarked tie would be broken. This
at least partially explains the energy men are willing to
put into backlash.

I am still working out the full implications of deriva-
tional thinking. Briefly, the implications are that it is
difficult to perceive women as free standing indepen-
dent singular human beings; it is also difficult to
perceive the activities that women engage in as fully hu-
man and worthwhile activities. For some people, pri-
marily men but also women, such perception may be
impossible. On the international scene, this postulate
makes it difficult for us to evaluate the position of wom-
en in other societies and may blind us even to examples
where women are not thought of derivationally. The
Jaqi people whose postulates I gave you above, for ex-
ample, have often been depicted as medieval European
peasants, with men as singular heads and women as de-
rivative (Hardman, 1988).

In conclusion I would like to look at the issue of sex-
ual harassment in the light of the Hill-Thomas hearings
as a way of seeing some of the implications of the deriva-
tional thinking that comes out of this pervasive struc-
ture.

Given derivational thinking, women in object posi-
tion, the primacy of the root, behavioral outcomes such
as the trivialization of sexual harassment and the sena-
tors' behavior at the Hill-Thomas hearings can be un-
derstood, even predicted. People did not disbelieve
Anita Hill. I don't think even the senators did. The
number of articles detailing sexual harassment in so
many national publications, and the attention given sex-
ual harassment on campuses and in the workplace show
clearly that she was believed. Given that he was the root
and she the derivation, then clearly if one must choose
between the two, one chooses the root. Also, he in sub-
ject position and she as object is "felt" to be 'right'—"her
only option (objects being optional) being to remove
herself, which would allow another object to slide into
the slot.

This does not gainsay other analyses, for instance
Elgin's in a recent Lonesome Node (1991), in which she
suggests that Hill made an error in strategy. I just do not
believe it would have made any difference. For evi-
dence, logic, and presentation, the group that testifi-
fors Hill could not have been surpassed. In the presence
of derivational thinking any excuse is sufficient to tip
the balance to the root and leave the derivation hang-
ning. Also, it is entirely appropriate to rid the root of any
hanging derivation so that it may be 'clean' and singular
and unmarked. One might think here, as a correlative
example, of the language used in fraternity initiation
 ceremonies (Sanday, 1990). The derivation does not
have an independent existence; the sacrifice of the root
for justice to the derivation cannot be expected. To use
men's metaphors and syntactic ordering, in the "game"
of 'he said, she said' it is not a "battle" of equals.

Endnotes

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2 For a detailed explanation of the data source material, see
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   Aymara tense on mutual attitudes. In M. J. Hardman
   (ed.), The Aymara Language in Its Social and Cultural
Occasionally, a writer's work is sufficiently thought-provoking that numerous people respond strongly and with diverse opinions. This, in itself, marks a significant achievement. Sometimes that work is also often exceptionally important in nature of the ideas it explores. Your *Women and Language* editor finds one such book to be *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science* by Evelyn Fox Keller (published by Routledge in 1992 and available in paper for 15.95).

Perhaps this importance can be testified to by the fact that we received two reviews of the Keller book along with a photocopy of Anne Fausto-Sterling's review in *Women's Review of Books*. Fausto-Sterling notes, importantly, that Keller's aim is not to repudiate science or to replace it, but reclamation "from within of science as a human instead of a masculine project." Fausto-Sterling notes that Keller focused almost exclusively on language, and that more will be required, especially "a clear understanding of the politics of scientific knowledge production." Saying that "this book is must reading" does not mean she agrees with everything in it, Fausto-Sterling concluded with the comment that "this book is too important to let" the difficulties of reading what she considers excessively complex writing interfere with reading these essays. Fausto-Sterling also thinks Keller under-valued the complexities of gender that are introduced by race. But, in all, the conclusion is that "none of us has a complete or right answer to the questions raised" and that the Keller's book has "pushed the conversation forward."

Because I agree with Fausto-Sterling and believe that the questions being raised by feminist critics of science are also questions about patterns of western thought reflected and perpetuated in our culture by our language, I believe discussion about Keller's book important for *Women and Language* readers. Hopefully the following quite disparate reviews when read in combination with the preceding article by M. J. Hardman, will stimulate commentary from some of you.
ry for studying the construct of science. She seems to view her personal history as authoritative in resolving the issue of gender and science, which ultimately flaws her generalizations. Since few women, indeed even academics, can imagine themselves as physicists, I am concerned that her credentials will particularly persuade women. Questions on Gender and Science are raised in the introduction and part I; the hypotheses and their defense presented in part II; part III addresses the problems of how language has shaped research directions in biology.

Part II fails to persuade this reviewer. Keller's analysis of physics starts and stops with the atom bomb and the males employed by the Manhattan project. She subscribes to a constrained view of science, that science must be measured not by its discoveries but by how those discoveries have been used. She summarizes her evidence and decides: physics is the science of unlocking the secrets of death, biology the secrets of life. Why? The sciences used to make the atom bomb unlocked a secret about a deadly object. The secret of life was unraveled by the "conquistadores" Watson and Crick, biologists. Keller conveniently omits the biologists who developed germ warfare.

These conclusions are bolstered by quotes and stories, such as that by Robert Oppenheimer reminding us that "as the (mushroom) cloud rose up in the distance, he recalled (lines from the Bhagavad-Gita): I am become Death the shatterer of worlds." She adds other stories to connect these ideas. For example, one major support for the 'Science of Death, Science of Life' hypothesis is the view proffered by Dundes that in ancient mythology the bullroarer "is the symbolic representation of a widespread belief that 'boys become men by means of male anal power.'" Here Keller provides her insight: This symbolic replacement of vaginal birth is also offered by the rites of primitive cultures which transform "boys into men" by "anal rebirth." The secrecy of the rites "serves to circumscribe the domain of destructive powers unleashed." Other stories are used: Mary Shelley's Frankensteins in which the male scientist coops the "procreative function" releasing destruction; the claim that a generation ago, a common sideline of budding contemporary male scientists was production of "stink bombs—ready to be set off by the young scientist whenever crossed by an uncooperative or angry mother." Aligning the image of the budding male chemist or physicist against the maternal image is used as evidence for the Science of Death, Science of Life hypothesis. In contrast, the stink bombs I remember were set off in high schools by the poorest students, often in front of a male principals office, in the hall during recess or a in neighborhood movie theater on a Saturday morning attended by few mothers. Stink bombs were set off to attract the attention of peers. One can easily agree that the weapons industry delights in using homo-erotic images. But this is not enough to build her case; better data is needed. Similarly, Keller suggests that biologists routinely describe the Watson-Crick discovery as "unlocking the secret of life." I had never heard this description and neither had my colleagues in biology.

Another flaw I find is misuse of scientific language: in the introduction she uses the word, force, which has the scientific meaning of causing the acceleration of an object. It also signifies the nature of a fundamental construct of our universe: to create action at a distance such as by a gravitational force field. In its generic sense the word also means impact. Keller takes advantage of the multi-level usage to write "Gravity is a force, DNA has force, but beliefs do not." Recasting this sentence with the correct use of language, one would say, 'Gravity is a force, the discovery of the structure of DNA has had an impact, but beliefs do not.' The sentence now loses its power to persuade. The sentence as originally constructed by Professor Keller is dramatic but distorts. And because many readers will be scientifically unsophisticated, the misuse of scientific terms is problematic. All of us practicing laboratory research agree that language is crucial to defining our results and criticisms. But critics need to be equally careful in analysis of the language of science.

One of Keller's major concerns is the objectivity of scientists in data interpretation, writing that "The problem is data do not speak for themselves." The implication here is that all data can have multiple interpretations, a problem in that she does not distinguish between data with obvious conclusions—such as the discovery of superconductivity—and data with non-obvious conclusions—such as the attempts to quantify the causes of breast cancer. Many experiments yield data which do speak for themselves, much data does not. The need for scientists to distinguish the two is obvious. But to assume that the work of physical scientists is flawed because males dominate our language community is ludicrous. I looked in vain for examples of her recasting, for example, the laws of gravity or electromagnetism in the language of kinship. The example she gives is insufficient: a quote attributed to Mary Hesse, "Neurons come in billions and their possible linkages in megabillions, while the words of a language come only in thousands and sentences cannot in a lifetime be long enough to match the antics of the neurons. 
There can’t be a word or a sentence to cover every particular thing.”

Such a conclusion ignores the role of mathematics as the language of science. Billions and billions of electrons interact in a conductor but, using the language of statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, we can predict very specific details of the phenomena of conduction. The attempt of scientists to model neural exchange using the mathematics of networks and non-linear thermodynamics has already opened up a new field of theoretical and experimental science. Sometimes experiments run ahead of language (i.e. mathematics) and sometimes the language is waiting for them such as in the development of quantum mechanics or the theory of relativity. Keller fails to instruct the unsophisticated reader that we do not completely understand some forces. Is she referring to current constraints on the mathematical language, describing for example the terms ‘weak and strong’ nuclear forces? In fact the terms, chosen by males, up, down, charm, flavor, top, bottom, to describe the aspects of quarks are not particularly masculine terms.

My first gesture after receiving this book and before reading it, was a study of the references. I was surprised to find no references to biographies, letters, or writings of the major female scientists of the 20th century, for example just to name three, Madame Curie, Lise Meitner, or Rosalind Franklin. The work of these women, discoverers of the source of radioactivity, the occurrence and theory of nuclear fission, and the first crystallographic fingerprint of the spiral structure of DNA is not even acknowledged. Certainly some insight could be gained by studying the sociological structure which defined their research and life. Perhaps Professor Keller does not consider the writings and research of these women germane to her hypotheses because there is no evidence in the writings of Madame Curie and Lise Meitner that they considered themselves participants in the “Science of Death.” On the contrary these women looked forward to the life giving technology which would result from their work.

Biology is a very different science from physics. The language of physics is mathematics. Any biological system is comprised of a complex set of positive and negative feedback loops. A complete solution which produces the orderly working of even the simplest living system has not been found. It is disguised from us for several reasons first, the problem of defining all the variables which enter into the working of the system, second, knowing the relative importance of these variables and third, constructing solvable equations for even the simplest models, i.e. involving only two or three variables. Until scientists are more successful at setting up and solving these equations a description and interpretation of the observations and experiments in genetics and population biology will necessarily incorporate an element of indeterminacy and thus imprecision of language.

The use of the Lotka-Volterra equations for ecological modeling is the example which Keller studies. She blames the failures of ecological modeling and population genetics which use these equations on the “systematic neglect of cooperative interactions and the privileging of competitive interactions.” But perhaps the problem of these failures has another root other than the social uses of language, namely, the ability to incorporate into a solvable equation the relative strengths of these two complex interactions. The Lotka-Volterra equations and their spin off “the Brusselator” can represent only the simplest system. Intelligent scientists who use them are well aware of their shortcomings. The solution to the biological problem awaits a cleverer mathematics albeit cleverer computer algorithms.

Attempts to understand these coupled systems, popularly known as complex systems, are being undertaken with some successes. But here, in the early stage of a problem, where the only solvable mathematics is too primitive to incorporate all the variables, the science will be tormented by the misuse of language with the wrong metaphors. Such convoluted language scenarios existed for the Greeks in trying to identify and describe motion, for the physicists and chemists trying to decipher temperature and heat and physicists trying to decipher particle physics. Once the fog lifts the language may be awkward but it loses its sociological connotations and the science is ready to use mathematics to decipher another unknown. For example, the use of the term calorie which predates the understanding of heat as energy is awkward but not stultifying. That some of the language may be socially directed does not necessarily flaw attempts to seek a solution. Keller seems to argue that it would, but the acceptance of a successful solution often depends more on the ability to test the proffered solution experimentally and theoretically than on the social structure. Several examples come to mind: the 19th century debate about Maxwell’s Equations; the language of pre-1957 theory of superconductivity, and the continuing debates on the foundations of quantum mechanics. In the case of solving the physics of superconductivity, the language clarified almost immediately after the hypothesis of the Cooper pairs and their subsequent experimental demonstration. Keller
has a point but the solutions for biology only await some precise mathematics.

We should remember that complete understanding of a scientific phenomenon—whether biological, physical or chemical—requires a theoretical description, experiments, an equation, and a database. And until a phenomenon is understood in this complete sense the language used may be partly metaphorical. For examples: the use of the term ‘animas’ by the Greeks to describe the motion of objects as if they were living before the concepts of motion were understood; the use of the concept of an invisible fluid called the ‘caloric’ to describe heat before the experiments of Joule; the use of the term ‘ether’ to describe the elastic material which pervaded the universe and which was responsible for the transmission of electromagnetic energy before the concept of relativity and the experiments of Michelson and Morley.

Professor Keller argues that the use of language is culture driven and thus gender driven, and that it has defined science. I find this conclusion too extreme because it fails to note that after an understanding of the phenomenon is reached the language is mathematical. Moreover, even before the “nature’s secret” is revealed metaphorical language may play a role but even that is not always gender driven.

.Secrets of Life/Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science (c) is available in paperback from Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc. 1992., at $15.95.

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.Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death
Reviewed by Arlene H. Olkin

When feminist philosopher of science Evelyn Fox Keller links gender and science and language, she poses “unallowable” questions that challenge our comfortable reliance on the neutrality of science. Over the past decade and a half, Keller has explored the cultural stereotyping of women and men and its effects on the thoughts and actions of scientists.

In her latest book, Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science, a collection of nine essays written between 1985 and 1991, Keller goes further into her inquiry by examining the language of scientists and how it functions as the vehicle which carries culture into the laboratory. With her 1985 book, Reflections on Gender and Science, Keller called our attention to what she sees as the “intrinsic masculinity” of Western science and how it creates obstacles to success for women scientists. In Secrets, Keller turns her philosophical high beam on the language of science, seeking to reveal through specific example the ways in which scientific metaphors influence both the process and the products of science.

The essays are arranged in three groups, according to theme. Most of them have appeared before in journals and other essay collections. Part I consists of a single essay, “Gender and Science: an Update,” in which Keller provides an overview of her current thinking on the subject. She begins with a caveat about “gender and science,” a phrase which she helped bring to prominence. The phrase has, in her view, become problematic over the past decade because of the slippage between “gender” and “women,” and the tendency toward ghettoizing questions about gender from other inquiries about science.

In Part II, Keller explains her recent preoccupation with the consequences of scientific activity, most clearly exemplified by the successes of molecular biology and nuclear physics in the production of technologies of life and death. Her theme here is the meaning of “secrets” and it plays throughout the essays in this group. Scientists, she notes, commonly refer to “secrets of nature” and “secrets of life” which they seek to reveal by their efforts. But what might it do to their mindset to even think about knowledge of the world in terms of secrets? Keller pushes us to ask, “whose secrets?” and “from whom?” She traces how the conventions of our language associate the secrets of women with the secrets of life and nature, which men seek to “undo” through the scientific method: female procreativity locked in drama with male productivity.

The first essay in Part II is entitled, “From Secrets of Life to Secrets of Death,” and is, by far, the most energetic and enthralling of the essays in the collection. Keller wrote it for presentation at the “Kanzer Seminar in Psychoanalysis and the Humanities” (New Haven, Spring, 1986). In the piece, she employs the psychoanalytic perspective which was a hallmark of her earlier work, Reflections on Science and Gender. She links the ancient rites of passage in which boys become warriors and men by symbolically, and secretly, co-opting female procreative powers, to nuclear weapons research that results in the “birth” of deadly “babies,” and finally, to the search for DNA, the “molecule of life” and the key to controlling evolution.

This essay is unique in the collection because it is the only one in which Keller uses the psychodynamic approach. While she is still committed to it, psychoanal-
ysis has recently become somewhat of an embarrass-
ment to philosophers, historians and sociologists of
science, and Keller avoids it in the other pieces for stra-
tegic reasons.

The remaining three essays in Part II, “Secrets of
God, Nature and Life,” “Critical Silences in Scientific
Discourse,” and “Fractured Images of Science, Lan-
guage and Power,” trace, respectively, the changing ref-
erent of “secrets,” the development of technologies of
life and death, and the force of social and material ambi-
tions on theory development in molecular genetics.

Part III consists of four essays of a more technical
nature, dealing with the question of how language func-
tions to set research agendas in evolutionary biology
and in molecular genetics. The last of these essays, “Be-
tween Language and Science: The Question of Di-
rected Mutation in Molecular Genetics,” is a
fascinating look at the linguistic construction of the
dichotomy between “random” and “purposive,” and how
the application of these terms to genetic variation may
have obscured a far more complex picture of evolution
than the ones we currently entertain. Keller suggests a
radical view of genetic variation as neither random nor
purposive, but rather, in keeping with Barbara McClun-
tock’s vision, as the manifestation of a genetic appara-
tus which reprograms itself as it “learns” from its expe-
rience.

Secrets is not breezy reading. It is challenging and
complex and some of the essays are not geared to a gen-
eral audience. But it amply rewards the traveller who
hangs in over rough spots in the trail, with some heady
vistas that are worth the climb. Keller is successful in
reveling to us some of the ways in which scientific lan-
guage “reflects and guides the development of scientific
models and methods” and directs the ends to which sci-
ence aims. In doing so, she posts a big arrow for those
looking for a way to affect change.

Secrets is rich in references and quotations from a
wide variety of poets, anthropologists, historians and
philosophers, as well as scientists, and the bibliography
is a valuable resource of readings on the social ramifi-
cations of science.

The reader who is new to feminist challenges to sci-
ence may be jolted by the imaginative up-ending of the
prevalent ideas and linguistic traditions of science.
Even those more familiar with the field are likely to be
rattled. Secrets provides no answers, but many riveting
questions for anyone interested in gender equity in sci-
ence, and for all who are concerned with the global con-
sequences of this most powerful human endeavor.

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Grammar is Sex: Language is a Woman
Julia Penelope

English teachers spend some portion of their ca-
reers trying to “explain” the vagaries of language and
the contradictions and inadequacies of the grammars
that purport to describe it. Their students sit bemused,
benumbed, and confused, wondering what, if anything,
the “rules” presented to them have to do, not only with
the language they speak, but with their lives. Analyses
of the conceptual metaphors that structure patriarchal
descriptions of English suggest that many of our prob-
lems with grammatical dicta originate in the thinking
about language coded in the resulting metaphorical ex-
pressions. Here, I will discuss three of the four related
complex metaphors that reflect patriarchal thinking
about language and communication: the CONDUIT METAPHOR, first described by Michael Reddy,
GRAMMAR IS SEX, and LANGUAGE IS A WOM-
AN. The fourth, LANGUAGE IS A TOOL, may need
no further explanation.

Michael Reddy argues that the Conduit Metaphor
is the prevalent metaphor in western descriptions of
language, including attempts to improve and under-
stand communication. Drawing on Reddy’s analysis,
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson redescribed the Con-
duit Metaphor as a complex metaphor, the CONTAIN-
ER metaphor, which they represented as a three-part
sequence:

IDEAS (OR MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS.
LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAIN-
ERS.
COMMUNICATION IS SENDING.

The framework of the Conduit Metaphor forces us
to conceive of language structures as containers, and
thoughts and feelings as objects we insert into them,
successfully or unsuccessfully. When we use the Con-
duit Metaphor to describe communication, we think of
words and sentences as having “insides” and “outsides,”
as containers into which we insert ideas and feelings.

As Reddy points out, the inherent danger of the
Conduit Metaphor is that it makes us think of commu-
nication as a simple process, like a drive-in bank’s pneu-
matic tube, one that “guarantees success without effort” (p. 295). We are taught to think that, in order to
communicate, all we have to do is pluck ideas and feel-