

Core Values, Value Conflict, and
Citizens' Ambivalence about Gay Rights

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Abstract: Recent research has recognized that many people simultaneously hold positive and negative attitudes about important political issues. In this paper, we review the concept of attitudinal ambivalence and propose a survey-based measure of ambivalence adapted from the experimental literature. Extending our earlier work on abortion, analysis of a statewide telephone survey of Florida residents reveals that (1) many people have ambivalent attitudes about issues related to gay and lesbian rights; (2) the amount of ambivalence varies according to the specific rights in question (military service, gay marriage and adoption, membership in youth organizations such as Boy Scouts, and others); (3) ambivalence on gay rights is to some extent a function of conflict among citizens' underlying core values; and (4) under certain circumstances, ambivalence appears to mediate the relationship between a person's issue preferences with regard to gay rights and his or her evaluation of political leaders and institutions.

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"I'm kind of two ways on that." – Survey respondent in media poll, quoted in the *South Florida Sun-Sentinel*, July 1, 2002.

At least until fairly recently, probably no other group in America was more reviled than homosexuals. If "one test of a democratic political system is its ability to incorporate its least liked and least powerful members into full citizenship," (Sherrill and Yang 2000: 20), this was a test on which both policymakers and the general public in the United States performed poorly. Fifty years ago, for example,

[i]n most of the country, homosexuality was grounds for forcible separation from society into prisons or hospitals. It was a disqualification for employment in the public service and for entry into professions such as law and medicine. In public discourse, when homosexuality was discussed at all, it was discussed as a perversion, an affliction, a weakness of character, and a threat to the American way of life and our nation's security" (Sherrill and Yang 2000: 20).

Even today, "[b]y virtually every tangible indicator to us, it is clear that gays remain disliked by a large share of the public at a very visceral level" (Wald 2000: 13).

It is equally clear, however, that the opinion climate with respect to lesbians and gay men is not nearly as negative or as intolerant as it once was. Most citizens continue to question the morality of homosexual behavior: According to the 2000 General Social Survey (GSS), roughly 63 percent indicated that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex was "always" or "almost always" wrong – a majority to be sure, but down noticeably from the 82 percent who felt that way in 1987.¹ Support for the civil rights and civil liberties of homosexuals has risen as well: Most Americans now believe that gays should be permitted to teach in colleges and universities, to serve in the military, and that there should be laws banning discrimination against gays in hiring and firing, while over forty percent are willing to allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt children (Wilcox and Norrandar 2002: 137-38; also Wilcox and Wolpert 2000; Sherrill and Yang 2000; Yang 1997; Haeberle 1999; Lewis and Rogers 1999; Strand 1998). On a personal level, only one in three respondents in a 2000 survey admitted to being uncomfortable around homosexuals, and just 38 percent said they would be very upset to learn that their child was gay (down from 65 percent fifteen years earlier; Wilcox and Norrandar 2002: 140-41).²

Although the reasons for this opinion shift are uncertain, some researchers point to the increasing number of Americans who have discovered that they have gay and lesbian friends (over half), relatives (about one in five), and/or workmates (one in three; see *Public Perspective* 2000: p. 31). Research shows that interpersonal contact reduces the likelihood that an individual will harbor negative feelings toward homosexuals (Wilcox and Wolpert 2000; Herek and Glunt 1993; Herek and Capitanio 1996). Another likely factor is the popular media, with movies such as *Philadelphia* and television shows such as *Ellen*, *Will & Grace*, and *The Rosie O'Donnell Show* introducing viewers to gay and lesbian characters and portraying them in a mostly favorable light (Wilcox and Wolpert 2000; Wilcox and Norrandar 2002; Brewer 2003). The AIDS crisis in general, and the revelation that Los Angeles Lakers basketball star Earvin "Magic" Johnson was HIV-positive in particular, may have humanized gay men for many people, especially as fears lessened that the disease would rapidly spread to the heterosexual community (Wilcox and

Norrander 2002). Finally, polls show that an increasing number of Americans have come to believe that an individual's sexual orientation is fixed at birth – and those who share this belief are more inclined to support homosexual rights (Tygart 2000) and, in all probability, less concerned that "gays or lesbians will try to seduce young, impressionable heterosexuals" (Wilcox and Norrander 2002: 140).

Our research is not intended to explain the public's shifting views about homosexuality, though it provides what we believe to be new insight into the nature and meaning of that shift.³ Consider, for example, the majority support expressed for two seemingly contradictory propositions, i.e., that homosexuality is "morally wrong" (see note 1) and that it is based, at least in part, on genetic inheritance and therefore not entirely a matter of personal choice (Tygart 2000). The mass public is, of course, well known for its attitudinal inconsistencies (Converse 1964), and this one may simply be another example of people giving top-of-the-head answers to survey questions dealing with topics to which they have given little thought. Alternatively, it is possible that the opinion shift that has taken place over the past 15-20 years is less straightforward than it first appears to be; in other words, while some citizens undoubtedly have become more tolerant of homosexuals, others may have made that journey only part of the way – by adopting positive orientations without necessarily abandoning all of the negative ones previously held. Such *ambivalence* could help to account for the fact that the American public appears to be, on average, both supportive of and hostile to homosexuals and gay rights, depending upon the specific question being asked (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992).

Although the data used here are cross-sectional in nature and cannot be used to look at opinion change directly, our results leave little doubt that many Americans are indeed ambivalent with regard to homosexual and gay rights issues. We also will present evidence that sheds light on both the origins and consequences of gay rights ambivalence, specifically, that it is associated with conflict among citizens' underlying core values, and that it can (but does not always) play a significant role in shaping evaluations of political leaders. Based on these findings, it is our contention that neither the nature nor the political relevance of public opinion on gay rights can be fully understood without taking ambivalence into account.

The Concept of Ambivalence

Researchers traditionally have assumed that attitudes can be measured as if they lie somewhere along a bipolar continuum that ranges from positive (or favorable) to negative (or unfavorable), with a neutral point in between (Thurstone 1928; Thurstone and Chave 1929; see Eagly and Chaiken 1993 for a review). This unidimensional view seems to make intuitive sense because, on most issues, people tend to think in bipolar terms. When they watch a movie or eat a meal, they usually classify it as either "good" or "bad" (or, representing the continuum and its neutral point, as "so-so"); and in the political realm, candidates and elected officials are often described ideologically as being either "liberal" or "conservative" (or "middle-of-the-road").

On the surface, describing something as both good *and* bad, or a candidate as both liberal *and* conservative, seems counterintuitive. Yet in real life we can, and do, evaluate objects as if they

contained separate components. Politicians, for example, are seen as being liberal on some issues but conservative on others (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, and Fiske 1982), with the summation of these perceptions presumably telling us whether he or she falls, overall, into one category or the other. Feldman (1995: 266) called this process the "distributions of considerations" and argued that an opinion expressed in response to a survey question provides only an estimate of the central tendency of an individual's attitudes or beliefs on that subject.

When someone's evaluations or beliefs about an attitude object are in conflict, we describe that person as being *ambivalent* (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 1997; Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Zaller and Feldman 1992). The concept of ambivalence is not new (Kaplan 1972; Scott 1969), especially to social psychologists who have on numerous occasions used experimental data to demonstrate empirically the existence of an ambivalence dimension based on the assumption that attitudes can indeed contain separate positive and negative components (Newby-Clark, McGregor, and Zanna 2002; Hodson, Maio, and Esses 2001; Armitage and Connor 2000; Jonas, Diehl, and Bromer 1997; Priester and Petty 1996; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995; Cacioppo and Berntson 1994; Katz, Wackenhut, and Hass 1986; Klopfer and Madden 1980).

Ambivalence has also begun to receive greater attention in recent years from political scientists and survey researchers generally (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; Frankovic and McDermott 2001; Lavine 2001; Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2000; Meffert and Guge 2000; Cantril and Cantril 1999; Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Feldman and Zaller 1992), although its measurement is often indirect and inferential. Zaller and Feldman (1992), for example, asked survey respondents to state whatever thoughts came to mind as they answered two traditional closed-ended policy questions; based on the mix of answers given, the authors concluded that "most people possess opposing considerations on most issues, that is, considerations that might lead them to decide the issue either way" (p. 585; also see Zaller 1992). This is the *ambivalence axiom* and, according to Zaller and Feldman, it helps to account for the over-time response instability often found in opinion surveys (Converse 1964). However, as Alvarez and Brehm (1995; also see Alvarez and Brehm 1997 and 1998; Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002) have correctly pointed out, a person's being able to identify arguments on both sides of an issue does not, in and of itself, signify the presence of an underlying conflict.

Using a different approach, Alvarez and Brehm (1995) inferred the presence of ambivalence in citizens' attitudes about abortion from patterns of error variance in heteroskedastic probit models of binary choice. Although inferences about an individual-level concept (ambivalence) based upon aggregate-level data (error variance in binary choices) are problematic, Craig, Kane, and Martinez (2002) employed a more direct measuring technique adapted from experimental psychology (Priester and Petty 1996; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995; Kaplan 1972) to confirm that a substantial amount of ambivalence about abortion does exist among the mass public. This study also found that both pro-choice and pro-life voters were ambivalent, but on different dimensions: Pro-life voters expressed conflict primarily regarding abortions obtained under "traumatic" circumstances (rape or incest, threat to the mother's health, chance of serious defect in the baby), while respondents with pro-choice views tended to be ambivalent about

"elective" abortions (cannot afford more children, doesn't want more children, doesn't want to marry father).⁴ Ambivalence thus appears to be relatively common, at least for certain issues, and its multidimensional structure on the abortion question suggests a greater degree of complexity than has previously been suspected. In fact, each of these conclusions is reaffirmed by the findings reported below concerning attitudes about gay rights.

Ambivalence and Core Values

Why are some people ambivalent and others not? In recent years, researchers have increasingly become aware of the central role played by core values in structuring citizens' behavior and their views on specific issues. Such values are said to consist of

overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship, and American society. These principles and assumptions facilitate position taking in more concrete domains by serving as general focal points in an otherwise confusing political environment. Individualism, faith in the free enterprise system, a sense of equality or fair play, and views on public morality are all examples of core values that Americans might call upon (McCann 1997: 565; also see Jacoby 2002; McClosky and Zaller 1984).

Empirically, Feldman (1988) found that core beliefs about equality of opportunity, economic individualism, and the free enterprise system contributed significantly to voters' policy and candidate preferences. Feldman and Zaller (1992) reported that the social welfare policy views of survey respondents were based partly upon their beliefs about the proper role of government, individualism, humanitarianism, and other abstract values and principles. Sniderman and Piazza (1993) discovered that the core values of individualism and authoritarianism were important in shaping Americans' racial attitudes. Peffley and Hurwitz (1993; also Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) identified "general postures" relating to militarism and authoritarianism that were associated with attitudes on foreign and defense policy issues.

Although it is generally believed that ambivalence occurs when there is a *conflict* involving a person's core values (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Katz and Hass 1988), the evidence showing this to be the case is extremely limited. In their study of political tolerance, for example, Peffley and his colleagues (2001) assumed that value conflict and ambivalence are interchangeable terms, yet they failed to demonstrate an actual link between the two using either objective or subjective measures of ambivalence. Craig, Kane, and Martinez (2002) approached the question more directly and found greater ambivalence among individuals with conflicting views on the values of moral traditionalism and marriage roles (whether a wife should look after the home and family rather than pursuing a career of her own) – but only on the elective, as opposed to the traumatic, dimension of abortion (above; also see Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Schnell 1993). The authors concluded that "future research needs to take a closer look at the extent to which ambivalence is truly grounded in value conflict" (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002: 295).

Several studies have reported a relationship between such core values as authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and individualism on the one hand, and citizens' attitudes on issues relating to

homosexuality and gay rights on the other (Brewer 2003; Wilcox and Wolpert 2000; Basow and Johnson 2000; Whitley and Lee 2000; Cotton-Huston and Waite 2000; Lewis and Rogers 1999; Rayside and Bowler 1988). Moreover, it is widely assumed that that opinion trends described earlier, and the current mix of supportive (civil rights and liberties) and nonsupportive (morality of homosexuality) beliefs shared by popular majorities, are due in part to the fact that many Americans "hold clashing values in the debate over gay rights – traditional morality versus individual freedom and equality" (Wilcox and Norrander 2002: 138). In other words, evidence that the mass public as a whole is of two minds on gay issues may reflect a considerable amount of ambivalence at the individual level, and that ambivalence may be a product of the conflicting core values shared by many citizens. These are the central hypotheses that will be tested in the following analysis, using measures of ambivalence that are much more direct than is typical for survey-based studies of general populations.

Data and Methodology

The present study is based on a telephone poll of 601 Florida residents conducted in June, 2002 by the *Florida Voter* survey organization. The sampling frame was drawn using a random-digit-dialing (RDD) procedure; each respondent was further qualified to ensure that he or she was at least eighteen years of age and a permanent resident of the state.⁵

Our measure of ambivalence is modeled on experimental work by social psychologists and adapted by Craig, Kane, and Martinez (2002, 2000) for use in surveys. The technique is a version of the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957), as modified by Kaplan (1972) in an effort to show that people's overall attitudes are made up of both positive and negative elements. In order to separate the two, Kaplan divided semantic differential scales at the neutral point and asked respondents to indicate *both* how positively *and* how negatively they viewed an attitude object. For the present study, Kaplan's language was adapted to accommodate the limitations of a telephone survey:

"I'm now going to read a series of statements about issues involving homosexuals, that is, gay men and lesbians. After each, I'd like you to rate each statement on a 4-point scale to indicate how *positively* you feel toward the statement. If you do not have any positive feelings toward the statement, give the statement the lowest rating of 1; if you have some positive feelings, rate it a 2; if you have generally positive feelings, rate it a 3; and if you have extremely positive feelings, rate it a 4. Please rate each statement based solely on how positively you feel about it, *while ignoring or setting aside for the moment any negative feelings you may have for the statement*. The first statement is . . ."

We then read a series of eight statements derived from various opinion polls, published scholarly research, and recent news stories:

- Homosexuals should be allowed to teach in schools.
- Marriages between homosexuals should be recognized as legal.
- Homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States military.
- Homosexuals should be legally permitted to adopt children.

- What homosexuals do in the privacy of their own homes is nobody else's business.
- There should be laws to protect homosexuals against discrimination in their jobs.
- Homosexuals should be allowed to join the Boy Scouts and other youth organizations.
- Homosexual couples should be able to obtain family health insurance coverage, the same way other people do.

After a number of filler questions (Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995), the above statement was repeated except with the words "positive" and "positively" changed to "negative" and "negatively." If a person seemed unsure or confused at any point, the interviewer repeated the instructions as many times as necessary. Just as the structure of ambivalence regarding abortion proved to be multidimensional (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002), we anticipated that responses to these eight questions would fall into two separate domains: issues involving basic civil rights and liberties (teach school, serve in military, privacy of own homes, job discrimination) and family-related issues (legal marriage, adopt children, Boy Scouts, health insurance).

Kaplan's model for measuring attitudinal ambivalence, which is used widely within the social psychology literature (Priester and Petty 1996), specifies that the amount of ambivalence is a function of *total affect* directed by the individual toward an attitude object (positive plus negative reactions) less the *polarity* of those reactions (the absolute value of positive minus negative responses). This can be formally represented as

$$\text{Ambivalence} = \text{Total Affect} - \text{Polarity}$$

The problem with the Kaplan model is that it fails to account for the presence of polarized beliefs (see Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002). Megan Thompson and her colleagues (1995) corrected for this deficiency by reformulating the model so as to include both similarity and intensity of components (i.e., reasoning that increased similarity between positive and negative components reflects greater ambivalence). In addition, they proposed that if similarity is held constant, increased intensity should lead to greater ambivalence. Putting it all together, the similarity-intensity (SIM) model calculates ambivalence as

$$\text{Ambivalence} = [(P + N)/2] - |P - N|$$

where P is the positive reaction score and N is the negative reaction score.⁶ The Thompson study (also see Priester and Petty 1996) found this model to be superior to others, including Kaplan's, at predicting *subjective* ambivalence, or the degree to which respondents reported feeling discomfort when asked to evaluate some attitude object. We thus elected to use the Kaplan method of collecting positive and negative reactions to our eight statements about gay and lesbian rights, but to calculate overall ambivalence using the similarity-intensity model.

Results

Four basic questions will be addressed in this section. First, how ambivalent are Floridians about gay rights? Second, is ambivalence related to citizens' underlying core values? Third, and perhaps most important theoretically, is ambivalence on gay rights a function of core value conflict? Fourth, what is the political relevance of ambivalence? Although we are unable to consider the latter question in depth, our data do permit us to determine whether ambivalence mediates the relationship between a person's attitudes on gay rights issues and his or her evaluations of both Governor Jeb Bush and the Florida state legislature.

The Frequency and Structure of Ambivalence

Like their counterparts around the country, a majority of heterosexual Floridians (58.3 percent)⁸ believed that "sexual relations between two adults of the same sex is morally wrong,"⁹ Against this less than promising backdrop, however, the figures in Table 1 reveal the same sort of aggregate-level ambivalence found in national polls. Respondents were far more positive than negative (mean scores of 3.49 and 1.50, respectively) about the statement that "what homosexuals do in the privacy of their own homes is nobody else's business," and about the need for laws to protect homosexuals against discrimination in their jobs (3.09, 1.81). They also were relatively comfortable with homosexuals teaching (2.54 positive, 2.12 negative), serving in the military (2.80, 2.05), and obtaining family health insurance coverage (2.82, 2.01), while expressing less support for gay and lesbian marriages (2.06 positive, 2.62 negative), adoption (2.21, 2.55), and participation in Boy Scouts and other youth organizations (2.35, 2.44). In line with prior research, those who believed that "people do not choose to be homosexual, they are born that way," were significantly more positive *and* significantly less negative ($p = .01$) than those who said that homosexuality is a matter of choice.¹⁰

Table 1 about here

Moving to the individual level, columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 confirm that the mixed views evident in public opinion polls are indeed rooted in the ambivalence felt by many citizens on gay rights issues. Roughly one-third of our respondents were at least minimally ambivalent (scores of 0.5 or higher) on seven of the eight items – about the same proportion that expressed ambivalence in an earlier survey about a woman's right to obtain an elective abortion, and more than were ambivalent about abortions obtained under traumatic circumstances (between 25-30 percent; see Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002: 294). Looking at the data another way (not shown in Table 1), we learn that (a) nearly three-fourths of Floridians in the present study were ambivalent (again using the 0.5 threshold) about at least one of the eight statements, and (b) 31.0 percent were ambivalent about three or more. It would thus appear that ambivalence is a fairly prominent feature of public opinion regarding gay and lesbian rights.

It is possible, of course, that different people are ambivalent about different aspects of the gay rights issue. As with abortion (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002), we anticipated that the structure of ambivalence on gay rights would be multidimensional; specifically, we predicted that the eight items would fall into two separate clusters: issues involving basic civil rights/liberties and family-related issues. Our expectations were mostly confirmed, but with a couple of interesting twists. First, the prospect of homosexuals becoming teachers was not perceived in civil liberties terms so much as it was a family matter – not surprising, really, given the frequent interaction that takes place between teachers and their (almost always younger) students, and the concern that some parents continue to feel about what consequences that interaction might have. Second, the question about homosexual couples being able to obtain family health insurance coverage loads surprisingly on what we initially identified as the civil rights/liberties dimension; the explicit reference to family notwithstanding, most Floridians appear to view this issue as

involving different considerations than the controversial (and less popular) proposals that gay men and lesbians be legally permitted to marry and adopt children.

Table 2 about here

Based on these results, we have reconceptualized slightly the two dimensions of ambivalence in Table 2 in terms of attitudes about *adult roles* involving interactions between homosexuals and others in society (serve in military, privacy of own homes, job discrimination, health insurance), and attitudes about *children and families* (teach school, legal marriage, adopt children, Boy Scouts). Separate indices were constructed ($\alpha = .705$ and $.664$, respectively) by taking the mean of respondents' ambivalence scores for the four items in each domain. Figure 1 shows that the two new variables have similar distributions, and their respective means are also very close (.19 for adult roles, .22 for children/families). Despite the existence of separate dimensions, there is a fairly strong tendency for those who are ambivalent in one area to be ambivalent in the other as well ($r = .50$, $p < .001$).

Figure 1 about here

Values, Value Conflict, and Ambivalence

We turn next to the question of whether gay rights ambivalence is related to citizens' underlying core values, and to the conflict that sometimes occurs among those values. Prior research has shown that support for gay rights is stronger among individuals who are committed to the norms of general social equality, and weaker among those who hold traditional views about what constitutes proper moral behavior. (Brewer 2003; Wilcox and Wolpert 2000). Yet it is not clear how or even whether such value orientations should be related to gay rights ambivalence, and we make no predictions about what our data will show in this regard. Instead, the central hypothesis is that ambivalence will be greater when the values of traditional morality (which should predispose someone to oppose gay rights) clash with those of either egalitarianism or individual freedom (which should have the opposite effect; see Wilcox and Norrander 2002).

Our measure of *egalitarianism* is based on strong or weak agreement/disagreement with the following statements: (E₁) "We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country." (E₂) "This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are." (E₃) "If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have many fewer problems." Answers were coded from +2 to -2, with higher scores (strongly disagree on E₁ and E₂, strongly agree on E₃) representing a positive commitment to egalitarian values. Overall scores for the index ($\alpha =$ a barely acceptable .483) were calculated as the mean of scores for component items.¹¹

A similar approach was used in constructing two separate measures of traditionalism. First, a *traditional lifestyles* index (what others often call "moral traditionalism"; $\alpha = .489$) was built from answers to three items: (TL₁) "This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties." (TL₂) "The newer lifestyles are contributing to the

breakdown of our society." (TL₃) "The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes." Second, respondents' support for *traditional marriage roles* ($\alpha = .647$) was measured as follows: (TM₁) "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job." (TM₂) "It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself." (TM₃) "A husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family." Higher scores represent a more traditional outlook in both instances (strong agreement with TL₁, TL₂, plus all marriage role statements, strong disagreement with TL₃). Although these two indices are positively correlated ($r = .37$, $p < .001$), the results of a factor analysis suggest that they capture distinct value dimensions.

Finally, our measure of *individualism* is a single item (strongly agree to strongly disagree, the latter indicating a more individualistic outlook): "Having your own ideas is important, but there are times when people need to set those ideas aside and go along with what the majority wants." A second statement, similar to the first but with opposite direction of wording ("People should stick to their opinions when they think they're right, even if others disagree"), was included in the survey but the two sets of responses were uncorrelated – a non-finding that appears to reinforce our earlier point about the pernicious effects of response set (see note 11). Fortunately, the results reported below remain almost the same regardless of whether "having your own ideas" alone or the two items together are used to measure commitment to individualistic values.¹²

As the literature would lead us to expect, egalitarianism is positively associated with (1) the belief that "there is nothing immoral about sexual relations between two consenting adults of the same sex" ($r = .22$; see above and note 9); (2) the belief that "laws are sometimes needed in order to protect the basic rights of homosexuals" ($r = .21$);¹³ and (3) a tolerant view of homosexuality ($r = .31$).¹⁴ Likewise, both traditionalism indices are negatively correlated with the same three variables ($r = -.41$, $-.26$, and $-.45$, respectively, for traditional lifestyles; $-.28$, $-.18$, and $-.34$ for traditional marriage roles). A strong sense of individualism, on the other hand, is not significantly related to any of the three. While these findings are not critical to our analysis of ambivalence, they do suggest that the attitudes of Floridians on issues relating to homosexuality and gay rights are probably structured similarly to the attitudes of those living in other parts of the country.

As we can see from Table 3, core values are not closely associated with ambivalence about gay rights. Egalitarianism is negatively ($r = -.13$), and lifestyle traditionalism positively ($r = .13$), correlated with ambivalence on the adult roles dimension, but neither of these coefficients is very strong; further, none of the relationships between core values and ambivalence regarding children and families achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. More germane to our theoretical focus is the fact that ambivalence appears, at first glance, to be only modestly linked to the presence of core value conflict. Ambivalence on adult roles is slightly higher ($r = .08$) among those with conflicting views about egalitarianism and traditional marriage roles, while children/families ambivalence is slightly higher ($r = .10$) among those who experience conflict between their attitudes on individualism and traditional marriage roles. These results provide only modest support for the assumption by scholars that ambivalence in general, and gay rights

ambivalence in particular, is a product of value conflict (also see Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; Alvarez and Brehm 1995).

Table 3 about here

In order to consider this argument more fully, we tested the following multivariate model:

$$\text{Ambivalence} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{egalitarian values} + \beta_2 \text{traditional lifestyles values} + \beta_3 \text{traditional marriage role values} + \beta_4 \text{individualism values} + \beta_5 \text{value conflict (egalitarianism * traditional lifestyles)} + \beta_6 \text{value conflict (egalitarianism * traditional marriage roles)} + \beta_7 \text{value conflict (individualism * traditional lifestyles)} + \beta_8 \text{value conflict (individualism * traditional marriage roles)} + \beta_9 \text{age} + \beta_{10} \text{education} + \beta_{11} \text{gender (female)} + \beta_{12} \text{religious attendance} + \beta_{13} \text{religious guidance} + \beta_{14} \text{attitudes about homosexuality} + \beta_{15} \text{know someone gay} + \beta_{16} \text{born that way} + e$$

where "religious attendance" refers to the frequency of attending services; "religious guidance" is a measure of the extent to which religion guides one's day-to-day living; "attitudes toward homosexuality" is the 6-item index described earlier (see note 14); "know someone gay" indicates whether respondents personally know any gay men or lesbians; and "born that way" reflects beliefs about whether or not homosexuality is a matter of personal choice (see note 10).

Each of our control variables was selected for the analysis because of its presumed association with support for gay rights (Brewer 2003; Wilcox and Norrander 2002; Wilcox and Wolpert 2000; Haeberle 1999; Lewis and Rogers 1999).¹⁵ As already noted, however, it is not obvious that we should expect the same factors that influence directional preference also to play a role in shaping ambivalence. With little theoretical guidance available, we rely on the simple, common-sense logic outlined at the beginning of this paper: Numerous surveys show that Americans have become more favorable toward homosexuality and gay rights in recent years, perhaps due to shifts in the core values that are thought to underlie citizens' positions on such issues (Brewer 2003). A portion of these changes undoubtedly reflects individuals moving from one side of the issue to the other (mostly negative to positive) and from undecided to (mostly) positive. Yet it is possible that another portion stems from people who were once anti-gay becoming not so much positive but rather ambivalent. Lacking strong reasons to think otherwise, we posit that the same factors have driven both processes.

The value conflict hypothesis is represented in our model by the coefficients for the interaction terms (β_5 through β_8), which are predicted to be positive and significant. In all four instances, an individual's score on the interaction term is itself positive whenever conflict is present, e.g., when s/he expresses either a commitment to both egalitarianism and traditional lifestyles or, more rarely, hostility to both; the interaction term is negative (no conflict) when the person is egalitarian and anti-traditional lifestyles, or *vice versa*. A positive β_5 coefficient would therefore indicate that ambivalence is higher among those who experience conflict on these two value dimensions, controlling for main effects and other variables in the model. Our assumption is that value conflict is present whenever scores on egalitarianism or individualism, or on individualism

and traditionalism, run in the opposite direction. We do not test for an interaction between egalitarianism and individualism, since there is no reason to believe that people who are high (or low) on both of these values will experience conflict that might affect their views on gay rights issues. For similar reasons, the interaction between traditional lifestyles and traditional marriage roles is excluded.

Since the ambivalence variables are ordinal, we used ordered logit to estimate the model. Looking first at adult roles, the coefficients in Table 4 provide some support for the value conflict hypothesis: First, respondents who express a strong (or, less often, weak) commitment to both egalitarianism and traditional marriage values tend to be more ambivalent ($p = .041$) on gay rights issues relating to military service, privacy, job discrimination, and health insurance. Second, if conventional standards of statistical significance are relaxed just a bit, it appears that ambivalence on these same issues is associated with conflict between the values of individualism and traditional marriage roles ($p = .081$). Neither of the remaining interactions is significant, nor are core value main effects, and the only control variable that affects ambivalence is attitudes about homosexuality. This latter relationship, which suggests that those who are *more* positive tend to be *less* ambivalent, is particularly interesting and in line with our earlier speculation, i.e., that as Americans have grown more tolerant of homosexuality, some have adopted a supportive stance toward gay rights, while others have moderated their previously anti-gay views but remain uncertain and conflicted on the subject.

Table 4 about here

Results for the children and family dimension (teach school, legal marriage, adopt children, Boy Scouts; see Table 5) also indicate that ambivalence may be a function of at least one, and maybe two, types of value conflict: the interaction term for individualism and traditional marriage roles is clearly significant ($p = .042$), and for egalitarianism-traditional lifestyles very nearly so ($p = .051$). None of the other variables in our model have a significant effect, though coefficients for both egalitarianism and age just miss the .05 level of confidence. In contrast to what we saw for adult roles, attitudes about homosexuality are strikingly unimportant here; high scores on this index are associated, as we would expect, with substantially greater positivity ($r = .50$ to $.58$) and substantially lesser negativity ($r = -.47$ to $-.55$) on the component items used to construct our children/family ambivalence index (see Table 1)¹⁶ – but not with greater (or lesser) ambivalence itself.

Table 5 about here

The findings presented in Tables 4 and 5 lend further credence to the notion that value conflict underlies attitudinal ambivalence among the mass public. In Craig, Kane, and Martinez (2002: 295), we reported that individuals with conflicting views regarding traditional lifestyles and traditional marriage roles¹⁷ were more ambivalent about abortions obtained under elective, but not traumatic, circumstances. Evidence in the present study is somewhat stronger in that *multiple* conflicts appear to be important in explaining ambivalence on both adult roles *and* children/family aspects of the gay rights issue. Although there obviously are other factors not yet

identified that help to shape ambivalence, these results confirm the assumption so often made by scholars that conflict among citizens' core values is at least part of the story.

The Political Relevance of Ambivalence

Ambivalence can be conceptualized as an attribute of an attitude. It has been hypothesized that ambivalence, like other attributes such as importance, strength, and commitment, will *moderate* the stability of attitudes over time (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2000; Armitage and Connor 2000; Bassili 1996), and that it also may affect the manner in which attitudes are translated into behavior (Armitage and Connor 2000). Our data do not permit us to address these specific possibilities, though we are able to consider a slightly different question: Does ambivalence have any impact on the relationship between a person's policy preferences, in this case on gay rights issues, and his or her evaluations of political leaders?

The lead question in our survey asked respondents whether they approved or disapproved (strongly or not strongly) of the way Jeb Bush was handling his job as governor. The second question measured approval or disapproval of the job being done by the state legislature in Tallahassee. Bush was elected governor in 1998, and is generally identified with both the business and the socially conservative elements of the Republican Party in Florida. Although he enjoyed very high approval ratings overall in early summer 2002, he was evaluated significantly less favorably among those who believed that laws are sometimes needed to protect the basic rights of gays and lesbians ($\tau\text{-}c = .19, p < .01$).¹⁸ Assessments of the Republican-controlled legislature were a little lower and a little less strongly, but still significantly, related to gay rights preferences ($\tau\text{-}c = .13, p < .02$).

To determine whether ambivalence affects these relationships, we estimated the effects of gay rights preferences (based on the single question), ambivalence (adult roles), and the interaction between them on the two job approval questions, while controlling for party identification (the standard 7-point scale from strong Republican to strong Democrat) and the respondent's general evaluation of how things were going in the state ("moving in the right direction," or "off track and moving in the wrong direction").¹⁹ In both models, we expect to see a significant negative interaction term (gay rights * ambivalence) indicating that ambivalence *weakens* the relationship between gay rights preferences and assessments of Governor Bush's or the state legislature's job performance.

Results in the top portion of Table 6 (again based on ordered logit) are consistent with our hypothesis. Not surprisingly, Republican identifiers and people who say that Florida is moving in the right direction tend to rate Governor Bush more favorably, as do those who feel there is no need for special legislation to protect the rights of homosexuals ($p < .05$ even with the effects of other variables taken into account). Greater ambivalence on the adult roles dimension of gay rights also is associated with approval of the governor's job performance, though this relationship is not quite significant ($p < .10$). The key variable in this analysis, however, is the interaction term, with the negative coefficient in Table 6 suggesting that ambivalence did indeed (1) reduce the likelihood of Bush approval among respondents who did not believe that gay rights

legislation was needed, and (2) increase the likelihood of approval among those who supported such legislation. In other words, ambivalence appears to moderate the relationship between issue preference and job ratings for the governor: People whose manifest policy views predisposed them to give Bush either high or low marks were significantly less inclined to do so when their opinions about the issue in question were conflicted.

Table 6 about here

The pattern is similar but less clear-cut in the case of legislative job approval (see the bottom half of Table 6). Ambivalence has a significant effect this time around, while gay rights preferences fall just short ($p < .07$). More importantly for our purposes, the coefficient for the interaction term is in the correct (negative) direction but significant at just $p < .10$ – perhaps to be expected since the zero-order correlation between support for gay rights and job approval was so weak to start with, i.e., there was not much of a relationship to be moderated. We also replicated the analysis in Table 6 using children/families ambivalence in place of adult roles ambivalence. Both interaction terms are again negative, though only the one for Bush job approval even approaches conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < .09$). Overall, we interpret these findings as demonstrating that, under certain conditions, ambivalence does have a moderating effect on the relationship between citizens' issue preferences and their evaluations of political leaders.²⁰ The challenge for future research is to identify with greater clarity what the relevant conditions might be; for example, on what kinds of issues is ambivalence most likely to interfere with someone's partisan or ideological leanings? what is the effect of ambivalence when other attitude attributes (strength, importance, extremity, intensity, and so on) are taken into account?²¹

Discussion

For many Americans, issues involving gay rights are viewed through the lens of equality: what matters most is whether public policies ensure that government and society treat gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in the same manner as heterosexuals are treated. For others, gay rights issues are seen in terms of traditional values: homosexuality as a "lifestyle choice" is thought to undermine the moral fabric that holds together a predominantly Judeo-Christian society. And for still others, gay rights invokes the ethos of individualism: personal freedom spawns a diversity that must be protected from conformist pressures in society. In fact, the present study shows that people frequently view gay rights through multiple lenses. Nearly three-quarters of our survey respondents are "of two minds" regarding one or more of the issues we examined, and the evidence suggests that this ambivalence stems in part from conflict engendered by their simultaneous commitment to such underlying core values as egalitarianism, traditionalism, and individualism.²²

Like most issues, the conflict over gay rights is typically presented in bipolar terms, with gay and lesbian groups (and their supporters) at one end of the spectrum pitted against social conservatives at the opposite end – differences between the two groups seemingly impossible to resolve because of the vast ideological gulf separating them. Yet our findings indicate that the extremity of interest group politics masks a substantial middle ground of ordinary people with

attitude structures more complex than standard survey questions would lead us to believe. We have seen, for example, that some people's thinking about gay rights varies according to whether the situation involves adult roles or children and families. But even beyond that, there are quite a number of Americans who hold *both* positive *and* negative attitudes about issues related to the gay rights controversy. Extremists are different from the general mass public by definition, but opinion research has largely portrayed "centrists" as those who attach relatively little importance to, or who lack a firm opinion on, whatever the issue of the moment happens to be. In contrast, an evolving research tradition has demonstrated that many in the center may actually have a foot in both camps.

We hope that our results will encourage political scientists and others to continue looking for evidence of attitudinal ambivalence, and to do so by focusing as much as possible on the views of individual citizens (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002) rather than of aggregates (Alvarez and Brehm 1995). It also is important to learn more about whether and how ambivalence matters, that is, what are its *consequences* for the nature of political discourse? Our own data suggest one possibility, that under certain conditions ambivalence mediates between a person's policy views and his or her evaluations of political leaders and institutions. In addition, we suspect that ambivalence might be able to help explain the well-documented instability of mass attitudes (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2000), some voters' apparent desire for divided government (Fiorina 1996), the difficulty experienced by many citizens in casting an issue-based vote, and other important aspects of American politics. It is time for scholars to recognize, once and for all, that not all attitudes are unidimensional and bipolar. Political issues are often complex, and so are the ways in which people think about them. The concept of ambivalence allows us to capture some of that complexity in a manner that should ultimately provide a better understanding of how ordinary citizens perceive, and attempt to influence, the political world in which they live.

Notes

1. Along the same lines, two 1998 polls showed that 59 percent felt that homosexuality was "morally wrong" (Gallup) and 54 percent considered it to be "a sin" (*Newsweek*). See *Public Perspective* (2000: 26).

2. On the other hand, well organized and intensely committed minorities continue to represent a threat to the rights and interests of homosexuals, perhaps especially in areas where they can employ the processes of direct democracy (Gamble 1997; also see Donovan and Bowler 1998; Donovan, Wenzel, and Bowler 2000).

3. The changes described above have occurred mainly among Democrats, Independents, and ideological liberals (Sherrill and Yang 2000; also see Haeberle 1999; Lewis and Rogers 1999), which suggests that voters' opinions on gay and lesbian issues, like those on abortion (Adams 1997), are evolving along partisan lines. For a contrary view, however, see Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002; also Brewer 2003, who found growing support for anti-discrimination laws and gays serving in the military among all partisan groups).

4. On the traumatic-elective distinction, see Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox (1992: 33). Whether someone was pro-life or pro-choice was determined by asking respondents directly to describe their preferences regarding the abortion issue.

5. Additional information about the survey can be obtained from *Florida Voter* directly (954-584-0204), or from the Graduate Program in Political Campaigning in the Political Science Department at the University of Florida (352-392-0262).

6. Conceptually, the first part of the equation, $[(P + N)/2]$, states that with similarity held constant, greater intensity leads to greater ambivalence; that is, as the average value of positive and negative scores increases, so do feelings of ambivalence. The second part of the equation, $|P - N|$ indicates that when similarity increases (e.g., an equal number of positive and negative reactions), a lesser amount is subtracted from the ambivalence total than if similarity were reduced; consequently, greater similarity translates into higher scores on ambivalence.

7. Ambivalence scores on the SIM range from -0.5 ("extremely" positive and no negative feelings, or "extremely" negative and no positive) to $+4.0$ ("extremely" positive *and* negative feelings for the same statement; see Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002: 291-92). For our purposes, scores of -0.5 and 0.0 ("generally" positive and no negative, or vice versa) are both considered to indicate an absence of ambivalence.

8. Our survey closed with the following question: "And finally . . . I'm going to read a list of terms people sometimes use to describe themselves: (a) heterosexual, or straight; (b) homosexual, gay, or (*female respondents only*) lesbian; and (c) bisexual. Now, as I read the list again, please stop me when I get to the term that best describes how you think of yourself (see Herek 2002: 47)." All analyses reported in this paper are based on the 94.5 percent who claim to be heterosexual. Although the combined proportions of self-professed homosexuals and bisexuals (0.8 and 1.8 percent, respectively, plus another 0.7 percent who didn't know and 2.2 percent who refused to answer) are almost certainly low compared with their actual numbers in the population, they are similar to what has been reported in other surveys (Wald 2000: 13). As one might expect, heterosexuals (see Table 1) are significantly less positive, significantly more negative, and significantly more ambivalent about gay rights than are non-heterosexuals.

9. Asked which statement came closer to their own opinion, 32.8 percent said "there is nothing immoral about sexual relations between two consenting adults of the same sex."

10. Our sample was evenly divided between "born gay" (38.9 percent said this statement came closer to their own opinion) and the contrasting view that "homosexuals are that way because they choose to be" (43.0 percent); 8.3 percent volunteered a mixed view, and 9.9 percent weren't sure.

11. In order to minimize the loss of cases due to missing values, an egalitarianism score was computed for any respondent who answered at least two of the three questions. The alpha coefficient here is obviously lower than one would like, probably reflecting the response set problems that tend to plague agree-disagree questions generally (including our own measures of traditionalism and individualism).

12. We should acknowledge that there are aspects of individualism other than the one examined here. While our questions were designed to tap support for a "freedom of expression" that we expected to be relevant for shaping people's attitudes about sexual preference, scholars with a different substantive focus might choose to measure individualism, for example, in economic (freedom to accumulate wealth) or more explicitly political (freedom to organize and try and influence decision makers) terms.

13. Respondents were asked whether this statement (50.5 percent) or the alternative, "there is no need for special legislation to guarantee rights for homosexuals" (39.5 percent), came closer to their own opinion.

14. Attitudes about homosexuality (or sexual prejudice) were measured with a 6-item scale ($\alpha = .901$) based on agreement or disagreement with the following statements: (a) "Sex between two men is just plain wrong." (b) "Sex between two women is just plain wrong." (c) "I think male homosexuals are disgusting." (d) "I think female homosexuals, or lesbians, are disgusting." (e) "It is natural for some men to be sexually attracted to other men." (f) "It is natural for some women to be sexually attracted to other women." Scores on the last two items, which are altered slightly from the original versions recommended by Herek (2002: 46-47), have been reversed to correct for direction of wording. High scores reflect a more positive attitude.

15. Because younger women are more liberal than other groups on some issues involving gay rights (Wilcox and Norrande 2002: 146), we also included an (age * gender) interaction term in our initial tests of this model. It proved to be unrelated to gay rights ambivalence.

16. Correlations with attitudes about homosexuality are similar, but slightly weaker, for the positivity ($r = .35$ to $.53$) and negativity ($r = -.34$ to $-.47$) items used to measure adult roles ambivalence.

17. These were slightly shorter versions of the same scales used here.

18. Preferences here were determined independently of the two ambivalence batteries, with a single question asking respondents which of the following statements was closer to their own view: "Laws are sometimes needed in order to protect the basic rights of homosexuals," or "There is no need for special legislation to guarantee rights for homosexuals." Nearly three-quarters (73.8 percent) of those who rejected the need for special legislation approved of Bush's performance as governor, compared with 58.5 percent of those who felt otherwise.

19. Volunteered "mixed" responses were accepted and coded as intermediate between "right direction" and "off track."

20. Although we thought that ambivalence might also moderate the relationship between gay rights preferences and the intention to vote for "more Republican or Democratic candidates" in the next general election, it turns out that such preferences were uncorrelated with vote intentions in the first place.

21. Our survey included measures of attitude strength (respondents were asked whether they felt "strongly" or "not so strongly" about the need for legislation to protect the rights of homosexuals) and attitude importance ("How important are the issues of homosexuality and gay rights to you personally – would you say they are very important, somewhat important, or not very important?"). In multivariate models, however, neither of these variables (a) is significantly associated with job approval ratings for Jeb Bush or the Florida legislature; (b) moderates the relationship between gay rights preference and approval ratings for Bush or the legislature (i.e., interactions with gay rights have little if any impact); or (c) substantially diminishes the moderating effects of ambivalence, as reported above. See Krosnick (1988, 1990).

22. There may, of course, be core values other than the ones discussed here (for example, authoritarianism; see Basow and Johnson 2000; Whitley and Lee 2000) that are important in shaping citizens' opinions about gay rights.

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Table 1

Frequency and Intensity of Ambivalence on Gay Rights Issues

	<u>Mean Positive</u> ^a	<u>Mean Negative</u> ^a	<u>Mean Ambivalence</u> ^b	<u>Percent Ambivalent</u> ^c
Teach school	2.54	2.12	0.226	33.3%
Legal marriage	2.06	2.62	0.177	32.0%
Serve in military	2.80	2.05	0.227	32.8%
Adopt children	2.21	2.55	0.208	32.7%
Privacy of own homes	3.49	1.50	0.061	22.6%
Job discrimination	3.09	1.81	0.250	31.2%
Boy Scouts	2.35	2.44	0.274	35.1%
Health insurance	2.82	2.01	0.257	32.0%

N = 534 to 556

^aMean scores, ranging from 1 (no positive or negative feelings) to 4 ("extremely" positive or negative feelings), for each of the eight statements. Data are for heterosexual respondents only.

^bMean SIM scores (see note 7), ranging from -0.5 to +4.0.

^cProportion (excluding those with missing values) who have SIM ambivalence scores greater than zero for each issue.

Table 2

Factor Analysis of SIM Ambivalence Scores

	Factor 1 <u>Adult Roles</u>	Factor 2 <u>Children/Families</u>
Teach school	.37	.53
Legal marriage	-.06	.81
Serve in military	.59	.35
Adopt children	.31	.72
Privacy of own homes	.78	.05
Job discrimination	.76	.15
Boy Scouts	.29	.54
Health insurance	.62	.27
Eigenvalue	3.164	1.038
Percent variance explained	39.5	13.0

N = 471

Note: Table entries are loadings based on a principal components factor analysis, varimax rotation (and listwise deletion of missing data). Loadings above .5 are shown in bold. Data are for heterosexual respondents only.

Table 3

Correlations among Core Values, Value Conflict, and Ambivalence

<u>Core Values</u>	<u>Gay Rights Ambivalence</u>	
	<u>Adult Roles</u>	<u>Children/Families</u>
Egalitarianism	-.13*	-.05
Traditional Lifestyles	.13*	-.02
Traditional Marriage Roles	.06	-.05
Individualism	-.06	-.07
<u>Value Conflict</u>		
Egalitarianism *		
Traditional Lifestyles	.01	.03
Egalitarianism *		
Traditional Marriage Roles	.08†	.03
Individualism *		
Traditional Lifestyles	-.05	-.03
Individualism *		
Traditional Marriage Roles	.06	.10*

Note: Table entries are zero-order correlations (Pearson's r) for heterosexual respondents only.

† p = .10

* p = .05

Table 4

A Model of Ambivalence: Adult Roles

	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Standard Error</u>	<u>Probability</u>
<u>Values</u>			
Egalitarianism	-0.021	0.105	.844
Traditional Lifestyles	0.152	0.104	.143
Traditional Marriage Roles	-0.109	0.082	.184
Individualism	-0.078	0.066	.240
<u>Value Conflict</u>			
Egalitarianism * Traditional Lifestyles	-0.045	0.079	.570
Egalitarianism * Traditional Marriage Roles	0.144	0.070	.041
Individualism * Traditional Lifestyles	-.0.008	0.053	.882
Individualism * Traditional Marriage Roles	0.082	0.047	.081
<u>Controls</u>			
Age (Older)	-0.002	0.005	.675
Education (Better Educated)	0.015	0.035	.671
Gender (Female)	-0.255	0.182	.162
Religious Attendance (Frequent)	0.013	0.101	.900
Religious Guidance (Strong)	-0.010	0.094	.917
Attitudes about Homosexuality (Positive)	-0.274	0.086	.001
Know Someone Gay (Yes)	0.085	0.235	.718
Born That Way (Yes)	0.020	0.106	.847

-2 log likelihood = 2244.846

Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2 = .097

Number of cases = 437

Note: Table entries are ordered logit coefficients for heterosexual respondents only. Threshold levels are not shown. The meaning of high scores on control variables is in parentheses.

Table 5

A Model of Ambivalence: Children and Families

	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Standard Error</u>	<u>Probability</u>
<u>Values</u>			
Egalitarianism	-0.172	0.103	.094
Traditional Lifestyles	-0.029	0.103	.774
Traditional Marriage Roles	-0.108	0.081	.184
Individualism	-0.045	0.065	.488
<u>Value Conflict</u>			
Egalitarianism * Traditional Lifestyles	0.151	0.077	.051
Egalitarianism * Traditional Marriage Roles	0.040	0.069	.564
Individualism * Traditional Lifestyles	-0.074	0.052	.158
Individualism * Traditional Marriage Roles	0.094	0.046	.042
<u>Controls</u>			
Age (Older)	-0.009	0.005	.063
Education (Better Educated)	-0.007	0.034	.829
Gender (Female)	-0.265	0.181	.142
Religious Attendance (Frequent)	0.046	0.100	.648
Religious Guidance (Strong)	-0.118	0.093	.205
Attitudes about Homosexuality (Positive)	0.003	0.084	.975
Know Someone Gay (Yes)	0.195	0.236	.408
Born That Way (Yes)	0.097	0.105	.357

-2 log likelihood = 2300.645

Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2 = .058

Number of cases = 437

Note: Table entries are ordered logit coefficients for heterosexual respondents only. Threshold levels are not shown. The meaning of high scores on control variables is in parentheses.

Table 6

Ambivalence as a Mediating Variable

	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Standard Error</u>	<u>Probability</u>
<u>Jeb Bush Job Approval</u>			
State: Wrong Direction	-2.049	0.226	.000
State: Mixed	-0.808	0.303	.008
State: Right Direction (omitted)	--	--	--
Strong Democrat	-2.311	0.359	.000
Weak Democrat	-2.079	0.386	.000
Leaning Democrat	-2.049	0.403	.000
Independent	-1.711	0.405	.000
Leaning Republican	-1.415	0.429	.001
Weak Republican	-1.512	0.387	.000
Strong Republican (omitted)	--	--	--
Opinion on Gay Rights	0.458	0.212	.031
Ambivalence (Adult Roles)	0.698	0.388	.072
Ambivalence * Gay Rights	-0.462	0.236	.050
-2 log likelihood = 807.704			
Nagelkerke Pseudo R ² = .398			
Number of cases = 434			
<u>B. State Legislature Job Approval</u>			
State: Wrong Direction	-1.656	0.214	.000
State: Mixed	-1.131	0.283	.000
State: Right Direction (omitted)	--	--	--
Strong Democrat	-0.494	0.289	.087
Weak Democrat	-0.110	0.324	.733
Leaning Democrat	-0.195	0.345	.571
Independent	-0.450	0.343	.189
Leaning Republican	-0.287	0.355	.419
Weak Republican	-0.144	0.316	.649
Strong Republican (omitted)	--	--	--
Opinion on Gay Rights	0.363	0.195	.062
Ambivalence (Adult Roles)	0.746	0.376	.047
Ambivalence * Gay Rights	-0.379	0.224	.091
-2 log likelihood = 960.112			
Nagelkerke Pseudo R ² = .212			
Number of cases = 423			

Note: Table entries are ordered logit coefficients for heterosexual respondents only. Threshold levels are not shown in either model.

Figure 1

Distribution of Scores on Ambivalence Indices

