Commonwealth
versus Thomas Aves.
35
Shaw C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court. The
question now before the Court arises upon a return to a habeas corpus,
originally issued in vacation by Mr. Justice Wilde, for the purpose of
bringing up the person of a colored child named Med, and instituting a legal
inquiry into the fact of her [**25]
detention, and the causes for which she was detained. By the provisions
of the revised code, the practice upon habeas corpus is somewhat
altered. In case the party complaining, or in behalf of whom complaint is made,
on the ground of unlawful imprisonment, is not in the custody of an officer, as
of a sheriff or deputy, or corresponding officer of the United States, the writ
is directed to the sheriff, requiring him or his deputy to take the body of the
person thus complaining, or in behalf of whom complaint is thus made, and have
him before the court or magistrate issuing the writ, and to summon the party
alleged to have or claim the custody of such person, to appear at the same
time, and show the cause of the detention. The person thus summoned is to make
a statement under oath, setting forth all the facts fully and particularly; and
in case he claims the custody of such party, the grounds of such claim must be
fully set forth. This statement is in the nature of a return to the writ, as
made under the former practice, and will usually present the material facts upon
which the questions arise. Such return, however, is not conclusive of the facts
stated in it, but the court is to [**26] proceed and inquire into all the
alleged causes of detention, and decide upon them in a summary manner. But the
court may, if occasion require it, adjourn the examination, and in the mean
time bail the party, or commit him to a general or special custody, as the age,
health, sex, and other circumstances of the case may require. It is further
provided, that when the writ is issued by one judge of the court in vacation,
and in the mean time, before a final decision, the court shall meet in the same
county, the proceedings may be adjourned into the court, and there be conducted
to a final issue, in the same manner as if they had been originally commenced
by a writ issued from the court. I have stated these provisions the more
minutely, because there have been as yet but few proceedings under the Revised
Statutes, and the practice is yet to be established.
[*207]
Upon the return of this writ before Mr. Justice Wilde, a
statement was made by Aves, the respondent; the case was then postponed. It has
since been fully and very ably argued before all the judges, and is now
transferred to and entered in court, and stands here for judgment, in the same
manner as if the writ had been [**27]
originally returnable in court. Notice having been given to Mr. and Mrs.
Slater, an appearance has been entered for them, and in this state of the case
and of the parties, the cause has been heard. The statement on oath is now to
be considered in the same aspect as if made by Mr. Slater. It is made in fact
by Aves, claiming the custody of the slave in right of Slater, and that claim
is sanctioned by Slater, who appears by his attorney to maintain and enforce it.
He claims to have the child as master, and carry her back to
The case presents an extremely
interesting question, not so much on account of any doubt or difficulty
attending it, as on account of its important consequences to those who may be
affected by it, either as masters or slaves.
The precise question presented by
the claim of the respondent is, whether a citizen of any one of the United
States, where negro slavery is established by law, coming into this State, for
any temporary purpose of business or pleasure, staying some [**28] time, but not
acquiring a domicil here, who brings a slave with him as a personal attendant,
may restrain such slave of his liberty during his continuance here, and convey
him out of this State on his return, against his consent. It is not contended
that a master can exercise here any other of the rights of a slave owner, than
such as may be necessary to retain the custody of the slave during his
residence, and to remove him on his return.
Until this discussion, I had
supposed that there had been adjudged cases on this subject in this
Commonwealth; and it is believed to have been a prevalent opinion among
lawyers, that if a slave is brought voluntarily and unnecessarily within the
limits of this State, he becomes free, if he chooses to avail himself of the provisions
of our laws; not so much because his
[*208] coming within our
territorial limits, breathing our air, or treading on our soil, works any
alteration in his status, or condition, as settled by the law of his
domicil, as because by the operation of our laws, there is no authority on the
part of the master, either to restrain the slave of his liberty, whilst here,
or forcibly to take him into custody in order to his [**29] removal. There seems, however, to be no
decided case on the subject reported.
It is now to be considered as an
established rule, that by the constitution and laws of this Commonwealth,
before the adoption of the constitution of the United States, in 1789, slavery
was abolished, as being contrary to the principles of justice, and of nature,
and repugnant to the provisions of the declaration of rights, which is a
component part of the constitution of the State.
It is not easy, without more time
for historical research than I now have, to show the course of slavery in
But notwithstanding these strong
expressions in the acts of the colonial government, slavery to a certain extent
seems to have crept in; not probably by force of any law, for none such is
found or known to exist; but rather, it may be presumed, from that universal
custom, prevailing through the European colonies, in the West Indies, and on
the continent of America, and which was fostered and encouraged by the
commercial policy of the parent states. That it was so established, is shown by
this, that by several provincial acts, passed at various times, in the early
part of the last century, slavery was recognized as existing in fact, and
various regulations were prescribed
[*209] in reference to it. The
act passed in June, 1703, Anc. Charters, &c., 746, imposed certain
restrictions upon manumission, and subjected the master to the relief and
support of the slaves, notwithstanding such manumission, if the regulations
were not complied with. The act of October, 1705, Anc. Charters, &c., 748,
749, levied a duty and imposed various restrictions upon the importation of
negroes, [**31] and allowed a drawback upon any negro thus
imported and for whom the duty had been paid, if exported within the space of
twelve months and bona fide sold in any other plantation.
How, or by what act particularly,
slavery was abolished in Massachusetts, whether by the adoption of the opinion
in Sommersett's case, as a declaration and modification of the common law, or
by the Declaration of Independence, or by the constitution of 1780, it is not
now very easy to determine, and it is rather a matter of curiosity than of
utility; it being agreed on all hands, that if not abolished before, it was so
by the declaration of rights. In the case of Winchendon v. Hatfield,
4 Mass. 122, which was a case between two towns respecting the support of a
pauper, Chief Justice Parsons, in giving the opinion of the Court,
states, that in the first action which came before the Court after the
establishment of the constitution, the judges declared, that by virtue of the
declaration of rights, slavery in this State was no more. And he mentions
another case, Littleton v. Tuttle, 4 Mass. 128, note, in which it
was stated as the unanimous opinion of the Court, that a negro born within
[**32] the State, before the
constitution, was born free, though born of a female slave. The chief justice,
however, states, that the general practice and common usage have been opposed
to this opinion.
It has recently been stated as a
fact, that there were judicial decisions in this State prior to the adoption of
the present constitution, holding that negroes born
here of slave parents were free. A fact is stated in the above opinion of Chief
Justice Parsons, which may account for this suggestion. He states that
several negroes, born in this country, of imported
slaves, had demanded their freedom of their masters by suits at law, and
obtained it by a judgment of court. The defence of the master, he says, was
faintly made, for such was the temper of
[*210] the times, that a
restless, discontented slave was worth little, and when his freedom was
obtained in a course of legal proceedings, his master was not holden for his
support, if he became poor. It is very probable, therefore, that this surmise
is correct, and that records of judgments to this effect may be found; but they
would throw very little light on the subject.
Without pursuing this inquiry
farther, it is sufficient for [**33] the
purposes of the case before us, that by the constitution adopted in 1780,
slavery was abolished in Massachusetts, upon the ground that it is contrary to
natural right and the plaint principles of justice. The terms of the first
article of the declaration of rights are plain and explicit. "All men are
born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable
rights, which are, the right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties, that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property." It
would be difficult to select words more precisely adapted to the abolition of negro slavery. According to the laws prevailing in all the
States, where slavery is upheld, the child of a slave is not deemed to be born
free, a slave has no right to enjoy and defend his own liberty, or to acquire,
possess, or protect property. That the description was broad enough in its
terms to embrace negroes, and that it was intended by
the framers of the constitution to embrace them, is proved by the earliest
contemporaneous construction, by an unbroken series of judicial decisions, and
by a uniform practice from the adoption of the constitution to the present
time. The whole tenor of [**34] our policy, of our legislation and
jurisprudence, from that time to the present, has been consistent with this
construction, and with no other.
Such being the general rule of
law, it becomes necessary to inquire how far it is modified or controlled in
its operation; either,
1. By the law of other nations and
states, as admitted by the comity of nations to have a limited operation within
a particular state; or
2. By the
constitution and laws of the
In considering the first, we may
assume that the law of this State is analogous to the law of England, in this
respect; that while slavery is considered as unlawful and inadmissible in both, [*211] and this because contrary to natural right
and to laws designed for the security of personal liberty, yet in both, the
existence of slavery in other countries is recognized, and the claims of
foreigners, growing out of that condition, are, to a certain extent, respected.
Almost the only reason assigned by Lord Mansfield in Sommersett's case
was, that slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable
of being introduced on any reasons moral or political, but only by positive
law; and, it is so odious, that nothing can [**35] be suffered to support it but positive law.
The same doctrine is clearly
stated in the full and able opinion of Marshall C. J., in the case of
the Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 120. He is speaking
of the slave trade, but the remark itself shows that it applies to the state of
slavery. "That it is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be
denied. That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, is
generally admitted, and that no other person can rightfully deprive him of
those fruits, and appropriate them against his will, seems to be the necessary
result of the admission."
But although slavery and the slave
trade are deemed contrary to natural right, yet it is settled by the judicial
decisions of this country and of
This view seems consistent with
most of the leading cases on the subject.
Sommersett's case, 20 Howell's State Trials, 1, as already cited,
decides that slavery, being odious and against natural right, cannot exist,
except by force of positive law. But it clearly admits,
that it may exist by force of positive law. And it may be remarked, that by
positive law, in this connection, may be as well understood customary law as
the enactment of a statute;
[**37] and the word is
used to designate rules established by tacit acquiescence or by the legislative
act of any state, and which derive their force and authority from such
acquiescence or enactment, and not because they are the dictates of natural
justice, and as such of universal obligation.
Le Louis, 2 Dodson, 236. This was an elaborate opinion of Sir William
Scott. It was the case of a French vessel seized by an English vessel in
time of peace, whilst engaged in the slave trade. It proceeded upon the ground,
that a right of visitation, by the vessels of one nation, of the vessels of
another, could only be exercised in time of war, or against pirates, and that
the slave trade was not piracy by the laws of nations, except against those by
whose government it has been so declared by law or by treaty. And the vessel
was delivered up.
The Amedie, 1 Acton, 240. The judgment of Sir William Grant
in this case, upon the point on which the case was decided, that of the burden
of proof, has been doubted. But upon the point now
under discussion, he says, "but we do now lay down as a principle, that
this is a trade which cannot, abstractedly speaking, be said to have a
legitimate [**38] existence. I say, abstractedly speaking, because we cannot legislate
for other countries; nor has this country a right to control any foreign
legislature, that may give permission to its subjects to prosecute this
trade." He however considered, in consequence of the principles declared
by the British government, that he was bound to hold, prima facie, that
the traffic was unlawful, and threw on the claimant the burden of proof, that the traffic was permitted by the law of his own
country.
[*213] The
Diana, 1 Dodson, 95. This case strongly corroborates the general principle,
that though the slave trade is contrary to the principles of justice and
humanity, it cannot with truth be said, that it is contrary to the laws of all
civilized nations; and that courts will respect the property of persons engaged
in it under the sanction of the laws of their own country.
Two cases are cited from the
decisions of courts of common law, which throw much light upon the subject.
Madrazo v. Willes, 3 Barn. & Ald. 353. It was an
action brought by a Spaniard against a British subject, who had unlawfully, and
without justifiable cause, captured a ship with three hundred slaves on [**39] board. The only
question was the amount of damages. Abbott C. J., who tried the cause,
in reference to the very strong language of the acts of Parliament, declaring
the traffic in slaves a violation of right and contrary to the first principles
of justice and humanity, doubted whether the owner could recover damages, in an
English court of justice, for the value of the slaves as property, and directed
the ships and the slaves to be separately valued. On further consideration, he
and the whole court were of opinion, that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover for the value of the slaves. That opinion
went upon the ground, that the traffic in slaves, however wrong in itself, if
prosecuted by a Spaniard between Spain and the coast of Africa, and if
permitted by the laws of Spain, and not restrained by treaty, could not be lawfully
interrupted by a British subject, on the high seas, the common highway of
nations. And Mr. Justice Bayley, in his opinion, after stating the
general rule, that a foreigner is entitled, in a British court of justice, to
compensation for a wrongful act, added, that although the language used by the
statutes was very strong, yet it could only apply to British [**40] subjects. It is true, he further says, that
if this were a trade contrary to the laws of nations, a foreigner could not
maintain this action. And Best J. spoke strongly to the same effect,
adding, that the statutes "speak in just terms of indignation of the
horrible traffic in human beings, but they speak only in the name of the
British nation. If a ship be acting contrary to the general law of nations, she
is thereby subject to confiscation; but it is
[*214] impossible to say, that
the slave trade is contrary to what may be called the common law of
nations."
Forbes v. Cochrane, 2 Barn. & Cressw. 448; S. C. 3 Dowl. & Ryl.
679. This case has been supposed to conflict with the one last cited; but I
apprehend, in considering the principles upon which they were decided, they
will be found to be perfectly reconcilable. The plaintiff, a British subject,
domiciled in
That slavery is a relation founded
in force, not in right, existing, where it does exist, by force of positive
law, and not recognized as founded in natural right, is intimated by the
definition of slavery in the civil law; "Servitus est constitutio juris
gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subjicitur."
Upon a general review of the
authorities, and upon an application of the well established principles upon
this subject, we think they fully maintain the point stated, that though
slavery is contrary to natural right, to the principles of justice, humanity
and sound policy, as we adopt them and found our own laws upon [**43] them, yet not being contrary to the laws of
nations, if any other state or community see fit to establish and continue
slavery by law, so far as the legislative power of that country extends, we are
bound to take notice of the existence of those laws, and we are not at liberty
to declare and hold an act done within those limits, unlawful and void, upon
our views of morality and policy, which the sovereign and legislative power of
the place has pronounced to be lawful. If, therefore, an unwarranted
interference and wrong is done by our citizens to a foreigner, acting under the
sanction of such laws, and within their proper limits, that is, within the
local limits of the power by whom they are thus established, or on the high
seas, which each and every nation has a right in common with all others to
occupy, our laws would no doubt afford a remedy against the wrong done. So, in
pursuance of a well known maxim, that in the construction of contracts, the lex
loci contractus shall govern, if a person, having in other respects a right
to sue in our courts, shall bring an action against another, liable in other
respects to be sued in our courts, upon a contract made upon the subject of
[**44] slavery
in a state where slavery is allowed by law, the law here would give it effect.
As if a note of hand made in New Orleans were sued on here, and the defence
should be, that it was on a bad consideration, or without consideration,
because given for the price of a slave sold, it may well be admitted, that such
a [*216] defence could not prevail, because the
contract was a legal one by the law of the place where it was made.
This view of the law applicable to
slavery, marks strongly the distinction between the relation of master and
slave, as established by the local law of particular states, and in virtue of
that sovereign power and independent authority which each independent state
concedes to every other, and those natural and social relations, which are
everywhere and by all people recognized, and which, though they may be modified
and regulated by municipal law, are not founded upon it, such as the relation
of parent and child, and husband and wife. Such also is the principle upon
which the general right of property is founded, being in some form universally
recognized as a natural right, independently of municipal law.
This affords an answer to the
argument drawn from [**45] the maxim,
that the right of personal property follows the person, and therefore, where by
the law of a place a person there domiciled acquires personal property, by the
comity of nations the same must be deemed his property everywhere. It is
obvious, that if this were true, in the extent in which the argument employs
it, if slavery exists anywhere, and if by the laws of any place a property can
be acquired in slaves, the law of slavery must extend to every place where such
slaves may be carried. The maxim, therefore, and the argument can apply only to
those commodities which are everywhere, and by all
nations, treated and deemed subjects of property. But it is not speaking with
strict accuracy to say, that a property can be acquired in human beings, by
local laws. Each state may, for its own convenience, declare that slaves shall
be deemed property, and that the relations and laws of personal chattels shall
be deemed to apply to them; as, for instance, that they may be bought and sold,
delivered, attached, levied upon, that trespass will lie for an injury done to
them, or trover for converting them. But it would be a perversion of terms to
say, that such local laws do in fact make [**46] them personal property generally; they can
only determine, that the same rules of law shall apply to them as are
applicable to property, and this effect will follow only so far as such laws proprio
vigore can operate.
[*217]
The same doctrine is recognized in
The same principle is declared by
the court in
The conclusion to which we come
from this view of the law is this:
That by the general and now well
established law of this Commonwealth, bond slavery cannot exist, because it is
contrary to natural right, and repugnant to numerous provisions of the
constitution and laws, designed to secure the liberty and personal rights of
all persons within its limits [**47] and
entitled to the protection of the laws.
That though by the laws of a
foreign state, meaning by "foreign," in this connection, a state
governed by its own laws, and between which and our own there is no dependence
one upon the other, but which in this respect are as independent as foreign
states, a person may acquire a property in a slave, such acquisition, being
contrary to natural right, and effected by the local law, is dependent upon such
local law for its existence and efficacy, and being contrary to the fundamental
law of this State, such general right of property cannot be exercised or
recognized here.
That, as a general rule, all
persons coming within the limits of a state, become subject to all its
municipal laws, civil and criminal, and entitled to the privileges which those
laws confer; that this rule applies as well to blacks as whites, except in the
case of fugitives, to be afterwards considered; that if such persons have been
slaves, they become free, not so much because any alteration is made in their status,
or condition, as because there is no law which will warrant, but there are
laws, if they choose to avail themselves of them, which prohibit, their
forcible [**48] detention or forcible
removal.
That the law arising from the
comity of nations cannot apply;
[*218] because if it did, it
would follow as a necessary consequence, that all those persons, who, by force
of local laws, and within all foreign places where slavery is permitted, have
acquired slaves as property, might bring their slaves here, and exercise over
them the rights and power which an owner of property might exercise, and for
any length of time short of acquiring a domicil; that such an application of
the law would be wholly repugnant to our laws, entirely inconsistent with our
policy and our fundamental principles, and is therefore inadmissible.
Whether, if a slave, voluntarily
brought here and with his own consent returning with his master, would resume
his condition as a slave, is a question which was incidentally raised in the
argument, but is one on which we are not called on to give an opinion in this
case, and we give none. From the principle above stated, on which a slave
brought here becomes free, to wit, that he becomes entitled to the protection
of our laws, and there is no law to warrant his forcible arrest and removal, it
would seem to follow as a necessary [**49] conclusion, that if the slave, waives
the protection of those laws, and returns to the state where he is held as a
slave, his condition is not changed.
In the case of The Slave, Grace,
2 Haggard's Adm. R. 94, this question was fully considered by Sir William
Scott, in the case of a slave brought from the West Indies to
A different decision, I believe,
has been made of the question in some of the
The question has thus far been
considered as a general one, and applicable to cases
of slaves brought from any foreign state or country; and it now becomes
necessary to consider how far this result differs, where the person is claimed
as a slave by a citizen of another State of this
In art. 4, § 2, the
constitution declares that no person held to service or labor in one State,
under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law
or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be
delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.
The law of congress made in
pursuance of this article provides, that when any person held to labor in any
of the United States, &c. shall escape into any other of the said States or
Territories, the person entitled, &c. is empowered to arrest the fugitive,
and upon proof made that the person so seized, under the law of the State from
which he or she fled, owes service, &c. Act of February 12, 1793, c. 7, § 3.
In regard to these provisions, the
Court are of opinion, that as by the general law of this Commonwealth, slavery
cannot exist, and the rights and powers of slave owners cannot be exercised
therein; the effect of this provision in the constitution and laws of the
United States, [**51] is to limit and restrain the operation of
this general rule, so far as it is done by the plain meaning and obvious intent
and import of the language used, and no further. The constitution and law
manifestly refer to the case of a slave escaping from a State where he owes
service or labor, into another State or Territory. He is termed a fugitive from
labor; the proof to be made is, that he owed service
or labor, under the laws of the State or Territory from which he fled,
and the authority is given to remove such fugitive to the State from which
he fled. This language can, by no reasonable construction, be applied to
the case of a slave who has not fled from the State, but who has been brought
into the State by his master.
The same conclusion will result
from a consideration of the well known circumstances under which this
constitution was formed. Before the adoption of the constitution, the States
were to a certain extent, sovereign and independent, and were in a condition to
settle the terms upon which they would form a more perfect union. It has been
contended by some overzealous philanthropists, that such an article in the constitution [*220] could be of no binding [**52] force or validity, because it was a
stipulation contrary to natural right. But it is difficult to perceive the
force of this objection. It has already been shown, that slavery is not
contrary to the laws of nations. It would then be the proper subject of
treaties among sovereign and independent powers. Suppose instead of forming the
present constitution, or any other confederation, the several States had become
in all respects sovereign and independent, would it not have been competent for
them to stipulate by treaty that fugitive slaves should be mutually restored,
and to frame suitable regulations, under which such a stipulation should be
carried into effect? Such a stipulation would be highly important and necessary
to secure peace and harmony between adjoining nations, and to prevent perpetual
collisions and border wars. It would be no encroachment on the rights of the
fugitive; for no stranger has a just claim to the protection of a foreign state
against its will, especially where a claim to such protection would be likely
to involve the state in war; and each independent state has a right to
determine by its own laws and treaties, who may come to reside or seek shelter
within [**53] its
limits, and to prescribe the terms. Now the constitution of the
But this point is supported by
most respectable and [**55]
unexceptionable authorities.
In the case of Butler v. Hopper,
1 Wash. C. C. 499, it was held by Mr. Justice Washington, in terms, that
the provision in the constitution which we are now considering, does not
"extend to the case of a slave voluntarily carried by his master into
another State, and there leaving him under the protection of some law declaring
him free." In this case, however, the master claimed to hold the slave in
virtue of a law of Pennsylvania, which permitted members of congress and
sojourners, to retain their domestic slaves, and it was held that he did not
bring himself within either branch of the exception, because he had, for two
years of the period, ceased to be a member of congress, and so lost the
privilege; and by having become a resident could not claim as a sojourner. The
case is an authority to this point, that the claimant of a slave, to avail
himself of the provisions of the constitution and laws of the United States,
must bring himself within their plain and obvious meaning, and they will not be
extended by construction; and that the clause in the constitution is confined
to the [*222] case of a slave escaping from one State, and
fleeing [**56] to another.
But in a more recent case, the
point was decided by the same eminent judge.
Ex parte Simmons, 4
Another question was made in that
case, whether the slave was free by the laws of Pennsylvania, which, like our
own in effect, liberate slaves voluntarily brought within the State, but there
is an exception in favor of members of congress, foreign ministers and consuls,
and sojourners: but this provision is qualified as to sojourners and
persons passing through the State, in such manner as to exclude them from the
benefit of the exception, if the slave was retained in the State longer than
six months. The slave in that case having been detained in the State more than
six months, was therefore held free.
This case is an authority to this
point; -- the general rule being, that if a slave is brought into a State where
the laws do not admit slavery, he will be held free, [**57]
the person who claims him as a slave under any exception or limitation
of the general rule, must show clearly that the case is within such exception.
The same principle was
substantially decided by the state court in the same State in the case of Commonwealth
v. Holloway, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 305. It was
the case of a child of a fugitive slave, born in
The same decision has been made in
[*223]
In Louisiana, it has been held, that if a person with a slave, goes into
a State to reside, [**58] where it is declared that slavery shall not
exist, for ever so short a time, the slave ipso facto becomes free, and
will be so adjudged and considered afterwards in all other States; and a person
moving from Kentucky to Ohio to reside, his slaves thereby became free, and
were so held in Louisiana. This case also fully recognizes the authority of
States to make laws dissolving the relation of master and slave; and considers
the special limitation of the general power, by the federal constitution, as a
forcible implication in proof of the existence of such general power. Lunsford v. Coquillon, 14 Martin's Rep. 403. *
* Marie Louise v. Marot et al. 9 Curry's
(
[**59]
And in the above cited case from
The same rule of construction is
adopted in analogous cases in other countries, that is, where an institution is
forbidden, but where for special reasons and to a limited extent such
prohibition is relaxed, the exemption is to be construed strictly, and whoever
claims the exemption, must show himself clearly within it, and where the facts
do not bring the case within the exemption, the general rule has its effect.
By a general law of
The constitution and laws of the
United States, then, are confined to cases of slaves escaping from other States
and coming within the limits of this State without the consent and against the
will of their masters, and cannot by any sound construction extend to a case
where the slave does not escape and does not come within the limits of this
State against the [**61]
will of the master, but by his own act and permission. The
provision is to be construed according to its plain terms and import, and
cannot be extended beyond this, and where the case is not that of an escape,
the general rule shall have its effect. It is upon these grounds we are of
opinion, that an owner of a slave in another State where slavery is warranted
by law, voluntarily bringing such slave into this State, has no authority to
detain him against his will, or to carry him out of the State against his
consent, for the purpose of being held in slavery.
This opinion is not to be
considered as extending to a case where the owner of a fugitive slave, having
produced a certificate according to the law of the United States, is bona
fide removing such slave to his own domicil, and in so doing passes through
a free State; where the law confers a right or favor, by necessary implication
it gives the means of enjoying it. Nor do we give any opinion upon the case,
where an owner of a slave in one State is bona fide removing to another
State where slavery is allowed, and in so doing necessarily passes [*225]
through a free State, or where by accident or necessity he is compelled
[**62] to touch or land therein,
remaining no longer than necessary. Our geographical position exempts us from
the probable necessity of considering such a case, and we give no opinion
respecting it.
The child who is the subject of
this habeas corpus, being of too tender years to have any will or give any
consent to be removed, and her mother being a slave and having no will of her
own and no power to act for her child, she is necessarily left in the custody
of the law. The respondent having claimed the custody of the child, in behalf
of Mr. and Mrs. Slater, who claim the right to carry her back to
Under a suggestion made in the
outset of this inquiry, that a probate guardian would probably be appointed, we
shall for the present order the child into temporary custody, to give time for
an application to be made to the judge of probate.