JOSEPH
BAYLIES v. JOSEPHINE M. CURRY
128
OPINION: [***2] [*290]
[**595] Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:
The case made by appellee's evidence, as stated in
the printed argument presented to us by appellant's counsel, is: "On
Sunday evening, June 6, 1886, appellee (who is a
colored woman) applied to the box-office of appellant's theater for tickets,
and was refused them; that she then procured a white customer of her husband to
get tickets for her; that with these tickets she and her husband entered the
theater and ascended to the balcony, where they were refused seats by the usher
because the seat coupons had been torn from their tickets, which was done by
the door-keeper; that the usher referred her to the door-keeper, the
door-keeper to the box-office, and that at the box-office her money was
returned and she and her husband went away." To this must be added, appellee testified that the gentleman in the ticket office,
who, she says, "looked like Mr. Baylies, throwed the money at me, swore, and said he didn't want no damned niggers in there; told me to take my crowd and get
out." This, it is true, is contradicted by evidence on behalf of
appellant; but since there is no evidence tending to show that
[***3] appellee was otherwise deprived of
the "full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges" of the theater than as thus detailed by her,
the jury must have found that the evidence preponderated in behalf of her
statement, and the judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming the judgment of
the circuit court, requires us to accept that view of the facts.
Appellant, upon the trial, offered to prove that he had, in order to avoid
collision between the races, adopted a rule, (and [*291]
that such rule was necessary,) to the effect that the colored people should
have one row to themselves in each part of the house, or as many rows as the
tickets which they bought would call for; but the court refused to allow the
evidence to be given. He also offered to prove that it
[**596] was the rule of his theater that colored persons
were given the same advantages for the same price, in all parts of this
theater, that white persons had, with the exception, only, that the colored
persons were assigned to a particular row of seats; but the court refused to
allow the evidence to be given. Appellant also asked the court to give to the
jury, among others, the [***4] following
instructions, but the court declined to do so, namely:
"3. The jury are instructed that the defendants were legally justified in
assigning colored persons to seats in the theater of defendant, Baylies, separate and apart from the seats of white
persons, provided the seats to which such colored persons were assigned were
equally comfortable and well situated.
"5. You are instructed, as a matter of law, that the proprietor or manager
of a theater has the right to make such reasonable rules as he may see fit,
regarding the seating of the occupants of his theater, or the disposition,
arrangement or classification of tickets sold to different persons or classes
of persons, provided such rules are reasonable, and do not discriminate against
any certain class or race of people as regards the prices and location of such
seats."
Exceptions to these rulings present the only question that we are now required
to consider.
It would seem too plain to admit of serious controversy, that the circuit court
ruled properly, because the evidence offered and the instructions asked were
irrelevant to the issue being tried by the jury. Appellee
offered no evidence tending to show that [***5]
appellant or his servants seated or offered to seat her in the same row with
other colored people, against her objection, nor did appellant introduce or
offer to introduce [*292] such evidence. The only case her evidence
tended to prove was, that after having paid, through another, for the requisite
ticket to the "first balcony," she was first denied admission
thereto, and afterwards denied admission to every part of the theater, because
of her color. The rule requiring colored people to sit in the same row,
separate and apart from white people, manifestly had no tendency to justify
either of these exclusions.
Beyond all question, sections 1 and 2 of the "Act to protect all citizens
in their civil and legal rights, and fixing a penalty for violation of the
same," approved June 10, 1885, (Laws of 1885, p. 64,) prohibit the denial
of access to the theater and to the several circles or grades of seats therein
because of race or color, for such is, in effect, the language employed. The
first section says: "All persons within the jurisdiction of said State shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges of * * * theaters, [***6]
* * * subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to all citizens." The second section says: "Any
person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, by
denying to any citizen, except for reasons applicable alike to all citizens of
every race and color, and regardless of color or race, the full enjoyment of
any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges in said section
enumerated, * * * shall for every such offense forfeit and pay a sum not less
than twenty-five (25) dollars, nor more than five hundred (500) dollars, to the
person aggrieved thereby."
It would be difficult to employ more comprehensive and sweeping language to
abolish all distinctions in accommodations, facilities, privileges or
advantages in theaters on account of race or color, than that thus employed.
But it is enough for the present that it includes denial of access to the
theater, and denial to the first balcony of the theater, and that it is not
contended, nor, in our opinion, can it reasonably be contended, [*293] that these sections are inoperative by
reason of repugnance to provisions of the constitution of this State or
[***7] of the United States.
The judgment is affirmed.