

The Linguistic Postulate and Derivational Thinking

MJ Hardman

The four articles included here deal with the theoretical constructs *linguistic postulate* and *derivational thinking*. The first article, "Andean Ethnography: The role of language structure in observer bias" deals with the concept of the linguistic postulate in detail and show its functioning within ethnography. The other three articles, all written ten years after the first, deal with the application of the concept of the linguistic postulate to English in a contrastive manner, leading to the development of the concept of derivational thinking, which is the mutually reinforcing interplay of three of the linguistic postulates of English. "Gender Through the Levels" is the defining article; "And if We Lose Our Name, then What About Our Land?" or, "What Price Development?" was written before that article and "Derivational Thinking, or, Why is Equality So Difficult?" was written after.

1988 "Andean Ethnography: The role of language structure in observer bias" in *Semiotica* 71-3/4, 339-372.

1993 "Gender Through the Levels" in *Women and Language* Vol XVI no. 2 pp 42-49.

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CONTENTS

MARCH/APRIL 1996
VOLUME 56, NUMBER 2

5 Upholding Human Rights and Environmental Justice

by Aaron Sachs

Over the years, environmental and human-rights groups active in the Third World have found themselves working at cross-purposes and with seemingly incompatible agendas. Lately, however, both groups have discovered how much they have in common.

8 Cover Story:

The Freedom of Susan Smith

by Thomas W. Clark

In the view of science, no being is exempt from the great chain of causality; in the opinion of the law, however, we are the uncaused originators of our own acts. The Susan Smith trial and its aftermath point up the irreconcilable contradictions between these two very different notions of "free will."

13 The Mute Speak

by Denise Noe

What is it like to have no voice or to be forced to expend a Herculean effort to convey the simplest meaning? The works of Stephen Hawking, Christopher Nolan, and Ruth Sienkiewicz-Mercer can teach us all some poignant lessons on the subject of human interdependency.

17 The Birth of a Nation in Cyberspace

by John C. Rude

The tiny African nation of Eritrea declared its independence from Ethiopia after a bloody 30-year struggle. Now a cyberspace community of expatriate Eritreans is debating the terms of the new constitution—a thrilling demonstration of "virtual democracy" in action.

23 A Letter to Pope John Paul II

by Henry Morgenthaler

In an open letter to the pope, the renowned abortion-rights activist and 1975 Humanist of the Year condemns the spate of recent anti-abortion killings and especially the reckless and inflammatory rhetoric that feeds such violence—a rhetoric found all too often on the lips of religious leaders and in statements from the Vatican.

25 The Sexist Circuits of English

by M. J. Hardman

Do we find it difficult to be nonsexist because sexism is actually "natural"? Or does the structure of our language simply make it feel that way? A comparison of English with the language used by an existing nonsexist society reveals a number of surprising insights.

DEPARTMENTS

2 Letters

3 UP FRONT

3 Private Property

by Linda Baker

4 Where's the Party?

by Mark V. Ferraro

12 Humanist Poetry:

So Anyway

by Jerry Ball

33 The Culture War

by Gary Pool

35 The Skeptical Eye

by George Erickson

36 Watch on the Right

by John Swomley

38 Church and State

by Edd Doerr

40 Humanistic Economics

by John Buell

41 Worth Noting

42 Civil Liberties Watch

by Barbara Dority

44 Our Queer World

by Scott Tucker

47 First Person

by Richard Pirozzi

To act in a way that is both sexist and racist, to maintain one's class privilege, it is only necessary to act in the customary, ordinary, usual, even polite manner.

—Joanna Russ, How to Suppress Women's Writing

In the 1960s, we said to ourselves that we would be nonracist and nonsexist. Now 30 years later, we find that simply saying so was easier than being so. We have, to our chagrin, discovered the truth of Russ' statement and the difficulty of implementing a society where concern and responsibility for the group coexists with respect for individual integrity, where both community and personal autonomy mutually support and reinforce each other.

One of the factors that makes it so difficult for us to perceive sexism, let alone to free ourselves of it, is that sexism is deeply embedded in our grammar in such a way that we are mostly unaware of its daily impact. (For linguists, the term *grammar* includes the formation of words, sentences, texts, and discourse.) This same structure leads us to think of autonomy and community as opposites.

The structure of English persuades us, both gently and not so gently, to think in sexist ways. Because our grammar leads us to see human relationships in sexist terms, we use that model to structure our relationships with other human beings, much as the laws governing slaves were based on the laws then governing women. Language and culture are on a feedback loop; changing one changes the other in complex interactional ways.

One can better understand the effects of our own language by looking at another; one is aware of the air only when one sees what it is not. Therefore, as a contrast, the structure of the Jaqi (pronounced "hah-kay") languages of South America can give us a glimpse into what a grammatical structure based on other principles might be like. The Jaqi are three groups of people in the Andes: 3.5 million Aymara ("eye-mah-dah") speakers in Bolivia, southern Peru, and northern Chile; a few thousand Jaqaru ("hah-kah-doh") speakers in Tupte and scattered in cities in Peru, mostly in the department of

Lima; and a handful of Kawki ("cow-key") speakers, the modern remnants of what was, 1,500 years ago, a vast mercantile empire extending from northern Peru to Argentina. Kawki is now a dying language.

The material presented here follows from a conceptual framework I first developed working with the Jaqi people—a language and culture without sexism in the basic structure. In order to account in a holistic way for the linguistic structures I discovered while writing the grammars for these languages, I developed the concept of the *linguistic postulate*, which is a theme or motif that can be found in almost all the sentences of a language, a feature that is used repeatedly by the language to organize the universe. For example, you might try to think of a sentence in English with no number—that is, with no singular or plural. It is possible only if the sentence consists of expletives ("Ouch!") or exclusively of an imperative ("Help!") or other second-person verb ("You sing"), no other verb forms or nouns allowed. Clearly, grammatical number (singular/plural) is a linguistic postulate in English, and just as clearly, English speakers regularly view this number classification as "natural," a part of nature rather than a learned part of an arbitrary system.

By contrast, the Jaqi languages do not mark singular versus plural—number is marked only if important or relevant to the context. Just as we can say *those* without indicating how many we mean, so Jaqi speakers can say *uqa* ("that, those") with a similar lack of specificity—but for them this may also include *one*.

Since I discovered the linguistic postulates of the Jaqi languages of South America to be quite different from those of English, I have found it worthwhile to compare the major Jaqi and English postulates—ones that require realization in virtually every sentence of each. This is a particularly useful exercise because human relations in the Jaqi languages are grammatically constructed on the basis of sexual and human

The Sexist Circuits of English

by
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The grammatical marking of data-source gives ideas both historical and human ties, encourages observation, and builds community through the recognized dependence on others.

Ranking comparative/absolute. In English, before she leaves the hospital, the child will be ranked using comparatives and absolutes as well as a lot of other narrative structures we have developed. By family and visitors, the child will be declared to be the most beautiful baby ever born: the best, the biggest, the smartest, the mostest you ever saw. The hospital personnel will weigh and measure and rank the baby with all the other children born that day—at that hospital, in that city, in that state or country. Parents go home talking about their “eightieth percentile” newborn. She has been placed in a hierarchy where there are no equals and where there is community only in competition.

The girl child in the Andes has come into a world where humans cannot be compared. If, in European style, she should try it, she will be told that comparing people is rude. To speak well of someone, one says *suma jaqiwa* (“That one is a beautiful human”). Within this structure, there is autonomy in uniqueness.

Number. In English, the first sentences the child hears will be full of numbers; as we have already seen, virtually every sentence will be loaded with singulars and plurals. As soon as she starts to speak, she will be corrected on any number of errors made, such as “one feet/two foots”—errors that will be met with great hilarity. She will also be picking up, gradually and continually, the value of the singular, especially as tied in with ranking, as she hears that only one person can be best, one needs to be on top, the buck stops here, there always has to be a boss, and so on and on. The child learns that singular is “best,” that singular is the “norm,” that singular is “most desirable.” This applies finally to only one way of life, accompanied in many cases by an insistence that others adopt this one way, too; and herein lies one of the reasons that diversity is so very difficult for us to understand or appreciate. Even our national motto, *E pluribus unum*, says “Out of many, one,” exalting the singular and implying that we need to eliminate our diversity.

The Andean girl child is surrounded with sentences marking data source; all day she must say, as part of each sentence, whether she heard what is known from someone else or whether it was gained from her own experience. What the child experiences directly is different from what people relay or what the storytellers weave. “Did you see?” or “What did they say?” they may ask. All of these categories—personal knowledge, knowledge through language, or nonpersonal knowledge—are marked grammatically, as constantly and as insistently as our number. Jaqi speakers view such marking as utterly natural and essential to any language. The child learns to pay attention to “how do I know?” This grammatical marking of data-source gives ideas both historical and human ties, encourages observation, and builds community through the recognized dependence

on others for information.

Sex-based gender for people and animal classification.

The child also learns that the major classification for people and all animals is sex-based and hierarchical. As with number, the male as the “best,” the “norm,” and the “most desirable” is learned early and well. Almost all animals and people are male in the story books, except those with young. It doesn’t take very long for children to learn that all other judgments are subordinated to this classification, with the result that boys like to be called by male names from animals, such as studs or bulls (feeling more in common with a male animal than with a girl), and girls learn quickly to be “feminine”—that is, to display, in a polite and courteous manner, a tractable, passive, and docile lower status. This allows the boys to show “masculinity,” even “chivalry,” which is the polite and courteous manner to display dominance and the threat of violence.

Part of the narrative pattern of this classification is that “everyone” is male. The following show this principle in action:

My freshman year, I took a creative writing class. I wrote a story about a woman coming to terms with her grief at her grandfather’s death. Although my story was the only one that got a unanimous “I like it” from the rest of my class, my teacher said that I hadn’t written something “important” enough, and if I ever wanted to write a good story, I would have to learn how to recognize these “unimportant” topics. I asked what an important story would be, and she said it should be something more relevant to all people. When I asked what could be more relevant to everyone than grief, she said that men couldn’t relate to my main character, and my story would alienate half the people who would read my story. (Apparently it was okay if women felt they were being left out.) However, after the class period in which we had workshopped my story, two of the men in the class came up to me and told me that, after they had read the story, they called up their own grandparents just to tell them that they loved them.

[Karen Mya Riemer]

[According to the National Institutes of Health] virtually all medical research has been on males only, including white mice. Now . . . medical researchers must include some women and nonwhite males—[but only] to be measured against white male response! However, some researchers have objected, saying that the rules will reinforce racial and ethnic stereotypes. To quote one of them: “Basically these rules say that every racial and ethnic group is fundamentally different biologically. And this is just not true. In the U.S. we don’t single out different

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equality. The major linguistic postulates in Jaqi are humanness (human/nonhuman) and data source (how do I know what I am saying—my own experience, from someone telling me, or otherwise?). These postulates are realized at all levels of the grammar: verb endings, noun endings, sentence formation, and storytelling. These linguistic postulates lead to a particular construction of the world and to thinking patterns that contrast with those to which our own language structure leads us.

To account for a particular constellation of linguistic postulates in English, I have developed the concept of *derivational thinking*. Three linguistic postulates in English interact in mutual reinforcement. These three are: number (singular/plural), sex-based gender with masculine as the root, and our ranking comparative/absolute (wise, wiser, wisest). These are further reinforced by a number of other sentence-forming and narrative patterns. This derivational thinking forms the grammatical base for our general model of human relationships.

The totality of a culture and a language are present at all times, with some portion being foregrounded. While grammatical items can be analyzed singly, they do not occur singly, which is why they also act as mutual reinforcers—they are all part of a pattern, one that is learned as a necessary requirement for participation in the human community. From the work of the Japanese neurosurgeon Tsunoda, we also now know that the very physiology of our brain structure is determined by our native language. By the time we are six years old, the grammatical structure of our native language appears to be the nature of the universe. Such is the nature of the human experience.

Grammatical and Narrative Patterns

In the following, we will examine the life pattern of a girl child in acquiring English and in acquiring Jaqi as we course through the sexist circuits of English.

Naming Patterns. In English, as soon as a baby is born, we label it as being the child of a man. Our naming patterns make the mother disappear precisely as she gives birth: the baby usually carries the father's name. Furthermore, when the formal announcement comes, the mother is reduced to a mere prefix: "Mr. and Mrs. John Jones announce. . . ." Furthermore, the name a girl child is given at birth isn't even a permanent one: it will change over her lifetime as the man responsible for her changes. Even the part of the name she feels is her own—the "given" name—will, for the most part, be a derivative of some man's name, formed by adding something. For example: Stephanie from Steven or Paula from Paul or diminutives like Betty or Patty. She is denied the identity that can be the foundation of autonomy from the very start. The social con-

cealment of the birth process is a part of this denial, as illustrated in the following incident, described by Tara Schreier, one of my students:

I recently attended with my friend John a gallery opening featuring two nature photographers who had both never shown their work to the general public before. Each artist was billed separately and equally and the only difference on the invitations was that one artist was a female and the other was a male. The photographs were arranged in one room in an alternating fashion so there was no division between the artists' works. The general theme of the entire show was "survival." The female artist concentrated on reproduction and birth. Most of the pictures showed all types of animals in the midst of the birthing process. I remember thinking how graphic but beautiful they were. The male artist chose to show the predatory nature of animals. Most of the scenes were violent hunt-and-kill shots. He too caught the beauty of it, I thought. As we came to the final photographs, John said, "This guy has such a unique and raw perspective, he really made this show." I asked him what he thought of the other artist and tried to point out that she really showed promise and her interpretation of survival showed pain and joy, which takes talent. "Give me a break!" John said. "That is exactly the point: look at the subject matter. It's a bunch of animals having babies! They belong in a nursery, not a famous gallery. Yeah, she took her chances with some wild animals; too bad it was not for something that meant *something*." The work was wasted effort because the subject was something he obviously could not comprehend.

Among the Jaqi the legal naming patterns follow Spanish custom, where the girl child takes the names of both mother and father. The given name is taken from some prestigious source, such as the Saints' calendar (for Macedonia, Sofronia, Eustolia, and so forth), from newspapers (Golda), or from a prestige language such as English (for Mery, Beti, and so on). The names may be derived from men's names in the original languages, but they are not so perceived by the Jaqi and would not be so within the Jaqi languages. Furthermore, the name given is a permanent one, Spanish custom notwithstanding. By Spanish law, grandchildren do lose grandmothers' names, but that is not of immediate perception nor identity/autonomy significance to the child. Furthermore, since most people can recite a family tree through five generations, and do so regularly when making introductions, the name may be legally lost but is not forgotten. These practices tie the newborn girl to her community while simultaneously giving her the first tool for developing identity and autonomy.

The structure of ranked classification by sex denies autonomy to half of us and gives rank-dependent autonomy to the other half.

ethnic groups. We assume that basically everyone is similar—that is, all are white male. If this latter assumption were real, then women and minorities would have been included on a regular basis from the beginning in establishing basic doses.

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One notation in the preface of the first edition of *Oh! Pascal!* by Doug Cooper and Michael Clancy (W. W. Norton and Co.) stands out for its unusualness as a corrective: "Incidentally, all personal pronouns in *Oh! Pascal!* are feminine. After hundreds of years of 'he' and 'his,' a few decades of 'she' and 'her' shouldn't bother anyone."

On the other hand, the Andean child learns that the major classification is between people and animals. A girl learns that her links are with other humans, not with the female of animals; she is not called by those names, nor are the boys around her. This structure also builds a sense of community, this time with all humans.

Pronoun sets. In English, the pronouns echo the structure of the noun sets. The child learns that the "generic" is *he* and thus begins a life of translations. A girl child must learn how to "translate" each and every *he* to know whether or not she might be included: "Will everyone please come in with his ticket?" Can she go in? This is not an easy matter and grammatically leaves girls and women always on the edges, always uncertain as to belonging. Her position is always uncertain, always subject to exclusion, even when legal barriers to inclusion have been removed. Because the male is the "norm," the "best," and the "most desirable," she is always being measured against him. This means that there is nothing she can do that is not *marked*. Deborah Tannen in a recent article has pointed this out in regard to women's apparel. Anything we wear is marked and open to judgment; there is no way for a woman to dress neutrally. The child is also learning that the *first person*, in all senses, is *I*—but, of course, that said person should be male.

The Andean girl must also learn pronouns, but her sets are people as contrasted with all else. The child is also learning to mark the presence or absence of *you* as a focus in the conversation: interaction with other people must always, grammatically, take into account how the person she is speaking with figures into what is being said. This grammatical structure causes a focus on community.

Things organized by sex. In English, the child learns that things are organized according to the sex principle as well: ships

are "shes"; women have "appliances" while men have "machines"; there are "girl" toys and "boy" toys; and so on. These are examples of *covert gender* in English.

The Andean girl learns that in her world things are organized by shape and that these shapes in motion are expressed in verbs. So if she carries pencils, it's *aya*; if grains, it's *achi*; if potatoes, it's *ira*; and if she is carrying water in a bucket (which a child will do from the age of two on), it's *asa*.

Word order in phrases. In English, as a girl acquires the rudiments of sentence formation, she learns all about ordering: boys, men, or males are always first and, together with the ranking comparative/absolute, this ordering is a very powerful statement. If she complains, she is reminded of "ladies and gentlemen" and "bride and groom" and is expected to be satisfied. No one remarks on what the bride and groom become by the end of the ceremony—namely, "husband and wife." Presumably the ordering is optional, but those who have tried to switch the order on a regular basis find it surprisingly difficult. This structure is a syntactic statement of the actual precedence in life: that it is difficult to change both reflects and reinforces the societal order. Every time we say "men and women" instead of "women and men," we reaffirm men's position as first precisely because *order* is important in English. This overwhelming assumption is illustrated in the following from Brooke Kelly:

While doing my research for this paper, I was surprised to find that not one subject (female or male) made a phrase with the female in the first position. I asked each subject to circle their [*sic*] gender at the top of the page, and I listed female before male. In fact, the male as primary seems to be so accepted that males circled female as their gender. I guess they were so accustomed to being first they neglected to even read the options.

After reading this to one audience, a young man came up to show me an application where the order of sex had also been switched. He told me that he had nearly marked the wrong sex!

Phrase order for the Jaqi child is far more flexible and also occurs much less as a syntactic device because people are included in the verb. Furthermore, when phrases do occur, the linker is more like our *with*—that is, more inclusive, not so itemizing. In addition, inclusion can be done with sentence suffixes. There is no pattern comparable to ours to make a girl child or a woman feel "always second."

Subject male/object female. Within English, the subject of the sentence is ranked above the object. Within linguistics, we even speak of "raising the object to subject position." The subjects in the child's world—the agents—are overwhelmingly

The ranking of subject above object ties in closely with the ranking of both number and sex-based gender: thus we find the singular male subject the most "comfortable."

men. The girl child is supposed to be the object. Think, for example, of the movie title for a film that was presumably about friendship between women and men: *When Harry Met Sally*. There is one textbook on syntax in which the subject of every example sentence is male, except for one—"Mary wrote a book about John"! The rule of male as subject is true of jobs, of honors, of recognitions, and of accomplishments and is a direct reflection of grammar. Theoretically, women could easily be included as subjects, but the difficulties encountered in doing so are amazing, and the ways in which people go about either denying the agent/subject position to women and/or denigrating her when she gets there anyway are the subject of an entire book by Joanna Russ. The importance of this one grammatical structure is hard to overemphasize. The following reflect what are daily personal experiences of all women. The first is what I call a "defining example": the people involved had no agenda but were merely being friendly in a basically neutral area. The grammatical patterns came to the fore in a clear example of ordinary perceptual patterns:

I was sitting in the waiting room, playing with my baby daughter Jamie. One of her favorite games is to grab my fingers for stability, and muscle her way up into a stand. A woman saw us playing this game and came over and said: "What a strong little boy you are, able to stand up on your own like that!" I answered: "She is very strong, isn't she?" The woman looked surprised and commented: "She's so big for a little girl. And you're so cute letting daddy pull you up like that."

[Art Bautista-Hardman]

My sister was taking an English class in high school that I had taken the year before. The class requires a fifteen-page term paper. My sister is an excellent writer and had always done well in English but had never written a formal term paper before. My parents suggested that I help her out with the logistics and I was happy to do so. I told her how I felt was the best way to do research, organize note cards, and so on, but left the actual work to her. As I expected, Susan did very well on the paper and when she showed the "A" paper to my parents, my father remarked, "Good work, Mike. You should help your sister out with her schoolwork more often!" At the time I was very used to comments like these and didn't think anything of it. Now, however, I recognize it as a denial of agency.

[Mike Wasson]

The ranking of subject above object ties in closely with the ranking of both number and sex-based gender: thus we find the singular male subject the most "comfortable" and where

we should place our "trust." The ranking of object/subject is anti-community and is part of what makes cooperative endeavors so difficult. The person in the object slot is likely to be uncomfortable; certainly an equality is not easily felt.

The subject/object grammatical structure is one of the areas in which the Jaqi languages and English most diverge. It could be said that the Jaqi languages grammatically express the Heisenberg principle: object and subject are conjoined into single-person suffixes such that object and subject are not separable. With these suffixes, the verbs are conjugated in ten interactive persons: for example, *yanhshutma* ("help me"), where the person suffix is *-utma* ("you to me imperative"). Also, there is no tendency toward foregrounding any particular person except you. The grammar, rather, keeps a strong running commentary as to the mutual involvement of all concerned with the matter at hand. This type of structure keeps community mentally present without distracting from autonomy.

Good for women equals bad for men. English vocabulary is heavy in deprecatives for women (see the next section). This is also true of sentences. Even compliments to women are insults when applied to men. This structure makes for a lot of trouble, as demonstrated in the following from Laura A. Boyce:

My roommate Amy's group of male friends have been "proving their manhood" by jumping off a cliff—at least 80 feet I've been told—at the quarries. I'd been hearing about a lot of groups of guys going to the quarries and hearing the stories. The stories about who wouldn't jump were the big thing. They were the butt of jokes and ridiculed by their "friends." So my roommate Amy, who is fearless beyond all measure, went with her male friends to the quarries. She jumped. The stories and jokes changed about the guys that didn't jump—a girl [sic] jumped and they didn't. They were less than a girl [sic], beneath a girl [sic]. Soon after, the trend among that group of guys of bringing new guys to the quarries to jump to prove their manhood ended. A girl [sic] had jumped, showing up the guys; she had tainted the ritual. It meant nothing now. The ritual died.

In other words, "Woman is 80-foot cliff jumper" makes the sentence "Man is 80-foot cliff jumper" no longer respectable or admirable; the first makes the second an insult. This structure is also directly behind the problem of women in combat and gays in the military: men frequently go into a volunteer military in order to prove themselves "men"—that is, agents/subjects. Given the structure here illustrated, if women should prove as good at killing as men, then why should men do it? What value would that be? Or if "unreal" men could do it, then how could it prove masculinity? The argument, however

The words in Jaqi that cluster around women are those having to do with creativity or productivity or usefulness in work, in art, in people.

couched in overlying philosophical structures, is right back here at the grammatical level: if a woman does it, it is an insult to men, and "we" must keep women (and their analogs) out of the agent position. Or, if they insist on being in that position, we will coopt them; they couldn't be "real" women. As Ruth Troccoli tells it:

My housemate, a single female, is in the process of trying to refinance her mortgage. She has done lots of maintenance and improvements prior to the visit of the appraiser, including using a chainsaw to remove some overgrown bushes/trees in front of the house. A neighbor (retired male professor) complimented her on the improvements, telling her, "You're a good man."

Among the Jaqi, good character is an aesthetic goal that is the same for both women and men, focused on productivity, hard work, and community responsibility while not trying to tell anyone else how to live. What is good for women is also good for men. The aesthetic falls under heavy attack in the cities, of course. I have seen the status of women there deteriorate over my lifetime, as they got more "education," which includes teaching them how little they are worth. The boys get the same teaching, of course, which means that some men among the Jaqi try to act "white," which means beating women and ordering people around. This trend is exemplified by Florence Babb in "Women and Men in Vicos, Peru: A Case of Unequal Development":

In the fifties and sixties, the anthropology department of Cornell University took on a plantation in Peru as a demonstration site for a development program. Before Cornell, all serfs had the right to cultivate specific portions of the land. Under Cornell, land titles were granted to the men serfs but denied to the women serfs. At one town meeting where such matters were being discussed, one woman showed up to defend her right to her land. She was vehement in her demands. The anthropologist conducting the meeting said that land was the concern of her husband only and told her to leave. She did not. He asked her husband to eject her, but her husband did not move; Andean husbands do not have such authority. Thereupon the two anthropologists present removed her bodily from the room, in an example of how modern husbands should treat their wives.

Deprecative words. A great many studies have been done of English vocabulary, pointing out the great number of deprecative terms used for women and the dearth thereof for men, except for being compared to women. A young woman is seen as a vegetable or a piece of meat; as she grows older,

she may be "feisty" but never strong or forthright. The vocabulary of words that deprecate women is furthermore always increasing as words get introduced for a given purpose, pass into general use, then become deprecative. The word *tart* was once a nice pastry. Think of what has happened to the word *feminist*. The mirror image of this is that deprecative words for men that are not based on women (*sissy*, *bastard*) do not remain unambiguously deprecative; think of what has happened to the word *macho*.

For the Jaqi, women are productive and there are no deprecative terms specific to them. There is one very bad insult, however: *q'ara*, which means "naked" and is used of men—especially white men—who are unmarried, have no land, and like to tell people how to live. Priests and boys coming home from school are prime examples of *q'ara*. One priest believes this to be the generic term for "white people." It is, in general and because of their behavior, the generic term for white men; but interestingly, it cannot be used for women. That women could be so unproductive is just not conceivable. I have not found a single anti-woman joke in any Jaqi language, nor any general anti-woman sayings; if they wish to denigrate women, the Jaqi switch to Spanish. There are a few jokes about men, not much used, generally relating to laziness. The words that cluster around women are those having to do with creativity or productivity or usefulness in work, in art, in people.

Referencing women as derivations. To underscore the derivational status of women in English—as though all of the preceding were not enough—we have a long list of derivational suffixes whereby one can derive a woman from a man—such as *smurfette*, *heroine*, and many others. These derived forms can never be as good as the "real thing": think of how leatherette holds up against leather. A goddess is never quite as powerful as a god; after all, she needs him to define her. This structure even keeps us from seeing structures from elsewhere that might inspire us to think otherwise, as the following by Lisa R. Perry illustrates:

The Cherokee have a person of power in the tribe who fits the white definition of a medicine man, but this person is a woman. White men had trouble dealing with this, so they decided that she was really the assistant of the real medicine man and called her a "corn woman."

And Elizabeth Ream reports:

In one science class where the majority of the people were males, the instructor would often end a statement with "for you guys," pause [and add] "and guyettes!" He never forgot to add "guyettes," but he always paused

In the Jaqi languages, words referencing women or men specifically are all different roots. There is no linguistic way to link women and men derivationally.

before saying it, and said it in the plural, even when I was the only female in the class.

This structure also denies autonomy to half the population.

In the Jaqi languages, words referencing women or men specifically are all different roots. There is no linguistic way to link women and men derivationally.

Conversational styles: community or hierarchy. A great deal of work has been done by many linguistic scholars on conversational styles in English. They have discovered that conversational styles for women most frequently have as their goal the building of community. Men, on the other hand, almost always use conversation for the purpose of building or maintaining hierarchies. The most common complaint in marriage is: "He won't talk to me." Taking into account the structures we have seen so far, and adding that of conversational style, this response to marriage is an understandable one. If he has you completely outranked, even to the point where you have given up your name for his, and the purpose of conversation is to build or maintain hierarchy, then, of course, there is nothing to talk about, unless you threaten to leave, and then the hierarchy must be maintained, so there is conversation for a while. These are learned patterns, and there are many individuals, of course, who know both styles and can switch. But many women face daily in the workplace men who are using language as a weapon, not as a tool for building a cooperative workplace, while their own styles carry other presumptions.

A student of mine, Christopher Thomas, recently did a term paper looking at the responses to requests for directions. He and a woman friend each asked 25 women and 25 men for campus directions to (a) a fake hall, (b) an obscure hall, and (c) a well-known hall. In total, they asked 300 people for directions.

The women generally replied the same whether the asker was a woman or a man. For example, 19 of the 25 women asked about the fake building sent both the woman and the man askers to an information booth. This is a community-building response, showing concern for the asker and including the asker in the community of the askee. It was the same pattern for the obscure building; those who could not give directions sent the asker to an information booth. In both cases, where directions were given to the obscure building, almost all were correct. Every woman gave both the woman and the man correct directions to the well-known building.

For the men, the pattern was very different, heavily dependent on whether the asker was the woman or the man. For the man as asker, they mostly refused to give directions or gave very vague directions. For the fake building, they mostly brushed him off. For the obscure building, only one-third of those who gave directions were correct, and even for the well-

known building only 15 men gave him directions. Not once did a man direct the asker to an information booth.

For the woman asker, on the other hand, she was given directions every single time, including directions to the fake building from the 25 men she asked. Not once, in all three questions, when the woman asked a man, did any of the men just say they didn't know. All of the men replied with some directions to the building. For the obscure building, only 10 out of the 25 were correct!

At no time did any man say "I don't know" to the woman. No man ever sent anyone to an information booth. Clearly, in this example, the men were using the conversational encounter as an opportunity to build hierarchy, making sure they were one-up on the woman—no matter the inconvenience to her should she believe them—and that they were not one-down to the man.

The woman uses conversation to establish a link, a friendship, while the man uses conversation as a tool with which to dominate.

In the Jaqi languages, conversation—language—is what one gives in recognition of proper human behavior; withdrawal of language is a specific sanction for those who behave like animals. Thus, both women and men talk a lot, although popular European belief has them as quite taciturn, which is a powerful statement as to their perception of European behavior.

Mismatched metaphors. One of the misfires in attempting to communicate across the sex barrier in English is the use of differing metaphors and also the use of metaphors that place men in the driver's seat, that emphasize the sea of privilege in which they live. Another is the commonness of the metaphors of violence and war: these do violence to the narrative style of women and leave us uncertain, again, of our place, emphasizing the sea of violence in which we live. We also have that whole terrible set of seminal metaphors which in academia equate intellectual ability and male sexual performance: for example, hard ideas that have great thrust and can stand up by themselves and be penetrating and not peter out and disseminate all over, entering and conquering all that virgin territory. The sexual metaphors underlying science are part of the chilly climate for women within science.

Work on the metaphors of the Jaqi languages is far from complete. A major domain is that of the metaphorical link between woman and seed. Also, the metaphor for love is *arishi*, "to speak mutually."

Conclusion

Derivational thinking is the name I have given to the type of

thinking and of perception in English that results from the union of all the structures listed previously, and that has as its foundation the three linguistic postulates of number, sex-based gender, and ranking comparative/absolute. These are the thinking patterns that rank human beings such that man is the norm and all else must be measured accordingly and seen as derivative therefrom.

Derivational thinking is the structure our language gives us for human relations. It is not surprising that we apply this structure to all other human relations, with the result that non-whites, colonials, and others we wish to denigrate are equated negatively to the "sublevel" of woman. In the center court of our first national reserve, now a national park in Hot Springs, Arkansas, there is a statue, lovely in its execution and considered emblematic, of a mostly unclothed native woman kneeling facing the fully clothed white male conqueror, offering up to him a bowl over which flows the water of the springs—America giving her gifts to Europe. This statue is simultaneously deeply racist and sexist, and the artistic embodiment of derivational thinking. Unfortunately, this depiction is "customary, ordinary, usual, even polite."

The most common "womanly" characteristic assigned to colonials, nonwhites, and others is lack of reason, which fully justifies denying agency, which keeps the grammatical structure of not only male but white male in the subject slot. This makes for difficult and uncertain autonomy even for men—any moment someone might outrank you and reduce you to some "woman" status (the only insults for men that remain insults). It makes us think that autonomy is antithetical to community. It makes us rank community below individual dominance, and it makes it difficult for us to appreciate diversity. So strong is the pattern that, when someone in a category that is not white male does something admirable, we find the way to make them, at least temporarily, honorary white men rather than recognizing the accomplishments as coming from a "derivative" source. Elizabeth Williams offers this case in point: "A close friend of mine in high school was black. When speaking of him to newcomers or just in casual conversation, people would often say, 'Jaie is not really black—he is a white guy trapped in a black man's body.'"

And the following anecdote is almost a definer. It occurred during a social for new graduate students and was given to me by Lisa R. Perry, a minority woman. Notice that *academics* is a pseudogeneric term; from the rest of the conversation, the subject was clearly limiting it to white males:

In a conversation with a professor here, he made the comment that it made more sense for "academics" to write books concerning minority and "Third World" problems because they would reach a broader audience (and more importantly the "right" audience) than if those same books were written by minorities and residents of Third World countries. When I asked him why he thought that, he said that the latter books would only appeal to such specialized groups as black studies, women's studies, etc. He did say, however, that minorities and women make

good assistants.

The grammatical structures we have seen for Jaqi come together for the Jaqi world view—a view now under heavy assault from European world views, all detrimental to the status of Jaqi women. Rather than learn and share, our actions are to dominate and destroy.

Life among the Jaqi, however, is not a utopia. The Jaqi are subject—as are all human beings—to the vagaries of human existence: children that come too soon, too late, or not at all; people who fall in love with the wrong person; rains that come too much, too soon, too little, too late; this year, the corn blights; next year, the potatoes. And all this without counting the troubles the dominant group brings in or the worries about educating the children so they won't suffer so. And there are the worries about the children who go to the city to get educated and turn out bad. Life is like that.

Suggestions

The English derivational thinking structure leaves all of us with a diminished capacity for autonomy, at best with a precarious sense of autonomy, with serious identity problems, and with rudimentary community-building ability. Most of us have, to one degree or another, at some point in our lives, challenged the assumptions underlying derivational thinking and, equally often, have felt frustrated at the difficulty of implementing what we perceived to be a more humanistic way of organizing human relations. We cannot simply adopt another set of linguistic postulates, nor can we wholesale and instantaneously change the linguistic patterns of our native language.

What I am suggesting is that it is possible to learn from other people, that it is possible to envision other ways of organizing human relationships. I am also suggesting that we can become more aware of the daily, sentence-by-sentence patterns that form our current relationships. Because language is essentially open, we can change some of the sentence-forming and narrative patterns for other patterns. We can opt for sentences without ranking. We can opt to place women before the *and*. We can opt for women in the subject position—without denigration. And we can seek new metaphors such that *one* will no longer be synonymous with *best*. We can be consciously aware of those we cannot (at least at this point) change—like grammatical number. This very awareness reduces its power. And as we change our language, thus also do we change our thinking and, sentence by sentence, the social environment in which we live.

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Why we should say "women and men" until it doesn't matter any more

Guest Editorial: M.J. Hardman

They say that "and" is a conjunction where both sides are equal. They say that "men and women" sound better. When we say that maybe we could say "women and men," they say that we are indulging in "reverse discrimination." They also used to say that generic "he" really included us all. I want to suggest that we should say "women and men" until the whole social/cultural world changes such that it doesn't matter anymore. I say that *only* by saying "women and men" do we today have any chance of equality on both sides of that little conjunction "and." Let me tell you why.

In English, three grammatical patterns interact (see Hardman 1978, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1996) to reinforce each other:

- 1) number—singular and plural so that singular is the base form and plural is derived from singular.
- 2) ranking comparative—virtually all we say or do is ranked (e.g., the questions we mostly ask have to do with ranking: What did you like most at? What did you like best out of?)
- 3) sex-based gender—the masculine is the base and the feminine is derived therefrom.

This means that:

- 1) In English order matters. Therefore, what comes first is seen as first in the metaphorical sense — better, higher ranked. So in the phrase "men and women" women do indeed come second.
- 2) Women are perceived as being derived from men, feminine words are perceived as being derived from masculine, even when not true etymologically (e.g., "woman" from "man" and "female" from "male" — both false derivations etymologically).

Therefore, in the usual order, "men and women," women not only come second but are perceived as the additional appendage of the first item, as part of the derivation that the root carries with it.

In the phrase "women and men," on the other hand, because "women" comes first, women are *perceived*. Since within the structure of English "men" are not perceived as ever being derived from men¹, but as always being the root, men are also perceived. Therefore, the phrase "women and men" comes as close as is possible in English to an equal listing of two items.

Because of derivational thinking, the phrase "women and men" does not put women in the spot previously occupied by men; we are not perceived as the root even if named first. Rather, the ordering of feminine first balances two perceptions, "first" and "derived." It permits women to occupy a spot where we are *not* perceived as the derivation of men, while men are perceived as being there fully nevertheless, because they are the root. Therefore, *both* women and men are perceived as present in a syntactic

Communication, Language and Gender (pp. 250-263). Cyberspace Publishing Corporation,

Hardman, M. J. (1994). 'And if we lose our name, then what about our land?' or, What price development? In L. H. Turner & H. M. Sterk (eds.) *Differences That Make a Difference: Examining the Assumptions in Gender Research* (pp. 151-162). Westport & London: Bergin & Garvey.

Women and Language, Vol. XXII, No. 21,

Page 1

structure that comes as close to equality as is possible in English.

The ordering consequences apply not only to all other phrases as well as the one illustrated here, but to sentences, paragraphs, and discourse structures. Thus, for genuinely inclusive language, it must be "she or he." The other way around only allows us to be tacked on, as we always have been.² In sentences, if we discuss first what Mary did, and then what John did, Mary's activities won't sound like an addendum to John's, but rather both people will be perceived as having done something. In presenting, for example, research results, if we present women-related results first, then both sets of data will be heard.³

Derivational thinking pervades our perception and our thinking within English; constant energy is required if we wish to think otherwise.

Notes

- 1 The regular failures of fictional attempts to switch sex roles is an example of the difficulty of altering this pattern. I know of only two successful efforts in this direction:
Elizabeth Vonarburg's *In the Motherland / Maerlande Chronicles*, Bantam, 1992; translated from French by Jane Briery.; successfully makes feminine linguistically the root, with masculine derived therefrom in a gripping epic-type novel.
Gerd Brantenberg's *Egalia's Daughters*. The Seal Press, 1977, 1985, translated from Norwegian by Louis Mackey, is the only successful sex reversal I know of, a funny satire with women in control, men with restrictive clothing, etc.
That both these books are translations from other languages into English says something about English. In the case of French, in terms of straight linguistic analysis, the masculine is derived from the feminine, by a subtractive morpheme—drop the final consonant; if nasal then nasalize the vowel, the feminine form is not predictable from the masculine. Because this is too radical, students, even today, still learn two lists for all adjectives — the masculine first and then the feminine! Forty years ago, I was involved in a project aimed at improving the teaching of foreign languages. We tried to introduce the feature of masculine derived from feminine to the teaching of French, to simplify learning. We failed. Derivational thinking was more powerful.
- 2 At a recent conference of an organization comprised almost entirely of women, the three male members asked that the language of the bylaws be changed from "she" to "he or she" to include them. After I explained what I have stated here, the group accomplished with unanimous vote the use of "she or he." Lately, a surprising number of women came to thank me and to say that they felt that the proposed change to "he or she" was in fact changing their organization from one of women to one dominated by men (all three of them!), but they hadn't known how to voice their concerns.
- 3 This has been a big problem in medical research, e.g., heart research. One example is that the artificial hearts were so constructed that they would not fit in a woman's body so that only men were candidates. When they finally did use one for a woman, it had to be "modified" (=derived) from the ones built for men.

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Andean ethnography: The role of language structure in observer bias^{*1}

M. J. HARDMAN-DE-BAUTISTA

The book under review examines one portion of the Aymara culture. The Aymara language is a Jaqi language, one of three that remain today from a much larger group once spoken throughout the length and breadth of the Andes mountains (Hardman 1981, 1986). Today speakers of the Aymara language number approximately three million: in Bolivia (the native language of approximately one third of the population), Peru (the dominant language of Southern Peru), and northern Chile. The other two extant Jaqi languages, Jaqaru and Kawki, are spoken in Peru, in the Department of Lima: Jaqaru by several thousand, including children; Kawki by only some twenty, and clearly a dying language. My own work among the Jaqi peoples now spans more than a quarter of a century, and includes, among other works, the grammar of Jaqaru (Hardman 1966, 1983) and the grammar of Aymara (Hardman, Yapita, and Vasquez 1975, 1988).² This has meant hours upon hours of conversation, uncounted tapes, teaching and lectures in the communities, and numerous fictive kinship ties. My travels have also taken me to Qumpi, the community used as the base for the study under review.

The Masked Media purports to be an examination of the fiesta complex among the Aymara in terms of its role in defining, continuing, and/or disrupting ongoing alliances. In other words, beyond the importance of the ritual itself is the importance of whom those sponsoring the fiesta choose as participants and what purpose the participants serve, in terms of communication and expression. Thus far there is no difficulty with the hypothesis; rather, it is a bit like pushing on an open door.

Buechler then elaborates for nearly four hundred pages about men's roles in the fiestas, in the end giving us a great deal of data but no feel at all for the meaning of the fiestas to the Aymara individuals involved — the stated objective of the book. In fact, in spite of my years in Jaqi-speaking communities, my familiarity with the community in which

* Hans C. Buechler, *The Masked Media*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1980.

¹ *Seminaria* 71-3/4 (1988), 319-372.

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Buechler worked, and even my acquaintance with some of the people who acted as his informants, the panorama presented in this book was, to me, alien.

Buechler's data is not wrong, exactly, or bad — that is, the *details* that he collected appear to be accurate. In fact, as I will point out in the third section, his careful attention to detail leads him to present data that directly contradict his theoretical/generalizing statements. What is wrong is the data that escaped him, the people and ties that were invisible to him, and the framework in which he placed what he did collect.

The above is, I recognize, a serious charge, and one I will attempt to justify in this review. Buechler is not alone in his blindness to the Jaqi framework — he is joined by many if not most ethnographers of the Andes. (Important exceptions are Miracle 1976, Isbell 1978, Collins 1981, Painter 1981, Carter and Mamani 1982.)

The underlying errors are two, from which the more superficial errors are derived: first, lack of knowledge of the language; second, correlative lack of knowledge of linguistic principles, both in general and specific to Aymara. Together these two errors lead to the imposition on the data, quite out of the awareness of the investigator, of his own framework. And I do mean 'his', for what we have, as a compounding outcome of both errors, is a *man* (the author) talking to *men* in *Spanish* (a sexist language, like English) with subsequent retranslation into English, thus exacerbating the effects of what was to begin with a biased data base — leading to an inevitable distortion of the meaning of any Aymara ceremonial. The result is larger than this distortion of the Aymara ceremonials, of course, and, in spite of what is considered for his period good training, is ethnocentrism on the part of Buechler. The limitations of the book are in large part a reflection of his time and place.

In the first section I propose to give a framework for understanding why, given a good investigator with adequate training and good will, one can still have a book that so little reflects Aymara culture. This general framework can be used to understand the limitations of other ethnographies of the Andes as well. In the second section, I give a very brief ethnographic overview to complement those I claim have been written with blinders on. The third section will then return to *The Masked Media* to show specific instances of how the biased data led to Buechler's missing the structure and meaning of Aymara ritual.

Linguistic postulates

Meaning is a result of structure: it also informs structure. If the structure is not perceived, then the meaning is equally obscure, and often appar-

ently simplistic. Consequently, the result is unintentionally lingocentric and concomitantly ethnocentric.

As a linguist, I see the key to the structure of meaning for any given society in the structure of its language. Clearly, a recently imposed language will be less congruent with its culture than one which has evolved with its culture. Nonetheless, pressures to re-form a language to incorporate pre-existing postulates when a language shift is made for other reasons (conquest, trade, education) clearly exist. (For the Andean case, see Hardman 1985.) The Jaqi language and culture have, however, managed to remain despite just such strong pressures.

The goal of discovering structure can be seen as the discovery of meaning. This is why meaning *cannot* be taken as the *root* for structural discovery — to do so inevitably builds a closed circle, a tautology, a self-fulfilling prediction. Only by using methods for discovery that allow the structure itself to emerge can the meaning of such a structure be discovered.

Field linguistics has long aimed at that goal, and has been much misunderstood in the process. Attainment is difficult, and methods can be, and frequently are, easily sabotaged. However, we are not discussing the impossible (cf. Redden 1981, Hardman and Hamano ms.).

If one works closely with a language over time in such a way as to allow the structure to manifest itself, one must also be in contact with the cultural conditions in which the language is used. On the purely grammatical side, it is not at all uncommon for languages to fixate on some particular grammatical category and mark it over and over again, in what appears to the outsider to be endless, useless redundancy (e.g., agreement systems of case, or number, or marking of subject, object, and verb for class or transitivity, etc.). Also one frequently finds that a category will be marked at different levels in the language and within different grammatical/morphological groups, e.g., in morphology and syntax, in nouns and verbs — sometimes in *all* of the above. Following England (1975: 203-235), these categories may be called *grammatical postulates*.

It is not possible to begin by looking for grammatical postulates — they must be discovered via the time-consuming and detailed work of grammatical analysis. Thus, a statement regarding the grammatical postulates of a language can only come when one knows the grammar well — i.e., after writing a full description.

In all cases that I know of, these grammatical postulates are easily correlated with (and sometimes discovered with the help of) cultural behaviors, both linguistic and non-linguistic. Where the correlations (at least some of them) can be clearly specified, we then have *linguistic postulates* (Hardman 1972, 1978). A researcher must be able to command,

at the appropriate moments. 'models for the analysis of language structure at all levels, synchronic and diachronic; a knowledge of anthropological linguistics, sociolinguistics, ethnosemantics, language, and culture; and understanding of glottopolitics, dialectology, culture contact, linguistic acculturation, language processes such as pidginization and creolization; and the ability to integrate all of this to focus on a single problem' (Hardman 1978: 117). The problem Buechler posed for himself was of precisely this type.

A given grammar will typically demand that high-level linguistic postulates be specified in virtually every sentence of the language. (There will be exceptions — every linguistic system I have ever examined has a 'leak' someplace — part of the dynamics of change?) Thus, by the time a child has acquired her language and culture, her cognitive system automatically encodes the relevant linguistic postulate features from any experience, whether or not these are subvocally or linguistically encoded. (Whether all thought is linguistic or not is a different argument, and not relevant here.) Thus, linguistic postulates are accepted without argument or discussion as natural parts of the universe, an example of nurture becoming nature for the participants. In fact it is so difficult to imagine 'real' human beings operating without one's own linguistic postulates that it verges on the impossible. They are the major structuring and selecting grids for the perception/cognition of any given culture.

Linguistic postulates must, however, be taught to children. As underlying assumptions they are particularly powerful, but they are also typically reflected in proverbs, sayings, and/or typical admonitions to children. They are also built into the vocabulary structure and the grammatical structure. Frequently they serve as major classifying devices for other types of behavior, most frequently without intellectual and/or conscious justification. When challenged, the most common native reaction is 'But it's natural!' When one at last discovers a linguistic postulate, and shares such a marvel with one's consultants, the usual reaction is 'well, of course, everybody knows that', or 'well, only *gringos* could be so dumb as to not know' (cf. Carpenter 1981). It has even been argued that surely we *make* such a distinction, even if it is not visible in the grammar.

I will here describe and illustrate two postulates from Indo-European, with some specific reflexes in English and Spanish; the way in which they impinge on Aymara studies; and two contrasting Aymara postulates which increase the negative impingement of the postulates the anthropologists take in with them. The Indo-European postulates are *number* and *sex*. The Aymara postulates are *data source* and *humanness*.

Number

Number, specifically singular versus plural, is a major postulate throughout Indo-European. Some languages mark it more overtly than others; some limit it to nouns and verbs, some include adjectives, marking in both morphological and syntactic (by agreement and/or governance) constructions. Spanish and English mark number rather differently — but both are unambiguous on the matter of singular and plural, with singular being unmarked. Looking briefly at English, cultural correlates are immediately obvious: in proverbs (one thing at a time); in our adulation of linear work; in our obsession with monotheoretical stances in academia (and its concomitant throwing out of all else in favor of the new *one* [cf. the Transformational Grammar period in linguistics]), with monotheism in religion, and with singular causes in history; in the sponsoring of monocropping in agriculture, even to single species of a single crop; and in our search for singular causes of diseases, with singular cures. Consider the epithet some have tried to make of 'eclectic'. The list is endless. Furthermore, each time we use language we regenerate the feedback necessary to reinforce the postulate — virtually every sentence in English (or Spanish) carries some number mark.

The notion of singularity given above may seem so obvious that it is unnecessary to state. But to an Aymara person, the above list is almost unthinkable, and certainly not very logical. The impingement of this singular/plural postulate on the Aymara has been devastating, from the earliest years of the conquest. An enormous amount of cultural energy has gone into efforts to thwart or at least diminish the repercussions.

In spite of the fact that Aymara has no grammatical number marking, under the pressures of the translation tradition two suffixes — one for verbs and one for nouns — have been pressed into service to translate Spanish plural markings. However, absence of such does not mean singular, and the more monolingual the speaker the less they occur (cf. Hardman 1982). In fact, one of my students has argued (Martin and Briggs 1981) that it is virtually impossible to be unambiguously singular in Aymara. (For example, the number one [*mayal*] also glosses as 'few'.)

Singular holds no fascination for the Aymara; nobody gives a thought to the concept. Rather, in coping with the environment, multiplicity has been the model. In land-holding the ideal is the *archipiélago* (Murra 1972) system, i.e., access to as many ecological niches as possible, which in the Andes means altitudes.³ Thus, a person may typically hold small plots of land from the high *puna* (14,000 feet) down to the sea coast, if possible. If not, she will seek access routes to such lands, or trade and cultivate fictive kin relations which allow her to be fruits of the various productive

zones of the Andes: Singularly-minded Europeans have, since their arrival, been attempting to stop all this. Farming is seen as being the labor of *one man (sic)*, *on one plot of land*, *with one house*. Furthermore, the farmer is supposed to stay on his (sic) land. Working around these artificial restrictions has clearly taxed the imagination of the Aymara, although most communities have managed to cope (Collins 1981, Painter 1981), continuing their non-singular mode of living and/or reinstituting it after interruption by Europeans. This non-singular mode of living involves:

- Households composed of multiple adults, each a person in her own right — the marriage unit is *never* a merger to one, but rather an alliance of two. In fact, the spouse does not become a member of the other's 'family', although both are members of the children's family.
- Multiple houses, hopefully one at the level of each field and one in the trading center. Access to only one house is clearly a sign of poverty.
- Multiple plots — a single plot makes for a low expectation of survival; the owner is entirely subject to the whims of frost, hail, a greedy priest or government official, or pest infestation. When many plots are owned, catastrophe in one can be absorbed by harvest in the others (Painter 1978).
- Multiple relatives, fictive and blood. Even with children the saying is that one is none.

The Aymara do not think singularly; coping with the imposed singularity of the *mistris*⁴ is difficult, but necessary.

In terms of anthropological studies, then, the Indo-European linguistic postulates lead researchers to see one *man*, whom they expect to be the singular representative for the family (as they define it), which will reside in one house, which *he* is presumed to own. They then proceed to ask 'him' alone about such matters as kinship and land ownership, and then presume that his answers are tantamount to the singular view of the culture they seek (see for example the questionnaire in Lewellen 1978: 172). The researchers do not even contemplate the possibility that there is *no* singular head of household, that 'one family' may not even be a concept. As a matter of fact, none of the Jaqi languages has a word for 'family'. Kin are 'my people' i.e., 'people' [*jaqi*] possessed is the normal expression for one's blood relatives, but does not include one's spouse (Collins 1983). The whole concept of family in our sense as a single nuclear unit is simply not present. Even the word for couple is impossible as a singular: *warmitchacha* ('womanman') is the only way of saying 'married couple', and is parallel to words for other couples — for

example, *raykaawki* ('motherfather'). Furthermore, the order of the two elements is not fixed. One cannot singularize the family or the family unit in Aymara.

Land is held individually, but with complicated communal usage rights (Carter 1965); it also is never merged into a singular for the household, although cooperation with many is necessary for cultivation, in all kinds of mutual arrangements starting with the *warmitchacha* alliance and including such systems as *minka*, *ayni*, *chiki'asiña*, and *waki*. Expectations of singular lead many an unwary anthropologist (including Buchler) to simply ignore large amounts of data.

Data source

Feeding into the mismanagement of data on the number score is the Aymara postulate of *data source*. In Aymara, it is virtually impossible to utter any sentence without indicating the source of one's data. A more detailed explanation of the data source material is available elsewhere (Hardman, Yapita, and Vasquez 1975, 1988; Hardman 1982, forthcoming b) and will not be recapitulated here. I will give a brief summary of the five basic categories, with the *cover* that these can be combined and elaborated extensively for all kind of purposes.

Personal-knowledge (PK): *Mama Wirlaw i'ani mang'i* — 'Ms. Berta ate bread (and I saw her)';
Thru-language-knowledge (TLK): *Mama Wirlaw i'ani mang' siw* — '(Someone said) Ms. Berta ate bread';
Inferential (I): *Mama Wirlaw i'ani mang'pacha* — 'Ms. Berta ate bread, I gather' (for example, I found an empty plate).
Non-personal-knowledge (NPK): *Mama Wirlaw i'ani mang'ayayna* — 'Ms. Berta ate bread.' (But I did not see her, do not know by direct experience.)
Non-involver (NI): *Mama Wirlaw i'ani mang'chixa* — 'Ms. Berta ate bread.' (But I had nothing to do with it; I'm not entirely sure, and who cares, anyway.)

One who errs in the use of these categories is at least a cad, and may be non-human. Over and over Aymara folk learning English will insist to me that it can't possibly be true that one can speak a language without marking data source — to them it is only *human* to do so. In fact, so *human* that Spanish of the Andes has been affected (Hardman 1982; Martin 1981a, b; Laprade 1976, 1981). It has not been discovered in the 400 years since the Spanish arrived because the Aymara presumed that

346 M. J. Hardman-de-Bautista

the Spanish speakers making data source mistakes were simply acting their usual non-human (or dog) best.

The data source postulate on the part of the Aymara acts to exacerbate the number postulate in clouding the vision of the anthropologist. If a man talks to a man about his relatives, he will get primarily male relatives, and from a male point of view. If he is asked to comment on the female view with marks that the Aymara man perceives as being PK, his answers will not be of the same caliber, and may even sound uncertain to the researcher, who, primed for singular focus, quickly dismisses such apparently useless material. If the question were framed in TLK terms, the answer would be quite different. A reflex of this is the ridiculously convoluted way in which some investigators have attempted to handle what data they didn't throw away but did not understand (cf. Hickman and Stuart 1972). Because the Aymara man values his human status (see below), he is unlikely to put words in the mouth of anyone he considers human, including his female relatives.

The same difficulties appear as he discusses land and animals; these are exacerbated further by the interplay of the postulates discussed below.

Gender

Sex and/or gender marking (seen as synonymous in Indo-European grammar [Miller 1977] whether they are or not) is, in Indo-European, of the sexist variety in that the male is seen as the prototype and the female as a secondary derivative, such that if the male is known, the female can be described with reference to him, but not vice versa. (Even the word *female*, from the French *femme* in diminutive, was reformed in English to look like it was derived from 'male' even though it wasn't.) A great deal has been written recently documenting the distorting effect of such grammatical practices as the 'generic' masculine; I will not recapitulate here (cf. McConnell-Ginet 1980; Kramarac 1981; Martyna 1980). Suffice it to say that we have been plagued with ethnographies of men, by men, for men that with unconscious dishonesty claimed to be ethnographies of entire cultures. If women were included at all it was only as servers of males in roles that for the most part look like they came out of Victorian England. Unfortunately, ethnographies of the Aymara have not been immune — this includes *The Masked Media* (but see Collins 1981, Painter 1981). Even the Aymara have protested this blindness (Mamani 1975, Llanque 1979, Copana 1981), to no avail. (It will be noted that Hardman, Yapita, and Vasquez 1975 and 1988 have two Aymara authors — one a woman, one a man, at the specific request of the Aymara themselves, who

felt that one could not learn the language well with the voice of only one man.)

Some of the very obvious distorting effects have been noted already, ignoring half the population is likely to distort any ethnography. Among the Aymara it is particularly bad, because this gender-marking interplays with the lack of number, as well as with the important postulates of data source and humanness.

Humanness

The second linguistic postulate of the Aymara language/culture that I wish to describe here is that of human/non-human. There are two sets of pronouns, one for humans, one for everything else — and the use of the non-human set to refer to humans is a good way to pick a fight (analogous perhaps to the use of female terms for males in English).

Human pronouns:

Naya 'I, with or without others, but not you'

Juma 'you'

Jupa 'they, she, he'

Jiwasa 'you and I, with or without others'

Non-human pronouns:

aka / uka / k'aya

The latter are usually translated as 'this' and 'that', and may be used as adjectives in Aymara. However, as pronouns for humans, they do not work at all. The unwary, working in translation tradition only, quickly fall into assigning animal status to Aymara people (e.g., 'this' is my informant).

Furthermore, vocabulary words for people are clearly distinguished from those of animals. Correlating with this, in the lack of any sex postulate, words which specifically refer to women are *not* derived from the paired item referring to men.

Jaqi 'people, person'

Warmi 'woman, wife'

Chacha 'man, husband'

Wawa 'child'

Imilla 'girlchild'

Yuqalla 'boychild'

On the other hand one has:

aywa	'domestic animal'
garchu	'female'
urqu	'male'

As a correlate of the humanness postulate, it is *never* a compliment to refer to a human being in animal terms. Children are admonished to behave like people. In a quarrel, to accuse the other of not behaving like a human is a particularly nasty insult. The verb 'to marry', the same for both sexes [*jaqichasña*], means literally 'to cause oneself to become a human being'.

These four postulates, two Aymara and two Indo-European, mutually interact to leave the researcher blind to Aymara realities. (They do the same for the Jaqi — many a Jaqi person, from any of the three groups, has insisted that the way women are treated in the U.S.A., for example in naming customs, is simply impossible — after all, isn't the U.S.A. *civilized*?) I will give one more example here in which all four interplay: there are many more in the third section.

A male anthropologist asks an Aymara man where he lives. The Aymara man replies with a statement regarding 'my house' — double singular to the questioner, also implying male ownership. What the Aymara man may be saying is, 'I and mine, but not you or yours, occupy the house I am showing you; it may or may not be a house to which I have title of inheritance (there is a 50 per cent chance that the inheritance title belongs to my wife), and it may or may not be where we spend most of the year, or any part of the year, but it is where I am sleeping at this time (or maybe only one of the places)'. Unless the Aymara postulates are understood, the researcher writes down 'virilocal' or 'patrilocal' and 'women go to live in their husband's house (one only)'. The interaction of the two Indo-European postulates precludes asking the necessary questions, unless the researcher is aware. Furthermore, if asked in a personal knowledge way, i.e. unmarked, the Aymara man, who values his human status, will not put words in the mouth of anyone else he considers human, including the woman with whom he shares a household.

Careers of Aymara (Jaqi) women

In our work as linguists, we are often given information that is not available to ethnographers who ask for it directly, especially when such questioning is in the form of a questionnaire and/or is mediated through an interpreter. Sometimes the information is a by-product of text collection for grammatical analysis; sometimes it is simply because we are

making the effort to speak the language, and are therefore seen as more human and more worthy of the ordinary exchange of human conversation (cf. Carpenter 1981). The result is that (anthropological) linguists frequently have greater access to cultural data than do ethnographers who focus directly on such data. This phenomenon interplays with the postulates described in the previous section in compounding distortion in the ethnography of the Aymara.

As a result, I have for nearly a quarter of a century had access to better and more complete data than have the ethnographers, particularly in such matters as attitudes, beliefs, world view, and cognitive/perceptive categories.

In the brief ethnographic statement I will present here, I will focus on those elements largely ignored in ethnographies such as *The Masked Media*, most specifically on women's careers and concerns.¹ My data is anecdotal and patterned, rather than statistical. My primary information comes from linguistic sources. The sources are very personal, from so very many women over the years — some very close friends, some *comadres*, some students, some *ahijadas*, some my hosts, some only acquaintances. Because much of the information has been given me in confidence, I here elect to merge the material from all three groups (Aymara, Jaqaru, and Kawki), and speak only of Jaqi women, thus precluding any identification of personal material. The pattern over the whole area is the same; only in details vary from group to group (for example, in one town men knit, in the next women do, but in all groups both sexes work in textiles).

I suspect some readers will feel deprived because this is only half an ethnography — especially as we women do ask 'what about the men'. (There is, unfortunately, no reciprocity on this from our male colleagues.) However, since the male viewpoint has been traditionally the sole focus, I will attempt here briefly to give some sense of the world view of Jaqi women. I will furthermore concentrate on rural women, with some comments on their reactions to the city.

Since the Aymara are not a staid people, very few women do not know the city, whether or not they know Spanish. In fact, travel is one of the first elements reinstated if it has been lost by, for example, the oppression of living on the *haciendas*. The Aymara travel a great deal. However, as with so much, the fact of extensive travel is not likely to come out with a direct question. I have a perfectly delightful tape in which one Jaqi woman states that she never travels, that she has never traveled, because she likes her home town just fine. Of course she goes to the jungle (four days' travel over very difficult terrain) to visit her son, and she goes to the capital city now and then (two days' travel), and she goes down the mountain for matches and sugar every week or so (one day's travel) —

but she never travels. It took me a long time to discover, but the definition of 'travel' is 'international' and/or 'airplane'; anything less does not count (which ought to say something about how much traveling is done). One Jaqi woman who went to England as a consultant said to me when she returned to the U.S.A. 'Now I've traveled!'. Thus, focus on rural women does not mean focus on women with no knowledge of the variety the Andes have to offer.

The thing that weighs heaviest on Jaqi women is control of their own reproductive lives. Of course there are herbs for inducing abortion and there is abstinence (not very satisfying), and, maybe, from the city there may come some contraceptives (about which every woman researcher will be immediately and thoroughly questioned). But cheap, effective, safe, and humane control does not exist (as we all know only too well). Therefore, it is not unusual for pregnancy and birth to be greeted with ambivalence. On the one hand, children are clearly welcome — who else will take care of you in your old age, accompany you, help with the farm work, take care of the animals while you irrigate, run to carry the water, the firewood, etc.? On the other hand, too many too soon can be a terrible burden, and there is the fear of injury or death in the birth process itself. But, given a good delivery and a lack of overbearing concerns, a birth is good. If the child is a girl, especially if it is the first, there is a quiet kind of deep satisfaction; she is a sign that the marriage is a good one, or if the mother is unmarried, maybe just that the relationship with the father is a good one. Also, she will be much company and wealth. If the child is a boy, that is also good, because he won't have to work as hard, and maybe he will have some luck in the school and thus in the city. Even if things are difficult at the beginning, these feelings do grow very shortly.

Jaqi children are spoiled mercilessly. The only corrective balance is the tremendous responsibility all children must bear. By five or six a child will be responsible for the family's sheep and goats, and no one refrains from scolding a child who allows the animals to damage crops. In the city, particularly if the parents are successful, such corrective influence disappears as the children are relieved of work, and the spoiling comes to the fore. A good deal of this has to do with the humanness linguistic postulate, and the correlative notion that one's will cannot be forced on any other human being; and the data source postulate, whereby one cannot have personal knowledge of another's internal state. Even with children, consensus is the goal.

Babyhood is spent snugly against mother; only seldom is bodily contact broken, and then only for work. I have slides of women dancing with babies on their backs. The children learn the rhythms of work and play in harmony through contact with their mothers' bodies. As soon as they are

toddlers, children will accompany their fathers as well in daily tasks, so that all little children receive much attention from adults. Boys may go more with fathers and girls with mothers, but the reverse also occurs, depending a lot on age and the tasks to be undertaken. At meals, around the fire at night, little girls are snuggled up sitting beside their mothers, in constant learning and reassuring contact.

By the time the child has learned to walk she will begin to bring water in containers suited to her size, gradually substituting larger ones as she is able to carry heavier and heavier weights. She will bring little twigs to the fire, gradually developing the capacity to bring great loads of heavy firelogs. Also, she will begin to accompany older siblings with the animals, until at five or six she is fully competent with a few sheep or goats. Gradually she will develop her skills to include larger numbers of animals, as well as pigs and cows — both harder to herd. Her skills in agriculture also develop along the same lines; she sits by her mother learning first to husk and shell the corn, then to sort the seed kernels into seeds, food, and market goods. It will be the same for potatoes. First she will participate in the stomping of the freeze-dried potatoes, in collecting and storing, gradually learning the complicated economy of deciding which potatoes, which varieties and qualities (of the several hundred⁶ varieties that any one woman will usually have access to, although the number is decreasing under foreign simplistic male ideas of farming) will be used respectively for planting, consuming, and marketing. If the woman will sponsor a festival in the coming year, specific portions of the harvest will be set aside for that purpose. If she is active in one of the saint-cults (*hermandades*), she may set aside some supplies for that purpose. She will also calculate any quantities she might need for upcoming ceremonies of a personal nature, such as the branding of her cows.

The work is ordinarily carried out, as much as possible, together with *comadres*, sisters, sisters-in-law, mothers, and daughters, so that in some tasks, like corn husking and shelling, there is also opportunity for exchange of information. Marketing is sometimes done cooperatively; for example, if it is the season for irrigation, but certain crops must be taken to market, one woman will take another's in exchange for irrigation, or two sisters will split up the tasks. Also, frequently, the men may be entrusted with handling the farming duties while the women take produce to market. There is some uneasiness in leaving men alone with work to be done, especially if animals are involved or if some crops need special attention, but it simply is not possible to handle all tasks in the ideal way — there is simply too much to be done, too many places to be at the same time.

What a little girl learns, then, is that she will have a career as a farmer:

she will think of herself as a farmer, with her other activities as adjuncts. Some women come to emphasize market activities over others and may come to think of themselves primarily as businesswomen — in fact a very large number of women in some areas have done that, to the point where they control the markets in cities like La Paz. Marketing is a primary factor in migration to the cities.

One of the major worries for women is the uncertainty of highland weather, and with it the uncertainty of crops. As explained above, an old Andean strategy for handling the problem is the *archipiñalago*. I have one tape in which a woman simply lists her land holdings — it takes 45 minutes, and she is in no way exceptional in her land holding. Today a woman wants as well a market stall in the city complete with a *purñi uta* — a house for arriving. Women choose to live according to convenience and comfort, frequently keeping more than one house easily habitable. Marketing, farming, and herding activities take primacy in deciding residence, at least until the children enter school. In early marriage a woman may continue to reside with her parents, or the couple may go to her husband's mother's house. *Ayllu*⁷ membership is by residence, established through one generation — i.e., membership is easily and readily shifted from that of one's parents.

The concern for diversification (Painter 1981, Collins 1981) will, among other things, play a major role in deciding whom to choose as a life partner. Certainly one wants, if at all possible, a man who is not lazy and who has a distribution of niches that will complement one's own. So, if a woman has no high pasture lands, a man with some will be doubly attractive. If she has no *purñi uta* in the city next to a market, a man with one will be attractive. If acquiring a satisfactory spread of niches through inheritance and access through marriage is not possible, women will also attempt acquisition by purchase (very difficult — people do not like to sell land) or by sharecropping.

A very large proportion of women also supplement their resources by additional economic activities. Some spin or twist, or weave or knit, or run boarding houses (for example, for the teachers in the community), or tailor, or run restaurants (especially at festival time when outsiders are likely to come). Some grow alfalfa even if they have no cows, and rent out the fields as pasture for cheese or money. Some own mules/horses and rent them out for burden/people bearing. Some own trucks. Above all, the little girl learns that, for a good life, she must diversify. Her career as a farmer is broadly conceived indeed, and requires complex management skills.

While she is learning of the heavy burden of work, the Aymara girl is also learning of the importance of play, and pleasure. From the begin-

ning, when she experiences music and dance on her mother's back, she learns to play as hard as she works, and that the two are inextricably bound. She learns from her mother's lips the beautiful and haunting *yarawi* songs for planting the broad beans, without which they might not grow well; she sings with her mother the verses and hears the echo of the men's answering chant for the canal cleaning. And above all she dances — first on her mother's back, then alone keeping time on the sidelines, then in play groups with her girl friends, then gradually joining the adult women in their dancing. (Andean dancing is only occasionally paired — more often it is line dancing or group dancing. Even when paired, opposite sex is by no means required — just a partner. Some exhibition dancing, or specific named groups with elaborate costumes for some festivals, especially those mocking or borrowing from the Spanish, are different.) No celebration, from holy-water baptism through marriage, hair-cutting, cow-branding, and work-parties, is celebrated without dance. One old woman told me, after I chided her following a dangerous incident, that her life did not matter, only the child's life (the focus of the danger) because she, the old woman, *had danced*, while the young child had not yet had her chance. Some who really enjoy dance and music will become superb singers of the *yarawi* and the *wak jayra* and the *waynu*, and important players of the *tinhya* — a small drum — and, above all, dancers. The dances, like the work, are highly athletic, and designed for strong active people who have enormous energy reserves.

But the dance — ah, what memories are stored up. I have one tape of a woman singing the song she sang at a particularly beautiful festival of which she was one of the sponsors some 60 years earlier. The voice is cracked, her hearing nearly gone, but the love of the dance and music and celebration still comes through.

One thing the little ones learn early is how to stay up all night on nothing but a few catnaps and still work a full day the next day, with no ill effects. One also learns how to judge one's alcohol intake, and how to appear to drink more than one does, and also how to take care of the men who do not have the capacity for such rational constraint.

The matter of choosing a life partner is a difficult and ambivalent one. Young girls are clearly instructed that marriage is not an ideal state, and that, as a matter of fact, if a woman wishes to live well and easily she would be better off *not* to marry. Relatively few women actually take that advice, although I do know a few who have — and who are, as a matter of fact, quite well off. So strong is the advice against marriage that there is a ritual lament, frequently indulged in before the unmarried (*lawagu*) to alert them to all the dangers and pitfalls. On the other hand, affectionate satisfaction is good, and a man who is not lazy can be a lot of help in

irrigation, plowing, and minding the kids and the house while one is off to market. Fortunately, the Jaqi marriage system (roundly denounced by all Christian sects) does allow some time for the couple to get to know each other (Carter 1977). Furthermore, since folks cannot act as full citizens until marriage — the culmination of the marriage ceremony is community commitment, not permission for sexual indulgence — there are a lot of reasons to marry. Children are not necessarily one of them — many women choose children without marriage, or choose a child and then reject the father, maybe later to marry better (and then grandma frequently has one more to raise).

Although stoutly denied (I suspect first under priestly pressure, and later internalized for form's sake), early friendship is developed from the age of five or six in the fields, followed by courtship, also in the fields. The herding is, in spite of appearances to the contrary (as reported by male white eyes), a highly social task, as kids endeavor to get the animals to cooperate in getting them to where they can interact with favorite friends. The children and teenagers carry with them (for animal control, they say) slingshots — in some places beautifully woven, highly decorative ones. Early contact is by slingshot. If a woman sees a shepherd she might like to talk to (to fall in love, or to love, in Jaqaru is *arishi*, 'to mutually speak'), she might toss a rock in his direction, or vice versa. If the shot is answered, then talk may begin. Even in apparently arranged marriages, the truth, late and intimately told, is that a lot went on before the event, out in the fields, and the young'uns got the parents to formalize it. In earlier times, this ritual of formalizing 'arranged' marriages was a very public yearly event in some places — but the fiction of never 'talking' before marriage fooled only the anthropologists (and, more importantly, the priests and missionaries).

Affectionate satisfaction is a woman's due. If her husband is an inadequate lover, she is fully within her rights to seek satisfaction elsewhere, although the logistics, given the farming business she runs, may make it very difficult, thus more easily said than done. However, she does have, and exercises, the right to complain, sometimes bitterly, to her fellow women. I have never, in more than 25 years, heard *anyone* blame the woman for such inadequacy. (She may, however, be criticized for short-sightedness if he is a good worker.) Furthermore, sex does get better as one gets older. There is a saying, in all three languages, in many versions, that has been told to me over and over, by more old women than I can count (and the number goes up rapidly as I now join their ranks) to the effect that 'well, we lose our teeth, our eyes don't see so well, our ears don't hear so well, but ... accompanied by hearty chuckles, giggles, and good camaraderie. One must only look out that one steer clear of *compadres* — a stronger incest taboo than even blood relatives.

Girls are initiated early into politics, precisely because when Spanish-speaking authorities show up women are *not* encouraged to attend the meetings (some communities imitate such tactics even when the officials are not present). However, a man may only speak for himself; if he speaks for his family he must first have his wife's consent and opinion, such that he acts as a reporter (cf. Núñez del Prado Béjar, 1975a, b). Children are always tolerated on the outskirts of *any* function, as long as they make no noise. Little girls act as court reporters for their mothers on political matters from the time they can accurately repeat what is said. This happens very early, and is closely related to the data source linguistic postulate. In fact, all Aymara verbs are divided into the groups of *kamsaña* ('what to say') and all others (Hardman, Yapita, and Vasquez 1975, 1988 Chapter V). Thus women do not rely only on men's reports of a meeting. If necessary, women will take charge of a given situation, for example arming themselves to fight a land takeover, but they really have more important things to do than sit in meetings. Since they hold the purse strings, nothing really crucial can take place without them — except, nowadays, for the funds which come directly from the government or international charities; these are typically placed in the hands of the incompetent men (everyone knows they can't handle money well).

Women are also active politically in the *hermandades* (cult groups or clubs), which care for a given saint's image and festival — precisely the topic of the book under review. Membership in these societies is inherited, usually along sex-specific lines (although if there is no same-sex heir, cross-sex inheritance is occasionally permitted). However, one way membership declines is by lack of inheritors — people don't jump at the chance to inherit cross-sex memberships. The proportion of a crop or of the market proceeds which will go into the sponsorship, who will do the dancing and singing, what kinds of *minik'a* and *ayni* ties will be formed and/or drawn on, which *comadres* one wants there, which will be honored — all are serious matters in political as well as personal terms for the women, and many an alliance thus formed between women will have repercussions down through the years on the entire community.

In some places women do indeed do (only) what the white males see so sex-specific that the other sex cannot take it on. For example, women sort the seeds, but in the American Universities Field Staff film 'Potato planters' (1976) the Aymara, being shorthanded of women, send an old man to get the seeds for one planting (although a woman does give them the once-over in the field before proceeding).

However, it must be noted that *nobody* is a housekeeper — housekeep-

ing is *not* a role. If a place needs sweeping out, the person it bothers does it or orders a child to do so. Houses are primarily sleeping/storage places, and it is nobody's job to 'keep' them (cf. Carter 1971). This lack can become painfully clear as there is movement towards more thorough urbanization and it is one of the negative stereotypes about 'Indians'. This is not related to cleanliness of person or clothes, which is the individual responsibility of each adult (for themselves and their children) and one most folks are careful about indeed (as can be seen in the AUFFS films).

The women understand the sexism of the dominant society, although they naturally state it in specific rather than theoretical terms ('all a girl gets is to be a maid') and therefore see schooling as a valuable resource for boys primarily. This is a perfectly logical and rational conclusion given the situation though it is now changing as the dominant societies open their doors somewhat. Every Jaqi man of my generation that I know who managed to get an education did so because his *mother* pushed, frequently against the wishes of his father (largely out of fear of authorities). Education for girls has been disappointing — I have heard many a grandmother ranting and raving about the inadequacies of her coastal or urbanized granddaughters, who can read and write but cannot make it on their own, are only interested in boys, and have no economic independence. They tend to blame it on the girls and women involved, rather than the system — if the boys make it why don't the girls do better? One hears this complaint in the strong booming voice of an old woman, baffled by the ugly effects of sexism on the young. Some women get disgusted at their lack of control in the cities and return to the mountains. Others open businesses, even street-corner ones, and make it, often through cooperation and exchange with women back home.

The variety of careers for women in the Andes is enormous, as could be imagined simply by the diversity of their activities. Nevertheless, one can make some generalizations about stages: A woman first learns the complexity of her role as a farmer. Then during the early years, in child-bearing, she works very hard indeed at raising the children and diversifying her economic activities. Then comes a consolidation period in early middle age, a more tranquil period, with the arrival of a few grandchildren, who help her. Then she gradually divests her various holdings among her children as they marry and/or bear and raise children of their own. Finally, if all goes well, she will spend a respected old age — at the side of and with frequent visits from the children, godchildren, and grandchildren, each bearing the appropriate gifts from the resources she cultivated and made available to them — with active participation in the ceremonial activities of her community.

The status and dignity she has as a human and productive person are

well earned. They radiate from her like the essential part of her being that they are. Only the encroachment of Western ways diminishes her. And she has maintained that dignity and sense of self-generation after generation, in spite of all the efforts of priests, missionaries, international and national developers, anthropologists, government agents, and teachers to strip her of that dignity and sense of self-worth.

The women of the Andes teach their daughters well.

The masked media

It is now appropriate to look specifically at some details of the Buechler book, in order to see the effect of viewing the Aymara fiesta system through the screen of the European male paradigm. Because the effects are pervasive, the citations given here are to be understood as exemplification only; examples of the problem can be found on virtually every page.

Buechler uses sexist language throughout. It could be argued that this is 'simply' a stylistic device, but it clearly reflects and reinforces a world view in which any representative of a human group is male — a view alien to the Aymara.

Buechler claims that the meaning of meaning is not germane (footnote 2, p. 15; cf. p. 8). I would argue that he is wrong, that it is impossible to see an empirical reality *without* imposing, perceiving, or inferring meaning — and that it is so for all humans, including anthropologists. Linguistic codes do indeed organize 'actual referents' — as we shall see, they do even for Buechler himself. Who does what, who is responsible — all such information is organized by Buechler's own linguistic system, such that he remains blind to what is actually happening around him. Believing that meaning is one step removed from empirical reality, a reality which he as an anthropologist believes himself capable of seeing, is a most dangerous conceit; in doing so, he makes himself oblivious to the blindness discussed in this article. The meaning of meaning — the sum total of all contexts in which a form is used — entails perpetually shifting meaning for *all* terms. But, believing as he does, his linguistic system is given the power of blinding him to a good deal of what is going on, because he is incapable of seeing the contexts in which the forms are used.

My specific comments will be organized around the four linguistic postulates described above, plus a few miscellaneous comments at the end pertaining to other structural features. Clearly, most statements reflect complex misinterpretations involving more than one postulate. The four postulates are expectation of singular/plural, disregard of data-source

so behave — nothing about the power of a father to so instruct, because he so clearly could not do so that no one even considered it mentionable). Furthermore, some of the men were indignant because they were really very proud of their dowries, and felt slighted that only women would be considered capable of owning land at marriage. (They did not consider that it was impossible for the woman only in a union to have land; however, they stressed that most of them *also* had land, and that *they* had not gone into their own marriages empty-handed.)

The meaning of *dote* in Andean Spanish is that portion of the child's inheritance that is ceded to her (*not* to her spouse) by her parents at marriage. It is important that parents be willing to part with some property when their child marries — and some parents are more generous, or more capable of giving up lands early, than others. Some allow only cultivation, rather than ownership — i.e., not full dowry.

Ownership *always* remains individual and personal. Lands are cultivated in common in the partnership of marriage, but are not held in common (Collins 1981, Painter 1981). Both members of the new couple are expected to recompense their spouse's kindred for the removal of a productive member (Collins 1983), and *this is fully reciprocal*. Concentration of same-sex informants, lack of understanding of data-source, expectation of singular inheritance, and expectation of male dominance kept Buechler from seeing that daughters-in-law are expected to help as much as sons-in-law — i.e., there is no 'dowry' repayment; instead there is *producer* payment.

When no men are around, Buechler *can* see the women. Someone must hire the brass band or panpipe assembly (p. 151), so women are seen if they constitute the singular source. This is then justified by saying they are 'market women — *maestras mayores*' (rather than 'normal' women).

The ritual ties across communities are important throughout the Andes, as far back as can be traced — and the road routes with toponyms give a good idea as to their complexity, in contrast to what Buechler says (p. 157). The cross-community ties increase with land reform, which often demands that members of one family split up in order to maintain control of lands. Also, marriages across boundaries are frequent, and serve to increase access to different lands (cf. Harris 1985). Interest in the festivals of other communities is great, including comparative statements. In fact, cross-community festival interest and attendance even transcend such differences as language.

Contrary to Buechler (pp. 46, 133, 158, 223, etc.), *individuals* do not sponsor festivals — married couples do. He says it correctly several times (although mostly restricting himself to 'a man must be married'), but then he goes back to thinking of a married couple as one — i.e., the man, the

marking, disregard of human/non-human marking, and expectation of the male as the primary and dominant figure.

Expectation of singular/plural

One pervasive flaw based on the singular/plural distinction, which I cannot cite without seeing the specific language, is the source of some of his mistakes regarding 'men only': since number is not routinely marked in Andean Spanish, the I/we (*yo/nosotros*) distinction serves no useful purpose and thus seems 'empty'. On the other hand, Spanish has no inclusive/exclusive. So, *yo/nosotros* was pulled into the task. If a man says 'mi casa' ('my house') or 'mi fiesta', he does not mean singular, only that the addressee is not involved. Just where this expectation of singular/plural cross-cuts with the gender postulate would be impossible to know without the original language — but I have seen it happen a lot.

Buechler describes the circular migration to the Yungas (p. 22) as a result of the *hacienda* system. (This is clearly not the case, as I have shown in both sections above; it is simply further implementation of a very old pattern. It is true, however, that current *misiri* political stands will have an effect on just *where* one may go [cf. Collins 1981].) It is also to him a pattern of an individual 'leaving'. This is simply a misperception of the pattern. The issue is the cultivation of as many varying resources as possible, including cities (Painter 1978, 1981). Buechler here demonstrates his dependence on the singular/plural postulate of Indo-European, as described above, as though only *one* focus exists for home/work.

Buechler sees duality everywhere, except in marriage (for example p. 56), where there *is* a duality — two lineages coming together (cf. Carter 1977).⁶ His misunderstanding of dowry [*dote*] (p. 125) brings together not only number and gender, but data source and humanness as well — plus a belief (unexpressed) in the absoluteness of Spanish lexemes. This is absurd, bringing to the fore, as it does, the author's limitations in Andean Spanish; Buechler lacks sensitivity not only for the Aymara but also for Andean Spanish.

While preparing this review, I read some sections to Andean folk. They found this bit about dowry particularly hilarious. I took the word used in Spanish [*dote*] and told them what European dowry was like (as Buechler understood it). They told me that I didn't know the meaning of the word. I told them that was indeed the way it was done in some places. They didn't believe me. They said no woman could possibly be so foolish as to give her husband title over any of her land. No woman anywhere in the world would ever behave in that way. (Note that they said no *woman* would

godfather, the father. This causes him to miss most of the ritual, an important part of which is the exhibition of the ongoing partnership (Buechler's own 'duality'). Couples in the process of breaking up or having troubles are unlikely to get the necessary *mink'a* and *ayni* help, let alone the help from real and fictive relatives. Buechler also misses the increased sexism brought by moves into town (instead assuming the contrary) (cf. Isbell 1978; Núñez del Prado Bejar 1975a, b).

The money from haircutting (p. 190) is not kept 'safe' — it is loaned out at interest, as a unit or in pieces. Either the *madrina* or the *padrino*, or both together, may act as banker. On occasion the parents may also be involved. Either way, the other participants act as checks and balances to assure a good rate of return and to see that there is no hanky-panky with the child's money.

Another type of singular/plural expectation is that of linearity — that change follows only one line. For example, on p. 5, where because he becomes more aware of *compadrazco* in the city, Buechler assumes the 'growth' of *compadrazco* (instead of its 'demise') as folks move to the city. I suspect he missed a good deal in the country, but more importantly, he missed the communication involved, and indeed the critical city/country relationships which are heavily dependent on *compadrazco* ties. These ties are also important in access to land and to market routes. Furthermore, although the words are Spanish borrowings, the evidence is that, like kinship, they spring from pre-Hispanic social norms (cf. Collins 1983).

Buechler sees only confirmation or establishment of a relationship, again in a lineal fashion only (p. 104). But change in relationships also occurs between the parents and those baptizing a child, especially a first child. For example, if all has gone well, the wedding godparents may become the godparents to the baby, and thus *compadre/comadre* to the new parents — changing sharply the existing relationships.

Disregard of data source

This problem permeates the entire book, although it would be difficult to point out the specific examples because the Aymara or Andean Spanish that is given is incomplete, inaccurate, and/or insufficient. However, it is strongly evident that, at least in part because of his disregard of the data source markers in the language of his informants, Buechler was unable to judge when he was being given personal-knowledge information and when he was being given, for example, non-involver information. I suspect that some of his misinformation is of this type, but I would have to hear the original conversations to tell in each specific case. This

postulate is very tightly tied to language form: for that reason it is difficult to give specific examples without the original language. Nevertheless, there are a few examples which clearly show a patent disregard of the grammatical feature that for the Aymara shows most clearly one's human respect.

'Naturally she was asked to make a wish and blow out the candles' (p. 192). Naturally!!! That type of statement clearly shows someone who is not listening — and a lot of ethnocentrism. The birthday complex has indeed been imported in part, sometimes including the cake and candles, always with 'Happy Birthday' sung in (approximate) English. The wish-making part has not been imported — in fact it is most baffling here, especially given a very strong distrust of secrets on the part of the Aymara. If there was a wish, it reflects some direct and very personal contact with some 'gringos': even then it is not taken to easily.

'[A]gain eclipsing her husband ...' (p. 195). This did not come through informants, and simply shows Buechler's ethnocentrism, attributing to others perceptions of which he has no possibility of personal knowledge. This is against all Aymara norms. Actually, in the situation he describes, as near as I can make out, the woman was behaving perfectly appropriately. The only notion of put-down was in the eyes of the author and/or the Hispanics present. It is true that there are some Aymara men who wish to shed their heritage, and these few do indeed become abusive to women, as part of their 'mistification'. Also, Hispanic men, like Buechler, frequently put them up to it, out of their own misguided sexism, and then infer that the origin was the underdeveloped Aymara! I have often witnessed such a sequence, where an Aymara man, out of courtesy, will agree with a put-down of women using non-involver grammar marks (sort of like 'if you say so' but noncommittal), only to be taken seriously by those who do not understand the grammar.

Disregard of human/non-human

This postulate interplays extensively with that of gender, but since Buechler's sexism is so much more evident, most of the examples are there. Quite simply, had he understood the Aymara human/non-human distinction, Buechler could not have been so blind to half the population. But I will describe here a few of the more salient examples.

Buechler does see the children's politeness (p. 36), especially in the matter of greetings — an accurate datum — but he does not accurately interpret it. It is linked to the human/non-human distinction and the child-rearing goal of aspiring to full human status (see above).

Buechler discusses the role of 'godfathers' in marriage (p. 125): it is, of

rise, equally the role of the godmother. I know a couple of marriages that have remained intact because of fear of losing the respect of the *mother*. It is indeed true that the husband and wife are admonished by their godparents to behave as *people*. Buechler, however, misses entirely the importance of the human/non-human distinction, and feels obliged to assert 'respectable'. Thus on this occasion, when he does get the language right, he blows it because he does not *understand* that language. To someone 'people' is the goal of growing up. The verb 'to marry' [*jaqichan*] translates as 'to cause oneself to become human'. The main point of an entire marriage ceremony is to take on full *jaqi* status in the community, and full *jaqi* responsibilities (somewhat analogous to the English use of 'man', unqualified, as equal to a desirable condition). He sees the point of the admonition, and the point of the ceremony.

This becomes evident from the fact that some individuals do not offer *ayni* gifts at all, but merely accompany a sponsor for one or more days during a fiesta. Such an act is seen as an important contribution in its own right' (p. 230, Aymara corrected). If Buechler knew more Aymara, his sentence would not be so defensive in tone, but would flow naturally in the Aymara framework — nor would such accompaniment be seen 'not *ayni*'. He is hung up on his own value system. In the first place, *ayni* is a system of loans, not gifts. On the value of accompaniment — *ayni* is 'companion'; *yanapaña* is 'to help' — therefore, companionship is a form of assistance. This is so even in Andean Spanish where *acompañar* equals *ayudame*. What this means is: those who accompany are giving, an equivalent at least of a *mink'a* day — and may even be repaying similarly incurred debt — or building up for their own day of need.

Expectation of the male as the primary and dominant figure

There is hardly a page of the book where this postulate does not leap out, exacerbated by the three above, destroy any hope of finding the Aymara world view; rather, it appears to be an odd way of viewing European peasants, which then feeds into some other unfortunate structural misperceptions (see below).

The statement on p. 19 that land is transmitted mainly through the male is simply *wrong*. In some *ex-haciendas* and areas affected by land reform, where Hispanic or international interests have assigned title to men only, it takes two to three generations to get back to normal — in the normal Andes 50% of the land is held by women — and no Andean woman I know ever willingly relinquishes title to her land (cf. Babb 1980: 13).

It is also not the case (p. 20) that only boys receive an inheritance at

marriage — girls also receive land. Both receive inheritance from both parents, though a mother may show preference, all other things being equal, to a daughter. This is widely reported elsewhere (Carter 1977, Collins 1981, Miracle 1976, Painter 1981).

Buechler claims that the wife's kin have more importance in the city, which is nonsense, once again a product of what is in the eye of the beholder — in this case a frequently encountered belief that white men's women have it 'best of all women' and that the higher the social class or more powerful the men, the better they treat 'their' women. This correlates to the 'whites will bring salvation' syndrome. (In this case the reverse might be closer to the truth. For a similar error serving as the framework of a book, cf. Bourque and Warren 1979.) Actually, there is no way a woman can disown her kin. And as to residence patterns, my experience across the Andes is that uxorilocal residence accounts for approximately 50%, exclusive of completely neo(neuro)local. In fact, I was severely taken to task by one older woman for allowing my husband to reside where he wished (i.e., in his house) rather than simply informing him that he was to live in mine with me — I was shirking my responsibility as a woman.

Buechler does recognize that women dominate the market — in a footnote (p. 31) (he generally reduces whatever it is women do to footnotes, cf. footnote 19, p. 102). The implication ought to be clear that no festival of any kind can be carried out without women supplying the goods (cf. Núñez del Prado Béjar 1975a, b). Even the footnote is not entirely accurate — the entry of men into the coca market is not yet complete, and in some areas men do *not* sell coca. That the whole economic underpinning of the fiesta system can be relegated to a footnote simply because that power is held by women clearly indicates the bias of the book — and its severe limitations as a network description of anything. In the same vein Buechler implies total male control of the child's hair-cutting ceremony (p. 109) (cf. Miracle 1976). This cannot possibly be the case. If women have marketing control (as he admits elsewhere), it ought to be obvious that supply control is critical to any ceremony. Even if men do on occasion make some purchases, I don't know any Andean man who would buy a sheep or a bicycle or any similar object without consulting his wife (although the reverse is not so true).

Buechler claims there is *increasing* female participation in dance — a truly amazing view implying *change* parallel to European-based groups. Elsewhere in the Andes, women's (and men's) participation is obligatory — the two have complementary roles. Most of the traditional dances cannot be performed by one sex alone. However, the dances mocking the Spaniards are indeed mostly male — as were the Spanish who deserved the mockery (judges, priests, soldiers, etc.). If female participation is

increasing, then they are using more traditional dances, i.e., recouping that which has been lost.

Buechler denies women their name rights (for example p. 53, but evident throughout). No woman in the Andes has ever introduced herself to me using her husband's name.⁹ They don't even do that in Andean newspapers. Kin-based reference is indeed common, but 'x's wife' is no more common than 'x's husband' or 'x's mother' or 'x's father' or 'x's sister', etc. Buechler quite routinely strips women of names. Clearly, for Buechler, a woman has no identity beyond that of her relationship to men, but that is *not* the perception of the Aymara, women or men.

Buechler lets his classification get in the way of data. Soft drinks for the women (pp. 85-86)? Not likely. Much more likely, for the Protestants. If in this case they were women, that should have been discovered. Women have been prime movers in establishing and supporting schools, and in pushing their children; this has also been an important reason for becoming Protestant, since Protestant missionaries brought the first schools.

Buechler's own data betrays him. Teenage girls are heavily into marketing (p. 92), but the importance or impact of this escapes him entirely.

Sometimes, when translating from Spanish, Buechler actually introduces more male focus than was there even in the original. For example (p. 179), he translates 'sons'. I imagine that the original Spanish was '*hijos*' and, in this case, 'children' would have been a more accurate translation.

Marketing traditions are often passed from mother to daughter' (p. 197). Buechler is correct. One would think that such an obvious tip-off would lead the author to look further into the passing of traditions, including land. Surely such a tradition does not arise full-blown from nothing. There is certainly nothing in the Hispanic world that would lead to an easy assumption of traditional female-line businesses.

In one paragraph, by giving accurate ethnographic data, Buechler manages to contradict himself. Membership in the butchers' guild is passed on male lines, but the butchers are predominantly women, and the specific example is of a man wanting to 'marry into' the guild! The data is there, but the correct interpretation is blocked by the linguistic postulates of Buechler's own framework.

Clothing is in the hands of women 'who play prominent roles in rituals akin to those played by men' (p. 217) — and this he attributes to improvement (!) of women's roles in La Paz, and arising only within the last 25 years! But I saw all this more than 25 years ago, and have actually seen women's control erode, rather than grow, over that period.

Buechler's statement that 'division of labor according to sex is very pronounced among the Aymara' (p. 249) is simply false (Collins 1981, Painter 1981, Hardman 1976). He then lists what *men* do (cf. Babb 1980: 33). In fact, both sexes, even where statements are made about division of labor, may and do take on the tasks of the other whenever there is need, as documented very well in the works cited above. Furthermore, the notion that women's work is 'lighter' is a *misri* idea — I recommend any who doubt this to try breaking clouds or carrying sacks of potatoes. (I have, and I can't.) Buechler's subtle concessions to women's power ('female submission is often more apparent than real') fall into the blatantly sexist mold exhibited throughout the book, which renders the analysis un-Aymara. The notion that the men supervise even a woman's cooking is laughable (the Aymara to whom I read the passage laughed). Coordination within the festival context may be done by either sex, as may the cooking. Apparently, if he saw one incident that could be classified as male supervision of women (for example a man handing some food to a woman), Buechler felt justified in proclaiming it the pattern. The two dances, all male, which he cites as typically traditional — the *morenada* and the *diablada* — are part of the Spanish import/syncretic system. They are not traditional Aymara dances; for those, one must look to planting, harvesting, or canal-cleaning.

Buechler states (p. 259) that all passes through the patriline, but he says (p. 269) that women nevertheless lay some stress on matrilineal ties as well (!). The first statement is reiterated throughout the book; the latter appears only this once. Slowly Aymara communities are rebuilding what they lost through the *hacienda* systems; sometimes they do it in the cities (for example, things Buechler noticed in the markets), sometimes in the country, by reestablishing land ownership patterns. In free communities the old patterns had a better chance of surviving, and in many cases did survive.

Other comments

As an extension of male dominance, Buechler also exhibits a belief in the primacy of European-based cultural progression, particularly as the line for change. Some of these examples have already been cited, but we will add a few more here.

Buechler's identification with the landlord class, the *misti*, is clear. For example, Buechler makes a most amazing claim: 'This image of the *patrón* as a fatherly benefactor ...' (p. 315) — to whom? I have many a tape, from Qumpi and from Jang'u Amaya, that specifically contradict any

such view — indeed, no one from Qumpi saw it that way, although the *parrones* believed themselves benefactors, and in their presence the Aymara did not contradict them. This one statement betrays the framework of the book. Yes, the *parrones* do have roles in the fiesta system, as do the priests. Neither is liked. The fiesta system has adapted to integrate the *misiri* power structure and Catholic liturgy. Many dances, and such rituals as the funeral games, mock precisely those roles also seen as essential even by the Aymara today. If there is communication, part of it is what a good job of being courteous the Aymara can pull off. Fatherly image indeed! Priests and *parrones* together! Interestingly, Buechler once asked me about the 'boy'¹⁰ from Qumpi with whom I had worked — referring to a man who is Buechler's senior and a college professor.

Buechler comments on the influence of the *hacienda* system on fiestas, including leadership patterns and prestige ranking. He is, of course, correct in that there was great influence, except that he misses the most important change — denigration of women (cf. Babb 1976). (Women have lost most in colonial situations; cf. Inos 1983.)

Buechler thinks that women are new to drinking (p. 321) and to economic power (as of 1970) — presumably because European women are. When I first went among the Jaqi in the late fifties, women older than I drank and held economic power. I have accounts of women dancing, drinking, sponsoring fiestas, even singing old songs from fiestas they had sponsored years before — women now in their seventies, eighties, and nineties. This is most certainly no new thing! On the contrary, they have in recent years lost economic power, and there are now pressures to drink less (for example from the Protestants).

If women carry money and pay for the beer their men drink, that is *Andean*, not *mestizo* as Buechler claims. Even Bourque and Warren (1979), with a conceptual framework similar to that of Buechler and thus with many of the same problems, found women giving drinking allowances to men. Drinking in Spanish taverns is different, of course, but women do make decisions about expenditures. For women to pay is an *Andean* carry-over — it has not come with increasing Hispanification.

If in any sense young women are becoming more important (p. 332), it is simply the restoration of what their foremothers had. In many cases women clearly state this in Aymara. However, in Spanish, courtesy will lead Aymara folk to say what the *misiri* wants to hear.

In a further justification of his framework, Buechler invokes the work of Bernstein (p. 184 and 353ff.). It is extremely unfortunate that any anthropologist (or anyone else) would choose Bernstein as an example of anything but faulty research techniques (cf. Vollweiler 1975). Bernstein's work has been used extensively to give to one's class prejudices a

'scientific basis'. The notion that any upper-class English speaker would automatically know Cockney, while the 'deprived' Cockney could not reciprocate (or that any white English speaker in the U.S. would automatically know Black English, but not vice versa) is absurd on the face of it. A critique of Bernstein cannot be undertaken here, but Buechler is badly misreading the richness and complexity of traditional Aymara society, even the 'elaborateness' of some portions of their 'code'.¹¹

There has always been much travel — I am collecting toponyms on some of these mule roads, an extremely complex and still-in-place system wherever motor roads have not yet arrived — so 'restricted' talk 'only' in small intimate groups was never the case. Furthermore, in the Aymara language itself (but not in the *Andean Spanish* of serfs) there are numerous levels and styles. The simplicity of the Qumpi festivals is in the eye of the beholder — Buechler is simply more attuned to complexity in La Paz. I myself find the city rituals more easily understandable — it is the country rituals, some portions of which are performed out of range of *misiri* observers, that I find more difficult to comprehend in their entirety. Also, much of the historical relevance is not immediately evident, coming out only when I ask for texts, in which the recounting of earlier enactments of given ritual/fiesta clearly interplays with the present one, adding a dimension that is sometimes absent in more citified versions. Also, under pressure from priests, missionaries, and *misiri*, there may be only tokens of what used to be large parts of a ceremony — invisible unless the history is known. If these pieces are not clearly articulated by the young, who then go to the city, they are lost; thus the citified rituals really are often simplified versions, in the symbolic semiotic sense (though more complex in terms of cash expenditure). Buechler's use of Bernstein's model in this case is severely distorting and prejudicial; to put Bernstein in the company of Whorf is a grave insult to the latter, and a distortion of what Whorf's work was about.¹²

Some additional problems arise because of lack of language knowledge. Throughout the book the lack of understanding of ceremony names shows through. Nor does Buechler recognize Spanish borrowings (for example *alwa* [p. 319], which should have signaled to him a recently introduced piece of the ceremony).

In discussing age-linked roles, Buechler could have easily found that there are named ages corresponding to roles. He was apparently unaware of the connection. As mentioned above, his lack of knowledge of 'to marry' [*jaqichasiña*], based on the root *jaqi* ('person, people'), led him to misunderstand not only the marriage ceremonies themselves, but also the entire process of sponsorship selection. The five named age roles are all either sex-neutral or parallel. The sex-neutral terms are the beginning

[*wawaj*, adult [*jaqi*], and old age [*chuymani*]. Sex-specific are *imilla/yuqalla* for the young and *tanwaku/wayna* for the marriageable. Adults may be divided into sex-specific categories [*warmi/chacha*] and so also may old-age, but in the latter case the terms vary from area to area.

In a comparable way, Buechler cites the kin terms borrowed from Spanish (*tia, tío*), and then fools himself that they came together with the Spanish kin system when in actuality they simply replaced terms in the vastly different Aymara system. They are part of the complex translation tradition, and at least in part acted as a smoke screen for nosy priests, among others (cf. Collins 1983).

Finally, what is missing from the book as a whole in terms of the stated goals is the matter of the long-term memories of festival high points, the long-term reactions to fiesta behaviors, and the long-term build-up of community. The whole analysis as presented seems extremely shortsighted, giving no scope to the historical dimension of the fiestas for individuals and for the community. Yet a great deal of any fiesta small-talk, from earliest preparations to last clean-up, is spent reminiscing over old fiestas and individuals in them. This is where Buechler's stated goal might have been met.

The book is valuable as a compendium of minutiae carefully collected and placed between covers. One Aymara person likened it to soup without salt or savor (almost identical to a comment another Aymara speaker made concerning an earlier book of Buechler's). The analysis tells us nothing about the world view of the Aymara, and may lead the unwary to misjudge them. For one familiar with the Aymara (including the Aymara themselves), there appears to be no organization to Buechler's presentation. We get no feeling at all of what it might be like to function within the Aymara fiesta system. The topic is well worth studying: the Aymara have a lot to say.

Notes

1. I wish to express my appreciation to my assistants: Yolanda López, teacher and farmer; native Aymara speaker from Lloquesani, Mocho, Huancané, Peru, and former Aymara drill master and student of anthropology and linguistics at the University of Florida; Elizabeth Dunn, advanced Aymara student and graduate student in agricultural economics, for reading earlier drafts (1982) of this review and making both substantive and editorial suggestions; and James McKay for reading the current version (1986) and updating references.
2. The spelling in this review is that of the Aymara alphabet (Yapita 1981, Hardman forthcoming a) which is used by the Aymara speakers themselves. Choice of alphabet has many political implications, as detailed in the sources cited. Within the ALMP we

have opted, at the specific request of the Aymara people, to use *ik'ir* alphabet, in part to make any of our publications more immediately accessible to them — an ethical issue, and in part because it accurately reflects the structure of the Aymara language — also of aesthetic importance to the Aymara people. The alphabet used by Buechler makes quite different political statements. The Yapita alphabet is as follows:

p	t	ch	k	q		i	a	u
p'	t'	ch'	k'	q'		i	a	u
p'	t'	ch'	k'	q'		ä	ä	ü
m	n	ñ						
l	ll							
w	r	y						
s			j	x				

' represents glottalization, " represents aspiration, q stands for post-velar occlusives, j represents a glottal fricative, x a post-velar one. Vowel length is marked with a dieresis. All Aymara in citations from the book has been corrected.

3. Archipiélago is also evidenced in the archeological record (Mujica 1985).
4. *Misiri* is one of the terms used to indicate whites or Hispanics or upper class folk, most decidedly non-Aymara. The usage of *The Masked Media*, and in this article, is Bolivian; usage in Peru is different.
5. In the few years since I first wrote this review, many more ethnographies of women and/or including women have become available than were known at that time. Some of these have apparently avoided the pitfalls outlined here, but there are none yet of Aymara women beyond the ones cited in this review.
6. The number is based on my conversations with Jaqi women. LaBarre's consultant knew more than 200 varieties (1947).
7. *Ayllu* is an important structural grouping in the Andes; definition has been difficult; full discussion would be a different paper.
8. Duality is the primary Quechua mode of organization; Aymara (and all Jaqi) organization is based instead on the number three (cf. Harris 1985, Hardman 1984).
9. Current Peruvian family law now recognizes Andean custom; the adoption of *dk* plus husband's first name is now legally optional.
10. The conversation was in Spanish, and the actual word used was *murk'urhu*.
11. Other investigators have been impressed by the great complexity of the Aymara, e.g. LaBarre's (1942, 1951) characterizations of the complexity of the Aymara medical systems, or Cole's (1969) work on the language of dreaming. Our own work, currently underway at the University of Florida, on discourse analysis of Aymara confirms in every way the complexity of Jaqi language and cultural codes.
12. I am well aware of the efforts of Bernstein himself to so distort Whorf, and I am aware that much has been made of the apparently scientific justification which such speculation gives to prejudice. That others have been uncritical does not exonerate any scholar from the scholarly obligation to evaluate sources. Taking on Bernstein, and why he has been so well-received, is another topic entirely.

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Differences That Make a Difference

*Examining the Assumptions
in Gender Research*

Edited by LYNN H. TURNER
and HELEN M. STERK



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"And If We Lose Our Name, Then What About Our Land?" Or, What Price Development?

M. J. Hardman

*Ak markanga warniq wamjanachqa, karnaps karnajiamchaga.
(Here in Tzipe women are as women themselves and men are also as men themselves.)*
—TZIPE SAYING

On the high, wind-swept plateaus and in the rugged, steep valleys of the Andes, Andean civilizations flourished for centuries, maybe millennia. From what remains and from what can be reconstructed, we know the cultures in existence a little over 500 years ago were thriving cultures with intimate and specific knowledge of the rugged environment that allowed not only survival but prosperity. The steep, terraced hillsides were richly productive in agriculture, everyone had enough to eat, an extensive, well-maintained road system allowed exchanges for a rich diversity in food and other products.¹

Cultural norms were of equality between women and men with complementary, sometimes overlapping roles, with a balance of power between the sexes, both believed to be equally necessary to a viable human community. The languages, in consonance with the cultures, had no structures for the denigration of women; rather, the grammatical structures affirmed humanness. The major grammatical divisions are not sex-based but rather human-based, with a separate set of pronouns for human beings and another for all else, including animals. The major inflectional category is not number, but data source, that is, sentences are marked as to the source of the material being presented, whether personal experience, knowledge-through-language, or some nonpersonal source. The languages grammaticalized the simile and have no easy way of ranking comparatively. The language and culture were deeply rooted in community and cooperation, not in ranking and competition.

Five hundred years ago, out of Europe, a conquest swept over the Americas devastating the existing cultures and leaving in its wake the European version of sexism with its own particular characteristics deeply rooted in the structure of the Indo-European family of languages (Miller 1977). The specific grammatical structures that so lowered the status of women in the Andes, as elsewhere, are sex-based gender with the feminine

a derivation of the masculine, number with plural derived from the singular, and the pervasive ranking comparative/absolute. I call the interplay of these three structures "rational thinking."

Sex-based gender marking in the world's languages is not necessarily rare, although way in which grammars have been written by members of the conquering European societies gives us a biased idea of frequency and typology. The language structures might by these conquerors involved not only the obligatory marking of sex-based gender, but a derivation of the feminine from the masculine, the result of a tradition at least 5,000 years old, in a constant feedback loop between women's place in these European societies and in their languages.

Part of the realization of this derivation is in the naming practices imposed on all conquered populations, patronyms that labeled all people, and by implication all gods, as belonging to men. The power to name implies much of the power of creation. Patronyms give the power to name people exclusively to men; without a father the word "has no name"; ancestry and family are identified through father's name; mother as her name and identity at marriage. Our old property rights exactly echoed these practices: old Anglo law allowed no property to a woman; what was her father's became husband's at marriage and her son's on his death. Recent times have modified these practices, but the underlying attitudes remain, particularly as "development" is practiced "third world" countries. The devastation of the conquest was compounded for women these practices were imposed by law, denying them the name, property, and identity rights that they had never had any reason to think were not theirs by birthright.

Current efforts at "development" threaten to destroy what little language and culture survived the original European conquerors. The affected women lose status, and, often, their very means of livelihood. Women's resistance to schooling, for example, is frequently a recognition of the loss such implies for them (Stein, ms.). At the same time, the rest of us may be losing models for what nonsexist societies might look like, a chance to imagine ourselves as living and growing in such societies. I argue that this is a loss to the women and men of the affected societies and also to ourselves as participants in the European-derived societies. In the languages of the conquerors, other men are invisible to us.

The Jaqi family of languages has been the focus of my research. As an anthropological linguist, my primary training enables discovery of the grammar of a language previously undescribed. This involves, in so far as possible, seeing a language within context in order to discover the meaning and function of grammatical particles. Necessarily, one must understand the sentences, discourses, and cultural contexts in which these are used if one is to account for the distribution.² Part of the methodology is a collection of "texts" for analysis. These texts include narrations which include, among other things, stories, autobiographies, biographies, histories, myths, descriptions, and also the recording of such ongoing events as conversations, speeches, celebrations, ceremonies. For accurate language analysis, these texts must be collected without translation interface, that is, in the context of the language being studied, not of a dominant prestige group. A language needs to be studied where it is spoken.

Jaqaru is a member of the Jaqi family of languages, which also includes Aymara, a major language of Bolivia, of southern Peru and of northern Chile. There are today some three and a half million speakers of Jaqi languages, the remnant of an empire that, before the time of the Incas, stretched from Ecuador to Argentina. The homeland of the Jaqaru speakers is a steep valley heavily terraced on both sides. The plaza is a little over 9,000 feet above sea level. Although under Spanish rule for 500 years, they have been able to maintain many of their own cultural constructs. This they have done by internal community cohesion, by the use of the language, and by reconstructing much of what they have been given to better fit their own worldview.

I, personally, have gained much from observing the women in Tupe. I first went there in the 1950s, when women's choices in the United States were far more circumscribed than they are today. I watched women working, not in the home and with no notion of the role of "housewife." I listened to and worked with a language that carried no deprecations of women and with texts from strong, self-possessed women who could not understand subservience. I remember one incident: my husband and I were living a long-distance marriage for professional reasons, which meant that he was not with the children. I was complaining of this to a Jaqaru friend. Utterly baffled as to why I had a problem, her solution was, "Well, you just tell him where he should live." For myself, as a young woman in the 1950s, this possibility had not occurred to me.

About fifteen years ago I invited my children's godparents to visit with us in Tupe, where Jaqaru is spoken. The godparents are very tall, fair *gringos* (the usual word in Peru, often said with affection, for European-looking foreigners). Because Tupe is a two-day trip from Lima, the second day on foot for some twenty-five kilometers and with a climb of some 5,000 feet, foreign visitors were, and are, exceedingly rare. One evening, after my *compadres* had recovered from their climb, I introduced them to a group assembled for tea and conversation in the home of one of my Tupe friends. The godparents' English name was very difficult for the people of Tupe to pronounce. For the godfather they finally got it right: *Erdmann*. Then they all braced for the godmother's name. I will never forget the look on the Tupinos' faces when her name turned out to be the same!

The only possible explanation for the two sharing a name that would have occurred to any of the Jaqaru people was that they were blood kin, therefore: incest. The godmother asked me to explain as, for this situation, her Spanish was failing her. I explained how in the United States a woman took her husband's name at marriage, losing hers, resulting in their having the same name. So that was why the names of my *comadre* and my *compadre* were the same. A young woman farmer, married to the man schoolteacher, looked quite perplexed and said to me: "But what, then, of inheritance, what of our land?" Yes, a good question indeed. The name attached to the land is also the name of the owner of the land. If a woman would have no name of her own, then how could she have land of her own? European practices had certainly long reflected that. At the time this conversation took place, it had only been legal for about a year for a woman to buy property in Florida without a male relative's signature.

EUROPEAN LANGUAGE AND EMBEDDED SEXISM

As part of the European conquest, the European system of patronymics was introduced. From early baptismal records found in Andean churches (Collins, 1983, and personal communication) the practice was apparently resisted. Today, children throughout the Andes follow the law in taking both the mother's and the father's patronyms. However, women do not take the husband's name, not even in Andean newspapers. One does find the name change practice, in almost Anglo style, among the upper classes with heavy international contacts. These are also the women who find our style of feminism most congenial and, by their names, are an example themselves of one of the ways in which importation of our traditions may be detrimental to other women. That this loss is serious was recognized by the woman quoted in the title of the paper, from the anecdote above. Her motive was to prevent loss, but even she did not know how much was already gone.

Most detrimental is the notion, based in the grammatical structure of derivational thinking, that, if one has in hand the masculine (in most cases for social sciences this means the men's point of view), then one has everything and all else can be derived therefrom. This, together with the singular and the ranking comparative/absolute, I call "derivational thinking." Derivational thinking has given us, in all the sciences, studies of and by men that have purported to be studies of us all. This is also the case in the fields of linguistics and anthropology. For example, in anthropology, the ethnographies have been written of half a culture and then labeled as though the ethnography were valid for the whole. In linguistics not only do we have the problem in grammars, as mentioned above, but, as an example, the defining work for sociolinguistics, Labov's work on New York dialects, was exclusively of men and boys (Labov, 1966). Women are, by the view fostered through this grammatical structure, grammatically unnecessary for physical reproduction of the species, or for language or cultural reproduction.

Some of the societies affected by the conquest may or may not have had a sexism of their own, though the Jaqi clearly did not. In any event, whatever sexism did exist was of a different structure, both in language and in culture, from that which the conquerors would impose. In some cases, the impact of the imported sexism has been so heavy that by now we can no longer know the nature of the original social structure. Florence Babb (1980) discusses the imposition of sexism as she details the devastating effect on women of the Vicos project, held up by many as a model of proper third world development, run by Cornell anthropologists in Peru. Vicos is located in the northern Andes of Peru; the people speak one of the Quechua languages, the largest family of languages extant in the Andes, Jaqi being the second. She states that there was a mild form of sexism already in place. The people involved were by then into at least the tenth generation of serfdom on an *hacienda* (plantation). To what degree the in-place sexism was original and to what degree imposed by the overlords is difficult to know. She discusses the reaction of the women to the loss of land being imposed on them by the male anthropologists from the United States, together with the loss of the Quechua

language (Stein, ms.), and how the introduction of European values and economics also included the teaching of violence toward wives.

Another example of historical loss reclaimed is found in the work of Maria Rostworowski (1983) on Inca society at the time of the conquest. She has sharply challenged the notion of a single male leader, suggesting, rather, that the power of appointment was in the hands of the sisterhoods (*pana*, "sister," clearly an important political concept within the Inca structure, but baffling to European men scholars) and that at all times there were two male executive secretaries, or administrators, appointed by the sisterhoods. These men, assumed by Europeans to be dictatorial monarchs, were, according to this study, subject to recall. This means that at the very point of conquest the original gender roles all but disappeared, as the Spanish elevated these administrators to all powerful "incas" and furthermore assumed them to be singular.

The success of the imposition of sexism by colonial powers is widely documented. In fact, it has been so complete that the assumption is voiced frequently that all women in all times and places have been oppressed in the same way. To the contrary, at least in some cases, the strength of the nonsexist native culture has been able, in part, to maintain the balance of women's and men's positions within the realm of the culture itself. A brief description of Jaqi women, what they have and what they have lost, what they seek and how they are currently placed within their own culture, the national culture, and on the world stage may be of value to perceive the possibilities for alternate constructions of social structure.

WOMEN AND LANGUAGE IN JAQI CULTURE

The Jaqi women of the Andes are primarily farmers and merchants, with some number talented also in weaving and other trades. They have been the primary movers behind the education of their children, wishing the best for their children and believing that education will give them a better life. Sometimes the impact of education is not what they had hoped for, in the case of their daughters it is almost always a deep disappointment. What is sad to see is strong, self-possessed grandmothers, making great sacrifices to go to the coast or to the cities in order to further the education of their children and themselves struggling to learn some Spanish, then coming down hard on their daughters whom they perceive as failures. The grandmothers, coming from a native culture of equality between the sexes, perceive school as equal opportunity. When the girls do not achieve as the boys nor are offered jobs equal to those of the boys, the old women perceive this to be the fault of the girls, rather than of the culture into which they have been thrown. Sometimes this leads to the decision of families not to educate their daughters, and sometimes one finds the granddaughters turning to European-based feminism to undo the damage done to their mothers.

What is even sadder is that these young women are sometimes blinded by the coastal culture and by the rhetoric of the imported European feminism to all that their

grandmothers had and have lost, in spite of the few voices that have recently been raised to the contrary (Alderete, 1992; Mita & Montecinos, 1992). They learn to see their grandmothers as illiterate, ignorant peasants with no culture at all and, in the process, lose their own history.

The Jaqi languages themselves function to structure perceptions of women by both women and men such that the European version appears "uncivilized," or irrational. The Jaqi languages themselves have no gender marking of any kind. The pronoun sets distinguish human as contrasted to nonhuman, and inclusiveness or not of addressee; they do not distinguish sex.³ For example, the human pronouns are: *nayva* (I, we but not you), *juma* (you), *jupa* (she, he, they), *jiwasa* (you and I, with or without others). The non-human pronouns are: *aka uka k'aya*. These are usually translated as "this," "that," "yonder X," that is, as demonstrative pronouns, which obscures their function as nonhuman pronouns and leads to unfortunate translations. There are specific vocabulary items that refer to people such as *Jaqi* (people) or *Wawa* (child, baby); to women and men, such as *Warmi* (woman, wife), *Awila* (grandmother, old woman), and *Chacha* (man, husband), *Achachila* (grandfather, old man); to girls and boys, such as *Imilla* (girl child), *Tawaqu* (teenage girl, young unmarried woman) and *Yuqalla* (boy child), *Wayna* (teenage boy, young unmarried man) and so on. These are all roots, none derived from another, unlike European languages, as in English *woman* is perceived as being derived from *man*. The terms with sex meaning are applicable when appropriate but there is no need to refer to sex when it is irrelevant to the conversation. Words for animals are different from those for humans, also as different roots, for example: *uywa* (domestic animal) *qachu* (female animal) and *urqu* (male animal). Use of these terms for people is equivalent to our own type of insults whereby men are insulted with terms for women. On the other hand, the highest praise for anyone, and the goal for children, is to be *Jaqi*, "human."

EUROPEAN-IMPORTED SYMBOLIC SEXISM IN THE JAQI CULTURE

In all of the sayings and jokes that I have collected within the language, I have found no deprecations of women in general. There is nothing like, for example, our class of "woman driver" or "dumb blonde" jokes. There are other classes of jokes, for example, the "idiot" jokes. Regarding men, a sort of running comment is that they are lazy. In fact one word in Jaqaru, *Aymara*, means "lazy," although, because this somehow became the name of the sister language, its use is now in rapid decline. When the men shift into Spanish, one does find antiwoman jokes and sayings. With loss of the native language comes the loss of the native perspective; women become objects of ridicule.

The denigration of women and of women's work and the difficulty of perceiving women and women's work as autonomous, following the European language structure, shows up in any and all aspects of social interaction. For ourselves, that women's work be less valued is not a surprise. Among the Jaqi, it directly reflects where the conquerors

have been successful. For example, the impact of the importation of sexism from the conquerors can be seen in the tax structure. Within the community, where the tax is based on labor, a woman's day is exactly equal to a man's day, that is, it is a human labor day. These activities are primarily dealt with in Jaqaru. When cash money, an introduction from Europe, is used, as in cash wages, a woman day is worth exactly half a man's day. These latter activities are mostly dealt with in Spanish.

Women who remain farmers and who sell, for example, cheese, on the open market or who, for example, run restaurants during fair/market days, can do very well indeed. Women, in fact, are major business entrepreneurs within the Andes, though ignored by international development concerns. For example, when I needed a truck to move my household goods from Bolivia to Peru it was done by an Aymara woman who owned a fleet of trucks for international commerce; she hired a man to drive the truck to Peru for me. Given the European belief in the name/property tie and the man/name tie, economic development is aimed at men only, including in the Andes commerce; but in the Andes, women are the merchants and the money handlers. No international small business loans or development materials ever go in their direction.

Another example of how the sexism is imposed and what it does to women's status is how the school system, held universally to be a "good" and to be a way to improve oneself, acts differentially on the girls and the boys, not because of the native culture but because of the imposition of the behaviors associated with derivational thinking from the dominant society. If a woman goes to school, then her possibilities become circumscribed by the Hispanic norms, which in the Andes are less severe than Anglo norms, but are nevertheless far more restrictive than the comparable status in the native cultures or for men in the European-derived sectors.

With the conquest, the imposed loss of name, and the loss of land came also the threat, and the reality, of violence, specifically in the form of rape. Rape was apparently unknown in the Jaqi societies; there is no easy linguistic way even of speaking of it, no name for it. Even today, in this aspect, there has not been a great deal of impact within village life. However, in language terms, a whole new genre of oral literature has developed to warn young women of this danger from Spanish speakers. Even in these stories the danger is depicted as seduction and betrayal, not as the violence with which we are so familiar. This new genre is one of the creative ways in which the Jaqi people have tried to cope with the new dangers specific to women. Translating or understanding structured violence toward women is difficult for people coming from a different sexual reality.

In texts I have recorded from Jaqi women, it is often what they do not say that is very telling. Their stories focus on themselves, not on their husbands, on their own land, not on the land of their husbands. Land is held personally; I have not yet met any Andean woman willing to pass the title of her land to her husband. This is a major issue in land reform, at least to the women involved, whether coming from revolution or internal politics or imposed by foreign institutions (BID, USAID, etc.) in the name of development. Florence Babb (1976; 1980) cites a particularly appalling example of development depriving women of land rights. In Vicos, men were given formal title,

although under the old system women also had had land use rights. One woman came to the meeting to protest the loss of her land. Her husband was ordered by the anthropologists to throw her out. He did nothing; according to the local culture he had no such right over her—so the anthropologists bodily threw her out in a demonstration of the modern, developed way to treat women.

Many of the land reforms have worked in this way, especially since the World War II when norms from the United States have had hegemony. I have known of some women in good marriages who decided not to fight the law. They have come to regret their acquiescence because they cannot then bestow the land to inheritors as they wish. They do indeed lose, sometimes the land itself, and thus their livelihood, if for any reason the marriage ends. Others have gone to great lengths in attempts to keep land, sometimes involving Byzantine paperwork and creative use of the Andean custom of multiple homes.

Grammatical number is an important component of the patterns of perception described here. By our naming patterns, the "family" becomes "one," by the name of the "man," which makes it grammatically easy to handle as a singular, which we also equate with "good." Land reforms have attempted to place one "man" (i.e. family) in one house on one plot of land. For people who farm widely separated plots of land in as many ecological zones as possible, and who have several houses at various altitudes, and who hold land personally, the land reforms, repeatedly launched for political purposes with democratic intentions, are a recipe for disaster. Singular is seen as stark poverty, little short of having nothing. A couple have many plots of land, many from her side and many from his side. Hers remain in her name, and his in his, and thus pass to the children. She keeps her name and he keeps his, passing both to the children. In survival terms, these many plots allow for variety in the diet in a good year, and food to eat when there is crop failure at one altitude. The latter is a frequent occurrence. Potatoes, domesticated in the Andes and known in some 10,000 varieties, are regularly cultivated in dozens of varieties by a woman and man together. Some can be freeze-dried, some can withstand frost, and so on. Potatoes there almost always are, from one altitude or another. One man, one house, one plot is not the Andean way.

Sexism, including the naming custom, forms part of a structure within the dominating culture. As part of that structure, many of the imports from Europe have had the effect of reducing women's lives and enlarging men's, even in areas where one might not think to look. These additional imports have the added effect of strengthening the pattern of loss so sharply detailed in the land and name loss, deepening the overall loss of autonomy and even power to fight against each new loss. Some examples might give the flavor of the daily context in which the Jaqi women attempt to maintain or reclaim their status.

According to my texts, the old pattern for music was that the women would sing and men would answer, and that men would play the reeds and women would play the *tinnya*, a small drum. The roles were fully complementary and necessary to each other. European instruments have been assigned entirely to the men, with nothing correspondingly given to the women. Furthermore, on the European model, bands have

now been formed that do not require any singing. In many places the ceremonies requiring singing are gradually being lost and/or separated from the men's use of instruments. This means also the loss of the language components of the musical tradition. The modified version, men only or primarily, is what is today marketed as "indigenous" music of the Andes. Thus, music is perceived as belonging only to the men, with women having a small, derivative, occasional part.

There is also the problem of occupation as indicated on identity and voting cards. I remember being quite shocked the first time I saw it. A friend of mine, a farmer, showed me an ID she had been required to get on the coast. It labeled her as "housewife"—a nonexistent role in the Andes. She had been told that was what she was supposed to be! Thus land and agriculture are perceived as belonging only to the men.

One additional anecdote may give the flavor of the problems women face today in "development," based on the behaviors resulting from derivational thinking, in this case through the social sciences as taught from textbooks based on U. S. social science textbooks and European-inspired international notions of development and education.

For Tupe, the government from time to time assigns "developers," depending on the political fashion of the period. Not too long ago a young, idealistic woman sociologist was assigned to help in economic development. She came to Tupe and called a meeting. We all went. The woman sitting next to me fell asleep on my arm—she had already put in a sixteen-hour day by the time the meeting had been called, had walked some ten miles with loads on her back, had irrigated, had herded her cows, sheep and goats, had milked and made cheese, and was tired. The developer came up with a new activity for women—raising rabbits. She talked on and on about how rabbits would be good for the women to raise.

I looked down on the woman leaning against me and wondered when she would have any time. People were courteous and after the meeting I asked some of them what they thought of the idea. Most just laughed, having made no sense of the matter at all. Two young women, active in the municipal organization, talked it over. There was no time to bother with rabbits. No one was ever in the community anyway during the day except the school children, the drunks and the sick. They all agreed that certainly no one had any time for such nonsense. At last one young woman remarked that maybe the men could raise the rabbits, especially the drunks, since they were around the town during the day!

I tried to discuss the matter with the young sociologist, without success. She informed me that in Tupe the men made all the decisions! As far as I could discern, she never once spoke to the women, but confined her conversation to the men that she perceived as being in power. Also, as is common, upon observing women working in the fields, by the application of derivational thinking, she had assumed that such labor was "helping" the men and was in no way essential, that women's time was by definition "vacant." This perception is exacerbated by the translation tradition and the conflicting interpretations of the verb "to help" (*ayllidar* in Spanish) and *yonqapaná* (Aymara) or *yanhishin* (Jaqaru). The Jaqi verbs are based on the root *yonha*, "companion" (Jaqaru) and do not carry a sense of primary/secondary of hierarchy. The Jaqaru root,

furthermore, is verbalized with a suffix meaning "mutually." Thus to say that someone "helps" another, in Jaqaru, means the people work together mutually in companionship. Thus if a woman says she "helps" her husband in the fields it does *not* mean that the work is primarily his, it means the two of them jointly cultivate both her fields and his. That time the developer did not succeed. There are still no rabbits in Tupe.

Stories are numerous, where "development" is fed through the men with no consultation with those who handle the money and with those who would be most affected; see, for example, the work of the Cuzqueña Daisy Irene Núñez del Prado Béjar for examples involving Quechua speakers (1975a; 1975b). In fact, in the Andes, money management is the almost exclusive province of women.

About the same time as the rabbit story, I was called upon to evaluate a similar project for another community. These projects were being pushed as major development from the central Eurocentric government. The whole notion of women having a lot of free time comes, of course, from our western definitions of housework as "not work" and from seeing all other work as done by men, thus obliterating from view the work the women actually do. If women are viewed as derivative of men, a woman and a man working together in the fields is easily and commonly perceived as one man only. This example of derivational thinking involving language and perception is amazing perhaps, when analyzed as I have done here, but is nevertheless common and normal.

CONCLUSION

As the conquerors' languages both reflected and caused the sexism they sought to impose, so also the nonsexist culture of the Jaqi is both reflected in and imposed by the language. Today there is a real possibility that, as a result of past governmental programs and present terrorism, what little has been able to survive these five centuries will be destroyed by violence. The loss of the language may close forever the possibility of thinking and speaking in this one nonsexist way both for the descendants of these self-possessed women and for us.

The differences make a difference. Language patterns that are used on a daily basis give rise to and reinforce different perceptual patterns. I have been the beneficiary of the opportunity to talk with and live with women who have never thought of themselves as derivations of men nor as "belonging to" men, but who have thought of themselves as autonomous productive human beings. In the crush of "world culture" these differences may well be lost. Respect for difference on our part, a profound belief in different and equal, may be the only hope for survival for these differences. As a minimum, we can listen to the voices, few though they be, that are now asking for that respect and for the return of the status held by their foremothers. As part of that ability to listen, we must also understand the blinders our own language places on us. A woman's name is her own; we must not assume we know hers simply because we have met her husband. Her land is her livelihood and her dignity.

NOTES

1. At the time of the conquest, the Andes supported some 20-30 millions in population, without hunger for anyone. Twenty-five years after the conquest, the population was one million and is only now rising again to preconquest numbers, but with extensive hunger and poverty.
2. Methodology is described in the field methods textbook (Hardman & Hamano, 1993).
3. All examples in this paragraph are from the Aymara language.

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Seeking Understanding of Communication, Language and Gender

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**A project of the Organization for the Study of Communication, Language and
Gender**

**“Derivational Thinking,
or, Why is equality so difficult?”**

by

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**"Derivational Thinking,
or, Why is Equality so Difficult?"**

In the introduction to a book regarding some aspect of feminism—which book I now forget—the author lamented that, within early feminist groups, structured to avoid hierarchy and authority, there nevertheless always emerged a hierarchy. She expressed bafflement as to why.

Many of us have been involved in activities which we believed would end some particular, agreed upon, injustice, only to find that as we eliminated one form or another, that very injustice simply mutated to express itself in other, sometimes more subtle or more sophisticated ways. This has certainly been the experience of many of the civil rights activists from the sixties. And it most certainly has been my experience in the matter of sexism within language. Some twenty or thirty years ago when I first began taking seriously the matter of reference to women in language, in spite of being a linguist, I honestly believed that it would be a relatively simple matter—for example, that using 'they' instead of 'he' would include women.

Some have argued that the beliefs are 'so deep in the culture' that they could not be eliminated by language. But as an anthropological linguist I am fully aware that all culture is mediated through language; if the belief is 'deep', then it must be 'deep' within the structure of the language.

I developed the concept of the 'linguistic postulate' in order to account for the manifestations of grammatical themes that I found realized within the grammar of the Jaqi languages of South America.¹ These categories, or postulates were realized over the whole of the grammar, not just in one place, and were also realized through the whole of the culture. These same themes also gave the people strength to resist at least part of the encroachment of the European cultures. Part of that resistance involved the continuing recognition of women as equal contributors to the well-being of the entire group. That was very impressive to a young woman from the intense sexism of post-war USA. Knowing, living with and studying the language of these women over the past 35 years has been valuable to me, both in coming to know my own and in imagining what might be.

Confronted now with the questions of our own resistance to the creation of structures of equality, I have recently turned my lens of linguistic postulates on my own language and culture. The result has been most useful.

¹ The Jaqi languages include Aymara, the native language of a third of the population of Bolivia and the major language of southern Peru and northern Chile, and two languages in Peru with very few speakers, Jaqaru and Kawki. These languages are the remnant of what was, before the Incas, the largest of the economic 'empires' of ancient Peru [Hardman 1985]. My own work among the Jaqi peoples now spans more than a quarter of a century [Hardman 1966], [Hardman 1983; Hardman et al 1975; Hardman et al 1988].

Three linguistic postulates realized in the grammatical structures of English make the construction of human equality difficult in English. These three are: number (singular/plural), sex-based gender with masculine as root, and our ranking comparative (wise, wiser, wisest). These three linguistic postulates interact together in a mutually reinforcing way to lead to the construct that I call Derivational Thinking. Derivational thinking relates not only to our construction of sex relations but, because it gives us the template for all human relations, is also the underlying mechanism which keeps us racist, that makes diversity so difficult to understand, and which leads to our imperialist behavior abroad.

Number is overtly obligatory and pervasive. Try thinking, for example, of a sentence in English with no mark or either singular or plural. Singular is unmarked and primary, plural derived.

Sex-based gender is partly overt, partly covert. The principle of English sex-based gender, which is the same as the sex-based gender of all IndoEuropean, is that the feminine is derived from the masculine. Therefore the feminine is dependent, grammatically, on the masculine, the masculine unmarked and the root.

The third structure is the comparative/absolute which means constant hierarchy. This structure may not appear to be obligatory but in interplay with the other two does indeed so function and thus forms the third partner in the construction of derivational thinking. If you doubt the pervasiveness of hierarchy, try going even an hour with no comparative or absolute.

Derivational thinking, then, results in thinking patterns that have all people (& things) ranked at all times, with only one can as primary, and that one as the unmarked. Since feminine is marked, than clearly that is not primary. Masculine singular as the top of the hierarchy 'feels' fully grammatical, fully coordinated—in incorporates the realization of all three postulates simultaneously. This manner of thinking carries the notion that there is not room 'at the top' for more than one, so that if women are elevated, then men must be demoted; if other races are given opportunity, then whites 'lose' opportunity—opportunity can only be singular, and all must be ranked.

As part of my teaching practice I require that my students observe language behavior according the the categories described in this paper. One student, a minority woman, brought an observation that is a summary of what I have been saying, all non-whites non-males structured together as dependent on and derived from the 'real' people on the top. She first reported it of one professor and then told us that a second professor had said the same thing to her only a few days later.

The professor told me that I had two strikes against me "as far as becoming a real scientist. You are a woman and a minority and that will keep you from being objective, you are too close to those people to get the right data. You just can't do it. You people need guidance to handle the data correctly and you need someone who can reach a real audience. But don't you worry. There is a place for you as an assistant. In fact women and minorities make very good assistants in the field." When I asked what he

meant by the "real" audience, he went on to say that works not done by "academics" only appeal to such specialized groups as "Black studies, Women's studies, etc." so they can't reach the "people who can recognize the real issues and can come up with real solutions to the problems: Experts who know best." [1]

Our grammar does not make it easy for us to hold diversity as different only, that is, equal and different. Indeed, the usual expression is "equal but different" as though the two expressions were mutually contradictory.

That the two expressions be understood as contradictory is not so everywhere. For example, among the Jaqi, where the simile is gramaticalized but where there is no easy way to rank², people are considered non-comparable. With the interaction of their linguistic postulates of 'data source', which specifies that one cannot have personal experience of another's internal states, and of the primacy of human over non-human, each person is considered autonomous and unique and equal. Among co-equal adults even the use of the imperative is avoided out of respect for the humanity of the other. If one does presume to compare (as I did early on in ignorance) one is chided for rudeness. Singularity is not a good nor a goal. At one point, for example, I was treated for a minor illness by invocation of a Protestant god, a few catholic saints and the divinity of the guinea pig and the river—with no sense of any contradiction on the part of anyone involved.

In one recorded speech, the mayor of a town explains that the higher authorities, all Hispanic with postulates similar to our own, have told him to order the people to do certain things. He then says that he knows he can't order anybody, but he will try to persuade. In other words, having a position of responsibility among the Jaqi gives one the right of first persuasion, but does not carry status. Prestige yes, but not status. Different and equal.

As I have shown elsewhere, these postulates are realized in the vocabulary, morphology, syntax, discourse and metaphorical structure of English [Hardman Forthcoming A; Hardman Forthcoming B]. Figure 1 is a summary of the structures identified in the overall view of English, with the basic ones and the one currently under discussion highlighted. [See Figure 1] In this paper I look specifically at the the subject/object construction of English. The discourse strategies that I discuss are identified in the work of Joanna Russ in *How to Suppress Women's Writing* [Russ, Joanna, 1983]. She does not there identify the problem with the grammar of English, but that is precisely what is being discussed³.

² It is a design feature of language—openness—that all things can be said in any language if enough context and length is allowed; one can always go through long circumlocutions or descriptions, or whatever. Languages differ in what can be said conveniently and in what must be said in order to be grammatical.

³ Donna Haraway in her book *Primate Visions* [Haraway, 1989] also uses the work of Joanna Russ, cf. p 46ff, as a frame for looking at primate studies.

Deborah Tannen recently published an article in the New York Times [Tannen, 1993] in which she discussed the perpetual markedness of women's dress. She is absolutely right. She, also, does not quite identify this cultural manifestation with the feminine in English grammar, but, again, that is exactly what is happening.

At the syntactic level in English the subject is the primary focus of the sentence. We are a noun oriented language to start with. Furthermore, we are agent oriented, focusing on 'who did it', this frequently being the first question asked of any situation. These three things come together in the focus on the subject of the sentence. Note also that the subject is again primary, which ties in with both singularity and with ranking. The kind of ranking that is involved is even reflected in linguistic theory which discusses raising the subject to object position—not unlike talk of raising women or non-whites to the white male position. Therefore, one of the results of derivational thinking is that a singular white male subject/agent would 'feel' most grammatical. Think of the way we write history and award patents, etc.

All of this is in sharp contrast with our attitude toward the object—who should get out of the way and become an agent or accept being blamed. Objects, furthermore, are considered easily interchangeable—not unlike derivations. 'Mrs John Jones', clearly a derivation as in 'man & wife', is interchangeable as to which human being it can apply to. 'John Jones' is not. The derivational suffixes such as '-ette' clearly flit from root to root.

In a term paper one student analyzed the examples in a text book on syntax [Maranzana, 1992]. I quote

"The role of the male is consistently that of agent or actor, while female figures are represented as some kind of object, recipient, instrument, or container. These roles, once assigned linguistic titles, represent grammatical relationships which are used in formal descriptions of language."

And every example reiterates, in both concrete and theoretical fashion, derivational thinking. Another textbook, the title not given me, was reported to have only one sentence in which Mary was the subject: 'Mary wrote a book about John'. As this sentence illustrates, there is more than one way, as in all grammars, for realizing the postulates so that if one way is blocked another way can be found.

Joanna Russ discusses the ways in which women's agency is denied within the literary canon. Though she does not specifically state so, what she has illustrated so richly are discourse devices for coping with the situations in which women, in spite of the grammar, are subjects/agents anyway. I have used her categories as guides to teach my students to observe in language behavior specifically what is meant by the application of derivational thinking to this agentive/subject category of grammatical/cultural behavior.

Part of derivational thinking is that anything that can go into the sentence 'Woman is _____'.is necessarily bad. If applied to men it is likely to be an insult. From the sentence 'Man is _____.' the implication is neutral to good. Terms from the second sentence can be applied to women and will normally be complementary, though simultaneously denying her womanhood, making her in some fashion an 'honorary' man. Thus, if a woman can be the subject/agent, then the activity does not belong in the second sentence.

My roommate Amy's group of male friends had been "proving their manhood" by jumping off a cliff—at least 80 feet I've been told—at the quarries. I'd been hearing stories about a lot of groups of guys going to the quarries. The stories about who wouldn't jump was the big thing. They were the butts of jokes and ridiculed by their "friends". So my roommate Amy, who is fearless beyond all measures went with her male friends to the quarries. She jumped. The stories and jokes changed about the guys that didn't jump—a girl jumped and they didn't. They were less than a girl, beneath a girl. Soon after, the trend among that group of guys of bringing new guys to the Quarries to jump to prove their manhood ended. The ritual died.[2]

If woman is an 80-foot cliff jumper, then it doesn't count for man to be an 80-foot cliff jumper. I argue that this is the grammatical pattern behind the problem with women in combat and gays in the military. i.e. 'Woman flies a combat jet.', therefore 'Man flies a combat jet.' is no longer a satisfying sentence. Many men go into the volunteer army in order to prove themselves 'men'. If women and gays (a derivational type of 'man') can do it, then what is it worth?

Let us look now at some of the discourse strategies used by those thinking derivationally to keep women out of the subject/agent slot, with examples from the life experiences of my students. To quote Keller [Keller, 1985:17], 'Naming nature is the special business of science.' To cope with any situation, we must first name it.

One of the most common, and one the students find easiest to illustrate, is simply to say that she didn't do it some man did it, her father, her brother, her boyfriend, her teacher, but not her. This we call Denial of Agency. The following story is from a married student with his first daughter.

I was sitting in the waiting room, playing with Jamie. One of her favorite games is to grab my fingers for stability, and muscle her way up into a stand. A woman saw us playing this game, and came over and said: "What a strong little boy you are, able to stand up on your own like that!" I answered: "She is very strong, isn't she?" The woman looked surprised, and commented: "She's so big for a little girl. And you're so cute, and letting daddy pull you up like that." [3]

Note the grammar. In the first case the little boy, subject/agent, was standing up. In the second case the only agency the little girl had was to put herself into the object position, with her father as the 'real' subject/agent. Jamie didn't do it, her father did.

On the other hand, in the Jaqi languages the subject/object not only are not ranked, they cannot even be separated. Thus, in Jaqaru, arkt^wa is 'I speak to somebody', arktawa is 'you speak to someone', but 'I speak to you' is arkimawa, where the person suffix on the verb, -ima carries the object and the subject in a unit that cannot be separated into parts. In Jaqaru the verb 'to help' is yanhishi, composed of yanha 'companion' and -ishi 'reflexive', so that the sentence Yanhshutma 'Help me.' means literally 'You to me be a mutual companion.' The language is interaction focused, not agent focused.

If she did it, and it can't be attributed easily to some man, then one can pollute her agency. Given our hierarchy plus the connotation of derivation as 'not original' and therefore, in some sense or other 'bad', which realizes itself in 'blame the derivation', this can result in such a denigration that what she did can be utterly dismissed. The pollution also ties into another cultural construct of good and bad being opposites and absolutes. Most of the pollution is sex-related, and for my students, comes in apparently a constant barrage of insulting epithets. Crazy is the other most common pollution. We all know only too many of these instances. Just this semester a student reported that a professor had dismissed the whole body of Margaret Mead's anthropological work because she had married thrice. But here's a story brought by a young man.

When a friend of mine had finished reading one of the several Star Trek novels written by Vonda N. MacIntyre, he appeared truly satisfied with the contents of the book. "I'm impressed," my friend said "this book wasn't as bad as some of the others. It's probably because that Vonda chick is some strange lesbian who stays locked up in her house all the time except when she dresses up as Mr. Spock to pick up other women." Although he had read many other lacking novels in the same genre (written mostly by men) he never made a comment more than "That was terrible" or "that sucked." However, when it was actually a good book, written by a woman, he had to make a derogatory comment to justify the occurrence. Until now, I never would have picked up the pattern.[4]

When I was first among the Jaqi I found it most disconcerting to listen to someone denigrate someone else and then be easily working with them. It took me a long time to understand that the denigration was of behaviors, and that in the round of things, other behaviors would not be so judged. I thought that is was an amazing practice of forgiveness, but 'forgiveness' was not part of the structure. They are highly critical of each other, and there is a verb tense that I call the 'remonstrator' used almost exclusively to scold. Real understanding came when I finally realized that judgment was on an aesthetic base, that the terms used in the judgment were not, in fact, good and bad, but beautiful and human or stony, naked or ugly. Furthermore, the judgments were not antonyms—Jaqi doesn't do antonyms—nor were they ranked as absolutes and mutually exclusives. One behavior did not cancel out the other, either way.

The third Russ discourse strategy for keeping women out of the subject slot is that of 'double standard of content' which invokes the hierarchy, that the experience of the derivation is of no consequence. What is the meaning of 'goddess'? She can only be defined through the existence and characteristics of a male god? That is the point—that the examination of a woman's life has no meaning except as examined through the masculine.

I recently attended a gallery opening featuring two nature photographers who had both never shown their work to the general public before. Each artist was billed separately and equally. My friend John and I toured the gallery together. The photographs were arranged in one room in an alternating fashion so there was no division between the artist's works. The general theme of the entire show was "survival". The female artist concentrated on reproduction and birth. Most of the pictures showed all types of animals in the midst of the birthing process. I remember thinking how graphic but beautiful they were. The male artist chose to show the predatory nature of animals. Most of the scenes were violent hunt and kill shots. He too caught the beauty of it, I thought. As we came to the final photographs John said, "This guy has such a unique and raw perspective, he REALLY made this show." I asked him what he thought of the other artist and tried to point out that she really showed promise and her interpretation of survival showed pain and joy, which takes talent. "GIVE ME A BREAK!", John said, "That is exactly the point, look at the subject matter. It's a bunch of animals having babies. They belong in a nursery, not a famous gallery. Yeah, she took her chances with some wild animals, too bad it was not for something that meant SOMETHING."[5]

This double standard of content utterly baffles my Jaqi friends. One Andean man, as he watches men engaging in this behavior has often remarked 'But don't they know where they came from?', i.e. 'Don't they know they were created by woman?' The equal privileging of women's and men's life experiences is, however, heavily impacted from the central government as boys' activities are funded but girls' are not, and silly things are invented for women to do because 'developers' can't see what women actually are doing.

The fourth Russ discourse strategy for keeping women out of the subject slot is that of 'false categorizing'. Categorizing is pan-human and even essentially human. So, if you can't get rid of these subjects by other strategies, invoke hierarchy and put the work in a category further down the hierarchy scale. This example is from a Cherokee woman.

The Cherokee have a person of power in the tribe who fits the white definition of a Medicine Man, but this person is a woman. White Men had trouble dealing with this so they decided that she was really the assistant of the real Medicine Man and called her a "corn woman".[6]

This type of false categorizing keeps us from seeing what woman elsewhere in the world have created and accomplished.

The fifth Russ discourse strategy for keeping women out of the subject slot is that of 'isolation'. She only did one of whatever it was, so it doesn't count. It can be attributed to 'luck' or a 'fluke'. In a way this might look like a contradiction of the singular, but the operative word here is not 'one' or 'first', but 'only'.

My piano teacher had to choose her three top students to play for a charity recital. Four of us were equally qualified for her top students (3 males and myself). She chose the three males to play. When I inquired politely as to the selection process, she informed me that she felt they had more experience playing for an audience after their participation in a Sonatina competition recently. Since I only competed once in an "official" competition (in which I won first place over the other three), she felt I would have difficulty coping with an audience. This was exceptionally ironic considering that she was aware of my accompanying my choral department and church in front of an audience regularly. I only competed once (even though the charity recital was not a competition).[7]

In the Jaqi languages data source marking enforces a sense of history so that the notion of things appearing or people doing things with no history is not easily expressed grammatically. One specifies what one has experienced or witnessed personally, what one has learned through language, and what comes from non-personal knowledge, like myths, old history, and so on. This makes for a connected sense of behavior and personality expectations.

The sixth Russ discourse strategy for keeping women out of the subject slot is that of 'anomalousness'. For example, virtually every young woman in my classes is involved in athletics of one kind or another, yet everyone of them feels herself to be, and is regularly told by everyone else that she is, absolutely weird among women to be able to do what she does. This neatly destroys community among women and also relieves the speakers of looking about for any other subjects that might belong to this category. Categorization into anomalousness renders the agent invisible.

Driving around this afternoon, I saw a sign that read "Men at Work," on the side of the road and I commented to my girlfriend that this sign might be the last sign to ever have to be changed to "People at Work," because I had never seen a woman working on road repairs and therefore the sign still holds true. In all seriousness, I was kidding her but she quickly called my attention to a woman we had both seen and commented on the day before, who was working on drainage pipes by the roadside. Oddly enough, she quickly dismissed her own example as invalid because the woman was "weird". Indeed we had both perceived this woman to be weird the day before, this being why we had commented on and remembered her. My girlfriend had cited her as an example in our little joke and then quickly disregarded her. Immediately I explained to her that she had just used one of Joanna Russ' categories and thanked her for an example to use for this observation.[8]

One young woman, active in sports from a young age, felt that anomalousness had been the most scarring of the strategies used against her, recounting how she was told that she was too rough an influence on girls, yet if she played with the boys she might turn them into sissys—anomalous either way.[9]

When women move into new fields, that is become subjects/agents where they have not before, two things happen with the effect of maintaining the existing derivational thinking structure. First, discourse strategies are used to keep the existence of women in the subject/agent slot invisible. When that is no longer possible, then hierarchy is invoked, the sentence frame behind the 'women is 80-ft cliff jumper' comes into play and the profession itself gets downgraded. This happened to secretaries and to teachers, and in my lifetime appears to be happening to physicians, professors, and maybe even to lawyers.

Clearly what we think of as the nature of the universe is not so. Clearly there other ways of organizing human relationships, and of constructing these relationships in language. Because English is a creole language, primarily dependent on syntax, we can at least on an individual basis name some of the manifestations of derivational thinking and alter our language, which will have the effect, slowly, of altering our perceptions and those of people around us.

Two caveats:

1) All of these discourse strategies are of course available for use in any situation a speaker may desire. The nature of language is indeed its flexibility. What we have been looking at here are the patterns of use, especially those patterns of use that are not fully in the conscious awareness of the speakers but that are pervasive, those patterns that reveal underlying conceptual structures.

2) The Jaqi people include women and men as equal human beings. They are also just ordinary human beings with all the ordinary flaws that come with being human and trying to muddle through. I found their way of life refreshing and enlightening, a most valuable and empowering experience for myself. It is not utopia. I am not recommending that we abandon our own for theirs, but rather that we share together in appreciation and mutual learning the creations that we have separately managed to bring about. Different and equal—not ranked.

3) I have found the work of other scholars valuable, in particularly two linguists, Suzette Haden Elgin [Elgin, 1980-; Elgin 1 993]and Deborah Tannen [Tannen 1986; Tannen 1993]. Their grammatical insights, especially at the discourse level, have helped me. I see my work as additional analysis to theirs and to that of so many others, not as opposition. As humans we are most adept at creating elaborate superstructures as justification of underlying perceptions. That my analysis work at the grammatical base does not in any way impugn those that work with other levels.

The value of naming the grammatical patterns being used is illustrated by the following observation.

I was sitting in the corridor with another student waiting for my exercise class to begin. Another student sat across from us, with his shorts pulled up around his leg so that most of his penis showed. He appeared to be reading the paper, but he had a smile on his face. I told the instructor that we had been flashed. He said, "You get what you look for." (Pollution of Agency.) I rebutted this, so he replied that it was just the same thing as a girl wearing a short skirt. (False Categorizing) I said that it certainly was not and indicated that the flasher might have mental problems. Then he told me, "Well, you were the only one who saw it." (Isolation, anomalousness) I said that I was not, that at least one other person saw it. Then he said, "Well, I didn't see anything." (Denial of Agency) This was an awful experience. However, I was thinking as it happened, "This is just like Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7 from Russ." I'm glad that I was able to recognize what was happening.[10]

Naming is empowering. To return to my first example, the feminist groups referred to had clearly organized themselves in a rational, thoughtful, egalitarian superstructure, only to be sabotaged from within our native language as derivational thinking reasserted itself in spite of the explicitly stated intentions of the speakers. Meanwhile, the Jaqi speakers easily believe the tales that the United States is a place where all people are completely equal, that being the normal, civilized way to live .

Endnotes

- [1] Courtesy of Lisa R. Perry
- [2] Courtesy of Laura A. Boyce
- [3] Courtesy of Art Bautista-Hardman
- [4] Courtesy of ScoK LaPorta
- [5] Courtesy of Tara Schreier
- [6] Courtesy of Lisa R. Perry
- [7] Courtesy of Anna Davis
- [8] Courtesy of Carlos Martinez
- [9] Courtesy of Karen Motz
- [10] Courtesy of Joan von Dauch

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Book Reviews

Essays About the English Language, Western Science, Patterns of Thought

Sometimes an editor feels a serendipitous symbiosis among essays received and/or books sent for review. That has happened with papers received and considered for this issue of *Women and Language*. And for that reason, the following group of papers is presented together. We have first an essay by M. J. Hardman, in which she provides fundamental insights into the connections among gendered thought patterns reflected in the English speaker's talk. Then we present two reactions to the collected essays of Evelyn Fox Keller, *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science*. For that reason, we devote more space than usual to book reviews. We combine two original reviews of Keller's book with excerpts from a review by Anne Fausto-Sterling in the May 1993 *Women's Review of Books*. At the same time, we invite your attention to the summary of Julia's Penelope's *Speaking Freely* and to the review of that book we previously published (Fall 1991). We hope to stimulate ideas and commentary on the usually unseen patterns of thought that perpetuate gender bias even when the words themselves may appear to have been "cleansed" of such biases.

Anita Taylor

Gender through the Levels

By M. J. Hardman

"To act in a way that is both sexist and racist, to maintain one's class privilege, it is only necessary to act in the customary, ordinary, usual, even polite manner."

Joanna Russ¹

Language permeates all we are as human beings, both within ourselves and in all our interactions without. As humans, our language provides for us the necessary structure for perception and for action. Different languages provide different structural principles for their respective speakers. By the time we are six years old we quite naturally assume the structural principles provided by our own language to be those of the universe; such an assumption is necessary to the acquisition of one's first language and culture. Some of the structural principles of English, the linguistic postulates of English, lead us to what I call 'derivational thinking' which makes it difficult for us to perceive women or the work women do as autonomous.

In working with the Jaqi languages of the Andes of South America, I gradually became aware of how the structural principles of these languages contrasted sharply with those of my own language in precisely the areas which make our perceptions of women so difficult.

I have developed the concept of the *linguistic postulate* to account for the way in which themes/concepts are manifested structurally across all the levels of a grammar within a given language and culture.

The grammar of any given language will typically demand that high-level linguistic postulates be specified in virtually every sentence of the language. In this way, by the time that a child has acquired her language, and her culture as well, her cognitive system automati-

cally encodes the relevant linguistic postulate features from any experience. Thus, we accept the linguistic postulates of our mother tongue without argument or discussion, as natural parts of the universe, an example of nurture becoming nature for the participants. In fact it is so difficult to imagine 'real' human beings operating without one's own linguistic postulates that it verges on the impossible. Linguistic postulates form the major structuring and selecting grids for the perception/cognition within any given language/culture.

Linguistic postulates must, however, be taught to children. As underlying assumptions they are particularly powerful, and they are also typically reflected in proverbs, sayings, and/or typical admonitions to children. For example, English speaking children are admonished with a sex reference, typically 'Be a good girl' or 'Be a good boy'. In the Jaqi languages, with the linguistic postulate of human/non-human, children are admonished to 'Act like a human' or they are accused of not treating someone else as a human.

Linguistic postulates are also built into the vocabulary structure as well as the grammatical structure. For example, verbs and nouns in the Jaqi languages carry a covert mark of human or non-human, like many of our English terms carry such a covert gender mark, e.g. Mary, ship. Frequently the postulates also serve as major classifying devices for other types of behavior, most frequently without intellectual and/or conscious justification. When challenged, the most common native reaction is 'But it's natural!' When one discovers, at last, a linguistic postulate while doing field work, and shares such a marvel with one's consultants, the usual reaction is—well, of course, everybody knows that, or well, only 'gringos' could be so dumb as to not know. It

has even been argued that surely we *make* such a distinction, even if it is not visible in our grammar. (Cf Carpenter, 1981.)

One such postulate in English is number. It is difficult to produce a sentence in English in which there is no singular or plural mark, and correlatively, we think of the unmarked number, singular, as being primary. If you doubt this, try thinking of a such a sentence. It is possible, but such sentences can't say much.

Marked versus unmarked is a linguistic concept referring to the fact that for some grammatical categories one form is the base on which the other form is constructed, i.e. one form is *unmarked*, the other *marked*. In English number, the unmarked (singular) is the primary.

Number, specifically singular versus plural, is a major postulate for all Indo-European languages. Some languages mark it more overtly than others; some limit it to nouns and verbs, some include adjectives, marking number in both morphological and syntactic constructions by agreement and/or governance. English marks number overtly in nouns, pronouns, and verbs and requires syntactic agreement. For English, cultural correlates of the number postulate are immediately obvious: in proverbs (one thing at a time); in our adulation of linear work; in our obsession with monotheoretical stances in academia and its concomitant throwing out of all else in favor of the new one, with monotheism in religion, with singular causes in history; in the sponsoring of monocropping in agriculture, even to single species of a single crop; in seeing singular causes of diseases with singular cures. Consider the epithet some have tried to make of 'eclectic.'

These Indo-European postulates contrast with those of the Jaqi languages of South America, for example. The Jaqi languages include Aymara, the native language of a third of the population of Bolivia and the major language of southern Peru and northern Chile, and two languages in Peru with very few speakers, Jaqaru and Kawki. These languages are the remnant of what was, before the Incas, the largest of the economic 'empires' of ancient Peru (Hardman, 1985). My own work among the Jaqi peoples now spans more than a quarter of a century (Hardman, 1966, 1983; Hardman et al, 1975, 1988). The two major postulates of these languages are Data Source and Humanness.

The linguistic postulate of Data Source means that the speakers indicate, in virtually every sentence, the source of the knowledge the sentence imparts. The three basic categories of data source in the Jaqi languages organize experience for the Jaqi speakers as singular and plural do for us. The first is *Personal-knowledge* which is the unmarked category for verb

tenses but does require a sentence suffix, *-wa*; this category is that of personal witness. The second is *Thru-language-knowledge*, which is all knowledge acquired because you heard someone say it or because you read it. The third is *Non-personal-knowledge* which typically requires special verb conjugations and which includes all knowledge from myth, legend and history for which there are no living witnesses. On the basis of these three categories the Jaqi languages each build an elaborate structure with endless nuances of data source. In the Jaqi languages it is virtually impossible to utter any sentence without indicating the source of one's data.²

Also, like us with our postulate of number when learning other languages, Jaqi people learning English will protest that it can't possibly be true that one can speak a language without marking data source. It is only human to do so. Data source in the grammar of the Jaqi languages was not discovered in the nearly 500 years since the arrival of the Spanish because the Aymara presumed that the Spanish and speakers of other European languages making data source mistakes were simply acting their usual non-human manner.

At one time the Jaqi were the dominant people in the Andes, and they, like us, also imposed their postulates on the people they came in contact with. Today the other languages of the Andes, Quechua and Andean Spanish, also reflect these same three basic categories of data source (Hardman, 1982; Martin, 1981a & b; LaPrade, 1976, 1981).

The second linguistic postulate of the Jaqi languages that I wish to describe here is that of human/non-human. This correlates in function to our sex-based gender system. The grammatical base consists of two sets of pronouns, one for humans, one for all else. Referring to humans with the non-human set is, in Aymara, a good way to pick a fight, analogous to using a woman term for a man in English. Since the non-human pronouns are translated with the English terms 'this' and 'that' (and the Spanish equivalents), non-Aymara speakers may unwittingly find themselves in the position of having seriously insulted Aymara people. Also many verbs, nouns, and adjectives carry in their meaning covert reference to human or otherwise, a meaning that is not obvious in the translations, and again leads to serious misunderstandings. Vocabulary words for people are clearly distinguished from those for animals. Correlating with this, since there is no sex postulate, words which specifically refer to women are *not* derived from the paired item referring to men.

As a correlate of the humanness postulate, it is *never* a compliment to refer to a human being in animal terms. Children are admonished to behave like people

(not animals) or to treat others as people (not animals). In a quarrel, to accuse the other of not behaving like a human is a particularly nasty insult. In Aymara, the verb 'to marry', the same for both sexes, /jaqichasiña/, means literally 'to cause oneself to become a human being,' that is, to assume full human responsibility and relationships within the community; this human status is the goal for the children.

Postulates are learned, they are not part of the common human heritage. The linguistic postulate that is of concern in this paper is that of sex-based gender in English, which, like humanness in Jaqi, is partly covert and partly overt. Its distinguishing feature is that the feminine is derived from the masculine. This postulate permeates every level of grammar, and has reflexes in the culture.

Because linguistic postulates are learned so early and because they interplay in the physiology of the brain (Tsunoda, 1985) our perceptions are guided by these structural principles. In any ordinary circumstance we project onto any new event or person the structures we already know. In this way, for example, women of non-European societies lost status with the imposition of colonialism, precisely because the European men could not/would not interact with a woman in power nor would/could they even recognize the full personhood of women.

Sex-based derivative gender is realized in all levels of English structure. Some of these levels have been quite thoroughly explored by other scholars; some have not. Under the concept of the linguistic postulate I tie these structures together, showing a common motivation in the varying manifestations.

Sex and/or gender marking (seen as synonymous in Indo-European grammar [Miller, 1976] whether they are or not) is, in Indo-European, of the sexist variety in that the male is seen as the prototype and the female as a secondary derivative, such that if the male is known, the female can be described with reference to him, or constructed from him, but not vice versa. Even the word *female*, from the French *femme* in diminutive, was reformed in English to look like it was derived from 'male' even though it wasn't (cf McConnell-Ginet, 1980; Kramarae, 1981; Martyna, 1980).

Refer to Figure 1 to follow the map as we trace gender through the levels of English.

The level of syntax and discourse, that of the sentence and the paragraph and the dialogue, have been dealt with at length by Elgin (1989), Tannen (1986), Penelope (1990), and others. This includes the differing ways in which women and men converse, the different meanings attributed to what appear to be common sen-

tences and conversational strategies, and the differing semantics for what would appear to be the same words, including the differing metaphors by which we structure our perceptions.


The material that these scholars have dealt with gives us some of the reasons for breakdowns in our daily communications. One metaphor miscue that Elgin discusses, for example, is the use by women of a schoolroom metaphor in cross with a sports metaphor preferred by men. In terms of semantics this root metaphor means that for women 'failure' carries a semantic burden of 'final'; for the other metaphor it does not. This is not biological in any way; for Japanese men, working out of a vastly different structure, 'failure' carries an even stronger semantic weight of 'final' than it does for those of us operating on the schoolroom room metaphor. Elgin also deals with the verbal abuse that comes from 'intelligent, educated, good' men. Tannen deals with purpose in conversation, specifically that women talk to form community, men to form hierarchies. You will note that the classroom is, ideally, a community, but that the purpose of sports is to outrank someone else. In this way the work of the two scholars can be seen as complementary, and we begin to understand why intimate conversation is so difficult.

Another aspect, beyond the scope of this paper, are what I call the "seminal" metaphors—the way in which scientific theory is couched in language reflecting men's sexual beliefs, a further manifestation of this linguistic postulate. Keller's 1985 work speaks to this.

Also in discourse and syntax we find the studies that have addressed the myth of the quantity of women's speech, as study after study shows great constancy in the larger portion of any mixed sex conversation going to the men. If we think of this in derivational terms, then we can see that the root must, of course, have more time and more space than its derivation.

Two other aspects of syntax are of interest here.

In English the subject is prime. In linguistics we even speak of 'raising the object to subject position' to form the passive. Subjects are obligatory; objects are not. The title of a recent movie, purporting to treat the subject of friendships between women and men was titled 'When Harry Met Sally', Harry in the subject position, and Sally guess where! One of the marks of 'derivational thinking' is keeping women out of subject positions. Textbooks in linguistics, for example, are notorious for examples of the type 'John hits Mary', never the reverse. Recently on our campus the students challenged one professor; he tried but had great difficulty imagining Mary in subject positions! (Maranzana, 1992)



Also, in English normal syntactic ordering is not women and men, but men and women, not female and male, but male and female, thus reinforcing the derivational order and also in this ordering reinforcing the nexus of male and one, leaving men singularly first even when plural.

The level of vocabulary is the level we are most clearly conscious of and is the level that has been most popularly explored. Penelope (1990), among others, has done a great deal of work with vocabulary. Because of the nature of the postulate it is difficult for words referring to women to remain positive or words referring to men to remain negative. For any sentence of the type, woman is _____, the item in the blank has a strong tendency to become deprecative; it is very difficult to make it otherwise. On the other hand, with the male as unmarked and prototype, it is difficult to keep anything unambiguously bad; even such things as assassin turn out to be admirable 'anti-heroes'! The word 'macho', which feminists had hoped to make into an insult, is an example. Equally, words referring to women are always insults when applied to men. I.e., if it is good for a woman, it is bad for a man. This includes not only specifically woman words, but adjectives referring to peaceful and nurturing qualities. In terms of derivational thinking, whatever belongs to the derivation must be stripped away from the unmarked root, otherwise the root might become the derivation.

The postulate has, perhaps, its most powerful realization at the grammatical level of the English language, not only because of its own characteristics, but because it is reinforced by two complementary postulates. The three basic obligatory constructions, all linguistic postulates, interplay together to reinforce each other. These are: number, hierarchy, gender.

Number is overtly obligatory and pervasive, as I illustrated above. Singular is the unmarked category, and the category that carries the semantic freight of 'best' oh to be Number One!

The second structure is the comparative/absolute (wise, wiser, wisest) which means constant hierarchy in our speech and our perceptions. Unranked comparison, which we label as a 'figure of speech,' the simile, is, interestingly, grammaticalized in the Jaqi languages, but Jaqi does not have our type of *ranking* comparative. The ranking comparative/absolute structure does not appear, at first glance, to be obligatory, but in interplay with the other two, does indeed function in this way, in mutually reinforcing fashion. We talk about equality as a topic but in our daily speech enunciate constant hierarchy. If you doubt me, try doing without a comparative

or an absolute for even an hour. I require my students to try it for 24 hours; so far no one has made it.

In contrast many languages have no ranking comparative at all, including the Jaqi languages. It may be that we must talk equality if we wish any at all, because we so easily and consistently lapse into hierarchy. In contrast, the Japanese talk hierarchy constantly because, according to Mizutani (1981), the moment they stop they lapse immediately into equality. (A culturally correlative example of this is that now well-known statistic that the Japanese CEO's are paid 16 times the salary of the lowest paid member of the firm; ours are paid 160 times that salary). We might think also of our constant ranking of students, the power of standardized tests, the importance given to even a hundredth of a second, the judgments of experiences by 'What did you like best?', etc. It is a constant experience of my students to discover that they must suddenly pay actual attention to the attributes of people and objects when they can no longer simply rank. Notice that this postulate is mutually reinforcing with one, in that only one can be at the pinnacle of our type of hierarchy.

The third structure is, of course, sex-based gender, which in English is partly overt and partly covert. The principle of English sex-based gender is that feminine is derived from masculine. Therefore the feminine is dependent, grammatically, on the masculine. The masculine is the unmarked; the feminine the marked. The structures which directly reflect sex-based gender include pronouns, names, and person referencing. There are results both in terms of perception and culture most of which are well-known to all of us; conferences like this one are held to discuss the cultural results.

A common myth is that languages like the Romance languages with overt gender everywhere are by that very fact more clearly sexist. This is not true. Covert categories actually may carry more weight precisely because they are not visible. Also, in a language like Spanish, a man cannot entirely divorce himself from the feminine; after all he personally has a feminine head, a feminine mind, a feminine hand, a feminine mouth, a feminine leg. These structures merit separate studies; ranking of languages is inappropriate.

First and foremost is the matter of pronouns, which are far more important than vocabulary precisely because they work as an integral part of the grammar. In many languages the functions that we assign to pronouns are carried in suffixes or other grammatical markers. The 'generic' *he* and the difficulties we have had finding substitutes for it are problems we are all familiar with. The relative difficulties between vocabulary

and pronouns was neatly illustrated on our campus by a document for graduate exams which had a line labeled 'Signature of chairperson or his representative.' Martyrna (1980), among others, has done some excellent studies of the psychology of the generic masculine whereby she found that the only people who could actually *not* imagine a male figure upon hearing the generic 'he' were a few women, not many but a few. Apparently there were no men who ever imagined anyone but a male. Part of the semantic freight of this use is that to be human is to be male.

However, the sex-based gender system of English is not confined to persons. Vehicles are frequently referred to as she—ships, boats, cars, etc. Mathiot (1979) has done a most interesting study in which she pulled apart some of the semantic elements of the pronouns in English. Another item that has been making the rounds, is that it is astonishingly easy for English speakers to assign a contrasting sex (gender) to any two items, and correlation from speaker to speaker is very high. Given a fork and a spoon, for instance, which is which?

In the same vein, the use of 's/he' makes an implication of derivation based on an accident of spelling where there is, in fact, no derivation historically. Linguistically the two forms are unrelated, but the power of the postulate is such that we can see it even in chance spelling conventions.

Part of the manifestation of the male as unmarked, with the feminine derivative, is the way in which women are identified. Identity is closely related to name reference, which is part of the power of naming, so that, as women, we may come to accept a derivative status along with our derivative name.

First, in terms of referencing, are the derivations '-ess' and '-ette' which are today the most productive of the feminine/diminutive suffixes (in the history of English there are many more). These can be added to anything, and are always, to one degree or another, pejorative. Consider, for example, how 'leather' holds up against 'leatherette.' A colleague of mine, concerned about the education his children were getting on TV started a collection of such terms as 'smurfette.' I was heartened by a report from a student of mine recently. A child, a niece of hers, was discussing some women actors. An adult corrected her to 'actress'. No, she said, women can be actors, too. She knew the meaning of the 'feminine' suffix very well" i.e., no validity except as specified by a governing/defining male presence.

Also, our basic terms, woman and female, appear and are believed to be, derived from the man and male. The history of woman and man is convoluted and involves meaning shifts, woman coming from a com-

pound, not directly a derivation. Female and male have no historical connection at all; female, from a French diminutive of *femme*, was respelled to *look* like it was derived from male! Thus is the power of the postulate of derivation, that is, the assumption of derivation is made even when inappropriate because it is assumed to be 'natural'.

There is great power in naming. Women's names, the very labels by which we claim our identity, are in English derivational. Our surnames are all patronymic, a custom our men are now imposing on the rest of the world. Thailand, for example, adopted this custom about 100 years ago, to the loss of women's names. The title Mrs. plus his name is fully derivational. Many women's personal names are also derived from men's names—Carla from Carl, Francie from Frank, etc. Only one name that I know of goes the other way"—Marion from Mary, which Eisler (1980) would probably argue is a remnant of the goddess (¿not god?).

Elgin was commenting on a difficulty that had arisen in the use of the name *syn-tonics* for some of the work she does. From a reader response she answered as follows:

"Steve Marsh writes to tell me that he likes the idea of naming the work I do 'the Haden-Elgin' method or system or whatever, and he lists its various good points. I understand. But there's a problem. Neither my first husband (Peter Haden) nor my second husband (George Elgin) took part in my work in any way, that is, supposing what I do is important enough to be labeled in this fashion, the label credits my two husbands, not me, with what I have done. Nor would my 'maiden' name be any help, since my father (Gaylord Wilkins) had nothing to do with my work either. Dale Carnegie doesn't have this problem; no American male has this problem; males tend not to realize this problem exists [Elgin, 1990]."

Derivational thinking results from the sex-based gender system of English which derives the feminine from the masculine and is reinforced by the linguistic postulates of number, with singular as unmarked (like masculine), and the ranking comparative. So masculine and singular go together in an interplay which allows only one on top. Male is unmarked. If female is to have equal rights, then by the number postulate and the hierarchy postulate, male would have to go down, and the singular/masculine unmarked tie would be broken. This at least partially explains the energy men are willing to put into backlash.

I am still working out the full implications of derivational thinking. Briefly, the implications are that it is difficult to perceive women as free standing independent singular human beings; it is also difficult to

perceive the activities that women engage in as fully human and worthwhile activities. For some people, primarily men but also women, such perception may be impossible. On the international scene, this postulate makes it difficult for us to evaluate the position of women in other societies and may blind us even to examples where women are not thought of derivationally. The Jaqi people whose postulates I gave you above, for example, have often been depicted as medieval European peasants, with men as singular heads and women as derivative (Hardman, 1988).

In conclusion I would like to look at the issue of sexual harassment in the light of the Hill-Thomas hearings as a way of seeing some of the implications of the derivational thinking that comes out of this pervasive structure.

Given derivational thinking, women in object position, the primacy of the root, behavioral outcomes such as the trivialization of sexual harassment and the senators' behavior at the Hill-Thomas hearings can be understood, even predicted. People did not disbelieve Anita Hill. I don't think even the senators did. The number of articles detailing sexual harassment in so many national publications, and the attention given sexual harassment on campuses and in the workplace show clearly that she was believed. Given that *he* was the root and *she* the derivation, then clearly if one must choose between the two, one chooses the root. Also, *he* in subject position and *she* as object is "felt" to be 'right'—her only option (objects being optional) being to remove herself, which would allow another object to slide into the slot.

This does not gainsay other analyses, for instance Elgin's in a recent *Lonesome Node* (1991), in which she suggests that Hill made an error in strategy. I just do not believe it would have made any difference. For evidence, logic, and presentation, the group that testified for Hill could not have been surpassed. In the presence of derivational thinking any excuse is sufficient to tip the balance to the root and leave the derivation hanging. Also, it is entirely appropriate to rid the root of any hanging derivation so that it may be 'clean' and singular and unmarked. One might think here, as a correlative example, of the language used in fraternity initiation ceremonies (Sanday, 1990). The derivation does not have an independent existence; the sacrifice of the root for justice to the derivation cannot be expected. To use men's metaphors and syntactic ordering, in the "game" of '*he* said, *she* said' it is not a "battle" of equals.

Endnotes

- ¹Russ, J. (1983). *How to suppress a woman's writing*. Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 18.
²For a detailed explanation of the data source material, see Hardman, 1986

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Occasionally, a writer's work is sufficiently thought-provoking that numerous people respond strongly and with diverse opinions. This, in itself, marks a significant achievement. Sometimes that work is also often exceptionally important in nature of the ideas it explores. Your *Women and Language* editor finds one such book to be *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science* by Evelyn Fox Keller (published by Routledge in 1992 and available in paper for 15.95).

Perhaps this importance can be testified to by the fact that we received two reviews of the Keller book along with a photocopy of Anne Fausto-Sterling's review in *Women's Review of Books*. Fausto-Sterling notes, importantly, that Keller's aim is not to repudiate science or to replace it, but reclamation "from within of science as a human instead of a masculine project." Fausto-Sterling notes that Keller focused almost exclusively on language, and that more will be required, especially "a clear understanding of the politics of scientific knowledge production." Saying that "this book is must reading" does not mean she agrees with everything in it, Fausto-Sterling concluded with the comment that "this book is too important to let" the difficulties of reading what she considers excessively complex writing interfere with reading these essays. Fausto-Sterling also thinks Keller under-valued the complexities of gender that are introduced by race. But, in all, the conclusion is that "none of us has a complete or right answer to the questions raised" and that the Keller's book has "pushed the conversation forward."

Because I agree with Fausto-Sterling and believe that the questions being raised by feminist critics of science are also questions about patterns of western thought reflected and perpetuated in our culture by our language, I believe discussion about Keller's book important for *Women and Language* readers. Hopefully the following quite disparate reviews when read in combination with the preceding article by M. J. Hardman, will stimulate commentary from some of you.

Anita Taylor

Secrets of Life/Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science by Evelyn Fox Keller.

Reviewed by Eugenie Vorburger Mielczarek, George Mason University.

This monograph is a reprinting of nine essays originally published or presented as lectures from 1988 through 1992. Organizing around the three themes of the title, Keller examines the inter-permeation of language, science and gender from the viewpoint of feminist theory and the issue of how language has shaped scientific progress. She argues that the cultural restrictions of gender and language shape science in the essay, "Gender and Science an Update," that updates her 1985 work *Reflections on Gender and Science*. Starting with the definition of gender, "a cultural norm guiding the psychosocial development of individual men and

women," Keller concludes that genderizing science led to the exclusion of women from the physical sciences. For all of history, at least until the latter ten years of this century, science and physical science in particular, was dominated by two commandments: the masculine mind was uniquely constructed to accomplish by reason (logical thinking), the feminine mind uniquely restricted by intuition. Smart women were recognized with the accolade 'thinking like a man'. Defeated men were censured by muttering 'just like a woman.' Keller questions how "the language of objectification, reification, and domination of nature" has shaped and served science in contrast to "a different language of kinship, embeddedness, and connectivity". . objectivity and success of science.

Keller holds a Ph.D. in physics. She evolved from physicist into feminist theorist, a unique personal histo-

ry for studying the construct of science. She seems to view her personal history as authoritative in resolving the issue of gender and science, which ultimately flaws her generalizations. Since few women, indeed even academics, can imagine themselves as physicists, I am concerned that her credentials will particularly persuade women. Questions on Gender and Science are raised in the introduction and part I; the hypotheses and their defense presented in part II; part III addresses the problems of how language has shaped research directions in biology.

Part II fails to persuade this reviewer. Keller's analysis of physics starts and stops with the atom bomb and the males employed by the Manhattan project. She subscribes to a constrained view of science, that science must be measured not by its discoveries but by how those discoveries have been used. She summarizes her evidence and decides: physics is the science of unlocking the secrets of death, biology the secrets of life. Why? The sciences used to make the atom bomb unlocked a secret about a deadly object. The secret of life was unraveled by the "conquistadores" Watson and Crick, biologists. Keller conveniently omits the biologists who developed germ warfare.

These conclusions are bolstered by quotes and stories, such as that by Robert Oppenheimer reminding us that "as the (mushroom) cloud rose up in the distance, he recalled (lines from the Bhagavad-Gita:) I am become Death the shatterer of worlds." She adds other stories to connect these ideas. For example, one major support for the 'Science of Death, Science of Life' hypothesis is the view proffered by Dundes that in ancient mythology the bullroarer "is the symbolic representation of a widespread belief that 'boys become men by means of male anal power.'" Here Keller provides her insight: This symbolic replacement of vaginal birth is also offered by the rites of primitive cultures which transform "boys into men" by "anal rebirth." The secrecy of the rites "serves to circumscribe the domain of destructive powers unleashed." Other stories are used: Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* in which the male scientist coopts the "procreative function" releasing destruction; the claim that a generation ago, a common sideline of budding contemporary male scientists was production of "stink bombs—ready to be set off by the young scientist whenever crossed by an uncooperative or angry mother." Aligning the image of the budding male chemist or physicist against the maternal image is used as evidence for the Science of Death, Science of Life hypothesis. In contrast, the stink bombs I remember were set off in high schools by the poorest students, often in front of a male principals office, in the hall during

recess or a in neighborhood movie theater on a Saturday morning attended by few mothers. Stink bombs were set off to attract the attention of peers. One can easily agree that the weapons industry delights in using homo-erotic images. But this is not enough to build her case; better data is needed. Similarly, Keller suggests that biologists routinely describe the Watson-Crick discovery as "unlocking the secret of life." I had never heard this description and neither had my colleagues in biology.

Another flaw I find is misuse of scientific language: in the introduction she uses the word, *force*, which has the scientific meaning of causing the acceleration of an object. It also signifies the nature of a fundamental construct of our universe: to create action at a distance such as by a gravitational force field. In its generic sense the word also means impact. Keller takes advantage of the multi-level usage to write "Gravity is a force, DNA has force, but beliefs do not." Recasting this sentence with the correct use of language, one would say, 'Gravity is a force, the discovery of the structure of DNA has had an impact, but beliefs do not.' The sentence now loses its power to persuade. The sentence as originally constructed by Professor Keller is dramatic but distorts. And because many readers will be scientifically unsophisticated, the misuse of scientific terms is problematic. All of us practicing laboratory research agree that language is crucial to defining our results and criticisms. But critics need to be equally careful in analysis of the language of science.

One of Keller's major concerns is the objectivity of scientists in data interpretation, writing that "The problem is data do not speak for themselves." The implication here is that all data can have multiple interpretations, a problem in that she does not distinguish between data with obvious conclusions—such as the discovery of superconductivity—and data with non-obvious conclusions—such as the attempts to quantify the causes of breast cancer. Many experiments yield data which do speak for themselves, much data does not. The need for scientists to distinguish the two is obvious. But to assume that the work of physical scientists is flawed because males dominate our language community is ludicrous. I looked in vain for examples of her recasting, for example, the laws of gravity or electromagnetism in the language of kinship. The example she gives is insufficient: a quote attributed to Mary Hesse, "Neurons come in billions and their possible linkages in megabillions, while the words of a language come only in thousands and sentences cannot in a life time be long enough to match the antics of the neurons.

There can't be a word or a sentence to cover every particular thing."

Such a conclusion ignores the role of mathematics as the language of science. Billions and billions of electrons interact in a conductor but, using the language of statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, we can predict very specific details of the phenomena of conduction. The attempt of scientists to model neural exchange using the mathematics of networks and non-linear thermodynamics has already opened up a new field of theoretical and experimental science. Sometimes experiments run ahead of language (i.e. mathematics) and sometimes the language is waiting for them such as in the development of quantum mechanics or the theory of relativity. Keller fails to instruct the unsophisticated reader that we do not completely understand some forces. Is she referring to current constraints on the mathematical language, describing for example the terms 'weak and strong' nuclear forces? In fact the terms, chosen by males, up, down, charm, flavor, top, bottom, to describe the aspects of quarks are not particularly masculine terms.

My first gesture after receiving this book and before reading it, was a study of the references. I was surprised to find no references to biographies, letters, or writings of the major female scientists of the 20th century, for example just to name three, Madame Curie, Lise Meitner, or Rosalind Franklin. The work of these women, discoverers of the source of radioactivity, the occurrence and theory of nuclear fission, and the first crystallographic fingerprint of the spiral structure of DNA is not even acknowledged. Certainly some insight could be gained by studying the sociological structure which defined their research and life. Perhaps Professor Keller does not consider the writings and research of these women germane to her hypotheses because there is no evidence in the writings of Madame Curie and Lise Meitner that they considered themselves participants in the "Science of Death." On the contrary these women looked forward to the life giving technology which would result from their work.

Biology is a very different science from physics. The language of physics is mathematics. Any biological system is comprised of a complex set of positive and negative feedback loops. A complete solution which produces the orderly working of even the simplest living system has not been found. It is disguised from us for several reasons first, the problem of defining all the variables which enter into the working of the system, second, knowing the relative importance of these variables and third, constructing solvable equations for even the simplest models, i.e. involving only two or

three variables. Until scientists are more successful at setting up and solving these equations a description and interpretation of the observations and experiments in genetics and population biology will necessarily incorporate an element of indeterminacy and thus impreciseness of language.

The use of the Lotka-Volterra equations for ecological modeling is the example which Keller studies. She blames the failures of ecological modeling and population genetics which use these equations on the "systematic neglect of cooperative interactions and the privileging of competitive interactions." But perhaps the problem of these failures has another root other than the social uses of language, namely, the ability to incorporate into a solvable equation the relative strengths of these two complex interactions. The Lotka-Volterra equations and their spin off "the Brusselator" can represent only the simplest system. Intelligent scientists who use them are well aware of their shortcomings. The solution to the biological problem awaits a cleverer mathematics albeit cleverer computer algorithms.

Attempts to understand these coupled systems, popularly known as complex systems, are being undertaken with some successes. But here, in the early stage of a problem, where the only solvable mathematics is too primitive to incorporate all the variables, the science will be tormented by the misuse of language with the wrong metaphors. Such convoluted language scenarios existed for the Greeks in trying to identify and describe motion, for the physicists and chemists trying to decipher temperature and heat and physicists trying to decipher particle physics. Once the fog lifts the language may be awkward but it loses its sociological connotations and the science is ready to use mathematics to decipher another unknown. For example, the use of the term calorie which predates the understanding of heat as energy is awkward but not stultifying. That some of the language may be socially directed does not necessarily flaw attempts to seek a solution. Keller seems to argue that it would, but the acceptance of a successful solution often depends more on the ability to test the proffered solution experimentally and theoretically than on the social structure. Several examples come to mind: the 19th century debate about Maxwell's Equations; the language of pre-1957 theory of superconductivity, and the continuing debates on the foundations of quantum mechanics. In the case of solving the physics of superconductivity, the language clarified almost immediately after the hypothesis of the Cooper pairs and their subsequent experimental demonstration. Keller

has a point but the solutions for biology only await some precise mathematics.

We should remember that complete understanding of a scientific phenomenon—whether biological, physical or chemical—requires a theoretical description, experiments, an equation, and a data base. And until a phenomenon is understood in this complete sense the language used may be partly metaphorical. For examples: the use of the term 'animas' by the Greeks to describe the motion of objects as if they were living before the concepts of motion were understood; the use of the concept of an invisible fluid called the 'caloric' to describe heat before the experiments of Joule; the use of the term 'ether' to describe the elastic material which pervaded the universe and which was responsible for the transmission of electromagnetic energy before the concept of relativity and the experiments of Michelson and Morley.

Professor Keller argues that the use of language is culture driven and thus gender driven, and that it has defined science. I find this conclusion too extreme because it fails to note that after an understanding of the phenomenon is reached the language is mathematical. Moreover, even before the "nature's secret" is revealed metaphorical language may play a role but even that is not always gender driven.

Secrets of Life/Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science (c) is available in paperback from Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc. 1992., at \$15.95.

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Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death

Reviewed by Arlene H. Olkin

When feminist philosopher of science Evelyn Fox Keller links gender and science and language, she poses "unallowable" questions that challenge our comfortable reliance on the neutrality of science. Over the past decade and a half, Keller has explored the cultural stereotyping of women and men and its effects on the thoughts and actions of scientists.

In her latest book, *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science*, a collection of nine essays written between 1985 and 1991, Keller goes further into her inquiry by examining the language of scientists and how it functions as the vehicle which carries culture into the laboratory. With her 1985 book, *Reflections on Gender and Science*, Keller called our attention to what she sees as the "intrinsic masculinity"

of Western science and how it creates obstacles to success for women scientists. In *Secrets*, Keller turns her philosophical high beam on the language of science, seeking to reveal through specific example the ways in which scientific metaphors influence both the process and the products of science.

The essays are arranged in three groups, according to theme. Most of them have appeared before in journals and other essay collections. Part I consists of a single essay, "Gender and Science: an Update," in which Keller provides an overview of her current thinking on the subject. She begins with a caveat about "gender and science," a phrase which she helped bring to prominence. The phrase has, in her view, become problematic over the past decade because of the slippage between "gender" and "women," and the tendency toward ghettoizing questions about gender from other inquiries about science.

In Part II, Keller explains her recent preoccupation with the consequences of scientific activity, most clearly exemplified by the successes of molecular biology and nuclear physics in the production of technologies of life and death. Her theme here is the meaning of "secrets" and it plays throughout the essays in this group. Scientists, she notes, commonly refer to "secrets of nature" and "secrets of life" which they seek to reveal by their efforts. But what might it do to their mindset to even think about knowledge of the world in terms of secrets? Keller pushes us to ask, "whose secrets?" and "from whom?" She traces how the conventions of our language associate the secrets of women with the secrets of life and nature, which men seek to "undo" through the scientific method: female procreativity locked in drama with male productivity.

The first essay in Part II is entitled, "From Secrets of Life to Secrets of Death," and is, by far, the most energetic and enthralling of the essays in the collection. Keller wrote it for presentation at the "Kanzer Seminar in Psychoanalysis and the Humanities" (New Haven, Spring, 1986). In the piece, she employs the psychoanalytic perspective which was a hallmark of her earlier work, *Reflections on Science and Gender*. She links the ancient rites of passage in which boys become warrior men by symbolically, and secretly, co-opting female procreative powers, to nuclear weapons research that results in the "birth" of deadly "babies," and finally, to the search for DNA, the "molecule of life" and the key to controlling evolution.

This essay is unique in the collection because it is the only one in which Keller uses the psychodynamic approach. While she is still committed to it, psychoanal-

ysis has recently become somewhat of an embarrassment to philosophers, historians and sociologists of science, and Keller avoids it in the other pieces for strategic reasons.

The remaining three essays in Part II, "Secrets of God, Nature and Life," "Critical Silences in Scientific Discourse," and "Fractured Images of Science, Language and Power," trace, respectively, the changing referent of "secrets," the development of technologies of life and death, and the force of social and material ambitions on theory development in molecular genetics.

Part III consists of four essays of a more technical nature, dealing with the question of how language functions to set research agendas in evolutionary biology and in molecular genetics. The last of these essays, "Between Language and Science: The Question of Directed Mutation in Molecular Genetics," is a fascinating look at the linguistic construction of the dichotomy between "random" and "purposive," and how the application of these terms to genetic variation may have obscured a far more complex picture of evolution than the ones we currently entertain. Keller suggests a radical view of genetic variation as neither random nor purposive, but rather, in keeping with Barbara McClintock's vision, as the manifestation of a genetic apparatus which reprograms itself as it "learns" from its experience.

Secrets is not breezy reading. It is challenging and complex and some of the essays are not geared to a general audience. But it amply rewards the traveller who hangs in over rough spots in the trail, with some heady vistas that are worth the climb. Keller is successful in revealing to us some of the ways in which scientific language "reflects and guides the development of scientific models and methods" and directs the ends to which science aims. In doing so, she posts a big arrow for those looking for a way to affect change.

Secrets is rich in references and quotations from a wide variety of poets, anthropologists, historians and philosophers, as well as scientists, and the bibliography is a valuable resource of readings on the social ramifications of science.

The reader who is new to feminist challenges to science may be jolted by the imaginative up-ending of the prevalent ideas and linguistic traditions of science. Even those more familiar with the field are likely to be rattled. *Secrets* provides no answers, but many riveting questions for anyone interested in gender equity in science, and for all who are concerned with the global consequences of this most powerful human endeavor.

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Grammar is Sex; Language is a Woman
Julia Penelope

English teachers spend some portion of their careers trying to "explain" the vagaries of language and the contradictions and inadequacies of the grammars that purport to describe it. Their students sit bemused, benumbed, and confused, wondering what, if anything, the "rules" presented to them have to do, not only with the language they speak, but with their lives. Analyses of the conceptual metaphors that structure patriarchal descriptions of English suggest that many of our problems with grammatical dicta originate in the thinking about language coded in the resulting metaphorical expressions. Here, I will discuss three of the four related complex metaphors that reflect patriarchal thinking about language and communication: the CONDUIT METAPHOR, first described by Michael Reddy, GRAMMAR IS SEX, and LANGUAGE IS A WOMAN. The fourth, LANGUAGE IS A TOOL, may need no further explanation.

Michael Reddy argues that the Conduit Metaphor is the prevalent metaphor in western descriptions of language, including attempts to improve and understand communication. Drawing on Reddy's analysis, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson redescribed the Conduit Metaphor as a complex metaphor, the CONTAINER metaphor, which they represented as a three-part sequence:

IDEAS (OR MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS.

LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS.

COMMUNICATION IS SENDING.

The framework of the Conduit Metaphor forces us to conceive of language structures as containers, and thoughts and feelings as objects we insert into them, successfully or unsuccessfully. When we use the Conduit Metaphor to describe communication, we think of words and sentences as having "insides" and "outsides," as *containers* into which we insert ideas and feelings.

As Reddy points out, the inherent danger of the Conduit Metaphor is that it makes us think of communication as a simple process, like a drive-in bank's pneumatic tube, one that "guarantees success without effort" (p. 295). We are taught to think that, in order to communicate, all we have to do is pluck ideas and feel-