32 U.S. 243 (1833)




Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.


 The judgment brought up by this writ of error having been rendered by the court of a state, this tribunal can exercise no jurisdiction over it, unless it be shown to come

 within the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the judicial act.


 The plaintiff in error contends that it comes within that clause in the fifth amendment to the constitution,  [***9]  which inhibits the taking of private property for public

 use, without just compensation. He insists that this amendment, being in favor of the liberty of the citizen, ought to be so construed as to restrain the legislative power

 of a state, as well as that of the United States. If this proposition be untrue, the court can take no jurisdiction of the cause.


 The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty.


 The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the

 individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular

 government as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their

 situation, and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if

 expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government  [***10]  created by the instrument. They are limitations of power

 granted in the instrument itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes.


 If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the states. In their

 several constitutions they have imposed such restrictions on their respective  [*248]  governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most proper

 for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no farther than they are supposed to have a common interest.


 The counsel for the plaintiff in error insists that the constitution was intended to secure the people of the several states against the undue exercise of power by their

 respective state governments; as well as against that which might be attempted by their general government. In support of this argument he relies on the inhibitions

 contained in the tenth section of the first article.


 We think that section affords a strong if not a conclusive argument in support of the opinion already indicated by the court.


 The preceding  [***11]  section contains restrictions which are obviously intended for the exclusive purpose of restraining the exercise of power by the departments

 of the general government. Some of them use language applicable only to congress: others are expressed in general terms. The third clause, for example, declares that

 "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." No language can be more general; yet the demonstration is complete that it applies solely to the government

 of the United States. In addition to the general arguments furnished by the instrument itself, some of which have been already suggested, the succeeding section, the

 avowed purpose of which is to restrain state legislation, contains in terms the very prohibition. It declares that "no state shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto

 law." This provision, then, of the ninth section, however comprehensive its language, contains no restriction on state legislation.


 The ninth section having enumerated, in the nature of a bill of rights, the limitations intended to be imposed on the powers of the general government, the tenth

 proceeds to enumerate those which were to operate on the state legislatures. These  [***12]  restrictions are brought together in the same section, and are by

 express words applied to the states. "No state shall enter into any treaty," &c. Perceiving that in a constitution framed by the people of the United States for the

 government of all, no limitation of the action of government on  [*249]  the people would apply to the state government, unless expressed in terms; the restrictions

 contained in the tenth section are in direct words so applied to the states.


 It is worthy of remark, too, that these inhibitions generally restrain state legislation on subjects entrusted to the general government, or in which the people of all the

 states feel an interest.


 A state is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation. If these compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with the treaty making power which is

 conferred entirely on the general government; if with each other, for political purposes, they can scarcely fail to interfere with the general purpose and intent of the

 constitution. to grant letters of marque and reprisal, would lead directly to war; the power of declaring which is expressly given to congress. To coin money is also the

 exercise of  [***13]  a power conferred on congress. It would be tedious to recapitulate the several limitations on the powers of the states which are contained in this

 section. They will be found, generally, to restrain state legislation on subjects entrusted to the government of the union, in which the citizens of all the states are

 interested. In these alone were the whole people concerned. The question of their application to states is not left to construction. It is averred in positive words.


 If the original constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the first article, draws this plain and marked line of discrimination between the limitations it imposes on the

 powers  [**675]  of the general government, and on those of the states; if in every inhibition intended to act on state power, words are employed which directly

 express that intent; some strong reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course in framing the amendments, before that departure can be



 We search in vain for that reason.


 Had the people of the several states, or any of them, required changes in their constitutions; had they required additional safeguards to liberty from the apprehended

  [***14]  encroachments of their particular governments: the remedy was in their own hands, and would have been applied by themselves. A convention  [*250]

 would have been assembled by the discontented state, and the required improvements would have been made by itself. The unwieldy and cumbrous machinery of

 procuring a recommendation from two-thirds of congress, and the assent of three-fourths of their sister states, could never have occurred to any human being as a

 mode of doing that which might be effected by the state itself. Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the state

 governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original constitution, and have expressed that intention. Had congress engaged in the extraordinary

 occupation of improving the constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in

 matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language.


 But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that the great revolution which established the constitution  [***15]  of the United States, was not

 effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched over the interests

 of our country, deemed essential to union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to

 liberty. In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments

 demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government -- not against those of the local governments.


 In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority in congress,

 and adopted by the states. These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot so apply them.


 We are of opinion that the provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just

 compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise  [***16]  of power by the government  [*251]  of the United States, and is not applicable to the

 legislation of the states. We are therefore of opinion that there is no repugnancy between the several acts of the general assembly of Maryland, given in evidence by

 the defendants at the trial of this cause, in the court of that state, and the constitution of the United States. This court, therefore, has no jurisdiction of the cause; and it

 is dismissed.


 This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the court of appeals for the western shore of the state of Maryland, and was argued by counsel:

 on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court that there is no repugnancy between the several acts of the general assembly of Maryland, given in evidence by

 the defendants at the trial of this cause in the court of that state, and the constitution of the United States; whereupon, it is ordered and adjudged by this court that this

 writ of error be, and the same is hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.