The
State v. John Mann.
13 N.C. 263 (1829)
RUFFIN, Judge.-- A Judge
cannot but lament, when such cases as the present are brought into judgment. It
is impossible that the reasons on which they go can be appreciated, but where
institutions similar to our own, exist and are thoroughly understood. The
struggle, too, in the Judge's own breast between the feelings of the man, and
the duty of the magistrate is a severe one, presenting strong temptation to put
aside such questions, if it be possible. It is useless however, to complain of
things inherent in our political state. And it is criminal in a Court to avoid
any responsibility which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance therefore it
is done, the Court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the
dominion of the master over the slave in North-Carolina.
The indictment charges a battery
on Lydia,
a slave of Elizabeth Jones. Upon the face of the indictment, the case is
the same as the State v. Hall. (9 N.C. 582, 2 Hawks 582.)
[**3] -- No fault is found with the rule
then adopted; nor would be, if it were now open. But it is not open; for the
question, as it relates to a battery on a slave by a stranger, is considered as
settled by that case. But the evidence makes this a different case. Here the
slave had been hired by the Defendant, and was in his possession; and
the battery was committed during the period of hiring. With the liabilities of
the hirer to the general owner, for an injury permanently impairing the value
of the slave, no rule now laid down is intended to interfere. That is left upon
the general doctrine of bailment. The enquiry here is, whether a cruel and
unreasonable battery on a slave, by the hirer, is indictable. The Judge below
instructed the Jury, that it is. He seems to have put it on the ground, that
the Defendant had but a special [*265]
property. Our laws uniformly treat the master or other person having the
possession and command of the slave, as entitled to the same extent of
authority. The object is the same--the services of the slave; and the same
powers must be confided. In a criminal proceeding, and indeed in reference to
all other persons but the general owner, the hirer [**4] and possessor of a slave, in relation
to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the owner. This opinion
would, perhaps dispose of this particular case; because the indictment, which
charges a battery upon the slave of Elizabeth Jones, is not supported by
proof of a battery upon Defendant's own slave; since different justifications
may be applicable to the two cases. But upon the general question, whether the
owner is answerable criminaliter, for a
battery upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority or force, not
forbidden by statute, the Court entertains but little doubt.--That he is so
liable, has never yet been decided; nor, as far as is known, been hitherto
contended. There have been no prosecutions of the sort. The established habits
and uniform practice of the country in this respect, is the best evidence of
the portion of power, deemed by the whole community, requisite to the
preservation of the master's dominion. If we thought differently, we could not
set our notions in array against the judgment of every body else, and say that
this, or that authority, may be safely lopped off. This has indeed been assimilated
at the bar to the other domestic relations;
[**5] and arguments drawn from
the well established principles, which confer and restrain the authority of the
parent over the child, the tutor over the pupil, the master over the
apprentice, have been pressed on us. The Court does not recognize their
application. There is no likeness between the cases. They are in opposition to
each other, and there is an impassable gulf between them.--
The difference is that which exists between freedom and slavery--and a greater
cannot be imagined. In the one,
[*266] the end in view is the
happiness of the youth, born to equal rights with that governor, on whom the
duty devolves of training the young to usefulness, in a station which he is
afterwards to assume among freemen. To such an end, and with such a subject,
moral and intellectual instruction seem the natural
means; and for the most part, they are found to suffice. Moderate force is
superadded, only to make the others effectual. If that fail, it is better to
leave the party to his own headstrong passions, and the ultimate correction of
the law, than to allow it to be immoderately inflicted by a private person.
With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the master, his
security [**6] and the public safety;
the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without
knowledge, and without the capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that
another may reap the fruits. What moral considerations shall be addressed to
such a being, to convince him what, it is impossible but that the most stupid
must feel and know can never be true--that he is thus to labour
upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own personal
happiness, such services can only be expected from one who has no will of his
own; who surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of another. Such
obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body.
There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the
master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect. I most
freely confess my sense of the harshness of this proposition,
I feel it as deeply as any man can. And as a principle of moral right, every
person in his retirement must repudiate it. But in the actual condition of
things, it must be so. There is no remedy. This discipline belongs to the state
of slavery. They cannot be disunited, without abrogating [**7] at once the rights of the master, and
absolving the slave from his subjection. It constitutes the curse of slavery to
both [*267] the bond and free portions of our population.
But it is inherent in the relation of master and slave.
That there may be particular
instances of cruelty and deliberate barbarity, where, in conscience the law
might properly interfere, is most probable. The difficulty is to determine,
where a Court may properly begin. Merely in the abstract it may well be
asked, which power of the master accords with right. The answer will probably
sweep away all of them. But we cannot look at the matter in that light. The
truth is, that we are for-bidden to enter upon a train
of general reasoning on the subject. We cannot allow the right of the master to
be brought into discussion in the Courts of Justice. The slave, to remain a
slave, must be made sensible, that there is no appeal from his master; that his
power is in no instance, usurped; but is conferred by the laws of man at least,
if not by the law of God. The danger would be great indeed, if the tribunals of
justice should be called on to graduate the punishment appropriate to every
temper, and every dereliction [**8] of menial duty. No man can anticipate
the many and aggravated provocations of the master, which the slave would be
constantly stimulated by his own passions, or the instigation of others to
give; or the consequent wrath of the master, prompting him to bloody vengeance,
upon the turbulent traitor--a vengeance generally practised
with impunity, by reason of its privacy. The Court therefore disclaims the
power of changing the relation, in which these parts of our people stand to
each other.
We are happy to see, that there is
daily less and less occasion for the interposition of the Courts. The
protection already afforded by several statutes, that all-powerful motive, the
private interest of the owner, the benevolences towards each other, seated in
the hearts of those who have been born and bred together, the frowns and deep
execrations of the community upon the barbarian, who is guilty of excessive and
brutal cruelty to his [*268] unprotected slave, all combined, have
produced a mildness of treatment, and attention to the comforts of the
unfortunate class of slaves, greatly mitigating the rigors of servitude, and
ameliorating the condition of the slaves. The same causes are operating, [**9]
and will continue to operate with increased action, until the disparity
in numbers between the whites and blacks, shall have rendered the latter in no
degree dangerous to the former, when the police now existing may be further
relaxed. This result, greatly to be desired, may be much more rationally
expected from the events above alluded to, and now in progress, than from any
rash expositions of abstract truths, by a Judiciary tainted with a false and
fanatical philanthropy, seeking to redress an acknowledged evil, by means still
more wicked and appalling than even that evil.
I repeat,
that I would gladly have avoided this ungrateful question. But being brought to
it, the Court is compelled to declare, that while slavery exists amongst us in
its present state, or until it shall seem fit to the Legislature to interpose
express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty of the
Judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where
the exercise of it is forbidden by statute. And this we do upon the ground,
that this dominion is essential to the value of slaves as property, to the
security of the master, and the public tranquillity,
greatly dependent [**10]
upon their subordination; and in fine, as most effectually
securing the general protection and comfort of the slaves themselves.
PER CURIAM.--Let the judgment
below be reversed, and judgment entered for the Defendant.