Essays > Utilitarian Famine


One of the monolithic problems confronting the world today is famine. With the struggle to find and to eat food, people are not free to pursue higher goals or to contemplate justice amongst equals, much less rights. Scholars like Onora O'Neill and Peter Singer attempt to connect the issue of the world's famine problem to one's moral code of ethics. In this paper, I will describe O'Neill's connection between Kantian ethics and famine, the differences she draws between Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, and explain Singer's belief that people have strong utilitarian obligations toward the problem.

The first key principle that O'Neill homes in on is that duties of justice must be fulfilled because if they aren't people have been used as mere means. Having written that, O'Neill continues her deliberation by declaring how Kantian ethics does not say anything about the moral status of unintentional action, or in other words, agent K letting the famine problem continue whilst purchasing a new fur coat. O'Neill elaborates by declaring that Kantian moral theory primarily says that we should do no injustice. She shows that in any situation, whether it's as part of a famine-stricken society that has a rationing scheme or not, or whether one like the United States in relation to Senegal, one must always be dutiful as a matter of justice. One must not deceive or take advantage of.

The second key principle she mentions pertains to Kantian duties of beneficence. That is, helping to promote others' ends and their capacities to be independent. As an example, it would be fun to purchase a fifty dollar ticket to Sea World, but it would be better, or rather, more important to contribute it as a means by which to assist someone become minimally independent. Time is not a factor. Such are Kantian approaches to famine.
O'Neill goes on to illustrate the difference between her advocated Kantian famine solutions and the standard utilitarian approach, which entails the knowledgeable consequences of all possible actions, that means actions committed and non. One such difference is the massive, comprehensive scope that utilitarianism takes to the problem. This scope involves all of the space-time continuum as well as moral factors, the consummate weight of moral good, and the needs of the many. Critically, it also involves the unintentional realm of action. Kant would not believe that people who have done something unintentionally "wrong" would be unjust or bad. Indeed, this is precisely why O'Neill argues for the Kantian approach to famine: Kantians would not need to know all the miserly details of a causal utilitarian scope or the full results of any possible action. Instead, they must have good will, good intentions, and it must be reflected through their actions.

Peter Singer disagrees completely. In contrast to O'Neill's Kantian approach, Singer adopts a very strong utilitarian solution. He begins his argument by stating what is obvious: suffering and death from famine is bad. He inserts the utilitarian element of the argument, that of advocating for the greater good, by writing that if it is within one's ability to prevent something bad from occurring, and in the process, not sacrifice something of comparable moral good, then one is bound to do it. Unlike the Kantian approach, Singer's does not exempt certain actions by virtue of space-time excuses. By accepting that people are equal, one is bound to help no matter where the famine is. That is, without sacrificing something of equal moral good. For example, if agent Y passes a toddler drowning in a large puddle, it would be a duty to help the toddler out of the puddle. There is no difference, according to Singer, with the problem of famine. Singer's argument is just that simple, but broadly sweeping in nature. Unlike the Kantian approach, it would entail major changes to the way civilization works.

There are areas where O'Neill and Singer agree. They agree that people dying and hurting from famine is bad, while duties of beneficence are good. The difference lies in the duties assigned. O'Neill believes it will be all right as long as the intentions are good and people do not commit injustices. Do not commit injustices is to be just. Singer believes that by ignoring a responsibility (a responsibility because it is morally good and people dying of famine is bad) to help others one is engaging in grave injustice. The contrast between these prevailing ideas is stark.