BROWN ET
AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA ET AL.
347
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE
WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas,
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n1 In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the
plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary school age residing in Topeka. They
brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a
In the
In the
In the
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[***7]
[*487] [**688] In each of the cases, minors of the
Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in
obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, [*488]
they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws
requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was
alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a
three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the
so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under
that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided
substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be
separate. In the
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal"
and cannot [***8] be made "equal," and that hence they
are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious
importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. n2 Argument
was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard
this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court. n3
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n2 344 U.S. 1, 141, 891.
n3 345
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[*489]
[2]
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered
exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states,
then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and
opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince
us that, although these sources cast some light, it [**689] is not
enough to resolve the problem with which we are [***9] faced. At
best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War
Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among
"all persons born or naturalized in the
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history,
with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that
time. n4 In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported
[*490] by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of
white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes
was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were
illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some
states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in
the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is
true that public school education at the [***10] time of the
Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on
Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the
North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing
today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded
schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year
in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a
consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public
education.
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n4 For a general study of the development of public education prior to the
Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A History of
Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley,
Public Education in the
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[***11]
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided
shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all
state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. n5 The doctrine of
[*491] "separate but [**690] equal" did not
make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy
v.
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n5 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v.
"It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that
the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that
all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the
States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment
was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by
law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity,
or right, most valuable to the colored race, -- the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored, -- exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a
subject race."
See also
n6 The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston,
59 Mass. 198, 206 (1850), upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality.
Segregation in
n7 See also
n8 In the Cumming case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring
the defendant school board to discontinue the operation of a high school for
white children until the board resumed operation of a high school for Negro
children. Similarly, in the Gong Lum case,
the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state
authorities had misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children
and requiring him to attend a Negro school.
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In the instant cases, that question is [***14] directly presented.
Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter,
there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been
equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible"
factors. n9 Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of
these tangible factors [**691] in the Negro and white schools
involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of
segregation itself on public education.
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n9 In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all
such factors. 98 F.Supp.
797, 798. In the
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[***15]
[3]
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy
v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout
[*493] the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws.
[4]
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In [***16] these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.
[5]
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and
other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in
finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal
educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school." In McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro
admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again
resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to
engage in discussions and [***17] exchange views with other
students, and, in general, to learn his profession." [*494]
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was
well stated by a finding in the
"Segregation
of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon
the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the
law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting
the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in
a racial[ly] integrated [***18] school
system." n10
[**692] Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
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n10 A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: "I conclude from the
testimony that in our Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in education
itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving educational
opportunities which are substantially inferior to those available to white
children otherwise similarly situated." 87 A. 2d 862, 865.
n11 K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality
Development (Midcentury White House Conference on
Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science
Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation
Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229
(1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination
and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949), 44-48;
Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).
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[***19]
[6]
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any
discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. n12
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n12 See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p.
497, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this
decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation
of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was
necessarily [***20] subordinated to the primary question -- the
constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced
that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order
that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the
cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present
further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for
the reargument this Term. n13 The Attorney General
[*496] of the
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n13 "4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates
the Fourteenth Amendment
"(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the
limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should
forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or
"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit
an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated
systems to a system not based on color distinctions?
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are
based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to
the end described in question 4 (b),
"(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
"(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
"(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence
with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
"(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance
with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions
should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts
of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed
decrees?" [***21]
n14 See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954).
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It is so ordered.