The State v. John Mann. From Chowan.
13 N.C. 263 (1829)
PRIOR HISTORY: The Defendant was indicted for an assault and
battery upon Lydia, the slave of one Elizabeth Jones.
On the trial it appeared that
the Defendant had hired the slave for a year--that during the term, the slave
had committed some small offence, for which the Defendant undertook to chastise
her--that while in the act of so doing, the slave ran off, whereupon the
Defendant called upon her to stop, which being refused, he shot at and wounded
her.
His honor Judge DANIEL
charged the Jury, that if they believed the punishment inflicted by the
Defendant was cruel and unwarrantable, and disproportionate to the offence committed
by the slave, that in law the Defendant was guilty, as he had only a special
property in the slave.
A verdict was returned for the
State, and the Defendant appealed.
DISPOSITION: Judgment reversed, and
judgment entered for the Defendant.
OPINION: RUFFIN, Judge.-- A Judge
cannot but lament, when such cases as the present are brought into judgment. It
is impossible that the reasons on which they go can be appreciated, but where
institutions similar to our own, exist and are thoroughly understood. The struggle,
too, in the Judge's own breast between the feelings of the man, and the duty of
the magistrate is a severe one, presenting strong temptation to put aside such
questions, if it be possible. It is useless however, to complain of things
inherent in our political state. And it is criminal in a Court to avoid any
responsibility which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance therefore it is
done, the Court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the dominion
of the master over the slave in North-Carolina.
The indictment charges a battery on Lydia, a slave of Elizabeth
Jones. Upon the face of the indictment, the case is the same as the State
v. Hall. (9 N.C. 582, 2 Hawks 582.) -- No fault is found with the rule then adopted;
nor would be, if it were now open. But it is not open; for the question, as it
relates to a battery on a slave by a stranger, is considered as settled by that
case. But the evidence makes this a different case. Here the slave had been hired
by the Defendant, and was in his possession; and the battery was committed
during the period of hiring. With the liabilities of the hirer to the general
owner, for an injury permanently impairing the value of the slave, no rule now
laid down is intended to interfere. That is left upon the general doctrine of
bailment. The enquiry here is, whether a cruel and unreasonable battery on a
slave, by the hirer, is indictable. The Judge below instructed the Jury, that
it is. He seems to have put it on the ground, that the Defendant had but a
special [*265] property. Our laws uniformly treat the master
or other person having the possession and command of the slave, as entitled to
the same extent of authority. The object is the same--the services of the
slave; and the same powers must be confided. In a criminal proceeding, and
indeed in reference to all other persons but the general owner, the hirer
[**4] and possessor of a slave, in
relation to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the owner. This
opinion would, perhaps dispose of this particular case; because the indictment,
which charges a battery upon the slave of Elizabeth Jones, is not
supported by proof of a battery upon Defendant's own slave; since different
justifications may be applicable to the two cases. But upon the general
question, whether the owner is answerable criminaliter, for a battery
upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority or force, not forbidden by
statute, the Court entertains but little doubt.--That he is so liable, has never
yet been decided; nor, as far as is known, been hitherto contended. There have
been no prosecutions of the sort. The established habits and uniform practice
of the country in this respect, is the best evidence of the portion of power,
deemed by the whole community, requisite to the preservation of the master's
dominion. If we thought differently, we could not set our notions in array
against the judgment of every body else, and say that this, or that authority,
may be safely lopped off. This has indeed been assimilated at the bar to the
other domestic relations; and arguments drawn from the well established
principles, which confer and restrain the authority of the parent over the
child, the tutor over the pupil, the master over the apprentice, have been
pressed on us. The Court does not recognize their application. There is no
likeness between the cases. They are in opposition to each other, and there is
an impassable gulf between them.-- The difference is that which exists between
freedom and slavery--and a greater cannot be imagined. In the one, the end in view is the happiness of the youth,
born to equal rights with that governor, on whom the duty devolves of training
the young to usefulness, in a station which he is afterwards to assume among
freemen. To such an end, and with such a subject, moral and intellectual
instruction seem the natural means; and for the most part, they are found to
suffice. Moderate force is superadded, only to make the others effectual. If
that fail, it is better to leave the party to his own headstrong passions, and
the ultimate correction of the law, than to allow it to be immoderately inflicted
by a private person. With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of
the master, his security and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his
own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the
capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap the
fruits. What moral considerations shall be addressed to such a being, to
convince him what, it is impossible but that the most stupid must feel and know
can never be true--that he is thus to labour upon a principle of natural duty,
or for the sake of his own personal happiness, such services can only be
expected from one who has no will of his own; who surrenders his will in
implicit obedience to that of another. Such obedience is the consequence only
of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else which can
operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute, to
render the submission of the slave perfect. I most freely confess my sense of
the harshness of this proposition, I feel it as deeply as any man can. And as a
principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it. But
in the actual condition of things, it must be so. There is no remedy. This
discipline belongs to the state of slavery. They cannot be disunited, without
abrogating at once the rights of the master, and absolving the slave from his
subjection. It constitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and free portions
of our population. But it is inherent in the relation of master and slave.
That there may be particular instances of cruelty and deliberate
barbarity, where, in conscience the law might properly interfere, is most
probable. The difficulty is to determine, where a Court may properly
begin. Merely in the abstract it may well be asked, which power of the master
accords with right. The answer will probably sweep away all of them. But we
cannot look at the matter in that light. The truth is, that we are for-bidden
to enter upon a train of general reasoning on the subject. We cannot allow the
right of the master to be brought into discussion in the Courts of Justice. The
slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible, that there is no appeal from
his master; that his power is in no instance, usurped; but is conferred by the
laws of man at least, if not by the law of God. The danger would be great indeed,
if the tribunals of justice should be called on to graduate the punishment
appropriate to every temper, and every dereliction of menial duty. No man can
anticipate the many and aggravated provocations of the master, which the slave
would be constantly stimulated by his own passions, or the instigation of
others to give; or the consequent wrath of the master, prompting him to bloody
vengeance, upon the turbulent traitor--a vengeance generally practised with
impunity, by reason of its privacy. The Court therefore disclaims the power of
changing the relation, in which these parts of our people stand to each other.
We are happy to see, that there is daily less and less occasion
for the interposition of the Courts. The protection already afforded by several
statutes, that all-powerful motive, the private interest of the owner, the
benevolences towards each other, seated in the hearts of those who have been
born and bred together, the frowns and deep execrations of the community upon
the barbarian, who is guilty of excessive and brutal cruelty to his unprotected
slave, all combined, have produced a mildness of treatment, and attention to
the comforts of the unfortunate class of slaves, greatly mitigating the rigors
of servitude, and ameliorating the condition of the slaves. The same causes are
operating, and will continue to operate with increased action, until the disparity
in numbers between the whites and blacks, shall have rendered the latter in no
degree dangerous to the former, when the police now existing may be further
relaxed. This result, greatly to be desired, may be much more rationally
expected from the events above alluded to, and now in progress, than from any
rash expositions of abstract truths, by a Judiciary tainted with a false and
fanatical philanthropy, seeking to redress an acknowledged evil, by means still
more wicked and appalling than even that evil.
I repeat, that I would gladly have avoided this ungrateful
question. But being brought to it, the Court is compelled to declare, that
while slavery exists amongst us in its present state, or until it shall seem
fit to the Legislature to interpose express enactments to the contrary, it will
be the imperative duty of the Judges to recognize the full dominion of the
owner over the slave, except where the exercise of it is forbidden by statute.
And this we do upon the ground, that this dominion is essential to the value of
slaves as property, to the security of the master, and the public tranquillity,
greatly dependent upon their subordination; and in fine, as most effectually
securing the general protection and comfort of the slaves themselves.
PER CURIAM.--Let the judgment below be reversed, and judgment
entered for the Defendant.