MITCHUM, DBA BOOK
MART v. FOSTER ET AL.
No. 70-27
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
407 U.S. 225; 92 S. Ct. 2151; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 104; 32 L.
Ed. 2d 705
December 13, 1971, Argued
June 19, 1972, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1]
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
FLORIDA.
DISPOSITION: 315 F.Supp. 1387, reversed and remanded.
OPINIONBY: STEWART
OPINION: [*226] [**2153] MR. JUSTICE
STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
[1A]
The federal anti-injunction statute provides that a federal court "may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments." n1 An Act of Congress, 42 U.
S. C. § 1983, expressly authorizes a "suit in equity" to redress
"the deprivation," under color of state law, "of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . ." n2 The
question before us [**2154] is [***3] whether this
"Act of Congress" comes within the "expressly authorized"
exception of the anti-injunction statute so as to permit a federal court in a §
1983 suit to grant an injunction to stay a proceeding pending in a state court.
This question, which has divided the federal courts, n3 has lurked in the
background of many of our recent cases, but we have not until today explicitly
decided it. n4
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n1 28 U. S. C. § 2283.
n2 The statute provides in full: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."
n3 Compare Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (CA3) (§ 1983
is an "expressly authorized" exception), with Baines v. City
of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (CA4) (§ 1983 is not an "expressly
authorized" exception). [***4]
n4 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n. 2; Cameron
v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 613 n. 3; Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 54. See also Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 556; Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15.
In Younger, supra, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS was the only member of the
Court who took a position on the question now before us. He expressed the view
that § 1983 is included in the "expressly authorized exception to § 2283 .
. . ." 401 U.S., at 62. Cf. id., at 54 (STEWART, J., joined by
Harlan, J., concurring); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 120
n. 14 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, J., joined by WHITE and MARSHALL, JJ.).
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[*227] I
The prosecuting attorney of Bay County, Florida, brought a proceeding in a
Florida court to close down the appellant's bookstore as a public nuisance
under the claimed authority of Florida law. The state court entered a
preliminary order prohibiting continued [***5] operation of the
bookstore. After further inconclusive proceedings in the state courts, the
appellant filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida, alleging that the actions of the state judicial
and law enforcement officials were depriving him of rights protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying upon 42 U. S. C. § 1983, n5 he asked
for injunctive and declaratory relief against the state court proceedings, on
the ground that Florida laws were being unconstitutionally applied by the state
court so as to cause him great and irreparable harm. A single federal district
judge issued temporary restraining orders, and a three-judge court was convened
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284. After a hearing, the three-judge
court dissolved the temporary restraining orders and refused to enjoin the
state court proceeding, holding that the "injunctive relief sought here
[*228] as to the proceedings pending in the Florida courts does not
come under any of the exceptions set forth in Section 2283. It is not expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, it is not necessary in the aid of this court's
jurisdiction, and it is not [***6] sought in order to protect or
effectuate any judgment of this court." 315 F.Supp. 1387, 1389. An appeal
was brought directly here under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, n6 and we noted probable
jurisdiction. 402 U.S. 941.
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n5 Federal jurisdiction was based upon 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). The statute
states in relevant part:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
. . . .
"(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States . . . ."
n6 The statute provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, any party
may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit
or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a
district court of three judges."
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[***7]
[**2155] II
[2]
In denying injunctive relief, the District Court relied on this Court's
decision in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281. The Atlantic Coast Line case
did not deal with the "expressly authorized" exception of the
anti-injunction statute, n7 but the Court's opinion in that case does bring
into sharp focus the critical importance of the question now before us. For in
that case we expressly rejected the view that the anti-injunction statute
merely states a flexible doctrine of comity, n8 and made clear that the statute
imposes an absolute ban upon the issuance of a federal injunction against a
pending [*229] state court proceeding, in the absence of one of the
recognized exceptions:
"On its face the present Act is an absolute prohibition against enjoining
state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three
specifically defined exceptions. The respondents here have intimated that the
Act only establishes a 'principle of comity,' not a binding rule on the power
of the federal courts. The argument implies that in certain circumstances a
federal court may enjoin state [***8] court proceedings even if
that action cannot be justified by any of the three exceptions. We cannot
accept any such contention. . . . [We] hold that any injunction against state
court proceedings otherwise proper under general equitable principles must be
based on one of the specific statutory exceptions to § 2283 if it is to be
upheld. . . ." 398 U.S., at 286-287.
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n7 At issue were the other two exceptions of the anti-injunction statute:
"where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments." Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 288.
n8 See First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Skokie,
173 F.2d 1; Baines, 337 F.2d, at 593. See also Taylor & Willis,
The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 Yale L.
J. 1169, 1194 (1933).
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It follows, in the present context, that if 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is not within
the [***9] "expressly authorized" exception of the
anti-injunction statute, then a federal equity court is wholly without power to
grant any relief in a § 1983 suit seeking to stay a state court proceeding. In
short, if a § 1983 action is not an "expressly authorized" statutory
exception, the anti-injunction law absolutely prohibits in such an action all
federal equitable intervention in a pending state court proceeding, whether
civil or criminal, and regardless of how extraordinary the particular
circumstances may be.
Last Term, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, and its
companion cases, n9 the Court dealt at length with the subject of federal
judicial intervention in pending [*230] state criminal
prosecutions. In Younger a three-judge federal district court in a §
1983 action had enjoined a criminal prosecution pending in a California court.
In asking us to reverse that judgment, the appellant argued that the injunction
was in violation of the federal anti-injunction statute. 401 U.S., at 40. But
the Court carefully eschewed any reliance on the statute in reversing the
judgment, basing its decision instead upon what the Court called "Our
[***10] Federalism" -- upon "the national policy
forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings
except under special circumstances." 401 U.S., at 41, 44.
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n9 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66; Boyle v. Landry,
401 U.S. 77; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82; Dyson v.
Stein, 401 U.S. 200; Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S.
216.
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[**2156]
[3]
[4]
[5]
In Younger, this Court emphatically reaffirmed "the fundamental
policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions." 401
U.S., at 46. It made clear that even "the possible unconstitutionality of
a statute 'on its face' does not in itself justify an injunction against
good-faith attempts to enforce it." 401 U.S., at 54. At the same time,
however, the Court clearly left room for federal injunctive intervention in a
pending state court prosecution in certain exceptional circumstances -- where
[***11] irreparable injury is "both great and immediate,"
401 U.S., at 46, where the state law is "'flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions,'" 401 U.S., at 53, or
where there is a showing of "bad faith, harassment, or . . . other unusual
circumstances that would call for equitable relief." 401 U.S., at 54. In
the companion case of Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, the
Court said that "only in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions
undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid
conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable
injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief against pending
[*231] state prosecutions appropriate." 401 U.S., at 85. See
also Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 203.
While the Court in Younger and its companion cases expressly disavowed
deciding the question now before us -- whether § 1983 comes within the
"expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, 401
U.S., at 54 -- it is evident that our decisions in those [***12]
cases cannot be disregarded in deciding this question. In the first place, if §
1983 is not within the statutory exception, then the anti-injunction statute
would have absolutely barred the injunction issued in Younger, as the
appellant in that case argued, and there would have been no occasion whatever
for the Court to decide that case upon the "policy" ground of
"Our Federalism." Secondly, if § 1983 is not within the
"expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, then
we must overrule Younger and its companion cases insofar as they
recognized the permissibility of injunctive relief against pending criminal
prosecutions in certain limited and exceptional circumstances. For, under the
doctrine of Atlantic Coast Line, the anti-injunction statute would, in
a § 1983 case, then be an "absolute prohibition" against federal
equity intervention in a pending state criminal or civil proceeding --
under any circumstances whatever.
The Atlantic Coast Line and Younger cases thus serve to
delineate both the importance and the finality of the question now before us.
And it is in the shadow of those cases that the question must be decided.
III
[6]
The anti-injunction [***13] statute goes back almost to the
beginnings of our history as a Nation. In 1793, Congress enacted a law providing
that no "writ of injunction be granted [by any federal court] to stay
proceedings [*232] in any court of a state. . . ." Act of
March 2, 1793; 1 Stat. 335. The precise origins of the legislation are shrouded
in obscurity, n10 but the consistent understanding [*233]
[**2157] has been that its basic purpose is to prevent
"needless friction between state and federal courts." Oklahoma
Packing Co. v. Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9. The law remained unchanged
until 1874, when it was amended to permit a federal court to stay state court
proceedings that interfered with the administration of a federal bankruptcy
proceeding. n11 The present wording of the legislation was adopted with the
enactment of Title 28 of the United States Code in 1948.
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n10 "The history of this provision in the Judiciary Act of 1793 is not
fully known. We know that on December 31, 1790, Attorney General Edmund
Randolph reported to the House of Representatives on desirable changes in the
Judiciary Act of 1789. Am. State Papers, Misc., vol. 1, No. 17, pp. 21-36. The
most serious question raised by Randolph concerned the arduousness of the
circuit duties imposed on the Supreme Court justices. But the Report also suggested
a number of amendments dealing with procedural matters. A section of the
proposed bill submitted by him provided that 'no injunction in equity shall be
granted by a district court to a judgment at law of a State court.' Id.,
p. 26. Randolph explained that this clause 'will debar the district court from
interfering with the judgments at law in the State courts; for if the plaintiff
and defendant rely upon the State courts, as far as the judgment, they ought to
continue there as they have begun. It is enough to split the same suit into one
at law, and another in equity, without adding a further separation, by throwing
the common law side of the question into the State courts, and the equity side
into the federal courts.' Id., p. 34. The Report was considered by the
House sitting as a Committee of the Whole, and then was referred to successive
special committees for further consideration. No action was taken until after
Chief Justice Jay and his associates wrote the President that their
circuit-riding duties were too burdensome. American State Papers, Misc., vol.
1, No. 32, p. 51. In response to this complaint, which was transmitted to
Congress, the Act of March 2, 1793, was passed, containing in § 5, inter
alia, the prohibition against staying state court proceedings.
"Charles Warren in his article Federal and State Court Interference,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 347, suggests that this provision was the direct
consequence of Randolph's report. This seems doubtful, in view of the very
narrow purpose of Randolph's proposal, namely, that federal courts of equity
should not interfere with the enforcement of judgments at law rendered in the
state courts. See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin
Proceedings in State Courts, 42 Yale L. J. 1169, 1171, n. 14.
"There is no record of any debates over the statute. See 3 Annals of
Congress (1791-93). It has been suggested that the provision reflected the then
strong feeling against the unwarranted intrusion of federal courts upon state
sovereignty. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, was decided on
February 18, 1793, less than two weeks before the provision was enacted into
law. The significance of this proximity is doubtful. Compare Warren, Federal
and State Court Interference, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 347-348, with Gunter
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 291-292. Much more
probable is the suggestion that the provision reflected the prevailing
prejudices against equity jurisdiction. The Journal of William Maclay
(1927 ed.), chronicling the proceedings of the Senate while he was one of its
members (1789-1791), contains abundant evidence of a widespread hostility to
chancery practice. See especially, pp. 92-94, 101-06 (debate on the bill that
became Judiciary Act of 1789). Moreover, Senator Ellsworth (soon to become
Chief Justice of the United States), the principal draftsman of both the 1789
and 1793 Judiciary Acts, often indicated a dislike for equity jurisdiction. See
Brown, Life of Oliver Ellsworth (1905 ed.) 194; Journal of William
Maclay (1927 ed.) 103-04; Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 96-100." Toucey
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 130-132.
See also Note, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 612 (1971); 1A J. Moore, Federal Practice
2302 (1965); H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 1075-1078 (1953); Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against
Proceedings in State Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 Mich. L. Rev.
1145 (1932). [***14]
n11 As so amended, the statute provided that state court proceedings could be
enjoined "where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to
proceedings in bankruptcy." Rev. Stat. § 720 (1874).
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Despite the seemingly uncompromising language of the anti-injunction statute
prior to 1948, the Court soon [*234] recognized that exceptions
must be made to its blanket prohibition if the import and purpose of other Acts
of Congress were to be given their intended scope. So it was that, in addition
to the bankruptcy law exception that Congress explicitly recognized in 1874,
the Court through the years found that federal courts were empowered to enjoin
state court proceedings, despite the anti-injunction statute, in carrying out
the will [**2158] of Congress under at least six other federal
laws. These covered a broad spectrum of congressional action: (1) legislation
providing for removal of litigation from state to federal courts, n12 (2) legislation
limiting the liability of shipowners, n13 (3) legislation providing for federal
interpleader actions, n14 (4) legislation conferring [***15]
federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages, n15 (5) legislation
[*235] governing federal habeas corpus proceedings, n16 and (6)
legislation providing for control of prices. n17
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n12 See French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250; Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226. The federal removal provisions, both civil
and criminal, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1441-1450, provide that once a copy of the removal
petition is filed with the clerk of the state court, the "State court
shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." 28 U. S. C.
§ 1446 (e).
n13 See Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co.,
109 U.S. 578. The Act of 1851, 9 Stat. 635, as amended, provides that once a
shipowner has deposited with the court an amount equal to the value of his
interest in the ship, "all claims and proceedings against the owner with
respect to the matter in question shall cease." 46 U. S. C. § 185.
n14 See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66. The
Interpleader Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 416, as currently written provides that in
"any civil action of interpleader . . . a district court may . . . enter
its order restraining [all claimants] . . . from instituting or prosecuting any
proceeding in any State or United States court affecting the property,
instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader action." 28 U. S. C.
§ 2361. [***16]
n15 See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433. The Frazier-Lemke
Farm-Mortgage Act, as amended in 1935, 49 Stat. 944, provides that in
situations to which it is applicable a federal court shall "stay all judicial
or official proceedings in any court." 11 U. S. C. § 203 (s) (2) (1940
ed.).
n16 See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 248-249. The Federal Habeas
Corpus Act provides that a federal court before which a habeas corpus
proceeding is pending may "stay any proceeding against the person detained
in any State Court . . . for any matter involved in the habeas corpus
proceeding." 28 U. S. C. § 2251.
n17 Section 205 (a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 33,
provided that the Price Administrator could request a federal district court to
enjoin acts that violated or threatened to violate the Act. In Porter
v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252, we held that this authority was broad enough
to justify an injunction to restrain state court proceedings. Id., at 255.
The Emergency Price Control Act was thus considered a congressionally
authorized exception to the anti-injunction statute. Ibid.; see also Bowles
v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503. Section 205 (a) expired in 1947. Act of
July 25, 1946, 60 Stat. 664.
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[***17]
In addition to the exceptions to the anti-injunction statute found to be
embodied in these various Acts of Congress, the Court recognized other
"implied" exceptions to the blanket prohibition of the
anti-injunction statute. One was an "in rem" exception,
allowing a federal court to enjoin a state court proceeding in order to protect
its jurisdiction of a res over which it had first acquired
jurisdiction. n18 Another was a "relitigation" exception, permitting
a federal court to enjoin relitigation in a state court of issues already
decided in federal litigation. n19 Still a third exception, more recently
developed, permits a federal injunction of state [*236] court proceedings
[**2159] when the plaintiff in the federal court is the United
States itself, or a federal agency asserting "superior federal
interests." n20
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n18 See, e. g., Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S.,
at 135-136; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226.
n19 See, e. g., Toucey, supra, at 137-141; Dial v. Reynolds,
96 U.S. 340; Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S.
356. See generally 1A J. Moore, Federal Practice 2302-2311 (1965).
[***18]
n20 Leiter Minerals Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220; NLRB
v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138.
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In Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, the Court
in 1941 issued an opinion casting considerable doubt upon the approach to the
anti-injunction statute reflected in its previous decisions. The Court's
opinion expressly disavowed the "relitigation" exception to the
statute, and emphasized generally the importance of recognizing the statute's
basic directive "of 'hands off' by the federal courts in the use of the
injunction to stay litigation in a state court." 314 U.S., at 132. The
congressional response to Toucey was the enactment in 1948 of the
anti-injunction statute in its present form in 28 U. S. C. § 2283, which, as
the Reviser's Note makes evident, served not only to overrule the specific
holding of Toucey, n21 but to restore "the basic law as generally
understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." n22
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n21 The Reviser's Note states in part: "The exceptions specifically
include the words 'to protect or effectuate its judgments,' for lack of which
the Supreme Court held that the Federal courts are without power to enjoin
relitigation of cases and controversies fully adjudicated by such courts. (See
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., . . . 314 U.S. 118 . . . .) A vigorous
dissenting opinion [ 314 U.S. 141] notes that at the time of the 1911 revision
of the Judicial Code, the power of the courts . . . of the United States to
protect their judgments was unquestioned and that the revisers of that code
noted no change and Congress intended no change." H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., A181-182 (1947). [***19]
n22 Ibid.
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[7]
[8]
[9]
We proceed, then, upon the understanding that in determining whether § 1983
comes within the "expressly authorized" exception of the
anti-injunction statute, the [*237] criteria to be applied are
those reflected in the Court's decisions prior to Toucey. n23 A review
of those decisions makes reasonably clear what the relevant criteria are. In
the first place, it is evident that, in order to qualify under the
"expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, a
federal law need not contain an express reference to that statute. As the Court
has said, "no prescribed formula is required; an authorization need not
expressly refer to § 2283." Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman
Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516. Indeed, none of the previously recognized
statutory exceptions contains any such reference. n24 Secondly, a federal law
need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order
to qualify as an exception. Three of the six previously recognized statutory
exceptions contain no such authorization. n25 Thirdly, it [***20]
is clear that, in order to qualify as an "expressly authorized"
exception to the anti-injunction statute, an Act of Congress must have created
a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court
of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to
enjoin a state court proceeding. This is not [*238] to say that in
order to come within the exception [**2160] an Act of Congress
must, on its face and in every one of its provisions, be totally incompatible
with the prohibition of the anti-injunction statute. n26 The test, rather, is
whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy
enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope
only by the stay of a state court proceeding. See Toucey, supra, at
132-134; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226; Providence
& N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 599; Treinies
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78; Kalb v. Feuerstein,
308 U.S. 433; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503.
[***21]
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n23 Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co.,
348 U.S. 511, 521 (dissenting opinion).
n24 See nn. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, supra.
n25 See nn. 12, 13, and 17, supra. The federal courts have found that
other Acts of Congress that do not refer to § 2283 or to injunctions against
state court proceedings nonetheless come within the "expressly
authorized" language of the anti-injunction statute. See, e. g.,
Walling v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 59 F.Supp. 348, 351 (WD
Ky.) (the Fair Labor Standards Act); Okin v. SEC, 161 F.2d
978, 980 (CA2) (the Public Utility Holding Company Act); Dilworth v. Riner,
343 F.2d 226, 230 (CA5) (the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Studebaker Corp.
v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (CA2) (the Securities and Exchange Act).
n26 Cf. Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (CA4).
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With these criteria in view, we turn to consideration [***22] of 42
U. S. C. § 1983.
IV
Section 1983 was originally § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 17 Stat. 13.
It was "modeled" on § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27,
n27 and was enacted for the express purpose of "enforc[ing] the Provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 17 Stat. 13. The predecessor of § 1983 was
thus an important part of the basic alteration in our federal system wrought in
the Reconstruction era through federal legislation and constitutional
amendment. n28 As a result of the [*239] new structure of law that
emerged in the post-Civil War era -- and especially of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was its centerpiece -- the role of the Federal Government as a
guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was clearly established. Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167; McNeese v. Board of Education,
373 U.S. 668; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1; Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-249; H. Flack, The Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment (1908); J. tenBroek, The Anti-Slavery Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment (1951). n29 Section 1983 opened the federal
[***23] courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal
remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation. n30
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n27 See remarks of Representative Shellabarger, chairman of the House Select
Committee which drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess., App. 68 (1871), and Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 545 n. 9.
n28 In addition to proposing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, Congress, from 1866 to 1875 enacted the following civil rights
legislation: Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat.
140; Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13; and Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat.
335. In 1875, Congress also passed the general federal-question provision,
giving federal courts the power to hear suits arising under Art. III, § 2, of
the Constitution. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470. This is the predecessor
of 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
n29 See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
Mich. L. Rev. 1323 (1952); Note, 75 Yale L. J. 1007 (1966); F. Frankfurter
& J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 65 (1928). As one
commentator has put it: "That statutory plan [of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Acts of Congress to enforce it] did supply the means of vindicating those
rights [of person and property] through the instrumentalities of the federal
government. . . . It did constitute the federal government the protector of the
civil rights . . . ." TenBroek, at 185. See also United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 n. 9; K. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction
(1965). [***24]
n30 As Representative Shellabarger stated, the Civil Rights Act of 1871
"not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may
have been that of slaves, but also to all people where, under color of State
law, they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which they are entitled
under the Constitution by reason and virtue of their national citizenship."
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871). And as Representative Hoar
stated: "The principal danger that menaces us to-day is from the effort
within the States to deprive considerable numbers of persons of the civil and
equal rights which the General Government is endeavoring to secure to
them." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335.
Although, as originally drafted in 1871, § 1983's predecessor protected rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution, the provision included
by the Congress in the Revised Statutes of 1874 was enlarged to provide
protection for rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law as
well. Rev. Stat. § 1979.
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[*240] [**2161]
It is clear from the legislative debates [***25] surrounding
passage of § 1983's predecessor that the Act was intended to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "against State action, . . .
whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial." Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (emphasis supplied). Proponents of the
legislation noted that state courts were being used to harass and injure
individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to stop deprivations
or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally
protected rights.
As Representative Lowe stated, the "records of the [state] tribunals are
searched in vain for evidence of effective redress [of federally secured
rights] . . . . What less than this [the Civil Rights Act of 1871] will afford
an adequate remedy? The Federal Government cannot serve a writ of mandamus upon
State Executives or upon State courts to compel them to protect the rights,
privileges and immunities of citizens . . . . The case has arisen . . . when
the Federal Government must resort to its own agencies to carry its own
authority into execution. Hence this bill throws open the doors of the United
States courts to those whose rights [***26] under the Constitution
are denied or impaired." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 374-376
(1871). This view was echoed by Senator Osborn: "If the State courts had
proven themselves competent to suppress the local disorders, [*241]
or to maintain law and order, we should not have been called upon to legislate
. . . . We are driven by existing facts to provide for the several states in
the South what they have been unable to fully provide for themselves; i. e.,
the full and complete administration of justice in the courts. And the courts
with reference to which we legislate must be the United States courts." Id.,
at 653. And Representative Perry concluded: "Sheriffs, having eyes to see,
see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or
falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices . . . .
All the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the processes of
justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and feared
detection. Among the most dangerous things an injured party can do is to appeal
to justice." Id., at App. 78. n31
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n31 Representative Coburn stated: "The United States courts are further
above mere local influence than the county courts; their judges can act with
more independence, cannot be put under terror, as local judges can; their
sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage; the jurors
are taken from the State, and not the neighborhood; they will be able to rise
above prejudices or bad passions or terror more easily. . . ." Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 460 (1871).
See also id., at App. 85 (Rep. Bingham); 321 (Rep. Stoughton); 333-334
(Rep. Hoar); 389 (Rep. Elliot); 394 (Rep. Rainey); 429 (Rep. Beatty); App.
68-69 (Rep. Shellabarger); App. 78 (Rep. Perry); 345 (Sen. Sherman); 505 (Sen.
Pratt); 577 (Sen. Carpenter); 651 (Sen. Sumner); 653 (Sen. Osborn); App. 255
(Sen. Wilson). Cf. id., at 697 (Sen. Edmunds).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***27]
Those who opposed the Act of 1871 clearly recognized that the proponents were
extending federal power in an attempt to remedy the state courts' failure to
secure federal rights. The debate was not about whether the predecessor of §
1983 extended to actions of state [*242] courts,
[**2162] but whether this innovation was necessary or desirable.
n32
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n32 See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 361 (Rep. Swann);
385 (Rep. Lewis); 416 (Rep. Biggs); 429 (Rep. McHenry); App. 179 (Rep.
Voorhees); 599-600 (Sen. Saulsbury); App. 216 (Sen. Thurman).
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This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it
was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to
the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state
instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state
officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights;
and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts.
V
[1B]
[10]
[11]
Section 1983 was thus [***28] a product of a vast transformation
from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century
when the anti-injunction statute was enacted. The very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of
the people's federal rights -- to protect the people from unconstitutional
action under color of state law, "whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S., at 346.
In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to
issue injunctions in § 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a "suit in
equity" as one of the means of redress. And this Court long ago recognized
that federal injunctive relief against a state court proceeding can in some
circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of
a person's constitutional rights. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; cf. Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479. For these reasons we conclude that, under the [*243]
criteria established in our previous decisions construing [***29]
the anti-injunction statute, § 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls within the
"expressly authorized" exception of that law.
In so concluding, we do not question or qualify in any way the principles of
equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to
enjoin a state court proceeding. These principles, in the context of state
criminal prosecutions, were canvassed at length last Term in Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, and its companion cases. They are principles
that have been emphasized by this Court many times in the past. Fenner
v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240; Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge,
295 U.S. 89; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 U.S. 45; Watson
v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387; Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S.
599; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157; Stefanelli
v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117; Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611. Today we decide only that the District Court in this case was in
error in holding that, because of the anti-injunction [***30]
statute, it was absolutely without power in this § 1983 action to enjoin a
proceeding pending in a state court under any circumstances whatsoever.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.
CONCURBY: BURGER
CONCUR: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE
and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the Court and add a few words to emphasize what
[**2163] the Court is and is not deciding today as I read the
opinion. The Court holds [*244] only that 28 U. S. C. § 2283, which
is an absolute bar to injunctions against state court proceedings in most
suits, does not apply to a suit brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 seeking an
injunction of state proceedings. But, as the Court's opinion has noted, it does
nothing to "question or qualify in any way the principles of equity,
comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin
a state court proceeding." Ante, at 243. In the context of
pending state criminal proceedings, [***31] we held in Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that these principles allow a federal
court properly to issue an injunction in only a narrow class of circumstances.
We have not yet reached or decided exactly how great a restraint is imposed by
these principles on a federal court asked to enjoin state civil
proceedings. Therefore, on remand in this case, it seems to me the District
Court, before reaching a decision on the merits of appellant's claim, should
properly consider whether general notions of equity or principles of
federalism, similar to those invoked in Younger, prevent the issuance
of an injunction against the state "nuisance abatement" proceedings
in the circumstances of this case.