

Job Skill and Black Male Wage Discrimination*

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Objective. Debate over the causes of wage inequality have raised suggestions that, rather than discrimination, skill differences may be the reason for racial wage disparities. The purpose of this research is to examine what impact on-the-job skill differences have on wage inequality. *Method.* I regress the log wage onto race and a measure of skill. The Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality Employer Survey is particularly useful in this analysis because it contains the employer's evaluation of the worker's relative skill against other workers. *Result.* When white and black men have the same employer's competitive performance rating, rather than decreasing racial wage differences, the differences actually increase. *Conclusion.* The wage gap is not a skills gap, but evidence of racial discrimination in the labor market.

Much of the policy debate about the efficacy of anti-discrimination laws has concerned how relevant a factor discrimination is in explaining racial wage differences. With the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, employers were forbidden from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Nevertheless, today there are still large wage differences between whites and blacks. Scholars ask not so much whether random acts of discrimination occur, but what impact general patterns of discrimination have on wage inequality. Some claim that large gaps in wages can be explained only by racial discrimination. Others blame wage gaps on unobserved skill deficiencies that minorities bring to the labor market that are not captured in normal statistical models.

The assumption that labor market discrimination is generally isolated to specific violations has led to policies where allegations of racial discrimination are to be handled primarily by the individual complainant on a case-by-case basis. Some (Epstein, 1992) have even claimed that anti-discrimination laws are unnecessary. We know that anti-employment discrimination laws are largely underutilized, particularly by the federal government (Graham, 1990:131; Leonard, 1990:49). Donohue and Siegelman (1991) state that only 1 percent of those having a problem with employment discrimination ever seek legal redress because the costs of suing a present employer can be

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very high. However, if employment and wage discrimination are the norm, the whole enforcement apparatus should be shifted to job audits, monitoring, and government-sponsored enforcement at the state and federal levels.

In discussions about racial wage differences, it is rare to find research using an employer measure of skill. In this study, using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) Employer Survey, the employer's competitive performance rating of the worker is used as the measure of skill. Not only do the measures of skill not reduce the racial wage gap, but black men also get slightly lower returns than white men for equivalent performance ratings. The cause for both phenomena is obviously racial discrimination in the labor market.

Wage Inequality is Due to a Lack of Skills

Some scholars who deny that discrimination is the primary factor in wage inequality ascribe this inequality to deficiencies in human capital or the labor market characteristics of black workers. For example, Heckman (1998:101) states that while there is no question that some employers do discriminate based on race, the evidence supports the idea that labor market discrimination is "no longer a first-order quantitative problem in American society." Rather, Heckman blames skill deficiencies that blacks bring to the labor market for the wage gaps.

Heckman's conclusions are based primarily on the work of Neal and Johnson, and Rivera-Batiz. Neal and Johnson (1996) regressed the log wage of black and Latino men and women aged 26 to 29 on race dummy variables, age, education, and scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). They found that matching for the AFQT score explained about two-thirds of the log wage difference for black men and all the difference for black women. Johnson and Neal (1998) also regressed the log of annual earnings on race and the AFQT score. Their findings show that the AFQT score explains about two-thirds of the earnings gap for black women and almost half the earnings gap for black men.

Rivera-Batiz (1992) used probit analysis to determine the impact of race/gender on the likelihood of being fully employed. He matched for education (two dummy variables, one for high school completion, the other for college completion), marital status, offspring, weeks out of work, and regional dummies. His results show that black men and women are considerably more likely to not be fully employed than whites. However, when matched for the scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) quantitative literacy test and reading proficiency tests, black men and women are no more likely to not be fully employed than are whites. Further, O'Neill (1990) finds that matching for education, experience, and AFQT score accounts for most of the black/white wage gap for males aged 22 to 29

who have some college education and who have worked 35 hours or more in a week.

The results from the aforementioned studies would seem to provide the answer to the issue of whether wage inequality in the labor market is due to racial discrimination or deficiencies in skill. However, all the AFQT studies have rather weak explanatory power.

Johnson and Neal's (1998) findings show that when earnings, not hourly wage rates, are the dependent variable, there remains a large racial wage differential, even if the AFQT score is included in the regression. This suggests that employed hours may be a significant problem. Neither Neal and Johnson (1996) nor Johnson and Neal (1998) include zero wage earners in their studies. If this had been done it is possible that the AFQT score would have had no impact whatsoever.

In addition, Rodgers and Spriggs (1996) have questioned whether the AFQT is a proper measure of job skill. The AFQT is less able to predict black wages than white wages, suggesting racial bias in the test. The AFQT score is highly correlated with the black race dummy variable, suggesting that the two are proxies for each other (Maume, Cancio, and Evans, 1996). When the AFQT is adjusted for the school grade completed at the time the test was taken and the age when the test was taken, the AFQT's impact on the log wage all but disappears (Rodgers and Spriggs, 2002).

Wage Inequality is Due to Discrimination

Those who posit that the most important cause of wage inequality is labor market discrimination use a number of techniques to support their theses, including regression analysis, job audits, and surveys. Surprisingly, many employers openly report that they discriminate. Kirschenman and Neckerman (1991) found that many of the Chicago employers they surveyed discriminated against blacks and workers in the inner city. In addition, employers show high rates of negative attitudes about young black men. Wilson (1996:ch. 5) reports that 74 percent of employers expressed views of blacks that were coded as negative, that is, racially biased.

Researchers who use the regression method create equations similar to those of researchers who accept the skill deficiency hypothesis; however, the gaps in wages are ascribed to discrimination, not a lack of skills. For example, Coleman (forthcoming) shows that black men and women continue to report discrimination in raises and promotions at higher levels than whites after controlling for human capital and industry concentration. However, blacks earn less than whites when working in the same industries, leading the author to conclude that racial discrimination is still very much present in the workplace. Mason (1997) finds that, given the same socioeconomic background factors, blacks complete more years of schooling

than whites and have a higher probability of graduating from high school, implying more skill, not less; nevertheless, they still earn lower wages.

Mason (1999) examines the lack of skills issue by performing separate wage regressions of white, black, Latino, immigrant, and native-born racial groups. He finds that whites received larger returns on job tenure than blacks or Latinos; white Latinos, whether immigrant or native, have higher wages than nonwhite Latinos, immigrant or native. Holzer and Neumark (1999) demonstrate that blacks actually have higher supervisor ratings than whites, and that affirmative action is not associated with a decrease in performance ratings of employees, implying that wage differences are not due to skill deficiencies.

If discrimination is not a major factor in labor market inequality, we would expect that black and white job seekers of apparent equal ability would receive the job at a ratio of 1:1; that is, half the time the black would get the job and half the time the white would get the job. However, the hiring audits, which consist of separate black and white job seekers with the same credentials, show that white job seekers are given the job at a rate of 3:1 (Turner, Fix, and Struyk, 1991).

Statistical evidence of discrimination in wages is sometimes criticized because of the possibility of omitted productivity variables that would explain the wage gap (Heckman, 1998:103–04). There are reasons to doubt that the wage differences are due to omitted productivity variables, but are instead the result of discrimination. First, the large number of high-profile court cases, consent decrees, and settlements between large firms and minority plaintiffs show that racial discrimination in employment is not at all rare (Darity and Mason, 1998:76). The most recent national case involves Coca-Cola, which settled for a record \$192.5 million for discriminating against black workers (King and Spruell, 2001).

Second, the audit studies mentioned above show that employers actively discriminate. In research outside the United States, even if job applicants apply by correspondence, eliminating any claim that the racial differences are due to intangible first impressions, those with Afro-Caribbean names receive responses that the positions are filled, while those with Anglo-Saxon names simultaneously receive notices inviting them for interviews (Darity and Mason, 1998). In the most recent résumé study, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2002) found that applicants with typically white names were 50 percent more likely to be called for an interview than were applicants with black-sounding names.

Also, studies (Darity, Guilkey, and Winfrey, 1996) show that based on 1980 and 1990 Census data, there was little wage discrimination between black and white females. If omitted productivity variables explain the 12–15 percent gap in black/white male wages, we would have to assume that black women actually earn considerably more than white women.

Critics of the regression evidence supporting racial discrimination rely on nearly identical models using the AFQT, and raise no such objections about

omitted variables. Rather, the AFQT models are used as evidence of skill deficiencies. It seems unreasonable to claim the models are unable to measure unobserved skill deficiencies, but at the same time can detect skill via the AFQT.

However, scholarly studies that find that a wage gap remains, even after matching for human capital and labor market criteria, fall short in that they rarely if ever have a variable for actual on-the-job ability compared to other workers. Even if the AFQT is inappropriate, there are other skill measures available, such as the employer's evaluation of worker performance.

Hypothesis

If discrimination is the cause of racial wage differences, there should be evidence of statistical wage discrimination against black men even after controlling for human capital, labor market, and skill characteristics. However, if the wage gap is really a skills gap, I would expect that controlling for job skill should show a significant decrease, if not a complete elimination, of the racial wage differences.

Data

MCSUI was the product of an interdisciplinary team of more than 40 research scholars from 15 colleges and universities. The entire employer survey had more than 3,000 employer respondents. The surveys were conducted between 1992 and 1994 in four cities: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. There were 720 employer respondents included in the subset used for this research, which is the total number of respondents who provided information for all variables in the models. Employers were asked a series of detailed questions about the last worker hired for a job not requiring a college degree. In Table 1, 71 percent of the workers were white men, 29 percent were black men. Every major business sector was included except farming and mining.

Because so many of the studies deal with the wages of males, I decided to limit this investigation to the differences in white and black male wages. Women tend to have very different labor market characteristics than men. Also, note that the MCSUI Employer Survey dealt with the last worker hired for a job not requiring a college degree. Since wage differences between recent employees are less than for workers on the job for longer periods of time, I would expect to see wage differences at lower percentages than in other studies.

Measuring Discrimination

There are two basic statistical techniques for detecting labor market discrimination. The Blinder-Oaxaca approach (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder,

TABLE 1
Summary Statistics

Variable	All Males		White Males		Black Males	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Log wage	2.19	0.44	2.25	0.43	2.05	0.43
White male	0.71	0.45				
Black male	0.29	0.45				
Age	30.09	9.27	30.65	9.65	28.73	8.14
Age-squared	991.21	668.53	1032.23	697.97	891.59	580.54
Education*	12.97	1.84	13.10	1.89	12.66	1.69
Tenure	186.27	314.32	200.78	284.30	151.01	375.85
Tenure-squared	133353	731034	120982	389539	163398	1211464
Competitive performance rating	1.81	15.62	1.80	16.05	1.81	14.57
Performance rating	77.54	14.28	77.95	13.79	76.55	15.38
Average performance rating	75.73	12.98	76.14	12.67	74.74	13.70
Weekly hours	38.751	8.69	39.00	8.57	38.12	8.96
Temporary or seasonal work 1 = yes, 0 = no	0.090	0.287	0.084	0.278	0.105	0.307
Los Angeles	0.15	0.36	0.15	0.35	0.16	0.36
Boston	0.28	0.45	0.34	0.48	0.13	0.34
Detroit	0.25	0.43	0.25	0.43	0.24	0.43
Atlanta	0.32	0.47	0.26	0.44	0.47	0.50
N	720		510		210	

*8 = Grade 8, 10 = some high school, 11 = GED, 12 = high school graduate, 13 = trade or technical school, or some college, 14 = associate's degree, 16 = college graduate, 17 = some postgraduate study, 18 = master's degrees, 19 = beyond master's, 20 = doctorate.
SOURCE: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, Employer Survey, 1992-94.

1974) is to create separate regressions for each race group. The human capital, labor market, and skill differences are captured by isolating the effects of intergroup disparity in the mean values of the variables included in the regressions. Discrimination is captured by isolating the effects of intergroup disparity in the estimated values of the constant term and coefficients in the regressions (see Darity and Mason, 1998:68).

The dummy variable method (Farley, 1984; Donohue and Siegelman, 1991) involves creating a regression equation with wages as the dependent variable, explained by some combination of human capital variables (age, education), labor market variables (occupation, industry, weeks worked, hours, etc.), and dummy variables for race, white males usually being the omitted category. The coefficient on the black male dummy variable represents the wages of black men compared to white men in the sample (not the wages of black compared to all men). If the coefficient on the black indicator variable is negative and statistically significant, this is taken as evidence of possible discrimination in the labor market, depending on which variables (human capital, labor market, or skill) are included.

Both techniques are acceptable; however, in this research I use the dummy variable technique. Generally, I find the dummy variable technique to be useful in showing exactly how much of the wage gap is due to the various characteristics of race, human capital, or skill.

Measuring Skill

As a final step, a model should include a measure of skill. If the wage gap remains even after the skill measure is included, then we may be safe in concluding that the reason for the wage difference is racial discrimination.

The MCSUI Employer Survey asked employers: "On a scale of 0–100 where 50 is average and 100 is the best score, how would you rate this employee's performance in this job?" Employers were then asked: "On a scale of 0–100, how would you rate the typical employee's performance in this job?" The competitive performance rating was calculated by subtracting the score on the former question from the score on the later question (Holzer and Neumark, 1998).

In Table 1, white men had an average performance rating of 77.95, compared to 76.55 for black men. However, black men and white men had nearly identical competitive performance ratings (1.80). There are no statistical differences between white and black performance ratings or competitive performance ratings.

The competitive performance rating is subjective; however, this is true of just about all the measures of skill used in most of the studies, including the AFQT. The evaluation of the worker against other workers in the same job, by someone who's own success and job depends in part on evaluating workers, is certainly a more objective measure of real on-the-job skill than an abstract test or general education.

For example, Rosen (1972:327) theorized that firms discriminate not only in wages, but also in occupation precisely because on-the-job experience is so valuable. Bishop (1998:24–25) states: “In most jobs, productivity derives directly from social abilities (such as good work habits and people skills) and cognitive skills that are specific to the job, the occupation, and the occupational cluster—not from reading, writing and mathematical skills.” Who better to evaluate these on-the-job skills than the job supervisor?

Results

First, notice that all the variables in Table 2 perform as we would expect. Wages increase with age, but decline with age-squared. Education and job tenure are positively correlated with wages. The competitive performance rating is also positively related to the log wage and is statistically significant at the 15 percent level. Although this is not considered significant at normal levels, this is generally what we would expect if the competitive performance rating is an actual indicator of job skill.

Table 2, Model 1 matches for race and shows that black men earn 0.174 log wage units less than white men. The predicted value of wages for white and black men in Model 1 is \$8.92 and \$7.49, respectively.¹ Thus, black men earn 19 percent less than white men when only race is considered.

The black male coefficient of -0.107 in Model 2 shows that when controlling for human capital, black men earn 0.107 log wage units less than white men. Model 2 yields predicted wages of \$8.92 and \$8.01, respectively, for white and black men. Thus, when black men have the same human capital as white men they still earn 11 percent less than white men. This means that about half ($[\$8.92 - \$7.49]/[\$8.92 - \$8.01]$) the wage differences between white and black men are due to differences in human capital.

Are the remaining wage differences between whites and blacks due to a lack of skill on the part of the black men? Matching for the employer's competitive performance rating in Model 3 does not close the wage gap at all for black men. In fact, black men may actually lose \$0.01 when they have the same competitive performance rating as white men. Note that the black male coefficient is slightly larger in Model 3 (-0.109) than in Model 2 (-0.107). The predicted value for wages in Model 3 is \$8.92 and \$8.00 for white and black men, respectively.

In Model 3, even with the same human capital and skill characteristics as white men, black men still earn nearly 11 percent less. If the remaining 11

¹White male wage = $2.1888 = b^*0 + b^*LosAngels + b^*Boston + b^*Detroit + b^*Atlanta + b^*cons \tan t$ antilog of 2.1888 = \$8.92

Black male wage = $2.0146 = b^*1 + b^*LosAngels + b^*Boston + b^*Detroit + b^*Atlanta + b^*cons \tan t$ antilog of 2.0146 = $\$7.492.1888 - 2.0146 = .174$

TABLE 2

Log Wage on Race and Competitive Performance Rating (OLS Coefficients, Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Model 1 Race	Model 2 Human Capital	Model 3 Skill
Competitive performance rating			0.0013 (0.0008)
Black male	-0.174**** (0.036)	-0.107**** (0.031)	-0.109**** (0.031)
Age		0.068**** (0.008)	0.068**** (0.008)
Age-squared		-0.0007**** (0.0001)	-0.0007**** (0.0001)
Education		0.068**** (0.007)	0.068**** (0.007)
Tenure in days		0.0002**** (0.00007)	0.0002**** (0.00007)
Tenure-in-days-squared		-4.61 ⁰⁸ (3.46 ⁰⁸)	-4.44 ⁰⁸ (3.46 ⁰⁸)
Los Angeles	-0.086* (0.051)	-0.008 (0.043)	-0.008 (0.043)
Boston	-0.166**** (0.052)	-0.080* (0.044)	-0.080* (0.044)
Detroit	-0.181**** (0.050)	-0.106*** (0.042)	-0.103 (0.042)
Atlanta	2.36**** (0.042)	0.066 (0.152)	0.071 (0.152)
Constant	0.055 (0.042)	0.330 (0.152)	0.331 (0.152)
Adjusted R ²	11.60	40.34	36.62
F [df]	[4]	[9]	[10]
N	720	720	720

White males are omitted category.

*p = 10%; **p = 5%; ***p = 1%; ****p = <0.1%, two-tailed test.

SOURCE: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, Employer Survey, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI.

percent difference in wages is not due to skill differences, what could be the cause? Racial discrimination is the most obvious answer. And this assumes that there is no discrimination in the acquisition of human capital, labor market outcomes, or the competitive performance rating. Discrimination in those areas would of course increase the impact of discrimination on wage differences.

Is it possible that the 11 percent wage discrimination gap is due to differences in labor force characteristics such as hours worked per week, or seasonal or temporary work? The problem with including these variables in the models in Table 2 is that reduced hours and temporary work may

themselves be the result of racial discrimination or a lack of skill. To test what impact skill differences may have on labor force characteristics, I created separate models regressing hours and temporary work status on race and the competitive performance rating.

In Model 4 of Table 3 the black male coefficient is -0.915 but it is not statistically significant. That is, black men work one hour per week less than the 38.751 hours that white men work per week when both have the same human capital characteristics.² Model 5 in Table 3 matches for the competitive performance rating. The black male coefficient drops to -0.905 , but is not significantly different from zero. Skill differences have no impact on the amount of hours that black men work relative to white men.

Table 4 regresses seasonal or temporary status on race and the competitive performance rating. Models 6 and 7 in Table 4 report logit odds ratios. In Model 6, the black male odds ratio is 1.35, meaning that black men are 1.35:1 times more likely than are white men, with the same human capital characteristics, to work temporary or seasonal jobs. However, statistically the odds ratio is not different than 1:1; that is, black men are no more likely to work seasonally than are white men. Model 7 adds that competitive performance rating. The black male odds ratio is essentially unchanged at 1.36 and not statistically significant. Models 8 and 9 give the same results as Models 6 and 7 except using logit coefficients. Skill differences have no impact on the likelihood that black man will experience temporary employment relative to white men.

Implications

Claims are made that differences in wages between male racial groups represent differences in skill not accounted for by normal productivity characteristics. Researchers have attempted to model skill using the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT); however, racial bias in the AFQT renders the results of such tests suspect.

This research uses the employers' competitive performance rating of the employees' on-the-job ability as the measure of skill. All the models show persistent differences in wages between racial groups ranging from 11–19 percent, regardless of human capital and labor market factors.

When controls are added for the employer's own competitive performance rating, the wage differences do not decrease, and actually increase very slightly for black men. These results are not surprising given the historical context of racial discrimination in American labor markets,

²White male weekly hours = $38.751 = b^*0 + b^*age + b^*age^2 + b^*education + b^*tenure + b^*tenure^2 + b^*LosAngels + b^*Boston + b^*Detroit + b^*Atlanta + b^*cons \tan t$
 Black male weekly hours = $37.776 = b^*1 + b^*age + b^*age^2 + b^*education + b^*tenure + b^*tenure^2 + b^*LosAngels + b^*Boston + b^*Detroit + b^*Atlanta + b^*cons \tan t$ $38.751 - 37.836 = .915$

TABLE 3

Hours per Week on Race and Competitive Performance Rating (OLS Coefficients, Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Model 4 Race and Human Capital	Model 5 Skill
Competitive performance rating		- 0.010 (0.019)
Black male	- 0.915 (0.712)	- 0.905 (0.713)
Age	1.36**** (0.182)	1.36**** (0.182)
Age-squared	- 0.017**** (0.002)	- 0.017**** (0.002)
Education	0.004 (0.175)	0.007 (0.175)
Tenure in days	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004**** (0.001)
Tenure-in-days-squared	- 1.93 ^{.06} (7.85) ^{.07}	- 1.95 ^{.06} (7.86) ^{.07}
Los Angeles	1.17 (0.997)	1.17 (0.998)
Boston	2.18**	2.19**
Detroit	(1.01) 3.60****	(1.01) 3.57****
Atlanta	(0.972) 12.69****	(0.973) 12.66****
Constant	(3.47) 0.112	(3.47) 0.111
Adjusted R^2	11.10	10.01
$F[df]$	[9]	[10]
N	719	719

White males are omitted category.

* $p = 10\%$; ** $p = 5\%$; *** $p = 1\%$; **** $p = <0.1\%$, two-tailed test.

SOURCE: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, Employer Survey, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI.

and show a clear pattern of racial discrimination in spite of equivalent skill. Unlike the AFQT, the possibility of racial bias in the competitive performance rating only increases the impact of discrimination on wages.

Readers should remember that the MCSUI Employer Survey only dealt with the last worker hired for a particular occupation. This means that the wage gaps are less than would be expected for workers who were on the job longer. However, the fact that large and significant gaps are found among recent hires speaks to the degree of racial wage discrimination present.

TABLE 4
Part-Time Status on Race and Competitive Performance Rating (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Logit Odds Ratios		Logit Coefficients	
	Model 6 Race and Human Capital	Model 7 Skill	Model 8 Race and Human Capital	Model 9 Skill
Competitive performance rating		0.990 (0.008)		-0.009 (0.008)
Black male	1.35 (0.408)	1.36 (0.409)	0.306 (0.300)	0.307 (0.300)
Age	0.823*** (0.058)	0.822*** (0.058)	-0.194*** (0.071)	-0.195*** (0.071)
Age-squared	1.002*** (0.0009)	1.002*** (0.0009)	0.002*** (0.0009)	0.002*** (0.0009)
Education	0.933 (0.078)	0.935 (0.079)	-0.068 (0.084)	-0.067 (0.085)
Tenure in days	0.998 (0.0009)	0.998 (0.0009)	-0.001 (0.0009)	-0.001 (0.0009)
Tenure-in-days-squared	1 (2.97 ^{.07})	1 (2.96) ^{.07}	-3.06 ^{.07} (2.97) ^{.07}	-2.99 ^{.07} (2.96) ^{.07}
Boston	1.51 (0.646)	1.52 (0.651)	0.418 (0.425)	0.422 (0.426)
Detroit	0.805 (0.368)	0.811 (0.371)	-0.216 (0.457)	-0.208 (0.457)
Atlanta	0.750 (0.331)	0.744 (0.329)	-0.286 (0.442)	-0.295 (0.442)
Pseudo R ²	0.046	0.049	0.046	0.049
χ^2 [df]	20.39 [9]	21.53 [10]	20.39 [9]	21.53 [10]
N	718	718	718	718

White males are omitted category.

*p = 10%; **p = 5%; ***p = 1%; ****p = <0.1%, two-tailed test.

Source: Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, Employer Survey, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI.

Contrary to Heckman's (1998:101) assertions, blatant racial wage discrimination is an omnipresent and persistent problem in American labor markets, which is more responsible for wage differences than are human capital disparities, themselves the result of racial oppression. Given the pervasive nature of wage discrimination, all employment discrimination enforcement agencies need to establish programs to actively monitor wage and employment discrimination and to continually conduct random job audits at the national, state, and local levels. These programs need to continue until there is no longer any measurable wage discrimination. Anything less than this almost guarantees that racial inequality will remain in American society for as long as America lasts.

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