491
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
After publicly burning an
American flag as a means of political protest, Gregory Lee Johnson was
convicted of desecrating a flag in violation of
I
While the Republican National
Convention was taking place in
The demonstration ended in front
of
[*400]
Of the approximately 100 demonstrators, Johnson alone was charged with a
crime. The only criminal offense with
which he was charged was the desecration of a venerated object in violation of
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(3)
(1989). n1 After a trial, he was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $ 2,000. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District
of Texas at
n1 Texas Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (1989) provides in full:
"§
42.09. Desecration of Venerated
Object
"(a) A person commits an offense if he
intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
"(1) a public monument;
"(2) a place of worship or burial; or
"(3) a state or national flag.
"(b) For purposes of this section, 'desecrate'
means deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor
knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover
his action.
"(c) An offense under this section is a Class A
misdemeanor."
The Court of Criminal Appeals
began by recognizing that Johnson's conduct was symbolic speech protected by
the First Amendment: "Given the context of an organized demonstration,
speeches, slogans, and the distribution of literature, anyone who observed appellant's
act would have understood the message that appellant intended to convey. The
act for which appellant was convicted was clearly 'speech' contemplated by the
First Amendment." Id., at 95. To justify Johnson's conviction for
engaging in symbolic speech, the State asserted two interests: preserving the
flag as a symbol of national unity and preventing breaches of the peace. The
Court of Criminal Appeals held that neither interest supported his conviction.
[*401]
Acknowledging that this Court had not yet decided whether the Government
may criminally sanction flag desecration in order to preserve the flag's
symbolic value, the Texas court nevertheless concluded that our decision in West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
suggested that furthering this interest by curtailing speech was
impermissible. "Recognizing that
the right to differ is the centerpiece of our First Amendment freedoms,"
the court explained, "a government
cannot mandate by fiat a feeling of unity in its citizens. Therefore, that very same government cannot
carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a set of approved messages to be
associated with that symbol when it cannot mandate the status or feeling the
symbol [**2538] purports to represent." 755 S. W. 2d, at
97. Noting that the State had not shown that the flag was in "grave and
immediate danger," Barnette, supra, at 639, of being stripped of
its symbolic value, the Texas court also decided that the flag's special status
was not endangered by Johnson's conduct.
755 S. W. 2d, at 97.
As to the State's goal of
preventing breaches of the peace, the court concluded that the flag-desecration
statute was not drawn narrowly enough to encompass only those flag burnings
that were likely to result in a serious disturbance of the peace. And in fact,
the court emphasized, the flag burning in this particular case did not threaten
such a reaction. "'Serious offense'
occurred," the court admitted, "but there was no breach of peace nor
does the record reflect that the situation was potentially explosive. One cannot equate 'serious offense' with
incitement to breach the peace." Id., at 96. The court also
stressed that another Texas statute, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.01 (1989), prohibited breaches of the
peace. Citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), the court
decided that § 42.01 demonstrated Texas'
ability to prevent disturbances of the peace without punishing this flag
desecration. 755 S. W. 2d, at 96.
[*402]
Because it reversed Johnson's conviction on the ground that § 42.09 was unconstitutional as applied to him,
the state court did not address Johnson's argument that the statute was, on its
face, unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
We granted [***352] certiorari, 488 U.S. 907 (1988), and now
affirm.
II
[***LEdHR2A] [2A] [***LEdHR3A] [3A]Johnson was convicted of flag desecration
for burning the flag rather than for uttering insulting words. n2 This
fact [*403] somewhat complicates our consideration of his
conviction under the First Amendment. We must first determine whether Johnson's
burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke
the First Amendment in challenging his conviction. See, e. g., Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 409-411 (1974). If
[**2539] his conduct was
expressive, we next decide whether the State's regulation is related to the
suppression of free expression. See, e. g., United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Spence, supra, at 414, n. 8. If the State's
regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent standard we
announced in United States v. O'Brien for regulations of
noncommunicative conduct controls. See O'Brien,
supra, at 377. If it is, then we are outside of O'Brien's test, and
we must ask whether this interest justifies Johnson's conviction under a more
demanding standard. n3 See [***353] Spence, supra, at 411. A [*404]
third possibility is that the State's asserted interest is simply not
implicated on these facts, and in that event the interest drops out of the
picture. See 418 U.S., at 414, n. 8.
[***LEdHR2B] [2B]
n2 Because the prosecutor's closing argument observed
that Johnson had led the protestors in chants denouncing theflag while it
burned, Johnson suggests that he may have been convicted for uttering critical
words rather than for burning the flag. Brief for Respondent 33-34. He relies on Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576, 578 (1969), in which we reversed a conviction obtained under a
New York statute that prohibited publicly defying or casting contempt on the
flag "either by words or act" because we were persuaded that the
defendant may have been convicted for his words alone. Unlike the law we faced in Street,
however, the Texas flag-desecration statute does not on its face permit
conviction for remarks critical of the flag, as Johnson himself admits. See Brief for Respondent 34. Nor was the jury in this case told that it
could convict Johnson of flag desecration if it found only that he had uttered
words critical of the flag and its referents.
Johnson emphasizes, though, that the jury was
instructed -- according to Texas' law of parties -- that "'a person is
criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if
acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he
solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to
commit the offense.'" Id., at 2, n. 2, quoting 1 Record 49. The
State offered this instruction because Johnson's defense was that he was not
the person who had burned the flag. Johnson did not object to this instruction
at trial, and although he challenged it on direct appeal, he did so only on the
ground that there was insufficient evidence to support it. 706 S. W. 2d 120, 124 (Tex. App. 1986). It is
only in this Court that Johnson has argued that the law-of-parties instruction
might have led the jury to convict him for his words alone. Even if we were to find that this argument is
properly raised here, however, we would conclude that it has no merit in these
circumstances. The instruction would not
have permitted a conviction merely for the pejorative nature of Johnson's
words, and those words themselves did not encourage the burning of the flag as
the instruction seems to require. Given
the additional fact that "the bulk of the State's argument was premised on
Johnson's culpability as a sole actor," ibid., we find it too
unlikely that the jury convicted Johnson on the basis of this alternative
theory to consider reversing his conviction on this ground.
[***LEdHR3B] [3B]
n3 Although Johnson has raised a facial challenge to
Texas' flag-desecration statute, we choose to resolve this case on the basis of
his claim that the statute as applied to him violates the First Amendment.
Section 42.09 regulates only physical conduct with respect to the flag, not the
written or spoken word, and although one violates the statute only if one
"knows" that one's physical treatment of the flag "will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his
action," Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
42.09(b) (1989), this fact does not necessarily mean that the statute
applies only to expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 588 (1974) (White, J., concurring in judgment) (statute prohibiting
"contemptuous" treatment of flag encompasses only expressive
conduct). A tired person might, for
example, drag a flag through the mud, knowing that this conduct is likely to
offend others, and yet have no thought of expressing any idea; neither the
language nor the Texas courts' interpretations of the statute precludes the
possibility that such a person would be prosecuted for flag desecration.
Because the prosecution of a person who had not engaged in expressive conduct
would pose a different case, and because this case may be disposed of on
narrower grounds, we address only Johnson's claim that § 42.09 as applied to political expression like
his violates the First Amendment.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
The First Amendment literally
forbids the abridgment only of "speech," but we have long recognized
that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word. While we have rejected "the view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea," United
States v. O'Brien, supra, at 376, we have acknowledged that conduct
may be "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within
the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments," Spence, supra, at 409.
In deciding whether particular
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First
Amendment into play, we have asked whether "[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that
the message would be understood by those who viewed it." 418 U.S., at
410-411. Hence, we have recognized the expressive nature of students' wearing
of black armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam, Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505
(1969); of a sit-in by blacks in a
"whites only" area to protest segregation, Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-142 (1966); of the wearing of American
military uniforms in a dramatic presentation criticizing American involvement
in Vietnam, Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); and of
picketing about a wide variety of causes, see, e. g., Food Employees v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313-314 (1968); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983).
Especially pertinent to this case
are our decisions recognizing the communicative
[**2540] nature of conduct
relating to flags. Attaching a peace sign to the flag, Spence, supra, at
409-410; refusing to salute the flag, Barnette, 319 U.S., at 632; and
displaying a red flag, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
368-369 [*405] (1931), we have held, all may find [***354]
shelter under the First Amendment. See also Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 588 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment) (treating flag "contemptuously" by wearing
pants with small flag sewn into their seat is expressive conduct). That we have had little difficulty
identifying an expressive element in conduct relating to flags should not be
surprising. The very purpose of a
national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country; it is, one might say,
"the one visible manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood." Id.,
at 603 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Thus, we have observed:
"[T]he flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas. The use of an
emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is
a short cut from mind to mind. Causes
and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit
the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design." Barnette,
supra, at 632.
Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signifies this
Nation as does the combination of letters found in "America."
We have not automatically
concluded, however, that any action taken with respect to our flag is
expressive. Instead, in characterizing such action for First Amendment
purposes, we have considered the context in which it occurred. In Spence, for example, we emphasized
that Spence's taping of a peace sign to his flag was "roughly simultaneous
with and concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State
tragedy." 418 U.S., at 410. The State of Washington had conceded, in fact,
that Spence's conduct was a form of communication, and we stated that "the
State's concession is inevitable on this record." Id., at 409.
[***LEdHR1B] [1B]The State of Texas conceded for purposes
of its oral argument in this case that Johnson's conduct was expressive
conduct, Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, and this concession seems to us as [*406]
prudent as was Washington's in Spence. Johnson burned an American flag as part --
indeed, as the culmination -- of a political demonstration that coincided with
the convening of the Republican Party and its renomination of Ronald Reagan for
President. The expressive, overtly
political nature of this conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly
apparent. At his trial, Johnson
explained his reasons for burning the flag as follows: "The American Flag
was burned as Ronald Reagan was being renominated as President. And a more powerful statement of symbolic speech,
whether you agree with it or not, couldn't have been made at that time. It's quite a just position
[juxtaposition]. We had new patriotism
and no patriotism." 5 Record 656. In these circumstances, Johnson's
burning of the flag was conduct "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication," Spence, 418 U.S., at 409, to implicate the First
Amendment.
III
[***LEdHR4] [4]The government generally has [***355]
a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in
restricting the written or spoken word.
See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-377; Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Dallas v.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). It may not, however, proscribe particular
conduct because it has expressive elements. "[W]hat might be [**2541]
termed the more generalized guarantee of freedom of expression makes the
communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis for singling out
that conduct for proscription. A law directed
at the communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech
itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need that the First
Amendment requires." Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt,
227 U. S. App. D. C. 19, 55-56, 703 F. 2d 586, 622-623 (1983) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, supra. It is, in short, not simply the verbal or nonverbal
nature of the expression, but the governmental
[*407] interest at stake, that
helps to determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid.
Thus, although we have recognized
that where "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms," O'Brien, supra, at 376, we have limited the
applicability of O'Brien's relatively lenient standard to those cases in
which "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression." Id., at 377; see also Spence, supra, at 414, n.
8. In stating, moreover, that O'Brien's test "in the last analysis
is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or
manner restrictions," Clark, supra, at 298, we have highlighted the
requirement that the governmental interest in question be unconnected to
expression in order to come under O'Brien's less demanding rule.
[***LEdHR1C] [1C]In order to decide whether O'Brien's
test applies here, therefore, we must decide whether Texas has asserted an
interest in support of Johnson's conviction that is unrelated to the
suppression of expression. If we find
that an interest asserted by the State is simply not implicated on the facts
before us, we need not ask whether O'Brien's test applies. See Spence, supra, at 414, n. 8. The
State offers two separate interests to justify this conviction: preventing
breaches of the peace and preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
national unity. We hold that the first interest is not implicated on this
record and that the second is related to the suppression of expression.
A
[***LEdHR1D] [1D] [***LEdHR5A] [5A]Texas claims that its interest in
preventing breaches of the peace justifies Johnson's conviction [***356]
for flag desecration. n4
[*408] However, no disturbance of
the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of Johnson's burning
of the flag. Although the State stresses the disruptive behavior of the
protestors during their march toward City Hall, Brief for Petitioner 34-36, it
admits that "no actual breach of the peace occurred at the time of the
flagburning or in response to the flagburning." Id., at 34. The State's emphasis on the protestors'
disorderly actions prior to arriving at City Hall is not only somewhat [**2542]
surprising given that no charges were brought on the basis of this
conduct, but it also fails to show that a disturbance of the peace was a likely
reaction to Johnson's conduct.
The only evidence offered by the State at trial to show the reaction to
Johnson's actions was the testimony of several persons who had been seriously
offended by the flag burning. Id., at 6-7.
[***LEdHR5B] [5B]
n4 Relying on our decision inBoos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312 (1988), Johnson argues that this state interest is related to the
suppression of free expression within the meaning of United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). He reasons that the violent reaction to flag
burnings feared by Texas would be the result of the message conveyed by them,
and that this fact connects the State's interest to the suppression of
expression. Brief for Respondent 12, n.
11. This view has found some favor in
the lower courts. See Monroe v.
State Court of Fulton County, 739 F. 2d 568, 574-575 (CA11 1984). Johnson's
theory may overread Boos insofar as it suggests that a desire to prevent
a violent audience reaction is "related to expression" in the same
way that a desire to prevent an audience from being offended is "related
to expression." Because we find that the State's interest in preventing
breaches of the peace is not implicated on these facts, however, we need not
venture further into this area.
The State's position, therefore,
amounts to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular
expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression
may be prohibited on this basis. n5 Our precedents do not countenance such a
presumption. On the contrary, they
recognize that a principal "function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or [*409]
even stirs people to anger." Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
551 (1965); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.
393 U.S., at 508-509; Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615
(1971); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56
(1988). It would be odd indeed to conclude both that "if it is the
speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection," FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.), and
that the government may ban the expression of certain disagreeable ideas on the
unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke violence.
n5 There is, of course, a tension between this
argument and the State's claim that one need not actually cause serious offense
in order to violate § 42.09. See Brief for Petitioner 44.
Thus, we have not permitted the
government to assume that every
[***357] expression of a
provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required careful
consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression, asking
whether the expression "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (reviewing circumstances
surrounding rally and speeches by Ku Klux Klan). To accept Texas' arguments that it need only
demonstrate "the potential for a breach of the peace," Brief for
Petitioner 37, and that every flag burning necessarily possesses that
potential, would be to eviscerate our holding in Brandenburg. This we decline to do.
Nor does Johnson's expressive
conduct fall within that small class of "fighting words" that are
"likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a
breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 574 (1942). No reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson's
generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal
Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. See id., at 572-573; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940); FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, supra, at 745 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
[*410]
We thus conclude that the State's interest in maintaining order is not
implicated on these facts. The State
need not worry that our holding will disable it from preserving the peace. We
do not suggest that the First Amendment forbids a State to prevent
"imminent lawless action." Brandenburg, supra, at 447. And, in
fact, Texas already has a statute specifically prohibiting breaches of the
peace, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.01
(1989), which tends to confirm that Texas need not punish this flag desecration
in order to keep the peace. See Boos v. Barry, [**2543]
485 U.S., at 327-329.
B
The State also asserts an interest
in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. In Spence,
we acknowledged that the government's interest in preserving the flag's special
symbolic value "is directly related to expression in the context of
activity" such as affixing a peace symbol to a flag. 418 U.S., at 414, n.
8. We are equally persuaded that this interest is related to expression in the
case of Johnson's burning of the flag. The State, apparently, is concerned that
such conduct will lead people to believe either that the flag does not stand
for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive
concepts, or that the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that
is, that we do not enjoy unity as a
Nation. These concerns blossom only when
a person's treatment of the flag communicates some message, and thus are
related "to the suppression of free expression" within the meaning of
O'Brien. We are thus outside of O'Brien's
test altogether.
IV
It remains to consider whether
the [***358] State's interest in preserving the flag as a
symbol of nationhood and national unity justifies Johnson's conviction.
[***LEdHR1E] [1E] [***LEdHR6] [6]As in Spence, "[w]e are
confronted with a case of prosecution for the expression of an idea through
activity," and "[a]ccordingly, we must examine with particular care
the interests [*411] advanced by [petitioner] to support its
prosecution." 418 U.S., at 411. Johnson was not, we add, prosecuted for
the expression of just any idea; he was prosecuted for his expression of
dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the
core of our First Amendment values. See,
e. g., Boos v. Barry, supra, at 318; Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988).
Moreover, Johnson was prosecuted
because he knew that his politically charged expression would cause
"serious offense." If he had burned the flag as a means of disposing
of it because it was dirty or torn, he would not have been convicted of flag
desecration under this Texas law: federal law designates burning as the
preferred means of disposing of a flag "when it is in such condition that
it is no longer a fitting emblem for display," 36 U. S. C. § 176(k), and Texas has no quarrel with this
means of disposal. Brief for Petitioner
45. The Texas law is thus not aimed at
protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is
designed instead to protect it only against impairments that would cause
serious offense to others. n6 Texas concedes as much: "Section 42.09(b)
reaches only those severe acts of physical abuse of the flag carried out in a
way likely to be offensive. The statute
mandates intentional or knowing abuse, that is, the kind of mistreatment that
is not innocent, but rather is intentionally designed to seriously offend other
individuals." Id., at 44.
n6 Cf. Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S., at 590-591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that lower court appeared to have construed state statute so as to
protect physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances); id., at
597-598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).
[***LEdHR1F] [1F] [***LEdHR7A] [7A]Whether Johnson's treatment of the flag
violated Texas law thus depended on the likely communicative impact of his
expressive conduct. n7 Our decision in Boos v. Barry, [**2544]
supra, [*412] tells us that this restriction on Johnson's
expression is [***359] content based. In Boos, we considered the
constitutionality of a law prohibiting "the display of any sign within 500
feet of a foreign embassy if that sign tends to bring that foreign government
into 'public odium' or 'public disrepute.'" Id., at 315. Rejecting
the argument that the law was content neutral because it was justified by
"our international law obligation to shield diplomats from speech that
offends their dignity," id., at 320, we held that "[t]he
emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect'"
unrelated to the content of the expression itself. Id., at 321 (plurality opinion); see
also id., at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
[***LEdHR1G] [1G]
[***LEdHR7B] [7B]
n7 Texas suggests that Johnson's conviction did not
depend on the onlookers' reaction to theflag burning because § 42.09 is violated only when a person
physically mistreats the flag in a way that he "knows will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his
action." Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
42.09(b) (1989) (emphasis added).
"The 'serious offense' language of the statute," Texas argues,
"refers to an individual's intent and to the manner in which the conduct
is effectuated, not to the reaction of the crowd." Brief for Petitioner
44. If the statute were aimed only at
the actor's intent and not at the communicative impact of his actions, however,
there would be little reason for the law to be triggered only when an audience
is "likely" to be present. At
Johnson's trial, indeed, the State itself seems not to have seen the
distinction between knowledge and actual communicative impact that it now
stresses; it proved the element of knowledge by offering the testimony of
persons who had in fact been seriously offended by Johnson's conduct. Id., at 6-7. In any event, we find the distinction between
Texas' statute and one dependent on actual audience reaction too precious to be
of constitutional significance. Both
kinds of statutes clearly are aimed at protecting onlookers from being offended
by the ideas expressed by the prohibited activity.
According to the principles
announced in Boos, Johnson's political expression was restricted because
of the content of the message he conveyed. We must therefore subject the
State's asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic character of the
flag to "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry, supra,
at 321. n8
n8 Our inquiry is, of course, bounded by the
particular facts of this case and by the statute under which Johnson was
convicted. There was no evidence that Johnson himself stole the flag he burned,
Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, nor did the prosecution or the arguments urged in support
of it depend on the theory that the flag was stolen. Ibid. Thus, our analysis does not rely
on the way in which the flag was acquired, and nothing in our opinion should be
taken to suggest that one is free to steal a flag so long as one later uses it
to communicate an idea. We also
emphasize that Johnson was presecuted only for flag desecration -- not
for trespass, disorderly conduct, or arson.
[*413]
Texas argues that its interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity survives this close analysis. Quoting extensively from the writings of this
Court chronicling the flag's historic and symbolic role in our society, the
State emphasizes the "'special place'" reserved for the flag in our
Nation. Brief for Petitioner 22, quoting
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S., at 601 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The State's argument is not
that it has an interest simply in maintaining the flag as a symbol of something,
no matter what it symbolizes; indeed, if that were the State's position, it
would be difficult to see how that interest is endangered by highly symbolic
conduct such as Johnson's. Rather, the
State's claim is that it has an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity, a symbol with a determinate range of meanings. Brief for Petitioner 20-24. According to Texas, if one physically treats
the flag in a way that would tend to cast doubt on either the idea that nationhood
and national unity are the flag's referents or that national unity actually
exists, the message conveyed thereby is a harmful one and therefore may be
prohibited. n9
n9 Texas claims that "Texas is not endorsing,
protecting, avowing or prohibiting any particular philosophy." Brief for
Petitioner 29. If Texas means to suggest
that its asserted interest does not prefer Democrats over Socialists, or
Republicans over Democrats, for example, then it is beside the point, for
Johnson does not rely on such an argument.
He argues instead that the State's desire to maintain the flag as a
symbol of nationhood and national unity assumes that there is only one proper
view of the flag. Thus, if Texas means to argue that its interest does not
prefer any viewpoint over another, it is mistaken; surely one's attitude
toward the flag and its referents is a viewpoint.
[*414]
[***360] [**2545]
[***LEdHR8] [8]If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable. See, e. g., Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S., at 55-56; City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65, 72 (1983); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 462-463 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S., at 745-746; Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 63-65, 67-68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115
(1972); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970); O'Brien,
391 U.S., at 382; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S., at 142-143; Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S., at 368-369.
We have not recognized an
exception to this principle even where our flag has been involved. In Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576 (1969), we held that a State may not
criminally punish a person for uttering words critical of the flag. Rejecting
the argument that the conviction could be sustained on the ground that Street
had "failed to show the respect for our national symbol which may properly
be demanded of every citizen," we concluded that "the
constitutionally guaranteed 'freedom to be intellectually . . . diverse or even
contrary,' and the 'right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order,' encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about our
flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous." Id.,
at 593, quoting Barnette, 319 U.S., at 642. Nor may the government, we
have held, compel conduct that would evince respect for the flag. "To
sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights
which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to
public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind." Id.,
at 634.
[*415]
[***LEdHR9] [9]In holding in Barnette that the
Constitution did not leave this course open to the government, Justice Jackson described one of our
society's defining principles in words deserving of their frequent repetition:
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id., at 642. In Spence,
we held that the same interest asserted by Texas here was insufficient to
support a criminal conviction under a flag-misuse statute for the taping of a
peace sign to an American flag. "Given the protected character of [Spence's]
expression [***361] and in light of the fact that no interest the
State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag
was significantly impaired on these facts," we held, "the conviction
must be invalidated." 418 U.S., at 415. See also Goguen, supra, at
588 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (to convict person who had sewn a flag
onto the seat of his pants for "contemptuous" treatment of the flag
would be "[t]o convict not to protect the physical integrity or to protect
against acts interfering with the proper use of the flag, but to punish for
communicating ideas unacceptable to the controlling majority in the
legislature").
[***LEdHR1H] [1H]In short, nothing in our precedents
suggests that a State may foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting
expressive conduct [**2546] relating to it. n10 To bring its argument
outside our [*416] precedents, Texas attempts to convince us
that even if its interest in preserving the flag's symbolic role does not allow
it to prohibit words or some expressive conduct critical of the flag, it does
permit it to forbid the outright destruction of the flag. The State's argument
cannot depend here on the distinction between written or spoken words and
nonverbal conduct. That distinction, we
have shown, is of no moment where the nonverbal conduct is expressive, as it is
here, and where the regulation of that conduct is related to expression, as it
is here. See supra, at
402-403. In addition, both Barnette
and Spence involved expressive conduct, not only verbal communication,
and both found that conduct protected.
n10 Our decision in Halter v. Nebraska,
205 U.S. 34 (1907), addressing the validity of a state law prohibiting certain
commercial uses of the flag, is not to the contrary. That case was decided "nearly 20 years
before the Court concluded that the First Amendment applies to the States by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment." Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 413, n. 7 (1974). More important, as we continually emphasized in
Halter itself, that case involved purely commercial rather than
political speech. 205 U.S., at 38, 41,
42, 45.
Nor does San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 524 (1987), addressing the
validity of Congress' decision to "authoriz[e] the United States Olympic
Committee to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of the word
'Olympic,'" relied upon by The Chief Justice's dissent, post, at
429, even begin to tell us whether the government may criminally punish
physical conduct towards the flag engaged in as a means of political protest.
[***LEdHR10] [10]Texas' focus on the precise nature of
Johnson's expression, moreover, misses the point of our prior decisions: their
enduring lesson, that the government may not prohibit expression simply because
it disagrees with its message, is not dependent on the particular mode in which
one chooses to express an idea. n11 If we were to hold that a State may forbid
flag burning wherever it is likely to endanger the [***362]
flag's symbolic role, but allow it wherever burning a flag promotes that
role -- as where, for example, a person ceremoniously burns a dirty flag -- we
would be saying that when it comes to impairing the flag's physical integrity,
the flag itself may be used as
[*417] a symbol -- as a
substitute for the written or spoken word or a "short cut from mind to
mind" -- only in one direction. We
would be permitting a State to "prescribe what shall be orthodox" by
saying that one may burn the flag to convey one's attitude toward it and its
referents only if one does not endanger the flag's representation of nationhood
and national unity.
n11 The Chief Justice's dissent appears to believe
that Johnson's conduct may be prohibited and, indeed, criminally sanctioned,
because "his act . . . conveyed nothing that could not have been conveyed
and was not conveyed just as forcefully in a dozen different ways." Post,
at 431. Not only does this assertion sit
uneasily next to the dissent's quite correct reminder that the flag occupies a
unique position in our society -- which demonstrates that messages conveyed
without use of the flag are not "just as forcefu[l]" as those
conveyed with it -- but it also ignores the fact that, in Spence, supra,
we "rejected summarily" this very claim. See 418 U.S., at 411, n. 4.
We never before have held that the
Government may ensure that a symbol be used to express only one view of that
symbol or its referents. Indeed, in Schacht
v. United States, we invalidated a federal statute permitting an
actor portraying a member of one of our Armed Forces to "'wear the uniform
of that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed
force.'" 398 U.S., at 60, quoting 10 U. S. C. § 772(f).
This proviso, we held, "which leaves Americans free to praise the
war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it,
cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment." Id., at
63.
We perceive no basis on which to
hold that the principle underlying our decision in Schacht does not
apply to this case. To conclude that the
government may permit [**2547] designated symbols to be used to communicate
only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no
discernible or defensible boundaries. Could
the government, on this theory, prohibit the burning of state flags? Of copies
of the Presidential seal? Of the
Constitution? In evaluating these
choices under the First Amendment, how would we decide which symbols were
sufficiently special to warrant this unique status? To do so, we would be forced to consult our
own political preferences, and impose them on the citizenry, in the very way
that the First Amendment forbids us to do.
See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S., at 466-467.
There is, moreover, no indication
-- either in the text of the Constitution or in our cases interpreting it --
that a separate juridical category exists for the American flag alone. Indeed, we would not be surprised to learn
that the persons [*418] who framed our Constitution and wrote the
Amendment that we now construe were not known for their reverence for the Union
Jack. The First Amendment does not
guarantee that other concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole -- such
as the principle that discrimination on the basis of race is odious and
destructive -- will go unquestioned in the market-place of ideas. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969). We decline, therefore, to create for the flag an exception to
the joust of principles protected by the First Amendment.
[***LEdHR1I] [1I]It is not the State's ends, but its
means, to which we object. It cannot be
gainsaid that there is a special place reserved for the flag in this Nation,
and thus we do not doubt that the government has a legitimate interest in making
efforts to "preserv[e] the national flag as an [***363]
unalloyed symbol of our country." Spence, 418 U.S., at 412.
We reject the suggestion, urged at oral argument by counsel for Johnson, that
the government lacks "any state interest whatsoever" in regulating
the manner in which the flag may be displayed.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Congress
has, for example, enacted precatory regulations describing the proper treatment
of the flag, see 36 U. S. C. § §
173-177, and we cast no doubt on the legitimacy of its interest in
making such recommendations. To say that
the government has an interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag,
however, is not to say that it may criminally punish a person for burning a
flag as a means of political protest. "National unity as an end which
officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is whether under our Constitution
compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement." Barnette,
319 U.S., at 640.
We are fortified in today's
conclusion by our conviction that forbidding criminal punishment for conduct
such as Johnson's will not endanger the special role played by our flag or the
feelings it inspires. To paraphrase
Justice Holmes, we submit that nobody can suppose that this one gesture of an
unknown [*419] man will change our Nation's attitude towards
its flag. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, Texas'
argument that the burning of an American flag "'is an act having a high
likelihood to cause a breach of the peace,'" Brief for Petitioner 31,
quoting Sutherland v. DeWulf, 323 F. Supp. 740, 745 (SD Ill.
1971) (citation omitted), and its statute's implicit assumption that physical
mistreatment of the flag will lead to "serious offense," tend to
confirm that the flag's special role is not in danger; if it were, no one would
riot or take offense because a flag had been burned.
We are tempted to say, in fact,
that the flag's deservedly cherished place in our community will be
strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation of the
principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the
conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign [**2548]
and source of our strength.
Indeed, one of the proudest images of our flag, the one immortalized in
our own national anthem, is of the bombardment it survived at Fort
McHenry. It is the Nation's resilience,
not its rigidity, that Texas sees reflected in the flag -- and it is that
resilience that we reassert today.
The way to preserve the flag's
special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these
matters. It is to persuade them that
they are wrong. "To courageous,
self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning
applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from
speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for
full discussion. If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence." [***364] Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
And, precisely because it is our flag that is involved, one's response
to the flag [*420] burner may exploit the uniquely persuasive
power of the flag itself. We can imagine
no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one's own, no better
way to counter a flag burner's message than by saluting the flag that burns, no
surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by --
as one witness here did -- according its remains a respectful burial. We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its
desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem
represents.
V
Johnson was convicted for engaging
in expressive conduct. The State's
interest in preventing breaches of the peace does not support his conviction
because Johnson's conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace. Nor does the
State's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national
unity justify his criminal conviction for engaging in political
expression. The judgment of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
CONCURBY:
KENNEDY
CONCUR:
JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring.
I write not to qualify the words
Justice Brennan chooses so well, for he says with power all that is necessary
to explain our ruling. I join his
opinion without reservation, but with a keen sense that this case, like others
before us from time to time, exacts its personal toll. This prompts me to add to our pages these few
remarks.
The case before us illustrates
better than most that the judicial power is often difficult in its
exercise. We cannot here ask another
Branch to share responsibility, as when the argument is made that a statute is
flawed or incomplete. For we are
presented with a clear and simple statute to be judged against a pure command
of the Constitution. The outcome can be
laid at no door but ours.
The hard fact is that sometimes we
must make decisions we do not like. We
make them because they are right, right
[*421] in the sense that the law
and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result. And so great is our commitment to the process
that, except in the rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for the
result, perhaps for fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the
decision. This is one of those rare
cases.
Our colleagues in dissent advance
powerful arguments why respondent may be convicted for his expression,
reminding us that among those who will be dismayed by our holding will be some
who have had the singular honor of carrying the flag in battle. And I agree that the flag holds a lonely
place of honor in an age when absolutes are distrusted and simple truths are
burdened by unneeded apologetics.
With all respect to those views, I
do not believe the Constitution gives us the right [**2549]
to rule as the dissenting Members of the Court urge, however [***365]
painful this judgment is to announce.
Though symbols often are what we ourselves make of them, the flag is
constant in expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs in law and peace and
that freedom which sustains the human spirit.
The case here today forces recognition of the costs to which those
beliefs commit us. It is poignant but
fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt.
For all the record shows, this
respondent was not a philosopher and perhaps did not even possess the ability
to comprehend how repellent his statements must be to the Republic itself. But whether or not he could appreciate the
enormity of the offense he gave, the fact remains that his acts were speech, in
both the technical and the fundamental meaning of the Constitution. So I agree with the Court that he must go
free.
DISSENTBY:
REHNQUIST; STEVENS
DISSENT:
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom
JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
In holding this Texas statute
unconstitutional, the Court ignores Justice Holmes' familiar aphorism that
"a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co.
v. [*422] Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). For
more than 200 years, the American flag has occupied a unique position as the
symbol of our Nation, a uniqueness that justifies a governmental prohibition
against flag burning in the way respondent Johnson did here.
At the time of the American
Revolution, the flag served to unify the Thirteen Colonies at home, while
obtaining recognition of national sovereignty abroad. Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Concord
Hymn" describes the first skirmishes of the Revolutionary War in these
lines:
"By the rude bridge that arched the flood Their flag to April's breeze
unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood And fired the
shot heard round the world."
During that time, there were many colonial and regimental flags,
adorned with such symbols as pine trees, beavers, anchors, and rattlesnakes,
bearing slogans such as "Liberty or Death," "Hope,"
"An Appeal to Heaven," and "Don't Tread on Me." The first
distinctive flag of the Colonies was the "Grand Union Flag" -- with
13 stripes and a British flag in the left corner -- which was flown for the
first time on January 2, 1776, by troops of the Continental Army around
Boston. By June 14, 1777, after we
declared our independence from England, the Continental Congress resolved:
"That the flag of the thirteen United States be
thirteen stripes, alternate red and white: that the union be thirteen stars,
white in a blue field, representing a new constellation." 8 Journal of the
Continental Congress 1774-1789, p. 464 (W. Ford ed. 1907).
One immediate result of the flag's adoption was that American vessels
harassing British shipping sailed under an authorized national flag. Without
such a flag, the British could treat captured seamen as pirates and hang them
summarily; with a national flag, such seamen were treated as prisoners of war.
[*423]
During the War of 1812, British naval forces sailed up Chesapeake [***366]
Bay and marched overland to sack and burn the city of Washington. They then sailed up the Patapsco River to
invest the city of Baltimore, but to do so it was first necessary to reduce
Fort McHenry in Baltimore Harbor. Francis
Scott Key, a Washington lawyer, had been granted permission by the British to
board one of their warships to negotiate the release of an American who had
been taken prisoner. That night, waiting
anxiously on the British ship, Key watched the British fleet firing on Fort
McHenry. Finally, at daybreak, he saw
the fort's American flag still flying; the British attack had failed. Intensely moved, he began to scribble on the back
of an envelope the poem that became our national anthem:
[**2550] "O say can you see by the dawn's early
light
What so proudly we hail'd at the twilight's last
gleaming,
Whose broad stripes & bright stars through the
perilous fight
O'er the ramparts we watch'd, were so gallantly
streaming?
And the rocket's red glare, the bomb bursting in air,
Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there,
O say does that star-spangled banner yet wave
O'er the land of the free & the home of the
brave?"
The American flag played a central
role in our Nation's most tragic conflict, when the North fought against the
South. The lowering of the American flag
at
One of the great stories of the
Civil War is told in John Greenleaf Whittier's poem, "Barbara Frietchie":
"Up from the meadows rich with corn,
Clear in the cool September morn,
The clustered spires of
Green-walled by the hills of
Round about them orchards sweep,
Apple- and peach-tree fruited deep,
Fair as a garden of the Lord
To the eyes of the famished rebel horde,
On that pleasant morn of the early fall
When Lee marched over the mountain wall, --
Over the mountains winding down,
Horse and foot, into
Forty flags with their silver stars,
[***367] Forty flags with their crimson bars,
Flapped in the morning wind: the sun
Of noon looked down, and saw not one.
Up rose old Barbara Frietchie then,
Bowed with her fourscore years and ten;
Bravest of all in
She took up the flag the men hauled down;
In her attic-window the staff she set,
To show that one heart was loyal yet.
Up the street came the rebel tread,
Stonewall
Under his slouched hat left and right
He glanced: the old flag met his sight.
'Halt!' -- the dust-brown ranks stood fast.
'Fire!' -- out blazed the rifle-blast.
[*425] It shivered the window, pane and sash;
It rent the banner with seam and gash.
Quick, as it fell, from the broken staff
Dame Barbara snatched the silken scarf;
She leaned far out on the window-sill,
And shook it forth with a royal will.
'Shoot, if you must, this old gray head,
But spare your country's flag,' she said.
A shade of sadness, a blush of shame,
Over the face of the leader came;
The nobler nature within him stirred
To life at that woman's deed and word:
'Who touches a hair of yon gray head
Dies like a dog!
March on!' he said.
All day long through
Sounded the tread of marching feet:
All day long that free flag tost
Over the heads of the rebel host.
Ever its torn folds rose and fell
On the loyal winds that loved it well;
And through the hill-gaps sunset light
Shone over it with a warm good-night.
Barbara Frietchie's work is o'er,
[**2551] And the Rebel rides on his raids no more.
Honor to her! and let a tear
Fall, for her sake, on Stonewall's bier.
Over Barbara Frietchie's grave,
Flag of Freedom and
Peace and order and beauty draw
Round thy symbol of light and law;
And ever the stars above look down
On thy stars below in
In the First and Second World
Wars, thousands of our countrymen died on foreign soil fighting for the American
cause. At Iwo Jima in the Second World
War,
During the Korean war, the
successful amphibious landing of American troops at
The flag symbolizes the Nation in
peace as well as in war. It signifies
our national presence on battleships, airplanes, military installations, and
public buildings from the United States Capitol to the thousands of county
courthouses and city halls throughout the country. Two flags are prominently placed in our
courtroom. Countless flags are placed by
the graves of loved ones each year on what was first called [*427]
Decoration Day, and is now called Memorial Day. The flag is traditionally placed on the
casket of deceased members of the Armed Forces, and it is later given to the
deceased's family. 10 U. S. C. § § 1481, 1482.
Congress has provided that the flag be flown at half-staff upon the
death of the President, Vice President, and other government officials "as
a mark of respect to their memory." 36 U. S. C. § 175(m).
The flag identifies
No other American symbol has been
as universally honored as the flag. In 1931, Congress declared "The
Star-Spangled Banner" to be our national anthem. 36 U. S. C. §
170. In 1949, Congress declared June 14th to be Flag Day. § 157. In 1987, John Philip Sousa's "The Stars
and Stripes Forever" was designated as the national march. Pub. L. 101-186, 101 Stat. 1286. Congress has also established "The
Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag" and the manner of its deliverance. 36 U. S. C. §
172. The flag has appeared as the principal symbol on approximately 33
United [***369] States postal stamps and in the design of at
least 43 more, more times than any other symbol. United States Postal Service,
Definitive Mint Set 15 (1988).
[**2552] Both Congress and the States have enacted
numerous laws regulating misuse of the American flag. Until 1967, Congress left
the regulation of misuse of the flag up to the States. Now, however, 18
"Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag
of the
Congress has also prescribed, inter alia, detailed rules for the
design of the flag, 4
n1 See Ala. Code §
13A-11-12 (1982); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3703 (1978); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-51-207 (1987); Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code
Ann. § 614 (West 1988); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-11-204 (1986); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53-258a (1985);
[*429]
The American flag, then, throughout more than 200 years of our history,
has come to be the visible symbol embodying our Nation. It does not represent the views of any
particular political party, and it does not represent any particular political
philosophy. The flag is not simply
another "idea" or "point of view" competing for recognition
in the marketplace of ideas. Millions
and millions of Americans regard it with an almost mystical reverence
regardless of what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs [***370]
they may have. I cannot agree that
the First Amendment invalidates the Act of Congress, and the laws of 48 of the
50 States, which make criminal the public burning of the flag.
More than 80 years ago in Halter
v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), this Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that forbade the use of representations
of the American flag for advertising purposes upon articles of
merchandise. The Court there said:
"For that flag every true American has not simply
an appreciation but a deep affection. .
. . Hence, it has often occurred that
insults to a flag have been the cause of war,
and indignities put upon it, in the presence of those who revere it,
have often been resented and [**2553] sometimes punished on the spot."
Only two Terms ago, in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,
483 U.S. 522 (1987), the Court held that Congress could grant exclusive use of
the word "Olympic" to the United States Olympic Committee. The Court thought that this
"restrictio[n] on expressive speech properly [was] characterized as
incidental to the primary congressional purpose of encouraging and rewarding
the USOC's activities."
But the Court insists that the
"Allowing the broadest scope to the language and
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of
free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words -- those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality."
The Court upheld Chaplinsky's conviction under a state statute
that [***371] made it unlawful to "address any
offensive, derisive or annoying word to any person who is lawfully in any
street or other public place."
Here it may equally well be said
that the public burning of the American flag by Johnson was no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and at the same time it had a tendency to incite a
breach of the peace. Johnson was free to make any verbal denunciation of the
flag that he wished; indeed, he was
[*431] free to burn the flag in
private. He could publicly burn other
symbols of the Government or effigies of political leaders. He did lead a march through the streets of
The Court could not, and did not,
say that Chaplinsky's utterances were not expressive phrases -- they clearly
and succinctly conveyed an extremely low opinion of the addressee. The same may be said of [**2554]
Johnson's public burning of the flag in this case; it obviously did convey
Johnson's bitter dislike of his country.
But his act, like Chaplinsky's provocative words, conveyed nothing that
could not have been conveyed and was not conveyed just as forcefully in a dozen
different ways. As with "fighting
words," so with flag burning, for purposes of the First Amendment: It is
"no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it]
is clearly outweighed" by the public interest in avoiding a probable
breach of the peace. The highest courts of several States have upheld state
statutes prohibiting the public burning of the flag on the grounds that it is
so inherently inflammatory that it may cause a breach of public order. See, e. g., State v. Royal, 113
N. H. 224, 229, 305 A. 2d 676, 680 (1973); State v. Waterman, 190
N. W. 2d 809, 811-812 (
[*432]
The result of the
Our prior cases dealing with flag
desecration statutes have left open the question that the Court resolves
today. In Street v.
Chief Justice Warren, in dissent,
stated: "I believe that the States and Federal Government do have the
power to protect the flag from acts of desecration and disgrace. . . .
[I]t is difficult [*433] for me to imagine that, had the Court faced
this issue, it would have concluded otherwise."
In Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405 (1974), the Court reversed the conviction of a college student who
displayed the flag with a peace symbol affixed to it by means of removable
black tape from the window of his apartment.
Unlike the instant case, there was no risk of a breach of the peace, no
one other than the arresting officers saw the flag, and the defendant owned the
flag in question. The Court concluded
that the student's conduct was protected under the First Amendment, because "no
interest the State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately
owned flag was significantly impaired on these facts."
In another related case, Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), the appellee, who wore a small flag on the
seat of his trousers, was convicted under a
But the Court today will have none
of this. The uniquely deep awe and
respect for our flag felt by virtually all of us are bundled off under the
rubric of "designated symbols," ante, at 417, that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from "establishing." But the
government has not "established" this feeling; 200 years of history
have done that. The government is simply
recognizing as a fact the profound regard for the American flag created by that
history when it enacts statutes prohibiting the disrespectful public burning of
the flag.
The Court concludes its opinion
with a regrettably patronizing civics lecture, presumably addressed to the
Members of both Houses of Congress, the members of the 48 state legislatures
that enacted prohibitions against flag burning, and the troops fighting under
that flag in Vietnam who objected to its
[*435] being burned: "The
way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel differently
about these matters. It is to persuade
them that they are wrong." Ante, at 419. The Court's role as the final expositor of
the Constitution is well established, but its role as a Platonic guardian
admonishing those responsible to public opinion as if they [**2556]
were truant schoolchildren has no similar place in our system of
government. The cry of "no taxation
without representation" animated those who revolted against the English
Crown to found our Nation -- the idea that those who submitted to government
should have some say as [***374] to what kind of laws would be passed. Surely one of the high purposes of a
democratic society is to legislate against conduct that is regarded as evil and
profoundly offensive to the majority of people -- whether it be murder,
embezzlement, pollution, or flag burning.
Our Constitution wisely places
limits on powers of legislative majorities to act, but the declaration of such
limits by this Court "is, at all times, a question of much delicacy, which
ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful case."
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall, C. J.). Uncritical extension of constitutional
protection to the burning of the flag risks the frustration of the very purpose
for which organized governments are instituted.
The Court decides that the American flag is just another symbol, about
which not only must opinions pro and con be tolerated, but for which the most
minimal public respect may not be enjoined.
The government may conscript men into the Armed Forces where they must
fight and perhaps die for the flag, but the government may not prohibit the
public burning of the banner under which they fight. I would uphold the
n2 In holding that the
[*436]
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
As the Court analyzes this case,
it presents the question whether the State of
A country's flag is a symbol of
more than "nationhood and national unity." Ante, at 407, 410,
413, and n. 9, 417, 420. It also
signifies the ideas that characterize the society that has chosen that emblem
as well as the special history that has animated the growth and power of those [***375]
ideas. The fleurs-de-lis and the
tricolor both symbolized "nationhood and national unity," but they
had vastly different meanings. The
message conveyed by some flags -- the swastika, for example -- may survive long
after it has outlived its usefulness as a symbol of regimented unity in a
particular nation.
[*437]
So it is with the American flag. It is more than a proud symbol of the
courage, the determination, and the gifts of nature [**2557]
that transformed 13 fledgling Colonies into a world power. It is a symbol of freedom, of equal
opportunity, of religious tolerance, and of good will for other peoples who
share our aspirations. The symbol
carries its message to dissidents both at home and abroad who may have no
interest at all in our national unity or survival.
The value of the flag as a symbol cannot
be measured. Even so, I have no doubt
that the interest in preserving that value for the future is both significant
and legitimate. Conceivably that value
will be enhanced by the Court's conclusion that our national commitment to free
expression is so strong that even the United States as ultimate guarantor of
that freedom is without power to prohibit the desecration of its unique symbol.
But I am unpersuaded. The creation of a
federal right to post bulletin boards and graffiti on the
It is appropriate to emphasize
certain propositions that are not implicated by this case. The statutory prohibition of flag desecration
does not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein." West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). The statute does not compel any conduct
or any profession of respect for any idea or any symbol.
[*438]
Nor does the statute violate "the government's paramount obligation
of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication." Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality
opinion). The content of respondent's
message has no relevance whatsoever to the case. The concept of "desecration" does
not turn on the substance of the message the actor intends to convey, but
rather on whether those who view the act will take serious offense. Accordingly,
one intending to convey a message of respect for the flag by burning it in a
public square might nonetheless be guilty of desecration if he knows that
others -- perhaps simply because they misperceive the intended message -- will
be seriously offended. Indeed, even if
the actor knows that all possible witnesses will understand that he intends to
send a message of respect, [***376] he might still be guilty of desecration if he
also knows that this understanding does not lessen the offense taken by some of
those witnesses. Thus, this is not a
case in which the fact that "it is the speaker's opinion that gives
offense" provides a special "reason for according it constitutional
protection," FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745
(1978) (plurality opinion). The case has nothing to do with
"disagreeable ideas," see ante, at 409. It involves disagreeable conduct that, in my
opinion, diminishes the value of an important national asset.
The Court is therefore quite wrong
in blandly asserting that respondent "was prosecuted for his expression of
dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the
core of our First Amendment values." Ante, at 411. Respondent was prosecuted because of the
method he chose to express his dissatisfaction with those policies. Had he chosen to spray-paint -- or perhaps
convey with a motion picture projector -- his message of dissatisfaction on the
facade of the Lincoln [**2558] Memorial, there would be no question about
the power of the Government to prohibit his means of expression. The prohibition would be supported by the
legitimate interest in preserving the quality of an important [*439]
national asset. Though the asset
at stake in this case is intangible, given its unique value, the same interest
supports a prohibition on the desecration of the American flag. *
* The Court suggests that a prohibition against flag
desecration is not content neutral because this form of symbolic speech is only
used by persons who are critical of the flag or the ideas it represents. In making this suggestion the Court does not
pause to consider the far-reaching consequences of its introduction of
disparate-impact analysis into our First Amendment jurisprudence. It seems obvious that a prohibition against
the desecration of a gravesite is content neutral even if it denies some
protesters the right to make a symbolic statement by extinguishing the flame in
Arlington Cemetery where John F. Kennedy is buried while permitting others to
salute the flame by bowing their heads.
Few would doubt that a protester who extinguishes the flame has
desecrated the gravesite, regardless of whether he prefaces that act with a
speech explaining that his purpose is to express deep admiration or unmitigated
scorn for the late President. Likewise,
few would claim that the protester who bows his head has desecrated the
gravesite, even if he makes clear that his purpose is to show disrespect. In such a case, as in a flag burning case,
the prohibition against desecration has absolutely nothing to do with the
content of the message that the symbolic speech is intended to convey.
The ideas of liberty and equality
have been an irresistible force in motivating leaders like Patrick Henry, Susan
B. Anthony, and Abraham Lincoln, schoolteachers like Nathan Hale and Booker T.
Washington, the Philippine Scouts who fought at Bataan, and the soldiers who
scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach. If
those ideas are worth fighting for -- and our history demonstrates that they
are -- it cannot be true that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power is
not itself worthy of protection from unnecessary desecration.
I respectfully dissent.